Shorocracy

Introduction:
Shura is a fundamental pillar of the Islamic political structure, and is considered an essential part of shurocracy, going beyond a practical decision-making mechanism to an existential principle that reflects Islam’s vision of the nature of authority and its relationship with the community.

Shura is linguistically defined as “extracting the most appropriate opinion by exchanging opinions” as stated in the Arabic language, while in terminology it is “exerting effort to reach the most correct opinion by exchanging views with people of piety and knowledge.”
Pre-Islamic Arab societies were characterized by the existence of sophisticated consultative systems, embodied in the “Dar al-Nadwa” in Mecca, built by Qusay ibn Kalab, which was a center for making crucial decisions related to peace and war, marriage, trade, and relations with tribes.
The tribal leader was chosen by free and direct election according to strict criteria that included “generosity, help, patience, dream, humility, and statement” as reported by Al-Jahiz.
In addition, power was not concentrated in the hands of the leader, but “the actual power was in the hands of the tribal council as a whole,” according to Alusi, and the individual had the right to hold the leader accountable for any negligence.
Shura in the Jahiliyya era was characterized by key characteristics, chief among them was the consensual nature, as decisions were often made by consensus, even if the majority prevailed through social pressure, as expressed by the poet Duraid ibn al-Summa: “I am only from Ghaziya, if she goes astray, I go astray, and if Ghaziya is guided, I am guided.” Also, social restrictions. In the Dar al-Nadwa, only the sons of Qusay or those who had reached the age of forty were allowed to enter, with a few exceptions such as Hakim bin Khuzam, who entered it at the age of fifteen.
Finally, Yemeni states witnessed well-developed consultative councils, as in the kingdoms of Sheba and Himyar, where councils were more organized in sedentary societies than in nomadic ones.

Turning to democracy, it remains one of the most controversial concepts in contemporary political philosophy, as it goes beyond its simple definition of “the rule of the people” – According to the literal translation of the Greek original (Demos = people, Kratos = authority) – to issues related to the mechanisms of practice, the limits of participation and the relationship of the majority to the minority. Some researchers note that the spread of the term globally was accompanied by a semantic expansion that made it “loose and ambiguous”, even as authoritarian regimes adopted the democratic discourse formally through mock elections. In this paper, we will try to research Shura and democracy and the question of the possibility of combining them with what we called in Syrian Future Movement as “Shariqatocracy”.

The Prophetic Establishment of Shura and its conceptual transformations:
We start the issue of the establishment of Shura from the sacred textual foundations of Shura in Islam. The Holy Qur’an established the principle of Shura through two pivotal verses:
1- The prophetic command: “And consult them in the matter” (Al-Imran: 159), which was revealed after the Battle of Uhud, despite the fact that the result of the consultation led to defeat, which emphasizes the sanctity of the principle above the results.
2- The societal character: “And they ordered them to consult among themselves” (Shura: 38), which coupled shura with the establishment of prayer, indicating its legal obligation.
In the practice of the Prophet as the applied model of the Qur’an, we find that the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) practically embodied shura in many situations:
１- The Battle of Badr, where he consulted the companions on the location of the battle and the confrontation with the enemy.
The Battle of Uhud, where he abandoned his personal opinion (staying in the city) for the opinion of the majority (going out to the enemy).
３- The Battle of the Trench, where he consulted Salman al-Farisi on the idea of digging the trench.
４- Community affairs, as he consulted on the enactment of the adhan, the story of al-Ifk, family affairs, and so on.
Abu Huraira described this approach by saying: “I have never seen anyone more consulted than the Prophet (peace be upon him).” It was these practices that established a radical shift in the concept of shura from being a tribal custom to a religious obligation.
Islam has brought about three qualitative shifts in the concept of shura:
First, generalization, from politics to a “way of life” that includes the social, economic, and scientific.
The second is religious consecration, as it has become “a necessity for Muslims in all their circumstances,” as Judge Abdul Qader Odeh put it.
The third is balance, when shura became “a balancing tool between individual freedom and group order,” according to Dr. Tawfiq al-Shawi.
In the historical development in the Rashidi and Umayyad periods of Shura, we find the Rashidi model, and Umar ibn al-Khattab can be taken as a model because of the length of his caliphate, and because Shura reached its peak during the reign of Al-Farouq Umar, who made it a basis for governance, as the theoretical foundations were clear in Umar’s statement: “There is no good in a matter concluded without Shura” and “Muslims have the right to have their affairs consulted among them.”
As for the practical mechanisms, they were clear in expanding the circle of advisors to include young people such as Abdullah ibn Abbas, consulting women as he consulted his daughter Hafsa, the mother of the believers, and specializing in advice when he consulted Amr ibn Maad Yakrab in military affairs. Umar also developed a system similar to “constitutional councils” where the matter is presented to the public and then to a special council of senior companions.
The Umayyad and Abbasid era witnessed important transformations that can be grouped by three pillars:
1- Relative continuity, as Muawiya maintained the “House of Wisdom” in Damascus as a center of knowledge and advice.
2- The Abbasid prosperity, where Al-Mamun developed the “House of Wisdom” in Baghdad (9th century AD) as a scientific complex that included translators and scholars from various disciplines, with a system of translation and collective research.
3- Cultural openness, as evidenced by the caliphs’ use of non-Muslims in scientific advice, such as Hanin ibn Ishaq, the Nestorian physician who translated the works of Galen.

However, the centrality of shura in Islamic political thought today is based on:

1. The theories of shura in Islamic thought have developed around two main axes, the first being mandatory. Jurists have differed between those who say that shura is mandatory (al-Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, al-Ghazali) and those who say that it is only informative, but the view that seems to be favored is mandatory (al-Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, al-Ghazali).
   Second, the concept of shura has expanded to include “political” such as choosing and monitoring the ruler, “social” such as “removing tyranny in the family system,” and “economic” such as distribution and spending systems.
   2. Ghannouchi considered shura “the backbone of the nation’s authority” and “an asset of religion.” Sayyid Qutb considered it “an asset of life in Islam” that transcends politics and all spheres of life, and Al-Mawdudi emphasized the obligation of shura and the need to take the opinion of the majority. As for Sayyid Qutb, he saw it as “an asset of life in Islam” that transcends politics to all areas of life, and Al-Mawdudi emphasized the obligation of shura and the need to follow the opinion of the majority.
   From its tribal roots in Dar al-Nadwa, to its prophetic establishment as a religious obligation, its development in the Rashidi era into a semi-institutionalized system, its flourishing in the House of Wisdom during the Umayyad and Abbasid eras, and its rediscovery in modern Islamic thought as an Islamic alternative to Western democracy, Shura remains the Islamic answer to the question of power and its relationship with society.

If contemporary political thought faces many challenges such as tyranny and intellectual dependency, reviving the integrated shura model that combines legal constants with procedural flexibility, and between the authority of the nation and the competence of the scholars, may constitute an entry point for rebuilding the contemporary Islamic political system. Shura is not just a political mechanism, but a “political obligation,” as the reformers called it, and a “political sin” for not practicing it. Above all, it is a practical embodiment of human succession on earth, which is based on sharing rather than tyranny, and wisdom rather than force.

Shura and Democracy, Similarities and Distinctions in Contemporary Political Thought:
The relationship between Islamic Shura and Western democracy occupies a central space in the contemporary Islamic political debate. While Shura is based on a religious reference that makes consultation a binding obligation, democracy is based on the philosophy of the social contract and popular sovereignty, so it is necessary to examine the fundamental points of similarity and difference and assess the possibility of complementarity between them in the context of the modern state, through the following conceptual foundations:

1. Shura is defined in Islamic jurisprudence as “the extraction of the most correct opinion through the exchange of opinions between people of competence and justice within the controls of the Sharia.” Ibn Ashur emphasizes that it is “a total origin of the principles of governance in Islam.”
   As for democracy, Schumpeter defines it as “a competitive mechanism for selecting governing elites through the ballot box,” whose sovereignty is centered on the popular will as the sole source of legislation.
2. Shura derives its legitimacy from explicit Qur’anic texts, some of which have already been mentioned, while democracy is based on a Western philosophical legacy embodied in the works of Rousseau’s “Social Contract” and Montesquieu’s “Separation of Powers.”
   When it comes to the functional similarities between shura and democracy, they look like protective mechanisms and functions.

The common governance mechanisms are:
1- Popular participation, as both systems reject individual monopolization of power.
Shura obliges the ruler to consult with the people, and democracy mandates representative representation.
2- Oversight and accountability. Islam established the principle of “Hisba” (holding the ruler accountable), while democracy has developed mechanisms such as parliamentary interrogations and withdrawal of confidence.
3- Pluralism of opinion, as both systems recognize the legitimacy of disagreement. The religious verse: “My nation’s disagreement is a mercy” corresponds to the principle of party pluralism in democracy.

In terms of protective functions, shura aims to curb tyranny by shifting the decision from the individual to the group, which is in line with John Stuart Mill’s warning against the “tyranny of the majority” in democracy. The two systems also achieve the “public interest” through parallel mechanisms: expert consultation in shura versus specialized parliamentary committees in democracy.

The fundamental differences can be categorized as follows:

1. Frame of reference: The source of legitimacy in Shura is that sovereignty belongs to the Shari’ah (Yusuf: 40), while in democracy, sovereignty belongs to the people, as the general will is the source of legislation.
   As for the limits of change, shura restricts decisions to legal constants (such as hudud and personal status), while democracy gives parliament absolute power to legislate, even if it contradicts previous laws.
2. Conditions of participation, whereby shura is required in the consultant: Knowledge of sharia (Ibn Taymiyyah: “There is no shura with ignorance”), in addition to moral justice.
   Democracy limits the criteria to procedural requirements (age, nationality).
3. In Sudan, the democratic experiment (1986-1989) was aborted due to the conflict between Islamists and secularists, and in Iran, the Guardian Council (made up of jurists) takes precedence over the elected parliament.

In talking about the potential of integration and its conditions, we see three things to note:

1. The theories of combining the two systems, such as the theory of “procedural employment,” where the mechanisms of democracy (elections, parliament) are adopted and restricted to the Islamic value framework, and work to legalize them, as Taha Abdel Rahman did by reformulating democratic concepts in Islamic language and linking them to the objectives of the Sharia, such as justice and freedom.
2. The stormy challenges, chief among them the religious issue, as Sayyid Qutb’s “rule of God” conflicts with the “sovereignty of the people,” the legal issue, as positive laws clash with categorical texts, and the political issue, as democracy is exploited to promote authoritarianism.
3. The conditions for successful integration lie in differentiating between mechanisms and ideology, such as adopting democratic mechanisms (such as voting) and critiquing the accompanying materialist philosophy.
   He represented the constitutional reference by making sharia the primary source of legislation and granting elected institutions the authority to exercise ijtihad in areas of jurisprudence.
   Institutional guarantees such as independent judicial bodies to monitor the constitutionality of laws, and scientific advisory councils that do not obstruct the popular will.

Despite the profound differences between shura and democracy in the sources of legitimacy and the limits of power, we believe that practical integration is possible through:

1. Modernizing the Shura, adopting institutionalization and popular representation, and expanding the circle of advisors to represent all groups.
2. The Islamization of democracy (if you will), as it remains a human system that is subject to development and is neither sacred nor rigidly molded in a way that does not take into account the cultural specificities of human beings, by adjusting its mechanisms to Islamic moral constants and linking popular sovereignty to responsibility before the Shari’ah.
3. The Malaysian model was able to balance Islam and democracy within a constitutional framework.
   The Tunisian experience, if we exclude the current circumstances, is the consensus between Islamists and secularists on the 2014 constitution.
   The biggest challenge remains to overcome the ideological debate in favor of the “deliberative process” that achieves the interests of the people, because “wisdom is the believer’s wandering, wherever he finds it, he is the rightful owner of it.” Shura and democracy are not opposites, but two sides of one human desire, which is to resist tyranny: Resistance to tyranny.

About shurocracy:
It seems that the first to theorize the term “shurocracy” in general was the Algerian Islamic leader Mahfouz Nahnah, head of the Movement of Society for Peace (Hamas), in the context of political dialogue in Algeria in the early 1990s. Nahnah coined the term during a dialogue with the Algerian government in 1991, with the aim of presenting a compromise model that combines Islamic principles with democratic mechanisms, and this came in response to criticisms of Islamists regarding the compatibility between Islam and democracy, as Nahnah argued that “shurocracy” represents a path to avoid polarization between religious extremism and secularism. Nahnah believed that “shuraqocracy” represents a path to avoid polarization between religious extremism and secularism. Nahnah proposed the term to express a system of government that applies the principle of “shura” (as an Islamic origin) through modern democratic mechanisms such as elections and pluralism. Later, German diplomat Murad Hoffmann (a convert to Islam) developed the term in his book “Islam in the Third Millennium” (2000), considering it as a model for contemporary Islamic governance, but Nahnah is considered the most prominent in spreading the concept politically.
Ghassan Khaled argues in his book “Badocracy: A Sociological Reading of Arab Democracies, argues that the issue of applying Western democracy in Arab societies is that the Arab social and political environment is fundamentally different from the West, making the transfer of the Western democratic model a “failed projection.”
Khaled rejects the reduction of democracy to elections and the circulation of power, asserting that the absence of consideration for the social environment (such as tribal and religious structure) and historical circumstances makes it a form without substance. He therefore proposes bidocracy as an alternative concept as a political system that reflects the Arab “tribal mentality,” where political practice is managed through mechanisms such as “political tribalism” (as sociologist Khaldoun al-Naqib called it), thus refuting attempts to reconcile Western democracy with Arab concepts of tribalism.
In his book “Badocracy,” Ghassan Khaled portrays the integration of Islamic Shura and Western democracy as a failed project based on the different social and historical structures between Arab and Western societies.
While his critique of formal democracies in the Arab world is a valuable analysis, his generalization of the “impossibility of integration” needs to be scrutinized from the perspective of Islamic political thought and historical and contemporary experiences.
The reduction of democracy to the Western model is evident in his thesis. Khaled overlooks the fact that democracy as a system of values (equality, participation, accountability) is not exclusive to the West.
In the Islamic tradition, the principles of shura as a mechanism for collective decision-making.
The pledge of allegiance is a consensual contract between the ruler and the ruled, and justice is the ultimate goal of governance (as Umar ibn al-Khattab said: “When did you enslave people when their mothers were born free?”).
These principles show intrinsic compatibility with democratic values, as Abdelwahab El-Messiri emphasizes that democracy is a “neutral mechanism” that can be embodied in different cultural contexts.
The book neglects the historical development of the institution of Shura. In the Prophet’s era, consultation was in the invasions (Badr, Uhud), and in the era of the Rashidun caliphs: The mechanism of choosing the caliph through the people of the solution and contract (community representation), and in the Abbasid era: The “Diwan of Grievances” for accountability.

This development demonstrates the flexibility of the shura and its ability to absorb contemporary governance mechanisms, as Mohamed Abed al-Jabri argues that the shura possesses “the capacity for institutional modernization.”
The integrative model, or what is possible and desirable, is manifested by:

1. Value complementarity, as shura and democracy intersect on key pillars: The Islamic pledge of allegiance and the democratic social contract establish a legitimacy based on popular consent.
   Like justice as a common goal (Ibn Taymiyyah says: “God will support a just state, even if it is an infidel…”).
   Like accountability, the command to do good and forbid evil parallel democratic accountability mechanisms.
2. Institutional integration, a hybrid model can be built through basic democratic mechanisms: Free elections, multiparty pluralism, separation of powers.
   It is also through consultative controls, such as the establishment of a “Supreme Values Council” (elected by scholars, specialists and civil society representatives) to:
   – monitor the consistency of laws with the purposes of Sharia (justice, dignity, public interest).
   – Preventing the enactment of laws that contradict the moral values of the majority without imposing a totalitarian religious vision.
   Instead of rejecting integration, a “gradual democracy” that takes into account specificity could be adopted. In a first stage, decentralization and local councils would be strengthened, an intermediate stage would develop civil society institutions, and an advanced stage would be full democratization with cultural controls.

As Abdelilah Belkeziz explains in “The Question of Democracy in the Arab World,” Morocco offers a practical example of this gradual but faltering process.
“The essence of democracy (participation, accountability) does not contradict Islam,” Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi asserts in his book “On the Jurisprudence of the Islamic State”. The problem is in linking it to atheism or moral decay.”
Rashid Ghannouchi believes that “Shura is the historical root of democracy, and democracy is the historical development of shura in the modern era” (in his book “Public Freedoms in the Islamic State”).
Khaled’s thesis offers a useful critique of formal democracy, but it goes too far:

1. Turning failures into a cultural imperative.
2. Freezing the shura in a historical model that cannot evolve.
3. Denying the resilience of societies.
   Therefore, we at Syrian Future Movement believe that the proposed integrative model is a creative synthesis between Islamic value roots and modern mechanisms, as epitomized by Malik Ben Nabi: “We do not import the machines and neglect the soul, nor do we adhere to the soul and reject the machines.”

Conclusion:
We claim that Syrian Future Movement was the first to launch the term “shurocracy” in Syria, through a speech delivered by its president, Dr. Zaher Badrani, after the liberation from the former Syrian regime, during the first national workshop held by Syrian Future Movement on Friday, 21/02/202, in the “Inana” hotel in the heart of the Syrian capital Damascus, where it included various Syrian segments of national political, media and social figures, representatives of political entities and parties from all provinces, especially from the city and countryside, in addition to Syrian Future Movement cadres in the north, and the ninth table of the workshop was entitled: Shuraqocratic Transformation.

Based on this position, we at the Research and Studies Department of Syrian Future Movement recommend the following:

1. The constitutional foundation and the balance between identity and citizenship, by avoiding excessive centralization, and drawing inspiration from the lesson of the United Arab Republic (1958-1961), which failed due to the elimination of Syrian specificity in favor of the centralized Egyptian model. Therefore, we believe that the new constitution should enshrine a cooperative centralization as we proposed in a previous paper published on our official website entitled: “Centralization, decentralization and the third option between them,” which recognizes the diversity of the Syrian regions, as it recognizes the diversity of Syrian regions. In addition to formulating a national identity that combines Islam as a value reference and citizenship as a basis for rights, while avoiding the Baathist model that made the party the “leader of the state” as in Hafez al-Assad’s constitution.
   The establishment of an independent body (elected, not appointed) that monitors the consistency of laws with the purposes of Sharia (justice, dignity, public interest, etc.), without imposing a totalitarian religious tutelage.
2. The Assad regime turned sectarianism into a governing tool through the dominance of Baathist Alawite officers, so the remedy is to dismantle the legacy of “bureaucracy” and build institutions by confronting sectarianism:

• De-politicizing identities through laws that criminalize discrimination.
• The inclusion of all components and agglomerations in power after decades of oppression.
• Reforming the military and security forces by transforming the military from an instrument of repression (as in the 2011 crackdown on protests) to a neutral national institution.

1. Participatory consultation mechanisms, moving from theory to practice through local councils as a basis, and applying the “progressive democracy” model that starts with empowering local councils (as in Morocco’s experience), especially after the fragmentation of centralized authority.
   In addition to ensuring the representation of all currents (Islamist, secular, Kurdish, etc.) in the next parliament through a proportional electoral system that prevents the dominance of a tyrannical majority, with quotas for women and youth in the electoral lists.
   This mechanism should be revived by establishing independent advisory councils (scholars, unions, academics) that bring expert opinion into decision-making, away from the security monopoly.
2. The economy, and making justice a guarantee of stability by fighting the rentier economy, by redistributing wealth and enacting progressive taxation. In addition to supporting small businesses in marginalized areas. Transparency in resources by empowering a national anti-corruption body, with popular oversight of reconstruction contracts.
3. Foreign policy and the need to balance between specificity and openness by avoiding the policies of the former regime that made Syria an arena for regional conflicts (such as intervention in Lebanon and Iraq), and continuing to adopt the vision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed today by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which is based on building relations with neighboring countries (Jordan, Turkey, Iraq) through mechanisms such as “meetings of the Syrian Ring States”, while preserving sovereignty.
4. Renewing religious discourse by avoiding polarization, not repeating the Assad regime’s mistake of using religion to justify power, adopting a model that separates political action from direct religious reference, and focusing on common values (justice, transparency).
   This entails reforming all education by introducing curricula that promote the values of consultation and constructive criticism, rather than a culture of blind obedience.
5. The guarantees of sustainability, the transition from chaos to tolerance, and the establishment of a comprehensive and genuine national reconciliation that avoids revenge, while strictly guaranteeing the rights of Christians, Alawites, and Druze through laws that criminalize takfir, as a sign of the state’s health and strength.
   Finally, create media platforms that reflect a plurality of opinion, away from the former regime’s monopoly on media.

The Syrian experience requires a recognition that tyranny has destroyed the fabric of society, and that the remedy is not a new tyranny in the name of religion, but a new social contract that combines justice and freedom.

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