Introduction: A Small Incident with a Major Significance:
On November 5, 2026, Syrians circulated a video of a Sufi gathering held inside the shrine of Imam al-Nawawi in the city of Nawa, in the Daraa countryside.
On the same day, the Nawa Shura Council issued a statement condemning these practices, deeming them “manifestations of extremism and attachment to shrines” inconsistent with the teachings of the Quran and Sunnah. The statement called on members of Sufi orders to “refrain from anything that might entrench manifestations of extremism and ignorance in religion.”
An official statement was subsequently issued by the Director of Religious Endowments in Daraa rejecting these practices.
This incident, which may seem marginal amidst the major challenges facing Syria, reveals a fundamental dilemma in the transitional phase: how can the state and society deal with religious and sectarian pluralism without allowing doctrinal differences to become tools of oppression, or religious freedom to descend into chaos that threatens the social fabric?
This article does not aim to favor one side over another, but rather to offer a civilizational, purpose-oriented reading that seeks to transcend the dichotomy of “prohibition” and “permission,” moving towards a “jurisprudence of governance” that guarantees everyone’s right to express their beliefs while simultaneously protecting public order and shared values.
First, the textual basis:
Religious pluralism in Islam cannot be discussed in isolation from the objective of preserving religion, which is the first of the five necessities.
However, the preservation of religion, in the correct purpose-oriented understanding, does not mean imposing a single interpretation of religion, but rather guaranteeing the freedom of choice through which religious obligation is fulfilled.
Quranic texts (coercion is negated, and diversity is a divine principle):
God Almighty says: {There is no compulsion in religion. Righteousness has become distinct from error.} (Al-Baqarah: 256) Scholars have affirmed that this verse “establishes the principle of religious freedom; it does not compel anyone to embrace a particular religion, and it guarantees that adherents of every faith can freely practice their religious rites in their places of worship in Muslim lands.”
Thus, the verse not only negates coercion in matters of belief, but also establishes a broader principle: religious freedom, which encompasses the freedom to practice that faith as well.
God Almighty says: “And if your Lord had willed, He could have made mankind one community; but they will continue to differ” (Hud 11:118). Thus, if He had willed, He could have created His servants on one religion. However, His established way in creation is diversity and difference. Difference is a divine law that must be managed. God Almighty also says: “And if your Lord had willed, all those on earth would have believed. So will you compel the people to become believers?” (Yunus 10:99). This is a clear rebuke to those who attempt to force people to believe.
God Almighty says: “And We have made you into nations and tribes so that you may know one another” (Al-Hujurat 49:13). The purpose of diversity is mutual understanding, not conflict or elimination.
The Prophetic Tradition:
If the verses established the principle of religious freedom, then the Constitution of Medina is the practical application of this principle.
It affirmed that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) built a new civil society. Establishing the principle of coexistence among different tribes, factions, religions, and sects was one of the Prophet’s (peace and blessings be upon him) most important goals after his migration to Medina. The Constitution stipulated that “Muslims and Jews are one community,” and it affirmed freedom of belief, respect for other religions, and the prohibition of imposing Islam by force.
The former Grand Mufti of Egypt described it as “the first to establish the principle of citizenship,” as the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) formulated it “to grant freedom of belief to non-Muslims, while maintaining their belonging to the nation and prohibiting any discrimination based on faith.”
The Prophet (peace be upon him) also permitted the delegation of Christians from Najran to pray in his mosque, which is “the House of God reserved for Muslims.” When some of the Companions wanted to prevent them, he (peace be upon him) said, “Leave them be,” and they prayed facing east.
This indicates that permission for something implies permission for its complementary aspects, and that allowing the construction of places of worship for non-Muslims is a complement and requirement of religious freedom.
Secondly, the jurisprudence of the schools of thought on the issue of Sufi gatherings and collective remembrance:
After establishing the principle of religious freedom, we move to the specific jurisprudential issue: the ruling on Sufi gatherings and collective remembrance.
It is important to remember here that this is a legitimate difference of opinion among scholars, not a definitive matter, and that even the scholars themselves differed on it. Their disagreement cannot be resolved by an official prohibition.
Evidence of those who permit it:
Those who permit it cite several texts:
- The hadith about “circles of remembrance”: The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said, “When you pass by the gardens of Paradise, graze therein.” They asked, “What are the gardens of Paradise?” He replied, “Circles of remembrance.” (Narrated by al-Tirmidhi)
- The hadith of Mu’awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan: The Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) came upon a group of his companions and asked, “What has brought you together?” They replied, “We have gathered to remember and praise God.” (Narrated by Muslim, al-Tirmidhi, and al-Nasa’i) This encourages gathering for remembrance.
- The Actions of the Companions: Ibn Hajar al-Haytami reported that the Sufis used the hadith of Ja’far ibn Abi Talib’s hopping before the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) as evidence for the permissibility of dancing. Al-Haytami explained this by saying it stemmed from Ja’far’s feelings. He also stated that al-Haytami permitted dancing that occurs involuntarily during ecstatic states.
- Al-Ghazali: In his “Ihya’ Ulum al-Din” (Revival of Religious Sciences), he dedicated an entire chapter to the etiquette of listening to music and experiencing ecstasy. He titled the first chapter “Chapter on the Differences of Opinion Among Scholars Regarding the Permissibility of Listening to Music and the Unveiling of Truth.” He concluded that listening to music can be permissible, disliked, or recommended.
The Arguments of Those Who Prohibit It:
In contrast, those who prohibit it cited:
- The hadith, “Whoever does an act that is not in accordance with our command, it is rejected” (narrated by Muslim). The Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Issuing Fatwas in Saudi Arabia considered Sufism to be an innovation in Islam, and every innovation is misguidance. They issued a fatwa prohibiting associating with Sufis or attending their gatherings.
- Dislike of Gathering for Remembrance: Malik reported his dislike of gathering for remembrance, and Ahmad said, “I do not dislike it if they gather without prior arrangement, unless they make it a habit.”
- Remembrance in Unison: Al-Shatibi considered “adhering to specific forms and manners, such as gathering in unison for remembrance,” to be an “additional innovation.”
The Middle Ground: “Gathering is good, but adhering to a specific manner is an innovation.”
However, Ibn Taymiyyah himself, who is considered one of the harshest critics of Sufism, “distinguished” between the principle of gathering and adhering to a specific manner.
He said, “Gathering for recitation, remembrance, and A supplication is good if it is not made a regular practice and is not accompanied by any reprehensible innovation. This is a subtle distinction that opens the door to regulation, not prohibition. If the gathering is good in principle, then the point of contention is the adherence to the structure (unity of voice and specific time), not the act itself.
Third: Why is it not permissible for the state to prohibit the gathering?
After reviewing the jurisprudential differences, the question arises: Is it permissible for an official body (such as the Director of Endowments in Daraa) to prohibit a religious practice about which scholars have differed in their rulings?
Prohibition presupposes possessing the absolute truth: Official prohibition presupposes that the prohibiting body possesses the absolute truth in a matter of scholarly interpretation. This is a dangerous claim that contradicts the humility of the scholars themselves. Ibn Taymiyyah, despite his strictness, did not say, “The gathering must be prohibited,” but rather, “The gathering is good if it is not made a regular practice.” Al-Ghazali, although not a Sufi in the traditional sense, dedicated an entire book to defending the practice of listening to music (sama’). So how can it be prohibited? A practice on which the leading imams of Islam disagreed?
The prohibition contradicts the objective of preserving the religion:
Preserving the religion, as Ibn Ashur states, has two aspects: “preserving the religion of each individual Muslim from anything that might corrupt their faith,” and “preserving the religion for the entire Muslim community.”
In this case, the prohibition corrupts the Sufi creed, rather than preserving it, because it forces them to abandon a practice they believe to be an act of devotion.
This is coercion to abandon the religion, just as coercion to embrace a faith is prohibited.
The prohibition contradicts the objective of maintaining public order:
It might be argued that the prohibition is necessary to maintain public order. However, this is an exaggeration. The Sufi gathering is not a threat to public order; rather, it is a peaceful practice. In this case, the prohibition creates public order, rather than preserving it, because it generates a feeling of marginalization among Sufis, making them a targeted minority instead of an integral part of society.
The prohibition contradicts the objective of Justice:
God Almighty says: “And when you judge between people, judge with justice” (An-Nisa: 58). Justice requires that everyone be treated according to the same standard. If one religious practice is permitted in a certain way, then another practice must be permitted in the same way, as long as it is peaceful. Selective prohibition (prohibiting the Hadra while not prohibiting other practices) contradicts justice.
Fourth, Towards a Purpose-Based Jurisprudence of Pluralism:
If prohibition is not permissible, what is the alternative? The alternative is not permissibility (allowing everything without restrictions), but rather regulation (organizing the practice with controls that protect everyone). This regulation is based on the “objectives of Sharia” itself:
Distinguishing between “belief,” “practice,” and “discourse”
Belief: It is not permissible to “coerce” anyone to change it, nor to “hold them accountable” for it, as God Almighty says: “Do not Compulsion in religion. This is absolute.
Practice: It may be regulated by controls that protect “public order” and “the rights of others,” but it should not be “prohibited” simply because of “differences in jurisprudence.”
Discourse: It may be “criticized” and “responded to,” but it should not be “criminalized” unless it contains “incitement to violence” or “declaring someone an apostate.”
The statement of the Nawa Council is “critical discourse,” not “incitement,” and it must be “protected” just as the institution itself must be “protected.”
Citizenship as a unifying framework:
In the modern state, citizenship is the objective that unites all components.
The International Islamic Fiqh Academy has affirmed that “citizenship” means “belonging to a specific state, both in terms of territory and reality, and holding its nationality,” and that “there is no legal impediment to Muslims in non-Islamic states participating in social, political, or economic activities that do not contradict established principles.” This principle applies “all the more so” to the “Islamic state” itself, which must “accommodate” all its citizens, regardless of their… Their doctrines.
Recognition, not denial:
Recognizing pluralism does not mean acknowledging the validity of every belief. A Muslim believes that his religion is true, and that others may differ. But “recognition” here is “political-ethical,” not “doctrinal,” meaning “recognizing the other’s right to exist and express themselves,” not “recognizing the correctness of their belief.”
This is the “essence of citizenship”: that people “differ” in “belief” and “agree” on “rights.”
Fifth, towards establishing “the jurisprudence of governance” in Syria:
Based on this analysis, the Syrian Future Movement recommends the following:
First: Issuing a “Law on Places of Worship and Religious Practice” that regulates the “right” of all sects to “practice their rituals” and defines the “controls” (safety, cleanliness, and not harming others), without “discrimination” between one sect and another. This aligns with the “objective of preserving religion” and the “objective of justice.”
Second: Establishing a “Council My country, a nation of religious and sectarian diversity, includes representatives from all sects (including Sufi, Shiite, Druze, and Christian), and is responsible for coordinating among them and resolving conflicts through dialogue, not prohibition. This aligns with the objectives of maintaining order and fostering citizenship.
Third: Reforming religious education curricula to include education on pluralism, the etiquette of disagreement, and the history of sects in Syria, instead of focusing on a single sect. This aligns with the objectives of preserving intellect (developing critical thinking) and preserving religion (promoting deeper understanding).
Fourth: Training imams and preachers in the etiquette of criticism and conflict management, enabling them to criticize practices they deem problematic without incitement or accusations of apostasy. This aligns with the objectives of preserving religion (protecting national unity) and preserving life (preventing violence).
Fifth: Strengthening national media that reflects the diversity of Syrian society. It offers programs about different religious communities, instead of ignoring or distorting them. This aligns with the objectives of preserving reason (countering misinformation) and preserving lineage (protecting future generations from polarization).
Sixth: Launching a National Charter for Sectarian Coexistence, drafted with the participation of all religious communities, in which everyone pledges to respect the right to differ, refrain from using violence or incitement, and commit to dialogue. This aligns with the objectives of preserving religion, maintaining order, and upholding citizenship.
Conclusion:
The Nawa incident, despite its small scale, tests the capacity of the new Syria to manage pluralism. If the state bans the Sufi gatherings, it will be repeating the logic of religious guardianship practiced by the previous regime, pushing Sufis towards isolation or protest. If it allows these practices without oversight, it will open the door to chaos. And “provocation.” The solution is not
The choice is not between prohibition and permissiveness, but rather between moderation—that is, recognizing everyone’s right to express their beliefs, while regulating practices with safeguards that protect everyone.
Justice does not mean uniformity, but rather recognizing difference and guaranteeing the right to express it for all. Syria, which has endured decades of exclusion, needs a state that does not fear difference, but embraces it, because difference is a universal law, and diversity is a national treasure.
What is required is not the elimination of disagreement, but its management with the principles of justice and respect, so that it does not devolve into strife or oppression.
This is the essence of civilized Islam, which the Syrian Future Movement adopts: a religion that sees mercy in difference, strength in diversity, and worship in citizenship.
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