Introduction:
On June 30, 2025, US President Donald Trump signed the executive order lifting comprehensive economic sanctions on Syria, ending more than two decades of financial and commercial isolation that began since the first sanctions were imposed in 2004 and culminated with the implementation of the Caesar Act in 2020.
This decision was promoted as a stepping stone towards stability and openness, but the field and political realities after it revealed a more complex scene and showed that lifting the international blockade does not necessarily mean internal openness or national renewal.
In the northeast, the authorities of the “Democratic Autonomous Administration” continued to operate in isolation from any inclusive constitutional proposal, avoiding a national political process that redefines the relationship between the center and the periphery.
In the south, despite a series of civil protests in Sweida since August 2023, local forces there have remained outside the official political process, suggesting a continued exclusionary mentality even at a supposedly foundational stage.
At the economic level, major cities, primarily Damascus and Aleppo, have witnessed a sudden investment influx since the beginning of July 2025, embodied in the launch of giant real estate and banking projects through newly established companies that often lack transparency in their funding sources and ownership structures.
This economic mobility, which is supposed to be accompanied by governance reforms and popular oversight, foreshadows the formation of new economic quotas that may entrench de facto authorities and weaken the chances of rebuilding the national state.
Therefore, our responsibility as democratic civil forces is not limited to monitoring these developments, but requires leading a courageous reformist discourse that restores the idea of citizenship and places the political process on new foundations that guarantee justice and transparency and open the way for a new social contract.
The lifting of sanctions should not become an opportunity for unofficial supra-constitutional alliances, but rather a foundational moment that rebuilds the country through dialogue, accountability, and justice.
The first theme:
Lifting sanctions is a legal step or a consecration of a supranational economy?
US President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 13988, ending the comprehensive sanctions imposed on Syria since 2004, especially the Caesar Act, which has been in place since 2020. This decision was met in some official circles as a window of economic salvation, but on the ground, it revealed a complex scene, with external openness without internal reform, flowing investments without transparency, and economic directions that lack popular representation or institutional oversight.
Some of the most notable things that happened after the sanctions were lifted:
- Port of Latakia: On May 1, 2025, a 30-year, €230 million investment and operating contract was signed with France’s CMA CGM.
Despite the importance of the project in modernizing maritime infrastructure, the contract has not been submitted to a referendum, pending approval by the next parliament, or a detailed statement from the Ministry of Transportation on the terms of the partnership and the distribution of revenues.
This ambiguity raises concerns about the economic sovereignty of vital ports. - Digital infrastructure: On May 31, 2025, the Ministry of Telecommunications signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Etihad Azeeb of Saudi Arabia, through the GO Telecom platform, to develop artificial intelligence and Internet of Things (IoT) in Syria.
This memorandum also did not go through a national committee, nor were the hosting mechanisms for sovereign data made public, despite the fact that it affects the technical structure of the state. - Damascus Cham Holding Company: has made a strong comeback with the modernization of the Marota City and Basilia City projects.
The company, which was established in 2016 and manages the province’s properties, has for years faced accusations of real estate monopolization. Despite the changed circumstances after the lifting of sanctions, there has been no independent audit of its spending or the distribution of alternative housing to the displaced, despite the fact that these areas are among the most serious urban displacement sites in the country.
Through these facts, it is clear that the lifting of sanctions was not a path towards integrated economic reform, but rather a partial opportunity that was exploited by powerful parties to reposition themselves economically, in a clear absence of the role of civil society and constitutional oversight of foreign agreements.
The result is a new economic landscape governed by non-transparent partnerships in which citizens have no role or representation.
The second axis:
Absence of local forces in the political transition, the SDF and Suwayda as a model:
After the US decision to lift sanctions, hopes rose that Syria would enter a new political phase, ending the logic of exclusion and opening the door to fair and comprehensive settlements. However, what happened on the ground revealed that the political process is still managed by the logic of centralization and by symbolic means that do not reflect the true diversity of the Syrian geography.
First: The Autonomous Administration (SDF): Although it effectively controls about 27% of Syrian territory, the Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria did not participate in the Syrian National Dialogue Conference in Damascus on February 25, 2025, which the government described as foundational for the transition.
Prior to this, the Autonomous Administration had rejected repeated invitations to participate in the Constitutional Committee, which was established under UN auspices on October 30, 2019, during the time of the former regime.
The Autonomous Administration has adopted its own federal project since 2016 and expanded its authority through local elections in September 2020 and September 2022, but it has preferred to maintain parallel security and economic relations with international parties such as Washington and the international coalition, without entering into any internal negotiations with the center in Damascus or other opposition forces.
This negotiating isolation is not only interpreted as a political disagreement, but also points to a structural crack in the perception of the state itself, with an existing authority running an independent economy (via the Rmelan port and local oil companies), without committing itself to any national constitutional framework and without being a party to post-sanctions negotiations.
Second: Suwayda: A popular movement outside official representation
Since June 2023, Suwayda governorate has been a model for a mature peaceful civil movement, starting with large demonstrations demanding administrative reform, passing through the formation of a coordination committee in July 2023, and ending with an attempt to send a negotiating delegation to Damascus on February 2, 2025, after liberation, to present an initiative for local governance.
However, this delegation was not given any representation at the Damascus 2025 conference, and its demands were not included in the outcomes of the “Cairo Forum for the Syrian Opposition,” which was held on December 12, 2024, in which opponents from abroad announced their involvement in drafting the Syrian constitution, without any coordination with active protest forces inside the marginalized provinces.
The Syrian government, despite President Ahmad al-Shara’a’s statements rejecting partition, has refused to recognize any political structure resulting from the Swedish Hirak, despite its popular and symbolic support, and has kept the relationship with it within a security and oversight framework.
Thus, it is clear that the ongoing political process, after the lifting of sanctions, is still being managed by nominally representative tools that exclude the actual actors on the ground. The SDF is officially absent despite the optimism of the March agreement between the president and the general, and Suwayda is politically absent either because of Sheikh al-Hijri’s provocative policy or because the current government led by Suwayda Governor Mustafa Bakkour overlooked al-Hijri’s decentralized demands despite his visit to the sheikh’s office after the attack on the governor and his resignation, which was rejected, all this while redrafting the constitution and building governance paths through conferences that do not witness the participation of the social or administrative forces that manage the land and bear the burdens of reality.
There is therefore a great fear of a supranational political process, without inclusive constitutional guarantees, that reproduces geographical and political gaps that do not build a state of citizenship but rather perpetuate power-sharing.
Axis III: The Syrian economy after decolonization – between opportunities for openness and the repetition of patterns of regional hegemony:
After the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Syria, followed by a similar move by the European Union on May 20, 2025, Syria returned to the international SWIFT system, Syrian banks were reauthorized to conduct foreign transfers, and a number of major agreements were signed with companies from Turkey, Qatar, France, and the United States. However, as valuable as these changes are, they raise the crucial question: are we rebuilding a transparent national economy or recycling regional models that have previously perpetuated inequality and monopolization?
According to the Ministry of Internal Trade, more than 450 new companies will be registered between April and July 2025, covering the real estate, energy, transportation, and financial services sectors. Some of these companies include:
- Al Sharq Financial Consulting, which was founded on July 3 and received its license in just 48 hours.
- New automotive and telecommunications companies have started operating despite the fact that these sectors have been at a near standstill since 2020.
But despite this quantitative growth, there is no clear legislative plan to amend investment laws, or to activate the Supreme Commission for the Supervision of Companies, which was established by decree in 2018 but has not been activated until now.
For example, after Jordan signed regional gas and water agreements in 2021, amendments to the Companies Law were passed and an independent investment watchdog was established.
In Syria, openness seems to have taken place, but without integrated institutionalized oversight mechanisms.
Among the most prominent agreements after the lifting of sanctions:
１-Signing an agreement on June 2, 2025 worth $7 billion between the Syrian Ministry of Energy and a consortium of companies:
- Kalyon GES Enerji, Cengiz Enerji of Turkey.
- Power International USA USA.
- UCC Concession Investments Qatar.
This agreement includes the construction of five power plants in Deir ez-Zor, Maharda, Zayzoun, Trefawi, and Wadiyan al-Rabieh.
The agreement to develop and operate the port of Latakia with French company CMA CGM on May 1, 2025, for 30 years, with an investment of 230 million euros.
Despite the value of these contracts, the fact that they were not presented to the next parliament, or legislative decrees were not issued, is reminiscent of the way major deals are managed without accountability.
For example, after Tunisia’s agreement with the Italian group Eni to expand energy ports in 2023, a parliamentary committee specialized in reviewing energy contracts was formed and the terms were published in the official gazette. In the Syrian case, on the other hand, transparent mechanisms are absent and contracts are managed through closed executive channels.
Also, the U.S. Treasury Department’s General License 25 opened the door to international financial transactions.
The Ministry of Finance has also started preparing for Syria’s return to the SWIFT network and facilitating foreign transfers. But: - A plan to reform the public banking sector has yet to be released.
- No updated provisions of the AML law have been announced.
- The Department of Banking Integrity, announced on May 14, 2025, has not been activated.
This reminds us of Iraq’s experience, despite the lifting of sanctions, the delay in reforming the banking sector led to the growth of money laundering networks.
This is a lesson for Syria today, as technical openness cannot be separated from structural legislative reform.
The question today is not just about the lifting of sanctions, as important as it is strategically, but about the shape of the reshaped economy:
- Are strategic contracts allocated on a competitive basis?
- Are distressed and affected areas taken into account?
- Are investment opportunities given to productive projects or real estate speculation?
In Lebanon, despite the end of the war and the influx of investments, the Lebanese economy has turned into a rentier model centered on the financial and real estate sectors, exacerbating social inequality and unemployment.
What has not been realized in Syria today is that the absence of legislation and oversight can lead to the same result: a supranational economy that perpetuates disparities between centers of power and the local community.
We are facing a rare opportunity: The lifting of sanctions opened the doors to international partnership, but not to the Syrian citizen unless oversight institutions are built, the law is enforced, and economic rights are safeguarded.
What is needed is not only the return of capital, but also the return of political confidence in the economy by building a model that involves civil society, is monitored by institutions, and is directed to serve the people and not to reproduce systems of influence.
Fourth axis: The state and local components after the lifting of sanctions – Towards the formulation of a cooperative decentralized national contract?
If sanctions represent external isolation, the lack of internal understanding between the center and local components constitutes a more severe and challenging internal isolation. The lifting of sanctions on Syria on June 30, 2025 opened the door for intensive external engagement in economic and development projects, but has not yet been accompanied by a real review of the nature of the relationship between the central state and local actors, be they political administrations (as in northeastern Syria) or social and municipal entities (as in the south and coast).
The opportunity here is not just to invest money, but to redefine the state as an institution that nurtures rather than controls, aggregates rather than dictates, and distributes rather than monopolizes power.
Over the past years, the Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria (AANES) has proven, despite reservations about its overall trajectory, that it is capable of managing service, educational, and security institutions within a quasi-federal model. Local elections in September 2020 and September 2022 produced elected local councils, and the regions have begun to adopt their own legal system, based on social contracts and organizational communications.
Despite these capacities, the Autonomous Administration was not invited to the Syrian National Dialogue Conference on February 25, 2025, despite the fact that the energy agreements signed in June included territory under its control.
In the Kurdish experience, after the lifting of international sanctions on Baghdad in 2003, a contractual relationship was established between the federal government and the Kurdistan Region, which resulted in the distribution of oil revenues and the allocation of financial shares to the region according to the budget laws.
In the Syrian case, the relationship between the center and the autonomous administration remains ambiguous, with no legal frameworks or distribution of financial responsibilities.
Since the Suwayda demonstrations in June 2023, the movement has also demanded the establishment of an “elected provincial council” with legislative powers. The Suwayda Coordination Committee, formed in July, proposed a decentralized administrative model based on community representation and local control.
However, this project, despite its maturity, was not included in any official political map either before or after liberation, as it was not represented at the Damascus Conference in 2025. Even the delegation sent by the committee to the capital on February 2, 2025 was not met with any clear governmental response, but was instead met with the postponement of meetings under the pretext of “security conditions.”
The experience of the Tunisian state of Medenine, after the 2011 revolution, where regional councils emerged with independent budgets and local planning powers, within the framework of the Basic Law for Municipalities. The experience showed that local empowerment does not weaken the state, but rather gives it societal legitimacy. In Syria, municipalities are still managed from the center, often without real powers or independent budgets, and these councils have not been able to adapt to the new change of power.
What these approaches reveal is that the crisis is not in the existence of local authorities, but in the absence of a national contract regulating the relationship between the center and the periphery. The lifting of sanctions should be an occasion to rebuild this relationship on clear legal and economic foundations, the most important of which are:
１- The state recognizes and legislates elected local structures in the constitution.
１- Economic revenues should be distributed fairly among the governorates.
Ensure partnership in planning rather than mere dependency in implementation.
Morocco’s advanced regionalization law, passed in 2015, gave regional councils broad powers in development and planning, while maintaining the authority of the state in sovereign issues. The model here connects administrative centralization and political unity in a flexible way, and shows that a strong state is not afraid of regional pluralism, but rather bets on everyone’s participation in building.
The new phase that Syria is going through requires not only attracting investment and money, but also redefining who is the political and economic actor at home. The state is not only a government in Damascus, but also municipalities in Sweida, civil councils in Hasakah, and professional unions in Aleppo.
Building an inclusive state in the post-sanctions phase requires a national agreement that rearranges the relationship between the center and the periphery and elevates the value of citizenship above everything else.
National unity is not built by denial or exclusion, but by partnership, by law, and by mutual recognition between state institutions and society.
Fifth axis: Lifting sanctions as an opportunity for justice and reform … or a wasted moment in the recycling of influence?
The moment international sanctions on Syria are lifted in May and June 2025 is an indisputable legal and commercial shift.
But in terms of state-building, they only have real value if they are transformed into a platform to launch a project of justice and institutional reform, not just a repositioning of former powers or the rise of new elites without popular legitimacy.
This is where we, as democratic civilian forces, must not only monitor the size of the financial flows or the nature of the contracts, but also judge this moment according to two fundamental questions: Who benefits and who participates?
If the era of the former regime was closed by a political decision, opening a new page should not take place before reparations, revealing the truth, and providing guarantees of non-recurrence. Transitional justice is not revenge, but a societal process that restores the dignity of the citizen, the legitimacy of institutions, and the balance of history.
In the Moroccan case, after the “years of lead,” the Equity and Reconciliation Commission was established in 2004, leading to reparations for more than 9,000 victims and a change in the methodology of dealing with national memory. The Moroccan model proved that an economy without justice does not unify national sentiment but rather deepens wounds.
A successful economy is not only built through the signing of agreements, but also through institutions that monitor, hold accountable, and legislate.
The lifting of sanctions, while a moment of financial empowerment, has so far lacked the tools for real reform, namely:
１- There is no independent body to monitor international contracts.
The antitrust law has not been enforced, although quasi-monopolistic companies are back in business.
The banking sector has not been restructured in accordance with international standards.
In post-genocide Rwanda, after the 1994 disaster, it established the Anti-Corruption Commission and linked every development project to an institutional reform program, making it a model for restoring international confidence in less than a decade.
In Syria, unless openness is coupled with the restoration of oversight bodies, public trust will not be restored.
Also, the lifting of sanctions should not only be constructed as a business opportunity but also as an entry point for renewing the contract between Syrians and the state. There are political and societal issues that should be included in economic and development projects:
１- Participation of municipalities and local components in project planning.
Allocate part of the proceeds to the reconstruction of the affected areas.
３- Linking investments to environmental and social controls in neglected governorates.
South Africa’s post-1996 constitution linked social justice and economic development, allocating state resources to integrate historically discriminated communities. So the economy was a vehicle for reconciliation, not just an expansion of national output.
What we need today is not to treat the moment of lifting sanctions as an opportunity to revitalize the budget figures, but rather as a window to build a new Syria that restores respect for citizens, institutions, and fairness. Transitional justice is the heart of reform, reform is the condition for trust, and trust is the entrance to partnership. Any economy that is not based on this equation will remain fragile, no matter how tempting the numbers may seem.
Conclusion: Syria after the lifting of sanctions … between internal responsibility and external challenges:
In times of international openness, the most important question is no longer about the size of contracts or the strength of allies, but about the nature of the national project we want! Should we be satisfied with removing financial restrictions? Or should we build a state governed by justice, managed by institutions, and expressing all its citizens, not just some?
The lifting of sanctions revealed the fragility of the relationship between authority and society, between the center and the periphery, between the economy and politics, which today requires a moment of reflection and collective responsibility, not alignment or surrender.
Rehabilitating the citizen, institutions, and justice are not just intellectual demands, but prerequisites for ensuring sustainable political and economic stability. Syria needs a renewed national model that is not recycled in the corridors of the deal, but is written in the conscience of the people and promotes them, not against them.
This article offers a brief vision and a practical roadmap:
- Establishing transitional justice through:
- Establish an independent body to document violations and compensate those affected.
- Include the values of justice and equity in the drafting of the new constitution, after the establishment of the parliament.
- Opening the way for affected communities to actively participate in state-building.
2. Launch a comprehensive institutional reform by:
- Restructuring the banking and tax sector in accordance with international standards.
- Activating oversight and accountability tools within ministries and independent bodies.
- Issuing a special law, albeit a presidential decree at this stage, on economic transparency and tenders.
3. Establishing an inclusive social contract that takes care of:
- Recognize the plurality of local structures and involve them in the formulation of central decision-making.
- Launch a decentralized national dialogue that includes non-politically engaged parties.
- Adopting a balanced development model between urban and rural areas, and between the coast and the interior.
4. Linking investment to community development:
- Allocate a portion of the proceeds to invest in education, health, and local infrastructure.
- Establish mandatory environmental and social standards for every new investment project.
- Establish an independent reconstruction fund managed by multiple regulators.
Thus, the lifting of sanctions is not the end of a crisis, but rather the beginning of a new path in which Syria will be built from all its components, with all its competencies, towards a future worthy of the memory of its people and the aspirations of its generations, and this is what we at Syrian Future Movement are working on and advocating for.
