Syria’s People’s Assembly between political reform and the reproduction of centralization

Introduction:
The Syrian political scene witnessed a remarkable shift with the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 66 of 2025, which reformulated the mechanism for electing the People’s Assembly and the conditions for its formation, opening the door to fundamental debates about the People’s Assembly between political reform and the production of centralization, the independence of institutions, and the potential for political reform in light of the existing balances.

Despite welcoming this decision as a step towards rebuilding the legislative institution, which was supported by Syrian Future Movement in its statement on Saturday, June 14, 2025, a deep analysis of this electoral model reveals fundamental issues related to the nature of representation, such as the role of political parties, and the extent to which the next council will be able to play its role as an independent legislative institution, away from the influence of the executive authority.
Theoretically, this decree represents a restructuring of a legislative institution that has long been the focus of debate about its actual role in formulating public policies and influencing sovereign decisions. The decree includes redistributing seats according to specific social categories, adopting a new electoral mechanism, and appointing one-third of the council members by the President of the Republic, and these changes raise fundamental questions about the nature of this model!
Is it a step towards real political reform, or is it just a reproduction of a centralized system of government?
On a philosophical level, the restructuring of the People’s Assembly can be seen within a broader framework related to the general concept of political representation and its responsiveness to the principles of democratic legitimacy, political pluralism, and independent governance. Transformations in the legislative system of any country cannot be limited to procedural changes, but must reflect a genuine political will to create a more representative and inclusive governance environment.
From a political science perspective, the Legislative Council represents the main pillar in the distribution of power between different institutions, and the definition of its functions and powers reflects the nature of the state and its political trends.

Therefore, any change in the structure of the council must be carefully studied to ensure that its role in oversight and policy formulation is not restricted and that it does not become a formal institution subordinate to the executive branch.

This article seeks to provide an integrated analysis of Decree No. 66 of 2025 by examining the theoretical and practical foundations of this model and studying its potential implications on the Syrian political scene, with a focus on the extent to which it achieves effective democracy, institutional independence, and the participation of all political and social forces in decision-making.

The concept of political representation between elitism and democracy:
The issue of political representation has always been a central axis in philosophical and political theorizing about the nature of governance and determining which groups have the right to participate in decision-making. With the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 66 of 2025 in Syria, a new model for organizing the People’s Assembly emerged by dividing it into the categories of notables and intellectuals, raising fundamental questions about whether this model achieves political pluralism or whether it reproduces a political elitism that seeks to maintain a specific dominance in the legislative scene.

This model, although it seeks to achieve a balance between influence and specialization, raises a number of issues:
1- The definition of notables and intellectuals is not precisely defined in the decree, which opens the door to non-transparent selections that may lead to elite dominance without clear foundations.
2- This categorization may lead to the exclusion of other popular groups, such as workers and peasants, who have always been part of the Syrian political structure in previous periods.
3- Focusing on the categories of notables and intellectuals may make the council unrepresentative, as true representation should not be limited to those with social and intellectual influence, but should include the full spectrum of Syrian society.
Throughout political thought, from Plato to Habermas, there is a clear difference between an elitist approach based on the rule of experts and elders, and a democratic model based on open popular choice.
In Syria, the reformulation of the Council’s membership in this way raises the question: Does this model represent a shift towards representative democracy, or does it indicate a new centralization of decision-making?
There is no doubt that the success of any legislative experiment is linked to its ability to represent society in its social and political diversity, and not be limited to specific groups, as the absence of other groups from the new composition of the Council may lead to:
1- Weakening the pluralistic nature of the legislative institution and turning the Council into an elitist body with predetermined orientations.
2- Reducing the chances of popular participation in the political process, especially if the members are selected through non-transparent methods or through prior political agreements.
3- The absence of political parties from the legislative scene deepens this issue, as parliamentary representation without the presence of a party organization leads to weak political effectiveness in the parliament.

Based on the criteria adopted, it can be said that the new decree reformulates the concept of political representation within a new elitist framework, which may lead to the reproduction of existing political hegemony instead of building a new pluralistic model, and if the selection mechanism is not based on open popular elections but on subcommittees, this raises a question about the extent of the independence of these committees in selecting council members.
Focusing on the categories of notables and intellectuals may also lead to unbalanced representation, with legislative institutions being more of an advisory body to the political system rather than an independent authority that reflects true societal diversity.

The formation of the new People’s Assembly according to the model based on notables and intellectuals raises fundamental issues related to the nature of political representation and the extent to which the Assembly responds to the requirements of real democratic transformation. In light of the absence of political parties and the unclear mechanism for selecting members, more profound reforms are needed to ensure that the legislative institution in Syria is a true reflection of the will of the people and not merely an extension of a political system based on the reproduction of elite hegemony.

The relationship between the executive and the legislature: The Problem of the Presidential Third:
The balance between the executive and legislative powers has always been a key axis in building democratic systems of government, as the independence of the legislature constitutes a major guarantee for the process of oversight, legislation, and representation of the will of the people away from the influence of the executive power.
However, Presidential Decree No. 66 of 2025 raises a fundamental issue in this balance by including a mechanism to appoint one-third of the members of the People’s Assembly by the President of the Republic, which raises questions about the extent to which the Assembly will be able to operate with true independence.
Politically speaking, the direct appointment of 50 out of 150 members by the president gives him wide influence within the House, as this third can turn into a decisive voting bloc capable of supporting decisions aligned with the executive branch or blocking unwanted legislation.
This leads to a state of legislative inequality, as the ability to enact laws and make crucial decisions depends on the extent to which the elected majority agrees with the appointed bloc, which may limit the parliament’s independence and hinder its role in holding the government accountable or proposing legislation in line with the demands of the political street.
In some democratic systems, members of legislative councils are appointed through various mechanisms, such as reserved seats for academic, economic, or community institutions, to enrich political dialogue. However, the Syrian model here tends to directly enhance the influence of the executive branch within the legislative institution, especially after the liberation from the Assad regime, making it closer to systems that tend to be politically centralized.
In established democracies, the relationship between the two powers is complementary rather than subordinate. Legislation remains subject to free deliberation within parliament, with no direct influence from the presidency or the government.
In the case of Syria, this presidential third opens the door to indirectly directing the council’s decisions by appointing figures loyal to or linked to the executive branch.
However, the appointment of one-third of the members by the president may lead to:
1- Weakness in the accountability of the executive branch, as voting blocs may form that support the government in all its decisions.
2- Blocking reform legislation if it conflicts with the president’s directives.
3- Turning the Council into an advisory body rather than an independent legislative institution, weakening the essence of the democratic process.

To solve this issue, it could be suggested to reduce the percentage of presidential appointments to ensure greater independence of the council, or to define a clear mechanism for selecting the presidential third through a neutral committee to ensure more pluralistic representation within the council, while presidential appointments should be linked to oversight conditions that impose real accountability within the council, thus limiting the use of this mechanism as a mere tool of political influence.
The issue of the presidential third is not just a procedural amendment, but a fundamental issue related to the structure of the state and the future of the legislative process, which requires a careful review to ensure that the People’s Assembly is an institution based on true democratic representation and not just an extension of the executive branch.

The absence of political parties: Are we facing a reproduction of a non-pluralistic system?
Modern democracy has always been associated with multiparty pluralism, as political parties form the main pillar of any political system that seeks to represent the interests of society and organize the political process.
The absence of any mention of the role of political parties in the formation of the new People’s Assembly raises two main possibilities:
1- Either
2- Or the absence of parties reflects a systematic policy aimed at keeping the political scene under the control of independent individual personalities, which limits any institutionalized political organization capable of presenting clear political programs that compete with each other.
In the first case, there may be a future intention to integrate the parties into the political scene, but their absence from this foundational stage of the electoral process weakens the democratic credibility of the Majlis.
In the second case, the exclusion of parties opens the door to an unpluralistic political model, where there are no competitive political organizations that enable citizens to choose according to clear political programs, but rather rely on personal considerations or informal political consensus.
Throughout history, political systems that lack organized parties have shown weakness in their ability to form effective legislative institutions, as members are chosen according to personal loyalties or non-institutional political balances. In the Syrian case, the absence of political parties in the new People’s Assembly may lead to:
1- Weak political interaction within the Assembly, as the absence of organized political blocs will make debates and legislation take place among individuals without a clear political vision.
2- Monopolization of the political decision by the executive authority, as there will be no organized party opposition capable of presenting alternative political visions, and the opposition, if any, will be individual and limited in its impact.
3- The difficulty of forming a political force capable of lobbying from within the Majlis, as the absence of parties will deprive the Majlis of the ability to organize political currents that push for legislation that is more in line with the aspirations of society.
The absence of political parties from this legislative process raises serious concerns about the future of political pluralism in Syria. The electoral process seems closer to a political reconfiguration according to a centralized vision, rather than a comprehensive democratic transformation. If this model continues, it may lead to:
1- Weakening the possibility of building a competitive political scene, as representation remains limited to independent figures without the ability to organize themselves within clear political orientations.
2- Stabilizing a legislative model that does not affect the general political decision, as the executive authority will remain able to control the legislative process without the presence of parties capable of imposing a political balance.
3- Loss of popular confidence in the political process, as the new council may not be seen as an institution that represents the will of the Syrian street, but rather as a pro forma body that lacks real pluralism.
The reconstitution of the People’s Assembly without reference to the role of political parties represents a fundamental issue in the process of political reform. It raises deep questions about the extent to which a truly pluralistic political model can be established in Syria, and unless a clear law is issued to regulate parties and integrate them into the political scene, this new legislative structure may merely be an extension of a centralized political model that does not reflect the true popular will.

The role of the High Elections Committee: Supervision or control?
The formation of the High Committee for the People’s Assembly Elections is a pivotal step in the reorganization of the electoral process in Syria, as it is tasked with overseeing the formation of the electoral sub-bodies that will elect two-thirds of the members of the Assembly, while the remaining third will be appointed by the President of the Republic.

According to the decree, the Supreme Committee will organize the electoral process, but it is not granted direct legislative or executive powers, which means that it will not be part of the next People’s Assembly. However, the nature of the committee’s composition and its members raises questions about its independence, especially since some of its members are affiliated with certain political currents, such as the former Syrian National Coalition, in addition to figures who were previously associated with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.
The decree does not specify the duration of the Supreme Committee’s work or the time frame for the formation of electoral sub-bodies, which leaves ample room for political postponements that may affect the credibility of the electoral process. In democratic systems, electoral committees have a clear time limit to ensure that the electoral process proceeds according to a strict timetable, but in the Syrian case, the absence of this specification may lead to an unjustified extension of the committee’s work period, which opens the way for re-engineering the political scene according to non-electoral considerations.
Although the committee is tasked with overseeing the elections, the constitutional declaration states that the People’s Assembly has no direct authority over the executive branch and can only hold hearings for ministers, weakening its oversight role.
This means that the SC, despite its regulatory role, may not be able to enforce strict standards of electoral integrity, especially if political interference influences the composition of the electoral sub-bodies.
To ensure that the SC is truly an impartial body, a clear time frame needs to be set for its work, so that it is not extended beyond the scope of the electoral process, the composition of the commission needs to be reviewed to ensure its independence from any political influence, the involvement of independent international or local monitoring bodies to ensure the integrity of the elections, and clarifying the relationship between the commission and the next People’s Assembly so that it does not turn into a body that indirectly influences the formation of the Assembly.
The role of the SC should be purely organizational, not part of the process of distributing political power, otherwise the electoral process will lose its democratic essence.

The reconstitution and duration of the People’s Assembly: Between democratic transition and political postponement:
One of the core issues raised by the presidential decree is the duration of the mandate of the new People’s Assembly, and the possibility of extending it before reaching a fully elected People’s Assembly. This point is not a mere administrative detail, but carries deep political implications regarding the extent of the regime’s commitment to an actual democratic transition, or whether this measure is merely an open-ended transitional phase that may drag on without clear guarantees for free elections.
According to the current constitutional declaration, the term of office of the new parliament is a renewable 30-month term, which raises several political issues:
1- If the extension process is not strictly regulated, direct elections may be postponed for unlimited periods, keeping the legislative authority under the control of transitional political arrangements rather than popular elections.
2- This model may lead to a lack of popular pressure to end the transitional phase, as the absence of a clear timetable makes the idea of democratic elections constantly postponed, which may gradually lose the council’s legitimacy.
3- In some political systems, legislative councils are extended under the pretext of unstable political or security conditions, but this may be used as a pretext to disrupt the democratic process, which is something to be wary of in the Syrian case.
There are no details on whether the constitutional declaration grants the council full legislative powers or whether it will remain subject to specific political arrangements. If there is no clarity on the relationship between the council and the overall constitutional framework, the council may remain more of a transitional political body than an independent legislative institution.
In some political models, procedures for the transition of power from a temporary to a permanent phase are codified, but in the Syrian case, there seems to be an organizational vacuum that may be exploited to extend the current situation beyond the specified period, and if a clear framework is not established to hold elections immediately after the expiration of the specified term of the current council, the new council may turn into:
1- A formal legislative body without real influence on the political scene, as its function will be closer to political consultation rather than passing legislation that reflects the will of the people.
2- A council that is constantly being extended under the pretext of incomplete political conditions, weakening any real movement towards building lasting democratic institutions.
3- A political tool to rearrange the scene without reaching real elections, as any real political transformation is delayed under procedural justifications.
According to the current constitutional declaration, the term of office of the People’s Assembly is one of the most important determinants of the future political transition in Syria. Unless strict controls are put in place to prevent the extension of the Assembly beyond its specified term, and to ensure an effective electoral process after the end of the transition, these arrangements may lead to the perpetuation of the current political situation without any real democratic transformation, which is what needs to be warned against.

Conclusion:
Presidential Decree No. 66 of 2025 represents a step towards restructuring the legislative process in Syria, but it raises fundamental issues related to the extent of the council’s independence, the absence of political pluralism, and the influence of the executive authority on the legislative decision. Building a strong legislative institution is not limited to amending the election mechanism, but requires a comprehensive reform that guarantees true democratic representation and establishes the rules of independent governance.

Syria’s political future depends on the ability of the next legislative institutions to represent all segments of society, be independent of executive influence, and establish a political platform based on pluralism and popular participation. To achieve this, a clear law for political parties must be adopted, the powers of the High Elections Commission must be regulated, and impartial oversight of the electoral process must be ensured so that the restructuring of the Council does not turn into a mere reproduction of a centralized political model.
In the end, the success of this process remains dependent on the will of the Syrians themselves, whether through active participation in the elections, pressure to ensure the integrity of the political process, and demands for real reforms that ensure a comprehensive democratic future.

Any political process that is not based on the popular will remains incomplete and threatens to lose its legitimacy, so the formation of a legislative council that reflects the aspirations of Syrians is a crucial step towards building a more just and stable Syria.

To ensure a fair and independent legislative process in Syria, we at Syrian Future Movement recommend the following:

First: Recommendations to the political leadership:

1. Reconsider the appointment of the presidential third to ensure the independence of the People’s Assembly and that it does not become a rubber stamp body subordinate to the executive branch.
2. Seeking a legal opinion for an exceptional approval of a clear law to regulate political parties, so that the Legislative Council will be an institution that reflects political pluralism rather than a gathering of independent personalities without clear political orientations.
3. Set a strict timeframe for the completion of the electoral process, and prevent any unjustified delays that may affect the credibility of the transition.
4. Activating real legislative oversight so that the parliament has the necessary powers to hold the government accountable and set public policies in accordance with the will of the electorate.
5. Opening channels of national dialog among various political and societal actors to ensure a comprehensive political consensus that is reflected in the formation of a People’s Assembly that reflects the various segments of Syrian society.

Second: Recommendations to the Supreme Electoral Commission:

1. Ensure the independence of the commission away from any political interference, so that its work is limited to organizing the elections and not influencing their political outcomes.
2. Establish transparent controls for the mechanism of selecting electoral subsidiary bodies to ensure the integrity of the elections and that they are not subject to any political quotas or informal understandings.
3. Engage friendly and respected international or local independent observers to ensure that there are no violations or political interference in the electoral process.
4. Define a clear timetable for the stages of the elections, so that specific dates are adhered to, ensuring a smooth transition to an elected council with full popular legitimacy.
5. Establish a transparent legal appeals mechanism that allows candidates to challenge any potential irregularities in the electoral process.

Third, recommendations for civil society:

1. Lobbying to ensure the integrity of elections through awareness campaigns and public oversight of the electoral process.
2. Promote citizen participation in the political process by organizing seminars and workshops that explain the importance of legislative representation in building Syria’s future.
3. Provide periodic oversight reports on the course of the elections to ensure that there are no illegal interventions or irregularities that hinder the transparency of the elections.
4. Demand broader representation for marginalized groups by pushing for an electoral law that guarantees social diversity in the composition of the legislature.
5. Encourage peaceful activism in support of political reform through national initiatives that promote dialog among various political actors.

Fourth, recommendations for political entities:

1. Forming clear political blocs to ensure that the elections are based on specific political programs and not just independent figures who are not linked to an integrated political vision.
2. Pressure to open the space for political parties so that the Legislative Council is a reflection of the national political movement and not a body closed to certain orientations.
3. Presenting thoughtful political programs for the next stage that contribute to drawing a clear roadmap for Syria’s political and legislative future.
4. Promote dialogue between different political forces to ensure that no single party monopolizes political decision-making.
5. Demand constitutional guarantees for the independence of the People’s Assembly so that it does not turn into an executive tool of power but remains an independent oversight and legislative institution.

Fifth, recommendations for the Syrian people:

1. Active participation in the elections through nominated popular committees, to ensure that legislative representation stems from the will of the electorate and not from closed political understandings.
2. Demand transparency in the electoral process and hold accountable any party that tries to influence the integrity of the elections.
3. Supporting reformist political programs that aim to build strong and independent democratic institutions.
4. Engage with civil society and oversight bodies to ensure that the popular voice is an integral part of the political process.
5. Rejecting any attempt to reproduce political centralization that enshrines executive hegemony over the Legislative Council, and demanding an electoral process that guarantees the independence of the legislative decision.

Building a strong and representative legislative institution for all Syrians requires radical political reforms and strict measures to ensure the integrity of the elections and the independence of the next parliament. Achieving this goal requires the combined efforts of the political leadership, the SC, civil society, political forces, and citizens themselves to push for real reform that will strengthen Syria’s democratic future.

Dr. Zahir Badrani