Introduction:
The contours of the new state—during the transitional period Syria is experiencing following the fall of the Assad regime—are defined first by constitutions and laws, and more importantly, by the initial appointment decisions made by the authorities.
While seemingly administrative on the surface, these decisions are fundamentally matters of principle and civilizational values; they test the state’s commitment to competence and integrity, as well as its ability to move beyond a five-decade legacy of prioritizing loyalty over merit.
Recent appointments within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and provincial administrations have sparked widespread debate: did the criteria reflect a blend of competence, administrative experience, and political trust, or did they merely reproduce an appointment model governed entirely by cronyism and loyalty, disregarding the concept of merit?
Reports indicate that these changes have ignited controversy regarding appointment standards, particularly amidst recurring accusations that political and factional loyalty took precedence over competence and administrative experience.
This article seeks to examine this dilemma through a modern perspective grounded in the Maqasid (higher objectives of Sharia) approach. It draws upon the Quran and Sunnah—within a Sunni framework—while incorporating insights from sociology and post-revolutionary state-building, and citing rich historical Islamic precedents to offer a critical analysis and practical recommendations.
First, the Jurisprudential Foundation:
The Quranic Text:
The Holy Quran defined the two pillars of any position of authority with a comprehensive and precise statement: “Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are due” (An-Nisa: 58).
Exegists have clarified that the “people of the trust” are those who are “competent and capable of discharging it”; thus, this constitutes a Quranic basis for the principle of competence.
Furthermore, the Almighty’s words regarding the story of Moses—”Indeed, the best one you could hire is the strong and the trustworthy” (Al-Qasas: 26)—confirm that the criteria for selection are strength (competence and capability) and trustworthiness (integrity and responsibility). These are two pillars without which no system can stand.
Jurists have affirmed that “authority rests on two pillars: strength and trustworthiness,” and that “appointing individuals to positions is predicated on the presence of two key attributes: strength and trustworthiness; thus, whoever excels in these two aspects is the most deserving of recommendation for the role.”
The Prophetic Sunnah:
The Prophetic Sunnah reinforces this principle and warns against violating it in the strongest possible terms.
Abu Hurairah (may Allah be pleased with him) narrated that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said: “When authority is entrusted to those unfit for it, then await the Hour” (narrated by Al-Bukhari). This Hadith represents a civilizational principle, implying that assigning positions to the incompetent is not merely an administrative error; rather, it is a sign of the collapse of the public order and the onset of chaos. It is reported that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: “Whoever is entrusted with any matter concerning the Muslims and appoints a man over them while knowing that there is someone among them more deserving of the role and more knowledgeable than him, has betrayed Allah, His Messenger, and the believers.”
This text establishes unequivocally that prioritizing the less qualified over the more qualified constitutes an act of betrayal—not merely an error of judgment—because it involves a dereliction of duty toward the Ummah (community), whose interests the ruler has been entrusted to safeguard.
Essential Objectives (al-Maqasid al-Daruriyyah):
In the classification of Maqasid (objectives of Sharia), public offices fall under the category of “essentials” (daruriyyat)—matters “legislated for the general public interest, such that their absence or neglect would lead to the breakdown of the social order.” Al-Shatibi categorized these roles as “communal obligations” (fard kifayah) upon which the interests of both religion and worldly life depend; this includes “high-ranking state functions and positions of governance and authority.” Entrusting such roles to the incompetent undermines these essential objectives.
Jurists have established that “the legal principles within the Islamic system regarding public appointments prioritize competence as the basis for selection; it is impermissible to appoint those lacking competence, or to overlook the most qualified candidate in favor of one who is less qualified.” Competence, therefore, is a requirement rooted in the objectives of Sharia (maqasidi) for preserving both the social and religious order.
Secondly, the Social Lesson:
From the Patrimonial State to the Legal-Rational State:
The Assad regime exemplified the “patrimonial state”—a model described by sociologist Max Weber as a system wherein authority rests on personal relationships and reciprocal loyalties rather than on legal rules and competence.
Academic studies have documented how the Assad regime “managed to entrench its patrimonial hegemony and penetrate both the bureaucratic sphere and society at large through networks of patronage and cronyism.” A report by Enab Baladi indicated that “the changes sparked widespread controversy regarding the criteria governing appointments—particularly amidst recurring accusations that political and factional loyalty took precedence over competence and administrative experience.” Observers believe that a significant share of appointments went to figures close to the new administration or drawn from circles that previously governed northwest Syria, and that “in the absence of qualified professionals, the administrative landscape is being shaped by criteria based on loyalty and cronyism.”
Rational-Legal Bureaucracy as an Alternative:
In contrast to the patrimonial model, Weber presents the model of “rational-legal bureaucracy,” which rests on five principles: rational-legal authority, a hierarchical structure, technical competence, impersonality, and a merit-based employment system.
This implies that transitioning from loyalty to competence is a prerequisite for the state’s survival; by its very nature, a patrimonial state cannot function as a state of institutions.
Third: Post-Revolutionary Studies:
The Post-Revolutionary Public Service Bargain:
Post-revolutionary public administration literature introduces the concept of the “public service bargain.” This concept explains the dual dilemma facing new revolutionary regimes: on one hand, they require loyalists to ensure the new regime’s stability; on the other, they need competent professionals to manage the bureaucratic apparatus. An analysis of Iran’s post-revolution experience suggests that “new political regimes emerging from revolutions eventually find themselves tasked with building high-level bureaucratic apparatuses geared toward facilitating regime stability,” and that the optimal model is one that “establishes a civil service arrangement that simultaneously fosters the loyalty, expertise, and representativeness of diplomats.”
Technocratic Reconciliation as an Alternative to the Justice-vs.-Competence Dichotomy:
Specifically within the Syrian context, the Damascus Institute for Studies offers a crucial analytical framework known as “technocratic reconciliation,” which is based on “the intersection of three central concepts: competence, neutrality, and the restructuring of the state’s institutional sphere.”
The Institute notes that this framework “posits that technocratic reconciliation represents a realistic approach to reactivating Syria’s administrative capital in the post-conflict era. It does so through professional, neutral vetting mechanisms that allow for the utilization of existing talent without reproducing polarization or resorting to mass exclusion.”
However, the Institute also warns of a scenario where “technocratic reconciliation transforms into a tool for reproducing pre-existing networks of influence under a technocratic guise.” This suggests that the Syrian equation is not a simple choice between “loyalty” and “competence,” but rather a challenge of “how to build a system that combines competence, representation, and neutrality.”
Fourth: Historical Islamic Lessons – The Example of Umar ibn al-Khattab
Competence Over Kinship:
Umar ibn al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with him) set a unique precedent in applying the principle of prioritizing competence over loyalty. Historians have documented his determination not to appoint any of his relatives to office—despite the evident competence of some, such as his cousin Sa’id ibn Zayd. He famously stated: “I shall not assign a task to anyone except the person most capable and competent to handle it.”
Indeed, “one of Umar’s cardinal rules and conditions regarding the appointment of governors was… that he would not appoint any of his relatives.”
Consultation and Testing:
Umar did not rely on personal intuition; instead, he consulted senior Companions when selecting governors, and he would test prospective appointees and scrutinize their backgrounds.
“The selection of officials took place within a religious framework, alongside the requirement for virtuous qualities such as truthfulness, integrity, competence, and vigilance.” This implies that selection mechanisms in Islam were not arbitrary; rather, they constituted an integrated system comprising the definition of objective criteria (competence and integrity), consultation and deliberation, testing and training, and periodic accountability (such as the dismissal of governors every four years).
The Experience of Saladin and the Ottomans:
This practice was not limited to the Rashidun Caliphate; Saladin (Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi) relied on military and administrative talent regardless of tribal affiliations.
In the Ottoman Empire, the Janissary system—in its initial phase—was based on training and merit. Gifted children were selected from across the empire, subjected to rigorous upbringing, and promoted based on competence.
However, this experience later deviated when the Janissaries transformed into a hereditary class driven by vested interests. This underscores that a merit-based system is not merely established once and for all, but is a culture that must be built and sustained.
Fifth: The Syrian Context:
Corruption Perceptions Index:
According to the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index issued by Transparency International, Syria scored 15 out of 100 points, ranking 172nd out of 182 countries—an improvement from its score of 12 and rank of 179 in 2024.
This means Syria has “advanced” only seven places, remaining “among the countries most severely affected by corruption globally.” These figures reveal that this superficial improvement does not reflect a genuine shift in administrative culture. 90% Below the Poverty Line:
The impact of prioritizing loyalty over competence goes beyond merely crippling institutions; it extends to deepening poverty. UN estimates indicate that approximately 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line, with extreme poverty reaching 66%. Furthermore, “14 years of war have set back Syria’s economic and social progress by some 40 years, and GDP has contracted by 50%.”
World Bank estimates place the cost of reconstruction at $216 billion (a conservative estimate), with a range of $140 billion to $345 billion. This demonstrates that cronyism is not merely an “ethical issue” but a direct economic impediment.
Networks of Influence:
Reports indicate that “wage policies in Syria are transforming into a tool for securing loyalty and perpetuating inequality, amidst signs that resources are being allocated based on patronage quotas rather than the development of a professional public administration.”
Reports have also observed that “loyalty has been exchanged for the prospect of personal enrichment—largely at the expense of service delivery or the public interest.”
The government has launched a campaign targeting “ghost employees,” pledging to dismiss one-third of the public sector workforce. Although nine officials were referred to the judiciary in August 2026 over corruption cases involving oil fields, these measures remain limited in scope given the magnitude of the problem. Sixth: Recommendations
Based on the aforementioned foundational principles, social insights, historical experiences, and the Syrian reality, the Syrian Future Movement makes the following recommendations:
First: Establish the principles of competence and integrity as a constitutional mandate. The constitutional declaration or public service law must stipulate that competence and integrity are the sole criteria for assuming public office, and that any appointment violating this principle is null and void.
Second: Establish an independent appointments body—modeled after anti-corruption agencies—to oversee appointments to sovereign positions. This body would set objective criteria (qualifications, experience, and achievements), publish the names and qualifications of candidates, and allow for public objection. This prevents a “circle of trust” from supplanting a “state of competence.”
Third: Adopt a system of testing and training prior to appointment—drawing on the precedent set by Umar ibn al-Khattab. Every candidate for public office must undergo an objective competency test and a mandatory training program, particularly for sensitive positions.
Fourth: Set short tenures for public offices, accompanied by periodic performance evaluations and the possibility of dismissal in the event of failure. Competence is not a permanent credential but an ongoing responsibility.
Fifth: Engage civil society organizations and professional unions as partners in monitoring appointments and evaluating performance, while also actively recruiting Syrian talent from the diaspora. Sixth: Linking competence with transitional justice; a system based on competence cannot be built while perpetrators of corruption enjoy impunity. Rather, holding the corrupt accountable must be a prerequisite for any administrative reform.
Seventh: Launching a charter bringing together the government, the opposition, civil society, and religious leaders—a pact in which they pledge to uphold standards of competence and integrity, and reject the “culture of loyalty” spawned by the defunct regime.
Conclusion:
In Islamic tradition, competence was not merely a “political choice”; it was a religious trust and a civilizational responsibility.
The Prophet (peace be upon him) warned that entrusting authority to those unfit for it is a sign of the corruption of the times.
And Syria today, as it builds… As it builds a new state from the ruins of five decades of authoritarianism, the country must restore the standing of this principle as a daily practice.
Loyalty to the nation is not synonymous with loyalty to individuals, and trust is no substitute for competence.
If Syria is to become the state of institutions its people have long dreamed of, it must begin here: with the very first appointment decision.
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