Introduction:
In 2025, Syria embarked on an unprecedented transitional phase following the fall of a regime that had ruled for over five decades. The question that arises is: Why are Syrian political parties still almost entirely absent from the country’s political life? Why haven’t we witnessed the anticipated surge in the establishment of political entities that Syrians have long awaited?
Field data indicates that the Syrian landscape today—a little over a year after the major change—is almost devoid of effective political parties. This apathy cannot be attributed to a single factor; rather, it represents a complex interplay of historical roots, psychological factors, cultural patterns, and a legislative vacuum, all seemingly converging on a single formula: a chronic fear of organized political affiliation.
Psychological Analysis of Apathy:
Political parties underwent a distorted transformation under the authoritarian regime that ruled Syria for over five decades. The ruling Ba’ath Party became an instrument of absolute domination, while other parties within the National Progressive Front were reduced to mere names devoid of any real political action.
This experience left not just a superficial wound, but also produced what can be called “chronic organizational fear,” which can be broken down into three overlapping psychological layers:
First, a phobia of party affiliation. In the collective memory of Syrians, party membership did not mean democratic participation, but rather the means by which an individual was transformed into a “political muzzle.” Freedom of expression was absent in the Ba’ath Party or the regime, and this extended to the licensed opposition parties that joined the National Progressive Front, where the final word belonged to the “mother” party.
There, a deep psychological shock crystallized. The party was not the tool for shaping public opinion that propaganda had promised, but rather an instrument of silencing dissent.
Second, a crisis of trust, where “the party is a mirror of political dynasties.” In the absence of any genuine party practice, the party model was imposed as a miniature platform for despotism, internally replicating the same paternalistic authority pattern that is criticized externally. This conflation of party structure and the behavior of the ruling power transformed the party process in the Syrian political unconscious into a “reproduction of despotism.” In other words, “Syrian parties are a mirror and reflection of political dynasties and political money, not a reflection of the youth who aspire to freedom, social justice, and the rule of law.”
Third, the scarcity of reward. To simplify this, we can assume that, psychologically, human behavior is evaluated according to two principles: an action either produces an immediate reward or prevents immediate punishment.
The former regime, through its repression, produced a formula in which the political process was limited to one type of action: avoiding punishment. Rewards for free party participation were nonexistent, while punishment was certain. Thus, political life was reduced to a system of endless obedience.
Fourth, the cultural and societal legacy. Here, it cannot be overlooked that the word “party” in Arabic originally carries connotations of severity, rigidity, and strictness. This semantic dimension is reflected at the level of collective consciousness, where the idea of “political organization” has come to carry a heavy burden of marginalization and coercion, which has made aversion to it an unconscious cultural response.
Social Analysis:
It is a striking paradox that the social movement in Syria today does not reflect a general political apathy. Although the interim constitutional declaration stipulated the guarantee of freedom to form political parties, this freedom remained contingent upon the issuance of a new law regulating their activities.
Despite this, new media outlets flourished, civil society movements emerged, and social debates and protests erupted concerning various issues. Some platforms even began operating without waiting for a law to regulate them.
But why hasn’t this movement translated into political parties?
The answer lies in the fact that the social context that sparked the revolution was fundamentally different from the context of institution-building.
The decades-long presidential economy did not allow for the emergence of a financially independent middle class. Instead, it led to the rise of a middle class dependent on loyalty to the regime rather than on production. After the fall of the regime, this class found no path to a natural transition from the position of “political subordinate” to that of “national partner.”
Field and Statistical Evidence:
The Syrians’ reluctance to engage with political parties cannot be understood without considering what scientific opinion polls reveal about the psychological and political state of Syrians today.
A large-scale survey (conducted by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2025) showed that:
- 58% of Syrians said that things were moving in the right direction (some of whom believed that the fall of the Assad regime, the release of detainees, and the improvement in security conditions were the most important reasons for this improvement).
- Nearly two-thirds (66%) believed that a democratic system was the best option for Syria.
- Only about 8% believed in a system without parties or elections.
These figures paint a contradictory picture, reflecting an overwhelming popular desire for democracy (66%) and a complete lack of trust in current institutions. This is also confirmed by ETANA polls (2026), which show that political legitimacy in Syria remains primarily based on the person of the legitimate president, rather than on the institutions that are supposed to oversee the transitional phase. But if we shift from the “leader/institution” approach to the “party system” approach specifically, the Arab Center’s survey reveals that nearly half of Syrians consider existing political parties “ineffective or unrepresentative of their aspirations” (preliminary estimates).
This figure reflects a profound divide: 61% want a democratic system, and approximately 48% want a civil state (compared to 32% who prefer a fully or partially religious state).
The problem, therefore, is not a rejection of democracy, but rather a lack of trust in those who represent it within the party system—a fundamental difference that explains the stagnation of the political landscape despite the social dynamism.
Structural Factors – The Legislative Vacuum and Historical Legacy:
The above is only one of the reasons for the apathy, but we see that there are structural reasons that further entrench it, namely:
The absence of a law regulating political parties. The constitutional declaration stipulated the freedom to form parties but entrusted their implementation to a new law that has yet to be issued. This legal vacuum effectively postpones political party life.
Geographical and political divisions. The unstable security situation, the multiplicity of local forces, and the persistence of geographical and political divisions make the idea of political party life an early challenge for a government still striving to unify the country and consolidate its institutions.
The absence of historically successful party models. Modern Syria has not witnessed a truly national political party with a pure national spirit. The parties that existed were ideological: communist, Arab nationalist, Islamist, or Syrian nationalist, but they were not truly “Syrian” in their orientations and programs. Comparative Experiences:
The issue of “revolting populations turning away from political parties” is not unique to Syria; it has been repeated in other Arab transitions. In the Egyptian experience (2011–2015), following the January 25 Revolution, a significant political vacuum emerged.
This void, created by the collapse of the National Democratic Party and the electoral ban imposed on its members, required filling with a new party-based identity that was previously lacking. This resulted in the return of figures from the old regime (“remnants”) to political life through various channels. Observers at the time explained the situation by stating that “the predicament the state found itself in after the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood regime was the political vacuum resulting from the absence of a political base, which led to the reliance on members of the dissolved National Democratic Party.” Former leaders of the National Democratic Party even declared their “delight at a ruling that allowed its members to run in elections.”
This Arab precedent demonstrates that the state of partisan apathy carries a clear cost. The resulting vacuum will inevitably be filled (or attempted to be filled) by those with experience, money, and connections—that is, by established institutions and figures with traditional influence, even if under new names. The solution is not to ban these entities, but rather to build a strong alternative party system capable of uniting citizens through national bonds that transcend mere loyalties.
In the West, between 1980 and 2008, the membership of major political parties in Western European countries declined by approximately half.
Opinion polls from the previous year showed that 45% of American adults considered themselves “politically independent,” and 60% expressed a desire for the emergence of a new, major third party, while only 27% identified as either Democrat or Republican.
An analysis published by the IPPR (a leading think tank) revealed that the percentage of voters in advanced democracies who reject traditional political parties has doubled in 50 years, reaching 44% by the 2020s. The “Anti-Establishment Index” also shows a rise in anti-establishment sentiment.
Generation Z is the first generation in US history where a majority (56%) does not belong to either the Democratic or Republican parties. This is attributed to deep-seated social, economic, and structural factors, not merely fleeting disillusionment.
Therefore, the Syrians’ disengagement from political parties, in one of its manifestations, is not an “abnormal” or “backward” phenomenon, but rather an indicator of a global trend, as seen in the most established Western political systems. However, the crucial point here is that this crisis is exacerbated in Syria because it has not yet recovered from the legacy of prolonged authoritarianism. Consequently, what is needed today is not a revival of the traditional party system, but a complete redefinition of it to suit the needs of the transitional phase.
The Greatest Danger – The Vacuum Filled by Remnants of the Old Regime:
The above leads us to the most serious problem posed by the current Syrian landscape: the vacuum of political parties is an existential threat to a republican state that cannot detach itself from party politics. Therefore, if the revolutionaries and the new civilian population abandon organized political action, who will fill the political arena?
The experience of several transitions (from post-Nazi Germany to post-2011 Egypt) has proven that old regimes do not disappear overnight. Rather, they transform into remnants of the old regime, possessing networks of influence, money, connections, and administrative experience. In the absence of new and authentic party structures, the old regime will be reproduced in new forms, but this time under different banners and names, some of which may appear modern on the surface, but whose substance is not significantly different from the old one.
This scenario, which we must be wary of, is not hypothetical; it is what we witnessed in the experiences of the Arab Spring (Egypt after 2011–2013). The absence of political parties did not prevent the return of symbols of the old regime to the joints of political life; on the contrary, it helped to reposition them indirectly.
The Greatest Danger – The Vacuum Filled by Remnants of the Old Regime:
The above leads us to the most serious problem posed by the current Syrian landscape: the vacuum of political parties is an existential threat to a republican state that cannot detach itself from party politics. Therefore, if the revolutionaries and the new civilian population abandon organized political action, who will fill the political arena?
The experience of several transitions (from post-Nazi Germany to post-2011 Egypt) has proven that old regimes do not disappear overnight. Rather, they transform into remnants of the old regime, possessing networks of influence, money, connections, and administrative experience. In the absence of new and authentic party structures, the old regime will be reproduced in new forms, but this time under different banners and names, some of which may appear modern on the surface, but whose substance is not significantly different from the old one.
This scenario, which we must be wary of, is not hypothetical; it is what we witnessed in the experiences of the Arab Spring (Egypt after 2011–2013). The absence of political parties failed to prevent the return of figures from the old regime to key positions in political life; on the contrary, it facilitated their repositioning indirectly.
Advantages of Party Activity in the New Syria (and Disadvantages of Abandoning It):
A. Advantages of Party Activity:
Building national institutional legitimacy, instead of leaving legitimacy dependent on the president or traditional actors (as clearly indicated by ETANA data). Parties can shift political loyalty from individuals to programs and principles, provided we ensure the absence of ideological parties.
A platform for policy formulation. The absence of effective parties weakens nation-building efforts and threatens any potential democratic path. Parties allow for a diversity of opinions and institutional oversight of decision-making.
Breaking the elite’s monopoly and achieving fair representation. Parties are practically the only way to represent societal diversity (reflected in the ETANA survey’s divisions between different governorates) in an organized, rather than reactive, manner.
Training new political cadres: Political parties are the only school capable of producing a new generation of leaders who believe in the democratic transfer of power, not inheritance or personal connections.
B. Disadvantages of Retreating from Party Activity:
Paving the way for the return of remnants of the old regime and the scenario of reproducing the old elites. There is no absolute political vacuum, and if it is not filled by the sons of the revolution and civil society, it will be filled by “figures of the old regime who escaped transitional justice,” this time after they have shed their skins.
Exacerbating sectarian and regional divisions: Opinion polls show a sharp divide between predominantly Sunni governorates and minority governorates in terms of trust in the government and services. Organized party dialogue is perhaps the only way to translate this anger into programs, not conflicts.
Weakening oversight of power: Political parties are the only guarantee for transforming “top-down governance” into a process of societal negotiation.
Prolonging instability, because stable party systems are what give legitimacy to governments and support the continuity of the political process even with changes in personnel.
Conclusion:
Based on the above, we in the Syrian Future Movement recommend the following:
- Priority: Enacting a balanced political parties law. This law should be issued urgently upon the convening of Parliament and guarantee freedom of association, along with clear mechanisms to prevent illicit funding and infiltration by remnants of the former regime.
- Establishing a national institute for training party leaders, and long-term training programs to empower a new generation of party leaders in administration, communication, and oversight.
- Encouraging parties to engage in fieldwork and reducing bureaucratic obstacles to their fieldwork in all governorates, while ensuring that this is not exploited for sectarian mobilization.
- Enhancing financial transparency through legislation that requires parties to publish their funding sources quarterly, to prevent the infiltration of old funds into new entities.
- Implementing the principle of youth and women’s quotas internally within parties as a condition for official recognition, to ensure that parties reflect the true diversity of Syria and do not reproduce the traditional power hierarchy.
- Launching a partnership between the government and civil society organizations. To institutionalize a continuous dialogue on national policy priorities, with the participation of emerging political blocs, provided they adhere to transparency and internal democracy.
Finally, the Syrians’ reluctance to engage with political parties may stem from “political despair,” but it also arises from the accumulated legacy of prolonged despotism, which has made party affiliation synonymous in the collective consciousness with submission and silence.
Because the former regime succeeded in cultivating a generation capable of organizing itself within party frameworks—which could mean their success in infiltrating the state through this unstoppable vulnerability—it is the duty of the moment, and the imperative of the new national forces, to remember that the task of forming parties must not be a mere replication of what came before, nor should they shy away from it, leaving it as a weak point for remnants of the old regime to infiltrate. Rather, they must establish and support the formation of non-ideological political and civil entities, based on transparency, accountability, and internal democracy.
If they do not, then those who will will are the ones who have the experience, the money, and the connections, but who have nothing to offer Syria except repeating the experiences that led the country to where it is now.
