Executive Summary:
This paper addresses the problematic use of the principle of “obedience to the ruler, even if he is unjust”—as established in the Ash’ari and Sufi schools of thought—to justify grave crimes and violations. It does so through a case study of the former Grand Mufti of the Syrian regime, Ahmad Badr al-Din Hassoun, who appeared before the Fourth Criminal Court in Damascus on June 25, 2016, on charges of participating in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and incitement to murder. The paper examines the extent to which Hassoun’s positions and fatwas align with the true principles of these two schools, concluding that he did not apply the principle of “patience in the face of injustice” but rather deviated into “the systematic fabrication of justifying injustice,” thus making him a prime example of how “scholars of the ruler” deviate from the objectives of Islamic law and the spirit of Sufism.
Introduction – Between the Authority of the Text and the Authority of the Event:
The first session of the trial of Ahmad Badreddin Hassoun, the former Grand Mufti of the Syrian Arab Republic (2005-2021), began on June 25, 2026, before the Fourth Criminal Court in Damascus, in an unprecedented step in the history of transitional justice in the region. The charges against him include: participation in war crimes and crimes against humanity, incitement to murder and issuing fatwas permitting it, and exploiting his religious position to justify military repression. These charges present Islamic scholars with a stark paradox: how can a scholar who identifies himself as an Ash’ari-Shafi’i, influenced by Sufism, become a symbol for justifying systematic violence against civilians?
The importance of this trial is not limited to the legal dimension, but extends to the very core of the study of Islamic jurisprudence and its foundations. Hassoun was not an exception in his discourse; rather, he explicitly relied on the system of “obedience to the ruler,” which constitutes one of the constants of Sunni political thought, particularly within the Ash’ari and Sufi schools.
Hence arise the questions of this research:
- What are the true origins of the principle of obedience to an unjust ruler in the Ash’ari and Sufi schools of thought?
- What are the criteria and boundaries that distinguish between “patience in the face of injustice” and “supporting and aiding the oppressor”?
- Where does Ahmad Hassoun’s model stand within this framework? Was it consistent with its essence or deviated from it?
This paper answers these questions through a critical analytical approach, based on the foundational texts of both schools and the pronouncements of their imams, applying them to the case under study, ultimately arriving at objective conclusions that contribute to building an Islamic consciousness that is an alternative to the consciousness of despotism.
First, the principle of obedience to an unjust ruler – its foundations and guidelines:
The textual and rational basis in the Ash’ari school of thought:
The principle of the obligation to obey the ruler, even if he is unjust, is firmly established in Ash’ari thought based on several pieces of evidence, most notably:
- The Quran: God Almighty says: {O you who have believed, obey God and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you} [An-Nisa: 59].
- The Sunnah: The Prophet’s ﷺ hadith: “Listen and obey, even if a black slave with a head like a raisin is appointed over you” [Sahih al-Bukhari, Book of Judgments, Chapter on Listening to and Obeying the Imam as Long as It Is Not Disobedience to God], and the hadith: “Whoever dislikes something from his ruler should be patient, for whoever rebels against the ruler by even a handspan dies a death of ignorance” [Sahih Muslim, Book of Leadership, Chapter on the Obligation of Adhering to the Muslim Community When Trials Appear].
- Consensus: Several imams have transmitted the consensus on the prohibition of armed rebellion against rulers, including al-Nawawi [Sharh Sahih Muslim 12/229] and Ibn Hajar [Fath al-Bari 13/121].
However, this principle was never understood in the Ash’ari school of thought as absolute delegation of authority or legitimization of injustice. The imams restricted this with strict guidelines, the most important of which is:
- Disobedience in sin, based on the Prophet’s saying (peace and blessings be upon him): “There is no obedience to a creature in disobedience to the Creator” [Sahih al-Bukhari, Book of Ahadith, Chapter on the permissibility of the report of a single truthful narrator. Musnad Ahmad, no. 1095]. Judge Abu Bakr al-Baqillani says: “It is not a condition for the imam to be infallible… nor are people obligated to obey him in disobedience to God” [al-Tamhid, p. 186].
- Preventing sedition and bloodshed: Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni clarifies that preventing rebellion against a tyrannical ruler is not out of love for injustice, but rather out of fear of the sedition of the sword, which leads to the shedding of blood and the confiscation of wealth. He says in “Ghiyath al-Umam fi al-Tiyath al-Zulm” (The Aid of Nations in the Darkness of Injustice): “Because rebelling against him replaces security with fear, bloodshed, raids, and corruption on earth. This is worse than enduring his injustice and wickedness, and reason dictates that the greater of two evils is preferable to avoid it.” [Ghiyath al-Umam, pp. 77-79].
The Sufi Perspective – The Greater Jihad and Self-Reform:
Sunni Sufi orders generally agreed with this approach, but from a specific spiritual perspective based on:
- Cultivating contentment and submission not to the ruler, but to God. Patience in the face of the ruler’s injustice is practiced as part of disciplining the soul to refrain from objection and discontent.
- Refraining from violence: Imam Abdul Qadir al-Jilani recommends abandoning conflict with rulers and focusing on self-reform. In his book “Al-Fath al-Rabbani,” he states: “Rulers are the whip of God Almighty, and His whip is not to be disputed. Treat them with good manners and do not oppose them… Rather, strive against your own desires first.” [Al-Fath al-Rabbani, Sessions 46 and 58]
- Advice and subtle hints, not outright condemnation: The great ascetics and Sufis adopted the approach of advising rulers and desiring their well-being to preserve the unity of the community. This is summarized in the saying of Imam al-Fudayl ibn ‘Iyad (a Sufi master): “If I had a supplication that would be answered, I would only use it for the ruler, for in his righteousness lies the righteousness of the people and the land” [Hilyat al-Awliya’].
However, all of this does not at all imply aiding the oppressor in his oppression or endorsing him. Rather, the stance of the great Sufis towards unjust rulers fluctuated between subtle criticism and dignified avoidance, never reaching the point of inciting murder or labeling the victims as terrorists.
Secondly, the dividing lines – from legitimate patience to sinful justification:
By examining the texts of both schools of thought, three dividing lines can be identified that place a religious scholar beyond the principle of obedience into the realm of complicity in injustice:
The difference between passive acquiescence and active justification:
Patience in the face of injustice, according to jurists, means refraining from armed rebellion to preserve security and prevent bloodshed. It does not mean praising the oppressor or condoning his actions. Imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazali says in “Ihya Ulum al-Din” (Revival of Religious Sciences): “If it is said: ‘The command to obey rulers, even if they are unjust, is valid, so how can we command obedience to them?’ We say: ‘Obedience to them is only required in matters that do not involve disobedience to God… As for praising and commending them…'”
“For them, it is a major sin” [Ihya Ulum al-Din, 2/337]. Therefore, changing the fatwa from “abandon fighting” to “join them and fight with them” is a transgression of passive neutrality into active bias towards the oppressor, which is absolutely forbidden because it directly aids in the shedding of forbidden blood.
The Prohibition of Aiding in Sin and Aggression:
The Quranic text is explicit: “And cooperate in righteousness and piety, but do not cooperate in sin and transgression” [Al-Ma’idah: 2]. If a fatwa becomes a tool for shedding innocent blood (such as that of civilians) or justifying specific crimes (such as barrel bomb attacks), the mufti moves from the position of one who is patient to that of an accomplice, as Allah says: {And do not incline toward those who do wrong, lest you be touched by the Fire} [Hud: 113]. Scholars have established the principle: “Aiding in sin is itself a sin.” Imam al-Nawawi emphasizes this legal and criminal prohibition in his explanation of the warning against tyrannical rulers, saying: “This includes a warning against aiding rulers in their tyranny. Whoever aids them in their tyranny or believes their lies, Allah and His Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) are free from him, and he will not come to the Cistern (of Paradise).” [Sharh Sahih Muslim, 12/433]
The Duty of Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil Upon Scholars:
Scholars in the Ash’ari school of thought are the inheritors of the prophets in clarifying and warning against wrongdoing. Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni describes them in his book “Ghiyath al-Umam” as follows: “Scholars are the exemplars of rulings, the beacons of Islam, the inheritors of prophethood, the leaders of the nation, and the masters of the faith… They are, in truth, the rightful authorities.” Denouncing a tyrannical ruler is obligatory according to the highest levels of Islamic law, the lowest being denunciation in one’s heart, and the least one can do is to refrain from disguising falsehood as truth. Remaining silent about injustice when one is able to speak out against it, let alone justifying it, is forbidden. Imam Abd al-Wahhab al-Sha’rani warned against the temptation of rulers and falling into flattery, saying: “We have taken a general covenant from the Messenger of God (peace and blessings be upon him) that we should not enter upon rulers and governors except for a legitimate necessity, such as enjoining good or forbidding evil… For whoever enters upon them for any other reason has flattered them in the religion of God.” [Lawaqih al-Anwar fi Bayan al-‘Uhud al-Muhammadiyya, p. 534]
Third, an analysis of Ahmed Hassoun’s case in light of these principles:
Doctrinal and Methodological Background:
Ahmed Badr al-Din Hassoun holds a doctorate in Shafi’i jurisprudence from Al-Azhar University. He identifies as an Ash’ari in creed, influenced by Sufism, and an advocate for “national unity” encompassing different schools of thought. This places him—in terms of his frame of reference—within the sphere of discourse governed by the aforementioned principles. Therefore, his actions and statements should be judged according to these principles, not by the whims of either side (his supporters or his opponents).
Hassoun’s Positions Under Study – From Description to Jurisprudential Classification:
By reviewing the accusations leveled against him and his documented public stances (such as his description of the revolutionaries as “terrorists,” his call for the recruitment of young men into the Syrian army, and his tacit support for barrel bomb attacks through his suspicious silence and insinuations), they can be classified jurisprudentially as follows:
Exceeding the Limits of “Hearing and Obeying” to “Justification and Incitement”:
The proper course of action for a scholar is to say: “Hear and obey in all that is not sinful, and do not rebel against him with the sword.” However, Hassoun went beyond this to say: “Rebelling against him is disbelief, fighting him is forbidden, and joining him is obligatory.” This is a reversal of the principle of obedience, transforming it from a tool for preserving the community into a tool for inciting it to kill itself.
Jurisprudential Classification: This is not patience, but rather aiding injustice and inciting murder, which is forbidden according to the Quranic verse (“And do not cooperate in sin and transgression”) and the principle that “the one who guides to evil is like the one who commits it.”
Jurisprudential Classification: This is not patience, but rather aiding injustice and inciting murder, which is forbidden by the Quranic verse (“And do not cooperate in sin and transgression”) and the principle that “the one who guides to evil is like the one who commits it.”
Violating the Sanctity of Innocent Blood:
His fatwa, which forbids fighting the Syrian army and mandates joining it, in the context of military operations targeting civilians and residential areas (documented internationally as war crimes), makes him complicit in the crime of “incitement to murder,” regardless of whether he personally carried a weapon.
Imam al-Shafi’i states in his book “Al-Umm”: “The one who orders [the killing of] someone will be severely punished and imprisoned for a long time, because he disobeyed God Almighty by ordering the killing of those whom God has not permitted to be killed” [Al-Umm, 6/196]. So what about someone who issues a fatwa permitting mass killing?!
The Reversal of the Principle of Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil:
Instead of advising the ruler and reminding him of the sanctity of life (as Ibn Taymiyyah did with sultans, and Ahmad al-Rifa’i with caliphs), he labeled the victims as “terrorists,” “traitors,” and “agents,” which falls under the category of “moral perjury” that justifies their killing by the authorities.
The Adaptation: This is one of the greatest sins, because it inverts the religious concept (making the forbidden permissible), and it is similar to what al-Sha’rani said about scholars who “exploit religion for worldly gain.”
The Analytical Conclusion:
It cannot be said that Ahmad Hassoun adhered to the principle of “obeying the unjust ruler” according to its fundamentals; rather, he adhered to its outward form, while its inner meaning was entirely different. He did not “endure injustice” but rather “fabricated religious legitimacy for it.” In this, he does not represent the Ash’ari and Sufi schools, but rather the model of the “scholar of the sultan” against whom the imams of these two schools—al-Ghazali, Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Sha’rani, and others—warned.
Conclusion – The Trial as a Restoration of the Scholars’ Prophetic Role:
Based on the preceding analysis and foundations, this research recommends the following:
- Ensuring the independence of religious institutions from the executive branch, both legislatively and administratively, so that religious edicts (fatwas) are not used as a cover for political decisions, and religious positions are not transformed into rewards for loyalty.
- Criminalizing fatwas that incite murder and violence, and including incitement in transitional justice laws as a crime in its own right, not merely an opinion or interpretation.
- Reviving the duty of advising the ruler, both privately and publicly, as a practical pillar of enjoining good and forbidding evil, and training religious scholars to practice this duty with courage and responsibility.
- Adopting criteria of scholarly competence and moral integrity in appointing muftis and senior religious figures, while stipulating their avoidance of narrow partisan affiliations, to guarantee the restoration of trust between society and its religious institutions.
With these foundations, the future Syrian state can reclaim the role of the religious scholar and break with the “scholar of the sultan” model that contributed to tearing apart the national fabric and shedding innocent blood.
Finally, from the perspective of Islamic scholarship, the trial of Ahmad Hassoun is a trial of a distorted jurisprudential and political model that has persisted for decades. It is an opportunity to reaffirm the following principles:
Obedience to God The rule of a ruler within the Sunni system is not a legitimization of tyranny, but rather a policy to avert sedition, restricted by the prohibition against aiding injustice and the obligation to offer sincere advice and denounce wrongdoing verbally.
Authentic Sufi orders reject violence and advocate mercy and justice, and cannot be a cover for or justification of the killing of civilians.
The independence of a scholar from authority is a condition for the validity of his religious testimony. The saying of Imam al-Awza’i remains decisive: “Nothing is more hateful to God Almighty than a scholar who visits an official (i.e., a governor or prince) out of greed.” [Mentioned by Ibn ‘Asakir in Tarikh Dimashq, 35/133. Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi narrated with his chain of transmission from al-Sha’bi, who said: “Three things are feared for this religion: the slip of a scholar, the argument of a hypocrite using the Quran, and an unjust ruler. The slip of a scholar is the most serious of these, because if a scholar slips, a whole world of people slips with him (i.e., they perish by following him).”]
Transitional justice in the new Syria must be based on holding accountable all those who contributed to the bloodshed, regardless of their role, because Islamic law does not differentiate between the killer with their hand and the instigator with their tongue and pen; each is judged according to their role and position, unless there is a compelling public interest.
Thus, the trial of Hassoun marks the beginning of restoring the balance of justice, the balance of religious edicts, and the balance of the written word. This is the only way to rebuild trust between the Syrian people and their religious institutions, in a future that embraces everyone without injustice or the justification of injustice.
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