The Prophet’s Hijrah and Post-Revolutionary Lessons

Initialization:

The Prophetic Hijrah remains in the memory of the nation as a foundational moment no less important than the revelation of the revelation, as it represented the transition from the suppressed call to the established state, and from individual weakness to a collective organization capable of shaping the future.

It was not an act of individual survival, but a strategic decision based on a civilizational vision, extending its mercy to the believers of Quraysh, the Jews of Medina, and even the hypocrites in Medina.

As symbolic as migration is spiritually, it offers practical lessons for building communities after a breakup.
Today, as the Arab world, and Syria in particular, undergoes revolutionary experiences that have changed structures and concepts, the question of foundation arises again: How do we move from revolution to state?
From anger to social contract?
From the overthrow of tyranny to the project of justice?
Recognizing migration as a moment of political, intellectual, and moral transformation, not just a geographical move, opens the horizon for a deeper understanding of post-revolutionary responsibility.
Just as the migration did not end with reaching the city, neither should the revolution end with the toppling of the Assad regime; its real journey begins with building an inclusive alternative, based on values, and taking lessons from the story, not the image.

Reflections on transformative action and political maturity:

When the Prophet Muhammad left Mecca in 622 A.D. (1 A.H.), he was not only fleeing persecution from the Quraysh, but also announcing a shift in his deep strategic vision! From a call for truth to a civilizational project that seeks to build an inclusive entity that preserves dignity, freedom, and diversity.
Hence, migration marked a turn from a state of vulnerability to a path of disciplined empowerment.
In Mecca, persecution continued for more than 13 years; Samia was killed and Bilal was tortured, forcing some of the companions to migrate to Abyssinia. But the Prophet (peace be upon him) was not frozen in thought by individual and limited reactions; he was planning a non-random migration across the Arabian Peninsula:

• Securing the city as a place of political transformation after the second Bay’ah of Aqaba (621 AD, a year before the Hijrah).
• Secure spatial and social alliances (Ansar).
• Maintaining the secrecy of the route and logistical preparation (choosing a friend, using Abdullah ibn Areeqat as a guide, camouflaging the trail through Asmaa bint Abi Bakr and the young Abdullah ibn Abi Bakr).
  Just like what happened after the Syrians went out in their demonstrations in 2011, when they gradually found themselves in a situation similar to that of the oppressed in Mecca, and by 2012, the revolutionary community began to enter the stage of forced migration to camps inside the country, refugees in neighboring countries, and even European exiles, but the political transformation was not mature at that time, and a question arose: Will we remain in the circle of grievances, or will we move towards entity building?
  We note the prophetic planning versus the revolutionary spontaneity, as the migration was preceded by three years of consultations and preparation during the pilgrimage seasons, then ended with the second sale of Aqaba, which was a “foundational contract” between the Prophet’s leadership and the community of Madinah.
  The migration was not an impulse, but a product of a deep political consciousness.
  
  In the Syrian context, despite the courage of the Hirak, many of the transformations were spontaneous or reactions to blood and violence rather than the result of strategic planning, which allowed unqualified or external forces to fill the vacuum, instead of the transformation being led by a national leadership that enjoyed legitimacy.
  Then the Prophet (peace be upon him) was not preoccupied with revenge against Quraysh, but started directly building the first building blocks of the state:
• The construction of the mosque as a religious, political and social center (622 AD).
• The fraternization between Muhajireen and Ansar to establish a social unity that transcends geography.
• Al-Madinah newspaper (Al-Madinah Constitution) to establish a civil contract based on diversity and complementarity.
  Is the national political project proposed today capable of being a Syrian “city newspaper” that brings together Arabs and Kurds, Muslims and Christians, inside and outside, conservative and civilian?
  Although our experience in the local councils that emerged in 2012-2014 constitutes a first organizational initiative, it did not turn into a sovereign structure, but was weakened by geographical ruptures and military interventions, so we need to feel the importance of moving from the house of vulnerability to the house of organization, from intention to structure.
  The Prophet did not declare a caliphate or absolute control after the Hijrah, but rather focused on building a social base, managing internal conflicts (the presence of the hypocrites, the presence of the People of the Book), and establishing a legitimacy based on sharing.
  In the Syrian case, some pre-liberation parties rushed to quickly propose an “alternative model,” whether in the form of religious or nationalist legitimacy, leading to competing centers of control and a lack of national consensus.
  Immigration was not the end, but the beginning.
  It was not just an exit from oppression, but an entry into responsibility.
  Similarly, the revolution should not stop at the moment of toppling the Assad regime, but go beyond it to the moment of establishing an inclusive national contract that reorganizes values and institutions and places society in the position of a partner rather than a follower.

Syria today is called upon to write its own “city newspaper” that transcends the language of conquest and opens the door to a society based on responsible freedom, organized pluralism, and justice as a governing value rather than a tool of revenge.

From explosion to project:

A revolution is not a moment of transient anger, nor an explosion to be recorded in history, but a state of radical transformation that requires clarity of vision, deep belief in the project, and patience for the gradual process of construction.
This is exactly what was embodied in the Prophetic Hijrah, which was not an act of flight, but a proactive step in establishment, a conscious transition from emotion to action.
Before the Prophet’s migration in 622 AD, there was a gradual movement to create awareness, starting with dawah meetings with the Aws and Khazraj tribes during the pilgrimage seasons (since 620 AD), through the first Aqaba Bay’ah (621 AD), where 12 men from Yathrib pledged faith and victory, and ending with the second Aqaba Bay’ah in which 73 men and two women participated and formed a political base for the migration.
At the beginning of the Syrian revolution in March 2011, the popular movement was characterized by spontaneity and purity, but it lacked a similar progressive mechanism.
There has been no clear Syrian “bay’ah aqaba” that unifies efforts and establishes understandings between revolutionary actors and host communities (such as the clans of Deir ez-Zor, or events in Aleppo and Homs).
As a result, armed forces and liberated areas entered without a political contract, causing some areas to quickly shift from a “revolutionary space” to a “sovereignty vacuum.”
The Companions who migrated to Abyssinia (615-616 AD) and later to Medina did not move with the motive of survival alone, but with the understanding that sacrifice must be in favor of a comprehensive project, and the Prophet refused to migrate to any tribe despite multiple requests (the Kinda tribe, for example), because the place is not enough, but there must be a commitment to the vision and its defense.
Hundreds of thousands of Syrians have been displaced from their areas since 2012 (Homs, Daraya, Aleppo, and later Ghouta…) without a collective post-displacement vision. There was no “political migration” in the prophetic sense, but rather displacement without an inclusive project. Indeed, the Syrian diaspora, despite its potential, still suffers from the absence of an inclusive compass, which raises the question: do we have a pledge of allegiance that transforms Syrian migrants from a state of brokenness to a vanguard of construction?
From emotional victory to institutionalized partnership?
We see in the Hijra that the Prophet did not accept to enter the city as a “strange leader” looking for protection only, but entered it with clear conditions: Leadership, contract, partnership, not blind loyalty.
Ansar were not a “supporting audience” but co-founders.
In the revolution, the relationship between the political and military forces and the local community was weak, or based on tribal or factional loyalty rather than an overarching pact.
Therefore, no real partnerships were built between the “actors” and the “ecosystem”.
In the absence of this relationship, the revolutionary areas were hit twice: Once by bombing and once by infighting.

After the Prophet (pbuh) arrived in Medina, he did not begin by declaring dominance, but by gradually establishing the project:

• First: The construction of the mosque (622 AD) as a spiritual, political and spatial center.
• Second: The fraternization between Muhajireen and Ansar, to address the economic and social divide.
• III: The Journal of Medina, the first civil contract regulating relations between Muslims, Jews and hypocrites.
• Later: The Battle of Badr (624 AD) came two years later, after the stabilization of the home front.

After the liberation of Idlib or eastern Aleppo, the rebels were quick to form governments and councils without providing an inclusive social platform or effective administrative structures.
No “political mosques” were built There were no political mosques, no civil fraternity, and no organized agreements (city sheets). The regions fell into a spiral of service hijacking, conflict of loyalties, and infighting, which weakened the incubator and failed the foundation.

Hijrah is not an act of emergency, but a disciplined vision that takes time, and a revolution, if it is to be empowered, must transform from a feeling to an idea, from a rebellion to a project, from a protest to a contract.

The most important prophetic lesson is that success is not measured by the speed of the fall of the old regime, but by the size of the ability to establish a new project capable of surviving… no matter how late Badr is, so we put the axes of comparison through the following:

1. Gradual Establishment:
   In the Prophetic model, a series of introductions (Hajj encounters, two sales, Hijra, mosque, fraternity, social contract).

In the Syrian reality, areas were suddenly liberated without institutional preparation, and were not preceded or followed by inclusive local charters.

2. Leadership:
   In the Prophetic model, leadership came by acceptance and allegiance, not by force.
   In the Syrian reality, there are multiple actors (civilian and military) without a clear mandate from the people.
3. The umbrella organization:
   In the Prophet’s model, the mosque was a place of worship, consultation, and correspondence, while the Madinah newspaper regulated the relationship between the sects.
   In the Syrian reality, the absence of inclusive institutions has led to fragmentation and the absence of consensus centers.
4. Managing Multiplicity, from the coexistence of Aws and Khazraj to factionalism:
   In the Prophetic model, multiplicity was contained through clear mechanisms and a newspaper that was binding on all parties.
   In the Syrian reality, organized mechanisms were absent, and pluralism turned into a struggle over legitimacy and interests.

From the tensions of the city to the divisions of reality.
Just as the city after the migration was not a paradise free of disagreements, the post-revolutionary phase is not an automatic political paradise. This is where values are tested, intentions are revealed, and solid foundations are built, not in the euphoria of victory.

From this perspective, studying how the Prophet managed internal and external differences after the Hijrah provides a realistic and profound guide for building post-revolutionary societies, including the Syrian case in particular, so we offer five projections to benefit from the anniversary of the Prophet’s Hijrah:

1. Political Hypocrisy, from Abdullah bin Ubayy to the Tools of Civil Disruption:
   In 2 AH (624 AD), after the victory in Badr, Abdullah bin Ubayy began to show apparent loyalty while hiding conspiracy, and turned into the head of the hypocrisy movement in Medina, and the Prophet did not remove him, but controls were put in place to contain his phenomenon and maintain civil peace, while effectively monitoring his behavior and limiting his influence.
   In the liberated areas after 2012, figures and forces emerged that rhetorically topped the revolutionary scene, but in practice they were implementing foreign agendas or emptying the revolution of its content. They were often dealt with by chaos or liquidation, which increased the bleeding in the internal arena.
   The solution was not always to clash, but to build an “environment of resistance to hypocrisy” through transparency, accountability, and strong institutions, as the Prophet did, and this is what needs to be corrected at the current stage.
2. Tribal and religious pluralism, from the Medina Charter to the absence of a Syrian contract:
   In 1 AH, the Prophet approved the Medina Charter, which stipulated that the Jews were “a nation with the believers” with a mutual commitment to protection, justice, and respect. When violations occurred (such as Bani Qinqaa after Badr, then Bani al-Nadir in 4 AH, and Bani Qurayza in 5 AH), the dealings were based on the terms of the newspaper, not on whim or identity.
   On the other hand, the absence of a national contract in the previously liberated areas led to the transformation of diversity from a source of richness to a source of perpetual strife. There was no “Syrian city newspaper” defining the relationship between the components of society, not between Arabs and Kurds, not between Islamists and civilians, and not between insiders and returning refugees. Each group categorized the other based on fears and assumptions, not on clear agreements to be respected.
3. The betrayal of alliances and shifting loyalties, from Bani Qurayzah to foreign intersections:
   During the Battle of Al-Ahzab (5 AH/627 AD), the Quraysh and Ghatafan allied and besieged the city, and as the pressure intensified, the tribe of Bani Qurayzah betrayed its pact and sided with the besiegers, so the Prophet dealt with the betrayal with political and judicial firmness, through an internal trial (led by Saad bin Muaz), not with mob revenge.
   In the years of the revolution, many areas (Ghouta, Aleppo, Daraa…) entered into alliances with multiple parties; some supported, some exploited.
   When some of these forces betrayed their allies in moments of siege or invasion, the opposition had no real tools for accountability or legal response.
4. From confronting the hypocrites to factional fighting:
   The Prophet (peace be upon him) refused to kill Abdullah bin Ubayy even after his dangerous statements (“If we go back to Madinah, we will drive out the weakest from it”), and said: “Let people not talk that Muhammad is killing his companions.”
   He chose to settle the matter with time and internal stabilization, not the sword.
   Since 2014, instead of building political mechanisms to resolve disagreement, and instead of containing disagreement within the framework of an umbrella project, disagreement turned into disintegration, and the revolution lost its compass in front of its public, although it was overcome by the liberation phase, but the consolidation of this dimension still needs greater efforts to ensure its sustainability.
5. Managing Emergencies, From the Siege of the City to the Regional Siege:
   The Battle of Al-Ahzab (627 AD) was the most severe emergency for the city, with the Quraysh army allied with Arab tribes, internal betrayal, and shortage of supplies. However, the Prophet (peace be upon him) chose to dig the trench as a new defensive solution that the island had never known (i.e. creative thinking, not improvisation).
   He also initiated an agreement with the Banu Ghutfan to contain them, without sacrificing the essence of the project.
   On the other hand, areas such as Eastern Ghouta and Aleppo faced similar conditions between 2013-2016: A suffocating siege, dwindling support, and internal division. But the tools of confrontation remained traditional: No alternative model was built, such as independent popular blocs, initiatives to reduce dependence on the outside, or the development of an internal contract to fortify the political front, as the Trench did.

Post-revolution, like post-migration, is not without turmoil, but the lesson is not in the occurrence of turmoil, but in the way it is managed.
Just as the Prophet turned the city’s conflicts into a founding ground, the new Syria can turn its multiplicity into a founding energy, and benefit from its experience during the revolution, if the will is there.
If the Prophet’s migration was the beginning of the road towards establishing a just state, what followed was not a path free of divisions, but rather full of challenges that revealed the project’s mettle and its moral and political solidity.
The revolution is not the victory, it is the declaration of it.
Post-revolution is the true test of political, social and value transformation.

The migration was not only a move from Mecca to Medina, but a qualitative leap from the discourse of advocacy and grievance to full political establishment. This transition actually began in 1 AH with the building of the mosque and fraternization, crystallized in 2 AH with the first military confrontations (the Battle of Badr), and continued until 9 AH when a state capable of negotiating emerged, as in the “Peace of Hudaybiyah” and the “tribal delegations”.

The current stage in Syria stands at a similar threshold. It is no longer possible to confine oneself to the rhetoric of revolution and condemnation of tyranny, but it is required to move towards establishing the state, not as an alternative authority, but as an ideological and social model, but the challenges that need to be studied:

• The new Syria needs a social contract on which to base the state, not a factional division.
• The dilemma of political transit. Just as the Prophet was not just a preacher in Medina, but a founding leader, Syrian elites must evolve from the role of denouncing opposition to that of national architect.
  The migration did not erase the wounding memory, but confronted it with political discretion and moral restraint.
  Here are three pivotal incidents:

1. Prisoners of Badr (2 AH): After the victory, the Companions disagreed on how to deal with the Quraysh prisoners, whether to kill them or ransom them.
   The Prophet (peace be upon him) chose redemption to give an opportunity for forgiveness and to turn the relationship around.

After Assad’s fall, dealing with regime figures and those who participated in crimes will not be simple. Transitional justice does not mean exemption, but rather a gradual process governed by law and society, and not retaliation.

2. The Battle of Uhud (3 AH): Despite the painful defeat and the fall of Hamza, the city did not turn into a vengeful state, nor were the families of the Quraysh tribe arrested in the city.

If tens of thousands of pro-regime Syrians with no blood on their hands return, the new leadership’s responsibility will be to manage coexistence, not settle scores.

3. The Prophet dealt with Zayd ibn Sa’d al-Fihri (one of the leaders of Bani al-Nadhir): After their fall in 4 AH, not everyone was killed, but the tribe was exiled under a clear contract.

This is similar to the need for legal mechanisms to separate those who commit violations from those who are involved in the system without direct culpability.

The transition from revolution to state requires a foundational, not an emotional, mindset. Just as the migration was not completed by arrival, but by organization and moral empowerment, the Syrian revolution needs a new architecture based on coexistence, justice, and pluralism. Transitional justice is not a political option, but a moral imperative that establishes civil peace and protects the revolution from falling into a counter-totalitarianism.

Conclusion:

The Hijrah is a spirit, not a history, and the revolution is a promise, not a moment.
The Hijrah proved that it was not just a geographical move, but a structural transformation in the concept of calling, leadership and society, and it was not a break for a fighter, but the beginning of the establishment of a state capable of justice amidst turmoil, and balance amidst strife.

By the same token, the revolution should not be reduced to the moment of the collapse of tyranny, but rather to the moment when Syrians come together on a common project, where pain becomes awareness, diaspora becomes determination, and difference becomes inspiration rather than division.

Migration has given us a clear roadmap:

• From vulnerability to empowerment through patience and planning.
• From tribal division to the contract of citizenship via Al Madinah newspaper.
• From personal vengeance to institutionalized justice through the redemption of prisoners and the trial of traitors.
• From nostalgia for the past to engineering the future with new values that govern relationships rather than passions.

Who will write our “newspaper”?
, who will build our “political mosque”?
, who will turn the diaspora into a base?
, and who will dare to establish a state that judges rather than retaliates, holds people accountable rather than excludes, and includes rather than reproduces what has fallen?

Because the migration was a moral and political resurgence from the heart of the ordeal, today we must evoke it, not in speeches or commemorations, but in the design of constitutions, the arrangement of the relationship between powers, the form of justice, and the formulation of the next Syrian dream.
Having drawn this intellectual map from migration to the future of Syria, it is appropriate to conclude with a set of practical recommendations that serve as a guide for intellectuals, activists, policymakers, and civil society:

A. Intellectual and political recommendations:

1. Adopting the migration model as a transformative framework for post-revolutionary thinking, not as a symbolic moment, but as a strategic guide for managing the transition from vulnerability to empowerment, from chaos to establishment.
2. Preparing a foundational national document (“Syrian City Newspaper”) that organizes the relationship between the social and political components on the basis of justice, pluralism, and equal citizenship.
3. Focusing on building the state on values rather than revenge, and drawing inspiration from the Prophet’s stances on the prisoners of Badr and the betrayal of the Banu Qurayzah as examples of the balance between justice and wisdom.
4. Utilizing the diaspora as a founding force, not just a humanitarian issue, and turning Syrians in exile into the vanguard of new state-building by empowering them with political participation and institutional support.
   

B. Institutional and legal recommendations:

1. The establishment of an independent transitional justice body that includes judges, activists and representatives of victims, which oversees investigation and accountability, and provides guarantees for fair reconciliation, which has been done, thank God, but needs to be strengthened.
2. Launching an open national dialogue that will continue at least until the drafting of the new constitution, because consensus precedes the text, and mutual recognition is the basis of any political construction.
3. Empowering local councils and strengthening their legitimacy from the grassroots, through free election mechanisms, institutional training, and linking them to discussions of the national public contract.
4. Protecting civil space from the dominance of weapons or ideological exclusion, and emphasizing that the next state should be based on the law, not an extension of the authority of factions or clans.
   

C. Educational and cultural recommendations:

1. Include the concepts of migration and the civil state in alternative education curricula as a means of raising a generation that internalizes the meaning of justice and participation rather than loyalty and fear.
2. Producing visual and written works that promote the spirit of migration as a compass for building Syria, documentaries, brochures, drama series, or digital visual content.
3. Commemorate the anniversary of migration as a time for renewed national debate, and hold local and international intellectual forums or conferences related to it.

Finally, what we need today is someone who thinks with the mind of immigration, not exile, who builds with the hand of prophecy, not the hand of booty, and who realizes that victory is not in the fall of walls, but in building the common house.