Arbitrary detention in Syria

Introduction:

Arbitrary detention represents one of the most serious human rights challenges facing Syria in the post-conflict phase, due to its direct impact on the structure of legitimacy, the concept of citizenship, and the credibility of emerging institutions in the context of political transition. The Syrian Network for Human Rights’ report, issued on August 2, 2025, documenting 109 cases of arbitrary detention during the month of July alone, reveals the continued systematic violation of individual freedoms under the guise of a fragmented authority among multiple actors, including the transitional government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This raises fundamental questions about accountability and governance.

  • Raqqa Governorate recorded the highest number of arrests, followed by Deir ez-Zor and Hasakah, reflecting the level of security centralization in areas controlled by the SDF, against which the report recorded 36 cases of arbitrary detention.
  • The transitional government recorded 12 cases, including five children. This is a remarkable percentage, given that it operates in environments supposedly “supportive of the revolution.” This raises questions about the seriousness of official bodies in respecting fundamental rights.

The legal nature of the violations:
Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.” This internationally enforceable provision is binding on all parties concerned. According to the Network’s report,:

  • Most arrests were carried out without judicial warrants.
  • Detainees were not afforded the right to contact lawyers or their families.
  • The few releases (only 44) were not accompanied by any accountability or transparency. Rather, they included partial releases in Latakia and Homs without any clarification of the legal mechanism or procedural basis.

This means that the arrests took place in legal environments not subject to any independent judicial oversight, reinforcing the hypothesis of a security system fueled by the logic of punishment outside state institutions.

Authoritarian Structure and Security Architecture in the Post-Conflict Phase:
There is a structural shift in the nature of security authority in Syria, from a centralized, authoritarian authority to a transitional, moral, national authority with “decentralized, repressive” characteristics. What is alarming is that the new actors have reproduced the model of arbitrary detention, but under the guise of new slogans. Thus, a “hybrid security architecture” has emerged, consisting of:

  • Local authorities lacking accountability frameworks.
  • Armed forces with diverse ideologies but who agree on managing the security file with a logic of control.
  • Formal or marginal judicial institutions lacking oversight or enforcement tools.

Children’s Rights at the Heart of the Crisis:
The existence of 10 cases of arbitrary detention of children (5 by the transitional government and 5 by the Syrian Democratic Forces) opens the door to a very serious level of specific violations. According to the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, the detention of children should be a measure of last resort and should be carried out according to special procedures that respect their age and psychological needs. However, the report points to the use of children in training camps and their isolation from their families, indicating:

  • A double violation: first, by depriving them of their liberty, and second, by exposing them to the risk of military conscription, as with the SDF.
  • Destruction of the social fabric: It reproduces a generation living in oppression within institutions that do not take into account their developmental needs, and turns children into tools of conflict rather than partners in a peaceful future.
  • Were they conducted by judicial decisions or through political understandings?
  • Were they accompanied by accountability measures for the detaining parties?
  • Were official statements issued clarifying the fates of the detainees or the reasons for their release?

The absence of these answers reinforces “detention as a negotiation tool,” rather than as an institutional practice subject to the law, and reveals the weakness of civil society organizations’ ability to enforce transitional justice standards.

Arrest as a Governance Mechanism in Post-War Syria:

It appears that arbitrary detention is no longer merely an act of authoritarianism, but has transformed into a tool of governance used to control and infiltrate communities and disrupt any emerging civil society. It thus constitutes:

  • A tool for producing collective fear, enabling dominant parties to reengineer societal behavior through “unexpected punishment.”
  • A mechanism for preventing civil organization, as activists and civilians are targeted to dismantle civil society networks.
  • A means of reshaping legitimacy, as arrests are used to impose a single vision of the “national interest,” marginalizing anyone who expresses a dissenting opinion.

Transitional Justice: Between Recommendation and Implementation:
Despite the Network’s call to establish accountability mechanisms, this call remains largely rhetorical and has not yet evolved into a viable implementation plan. This is due to several reasons:

  • The absence of a central Syrian entity across the entire Syrian landscape, along with a lack of influence in Sweida and northeastern Syria, with the legitimacy to oversee accountability.
  • The fragmentation of the human rights file among non-governmental organizations that lack the means to implement it.
  • The absence of effective international pressure on internal parties to ensure security and institutional reform.


Transitional Justice: Between Recommendations and Implementation:
Despite the Network’s call to establish accountability mechanisms, this call remains largely rhetorical and has not yet evolved into a viable implementation plan. This is due to several reasons:

  • The absence of a central Syrian entity across the entire Syrian landscape, with no influence in Sweida and northeastern Syria, with the legitimacy to oversee accountability.
  • The fragmentation of the human rights file among non-governmental organizations that lack the tools for implementation.
  • The absence of effective international pressure on internal parties to ensure security and institutional reform.
  • Therefore, discussions of transitional justice must transcend the procedural level and become part of a broader Syrian vision of the state, including:
  • Building an independent judicial apparatus with authority across the entire Syrian landscape.
  • Codifying security practices.
  • Involving civil society in monitoring and documentation.
  • Activating reporting and rehabilitation mechanisms for victims.

Conclusion:
The Syrian Network for Human Rights’ report, despite its important documentation, needs to be the starting point for a series of strategic actions, including:

  1. Launching an independent national observatory for violations, unaffiliated with any political party, with oversight and legal powers.
  2. Establishing a Syrian Charter for Rights and Freedoms, approved by representatives of political and civil parties in the various areas of control, as a transitional reference.
  3. Encouraging dialogue between the parties controlling the ground with the aim of establishing common red lines that prohibit extrajudicial detention, regardless of the political justifications.
  4. Balanced international pressure should be applied to all parties without selectivity, as highlighting only the regime undermines the credibility of human rights organizations and reinforces the duality of “legitimate violations” among some revolutionary forces.
  5. Linking arbitrary detention to the discussion of state-building, as the state is not built on fear, but on a social contract that allows for pluralism and rejects repression as a tool of political control.


Arbitrary detention in Syria is no longer merely a human rights violation; it has become part of the structural dilemma of the alternative state project. Between the parties claiming revolution and those raising the slogan of self-rule, violations continue, and civilians share vulnerability and fear. Therefore, building a legitimate state will only be achieved by breaking with these practices, opening the door to accountability, and collectively recognizing that stability cannot be achieved without freedom, and that dignity is not a privilege but the essence of the new national contract.

Share it on:

Also read

Reconstructing the Arab Man: From Marginalization to Rebirth

The challenges facing the Arab individual and how he can be reshaped from marginalization to positive transformation.

4 Dec 2025

أنس قاسم المرفوع

The reality of drug trafficking and use in Syria before and after the fall of the Assad regime

The reality of drug trade and use in Syria before and after the fall of the Assad regime and its

4 Dec 2025

إدارة الموقع