Islam…extremism or moderation?

Sayyid Qutb and Mahmoud Muhammad Taha as a Model

Introduction

Perhaps the use of the term “moderation” in Islamic thought began with the verse, “And thus We have made you a middle nation” (Al-Baqarah, 143). According to Arkoun, “Historically, a humanistic tendency with a secular tinge emerged in Islam in the early Middle Ages. However, this humanism was aborted starting in the eleventh century AD for historical reasons… not because God said so… social actors (i.e., humans) are the ones who say that” ([ii]). However, we can say that since the beginning of the twentieth century, calls began to choose the method and term “moderation and centrism” through the masters of the reformist school, starting with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh in particular. The use of this term bore the character of renewal while preserving the Islamic identity against the colonial Western identity ([iii]). Then, after the stage of independence, and the subsequent emergence of nationalist governments, and with it the rise of jihadist movements that broke free from the grip, and were not like the Saudi example with “The Brothers of He Who Obeyed God,” calls for “moderation and centrism” emerged in a more expansive form, and became so widespread that we can consider them to have become a contemporary doctrine, so that this doctrine became, as it seems, a response to calls for excommunication ([iv]), then jihad, violence, and extremism. Here, these calls can be classified into two main streams:

1- The Islamic movement and the “awakening” phase, most prominent among its figures being Muhammad al-Ghazali and, later, Yusuf al-Qaradawi ([v]).

2- The position of the official authorities ([vi]), which chose to embrace calls for moderation and centrism for several reasons, including:

A- To combat jihadist movements ([vii]).

B- Out of hypocrisy toward the West or fear ([viii]). Otherwise, the choice of moderation was not based on conviction, nor was it a form of support for one ideology against another.

C- To ward off the accusation of terrorism and its scarecrow (through support or proselytizing).

D- To assume its cloak as a pretense and cover, while secretly supporting other incubators for various purposes.

The Problem Is Not Heritage

This complex reality, with its combination of Salafi, Salafi-jihadist, Sufi, moderate, and authoritarian movements—if we ignore the Shiite aspect due to its uniqueness and its disconnect with the Sunni context—has become a major factor in intellectual and religious conflict. It has even divided people between “moderates” and “extremists,” fostering both camps. Each group claims to represent Islam alone. The extremists among them cite evidence from the Qur’an, the Sunnah, heritage, and history, while the moderates likewise cite evidence from the Qur’an, the Sunnah, heritage, and history. Each group seeks to gain the exclusive right to speak on behalf of Islam, while seeing the other as contradicting the truth ([ix]).

To address this issue, we will address the foundations and break them down into three levels:

1. The sacred text (the Qur’an and the authentic Sunnah).
2. The jurisprudential heritage.
3. The historical experience (from the time of Abu Bakr’s accession until the collapse of the Caliphate in 1924).
4. The Religious Text

By examining the religious text, we can extract evidence relied upon by extremists and evidence relied upon by moderates. An example that demonstrates the difference in outcomes from the religious text is “the practical distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims.”

A. The Qur’an, and we will cite only one example for clarification. Extremists cite the verse, “There has certainly been for you an excellent example in Abraham and those with him, when they said to their people, ‘Indeed, we are disassociated from you and from whatever you worship other than God.'” (Surat al-Mumtahanah: 4), as evidence of disassociation from all non-Muslims and even hostility toward them.[x] And the verse, “And never will God grant the disbelievers a way over the believers.” (Surat al-Nisa’: 141) as evidence of the impermissibility of non-Muslims sharing power.[xi]

These verses and others can be considered a convincing religious argument for the extremists of our time.

These verses, and many others, are used by extremists of our time as a religious argument that must be adhered to.

Meanwhile, we see moderates and centrists interpreting the previous verses of Surat al-Nisa’ in a way that removes them from the extremists’ connotations. And their outcomes ([xii]).

B. As for the Prophetic Sunnah, whether authentic or mutawatir, we can here cite some hadiths as evidence, such as the hadith: “Expel the polytheists from the Arabian Peninsula” (Sahih al-Bukhari), the hadiths about “killing the apostate” ([xiii]), the hadiths about the blinding of the eyes of the Arabs ([xiv]), and other hadiths that extremists use as evidence for their practices.

Meanwhile, moderates cite the Prophet’s statement to one of his leaders: “If they accept the dhimma contract, inform them that they have what Muslims have and are liable for what Muslims are liable for” ([xv]), the hadiths about the Prophet’s proposal to give a third of Medina’s produce as jizya to the Ghatafan tribe for abandoning the Quraysh alliance on the Day of the Trench, the incident of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, and other hadiths that they use as religious foundations for their doctrine.

2- The Jurisprudential Heritage:

Let us take one influential example from the national context: (dealing with non-Muslims). We see extremists issuing fatwas that prohibit the construction of churches in Muslim lands. And its renewal ([xvi]), and fatwas prohibiting non-Muslims from assuming power ([xvii]).

As for the moderates, you will see them citing the opinion of some jurists who permit the construction of churches in Muslim lands ([xviii]), and the permissibility of seeking assistance from non-Muslims for anything less than the supreme caliphate, because it is a caliphate from the Prophet ([xix]). Given its nonexistence in our time, non-Muslims may assume all positions as long as the interest allows it.

3- The Historical Experience (From the accession of Abu Bakr to the fall of the caliphate).

The author of the study agrees with Dr. Hosni Nasr that “Islamic civilization was characterized by a historical tendency” ([xx]). From here, we will see extremists or hardliners—the researcher does not consider the difference between the two terms here—cite, for example, the case of Abu Bakr al-Siddiq’s fight against those who refused to pay zakat ([xxi]), and their evidence from the case of Khalid ibn al-Walid and the accusation of Umar ibn al-Khattab that his sword was brittle ([xxii]), and Abu Bakr’s response that he They are burdensome to the enemies of God ([xxiii]), and you will see them citing the killing of al-Ja’d ibn Dirham as evidence for the permissibility of killing innovators ([xxiv]).

In contrast, you will see moderates citing Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz’s suspension of jihad and his failure to collect the jizya from those who converted to Islam ([xxv]). They will also see them citing Umar ibn al-Khattab’s stance on Khalid ibn al-Walid and his dismissal of him, in addition to the participation of Christians in Saladin’s army ([xxvi]), for example.

There is no certainty.

On this short journey, we can say:

First, both options, “extremism” and “moderation,” have a precedent and evidence. Therefore, through an objective reading, we can claim that religion (textually, jurisprudentially, and historically) is replete with references to both sides. If we remove our partisanship and intellectual prejudices, we will arrive at the following conclusion: We cannot judge an extremist as extremist, nor a moderate as corrupt. This is because the extremist claims to be applying his religion, following his heritage, and completing his history, and because the moderate sees himself as such. In the religious context, the only authority to decide is the possessor of the religion, namely God Almighty, since the connection between heaven and earth was severed with the death of the Messenger of God (peace be upon him), who had the exclusive right to speak on behalf of God Almighty. If deciding the matter requires an external authority whose judgment is acceptable, then it becomes difficult to decide which of the two options is the religious and jurisprudential objective that is consistent with the organic history of the nation. The matter becomes dependent on the convictions and choices of Muslims.

Between Sayyid Qutb and Mahmoud Muhammad Taha

Here, the example clearly demonstrates that moderation and extremism are human choices, and that there is no divine certainty regarding the preference for one over the other. This is demonstrated through two figures who represented a similar case in intellectual influence and practical interaction with them:

1- Sayyid Qutb:

Sayyid Qutb was executed for his ideology—in addition to his opposition to Gamal Abdel Nasser—based on declaring regimes and peoples infidels. Although Sayyid Qutb’s rhetoric was literary and rhetorical, the generality of his words gave an indication of declaring Muslim society infidels, such as his statement: “When the truth of ‘there is no god but God’ is established… only then does this religion begin to establish systems and establish laws… When they call people to re-establish this religion, they must first call them to embrace the faith, even if they call themselves Muslims” ([xxvii]).

Sayyid describes everything around him; Even mosques and gatherings of knowledge, remembrance, and preaching are considered jahiliyyah, in a clear generalization. He says: “Today we are in a state of jahiliyyah similar to the jahiliyyah that Islam experienced, or even darker. Everything around us is jahiliyyah: people’s perceptions, beliefs, traditions, and cultural resources, their arts and literature, their laws and regulations. Even much of what we consider Islamic culture, Islamic references, and Islamic philosophy is also a product of jahiliyyah” ([xxviii]).

2- Mahmoud Muhammad Taha

He was also executed ([xxix]) for his idea, in which he decided that Islam is merely the Meccan state, which calls for religion devoid of all other attributes, and calls for virtues, tolerance, forgiveness, and purification. As for the Prophet’s civil state, it is an interaction with reality that does not bind us. It is an exceptional version of the first state due to the historical context. The Meccan state is the origin of Islam, in which the following verses were revealed: “And say, ‘The truth is from your Lord. So whoever wills – let him believe; and whoever wills – let him disbelieve.'” (1:11) “So remind [them]; you are only a reminder; you are not a controller over them.” Taha believes that the recipients of the prophetic message, such as the Quraysh, rejected the call and even opposed it through war and disobedience. They conspired to kill the Prophet himself, even forcing him to emigrate. Hence the need for the branch verses appeared, which are the verses of jihad, which are represented by “And fight them until there is no more persecution and religion is for God,” then came the prophetic hadith “I was commanded to fight the people until they testify that there is no god but God.” The verses of the branches revealed in Medina abrogated the verses of the fundamentals revealed in Mecca. These were temporarily abrogated by the historical context of the seventh century CE, which does not mean they will be universalized forever outside that context. Therefore, according to Taha, our time is the time of the revelation of the verses of the fundamentals, where “there is no compulsion in religion.” Taha called this “the second message of Islam,” which, in his view, is the fundamental message. He wrote a book bearing the same name ([xxx]), in which he addressed topics that answered the questions he raised. This is evident in the titles of the fifth chapter of his controversial book, which are:

• Jihad is not a fundamental principle of Islam
• Slavery is not a fundamental principle of Islam
• Capitalism is not a fundamental principle of Islam
• Inequality between men and women is not a fundamental principle of Islam
• Polygamy is not a fundamental principle of Islam
• Divorce is not a fundamental principle of Islam
• The veil is not a fundamental principle of Islam
• A society in which men are isolated from women is not a fundamental principle of Islam

The question now is: Why did Mahmoud Muhammad Taha’s idea not spread? The ideas of Sayyid Qutb, may God have mercy on him, spread among Muslims. Both figures watered their ideas with their blood. The idea fell with the fall of the body, contradicting Ghassan Kanafani’s statement that it is the body that falls, not the idea. Let us ask the question again: Why did Sayyid Qutb’s idea triumph over Taha’s?

It may be true to say that the marketing by the Islamic movement (the Sahwa), which controlled a vast swathe of the Islamic world, favored Sayyid’s idea over Taha’s. However, in my opinion, there is another reason, which is the Islamic imagination’s refusal to accept the idea of ​​stripping heritage of its sanctity and its refusal to break with the entire Islamic context: its text, biography, caliphate, jurisprudential heritage, and history. Consequently, Mahmoud Taha’s idea became imperative to break away from Islamic identity and embrace a loose, unstructured, critical mindset ([xxxi]). Given that the scientific and cultural community, due to political tyranny, will not allow intellectual pluralism; Choosing to isolate oneself and seek solutions from within the Islamic tradition (text, heritage, or history) will be the most acceptable option for Muslims. Therefore, the issue is essentially a matter of self-interest!

Why do we choose moderation and centrism?

We choose it because we want to, we see the benefit([xxxii]) in it, and we rally supporters around it with arguments for it. Otherwise, we might be defeated by extremist calls for many reasons, including:

1. Fighting Islam([xxxiii]).
2. Extremism against everything Islamic([xxxiv]).
3. Imprisoning scholars, especially Salafis among them([xxxv]).
4. A sense of inferiority complex, which allows these ideas to permeate people and spread among them the idea of ​​”religious superiority”([xxxvi]), especially if all of this is supported by extremists on the other side([xxxvii]).

Conclusion

I conclude with two points:

The first point is the glaring example in France of using secularism alone to prevent Muslim women from wearing the jilbab, to the point that French schools in Morocco banned Muslim women from entering their schools if they wore the jilbab ([xxxviii])!

This situation will be responded to solely from a secular perspective, and it will be defended solely from a secular perspective, given that French laicism is different from American secularism, for example. American secularism is present in all areas and will most likely be confined to education, politics, and simple, marginal matters. In France, however, the effectiveness of secularism extends to public affairs, dress, and freedoms ([xxxix]). Therefore, ideology, whether religious or non-religious, will provide evidence for and against something. Hence, the necessity of continuing to broaden our perspectives toward non-ideological outlets.

The second point is that we must first acknowledge that the possessor of religion conceals himself from us ([xl]), and God Almighty or a Messenger from Him informs us; It is the only thing that separates us all, and in this state of obscurity, the claim that Islam monopolizes it will be an unsubstantiated claim by any movement, without evidence or argument. Therefore, we can say the following:

• Moderation is a rational approach and choice, not a religious one. It is more of a personal choice that we accept, because the alternative is irrational and uninterested, as we see it as a society or individuals.

For example, killing an apostate in our time is impossible to implement, or even to disclose, given the triumph of liberalism and individual freedom, its sanctification, and the prevalence of unbridled social media.

• Hassan Hanafi argues that “the right and the left are not two distinct intellectual positions, but rather two trends in interpretation” ([xli]), meaning that moderation is a reading and approach shared by all religions and religious and even non-religious movements, just as extremism is.
• It can be said, “Just as extremists feed off each other, so moderates strengthen themselves off each other.”
• The necessity of thinking outside the realm of religion about the importance of moderation, even if we claim that this view is at the core of religion, so that the question of the moment arises: Is there a realistic interest in extremism, whatever its nature, or is there an interest in moderation? Will the world be more free, dignified, prosperous, and prosperous with the victory of extremist calls? Or is moderation the cure for all ills?
• With this approach, we move away from the idea of ​​a “religious conflict” between moderation and extremism, in which one may prevail relatively over the other, or may create a kind of fragmentation and disintegration of Islam as a global religion into multiple religions.

There is no doubt that any human action will be flawed, whether in its incorrect, immature, and incomplete concept, or in its implementation, which may fall short of idealism. However, to resolve the dilemma of attacking moderation with its negatives, the negatives of moderation must be placed within a table opposite the negatives of extremism, and the rationale for balancing them must be explained. The negatives of democracy, such as the participation of the rabble in decision-making and the influx of political funds to win votes, are in no way comparable to the negatives of tyranny, oppression, monopolizing the understanding of religion, controlling power, and subjugating human will. Hence, the wisdom of the saying, “Democracy is the best of all bad choices!” ([xlii]) is considered valid.

• Tyrants must not exploit moderation out of hypocrisy and fighting religion itself, as this would be considered a true setback for moderation. Rather, moderation must be an ideal idea that governs and is not governed. Therefore, true moderation must be resistant to being extremist in itself and moderate in name!

From here, and in accordance with the vision and approach of the Syrian Future Movement, we recommend that moderation be a realistic, self-interested choice that pulls the rug out from under the feet of extremists, whoever they may be. We must extend our hand as Muslims to all moderates, across all religious and non-religious groups, and avoid clashing with those who have adopted an extremist ideology in a religious sense, as this may be considered a religious doctrine. We must focus on realism and legitimate interests, engaging with them rationally and for self-interest, not religiously.

Researcher: Jumaa Muhammad Lahib

Research and Studies Department

Religious Office

Syrian Future Movement

Footnotes:

• [i] Hajj Hamad believes that the moderation in the verse indicates a geographical, not an intellectual, moderation. Jihad is linked to location, and therefore jihad only during the time of the Prophet and after him is not jihad. See: Muhammad Abu al-Qasim Hajj Hamad, The Intellectual and Civilizational Crisis in the Current Arab Reality, Dar al-Hadi, Beirut, 2004, 229.
• [ii] Muhammad Arkoun, Secularization and Religion: Islam, Christianity, and the West, Dar al-Saqi, Beirut, 3rd ed., 1996, 41.
• [iii] See: Charles Adams, Islam and Renewal in Egypt, translated by Abbas Mahmoud al-Akkad, Committee for Authorship, Translation, and Publication, Cairo, 1935, pp. 24, 25. Also see for more information: Al-Urwa al-Wuthqa magazine, article: “Why was the newspaper published?”, p. 6.
• [iv] This can be proven by the book “Preachers, Not Judges,” which was written under the supervision of the second Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Hudaybi, and which was a response to the excommunication of Muslims. Abu al-A’la al-Mawdudi: For those who uttered the Shahada but did not complete the rest of their Islamic imagination, see: Preachers, Not Judges (A Response to al-Mawdudi) – E3tidal
• [v] See, for example, al-Qaradawi’s books: “The Islamic Awakening Between Denial and Extremism” and “Contemporary Ijtihad Between Discipline and Disintegration.”
• [vi] Evidence can be drawn from the government’s support for Sheikh Muhammad Metwally al-Sha’rawi, and the appointment of Muhammad Hussein al-Dhahabi as Minister of Endowments. In Syria, the example is clear with the government’s support for the late Mufti Ahmad Kuftaro and Muhammad Sa’id Ramadan al-Buti.
• [vii] We find this clearly in al-Buti’s book “Jihad in Islam,” in addition to his book “Non-Sectarianism: The Most Dangerous Heresy Threatening Islamic Law.”
• [viii] This was clearly demonstrated in Syria in the support for Sufi movements, while the Salafi movements were limited for fear of being accused of supporting al-Qaeda after the invasion of Iraq, since Sufism is considered a moderate religious aspect, even if it is not in reality!
• [9] This is perhaps most evident with Muhammad Zahid al-Kawthari (d. 1952 CE) and his confrontational output with Salafis and non-sectarians, and on the other side, to this day, with al-Adnani, al-Maqdisi, al-Qanibi, and others.
• [x] See Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s book “The Religion of Abraham, the Call of the Prophets and Messengers, and the Methods of Tyrants in Diluting It and Distracting Preachers from It,” published on Salafi-jihadist websites and not yet in print.
• [xi] See Ibn Baz’s fatwa on this matter: The Ruling on Seeking Help from Infidels for the Interest of Muslims (binbaz.org.sa)
• [xii] This interpretation was narrated from Ali ibn Abi Talib via Yasba’ al-Hadrami. Rashid Rida, author of “Al-Manar,” offers a subtle interpretation, stating that guardianship is for this world and the Hereafter, but subject to conditions that, if met by infidels, would lead them to take over this world. See: Tafsir Al-Manar, vol. 5, 466.
• [xiii] Narrated by Muslim in his Sahih: “By Him besides whom there is no god, the blood of a Muslim man who bears witness that there is no god but Allah and that I am the Messenger of Allah is not permissible to be shed, except for three: one who abandons Islam, one who separates from the community…”
• [14] In the hadith of the Arab tribe who came to him in Medina and surrounded it, he said: “If you went out to our camels and took some of their urine and milk, then they did so. They woke up and attacked the shepherds, killed them, drove away the camels, and apostatized from Islam. So the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, sent after them and brought them. He cut off their hands and feet, gouged out their eyes, and left them in Al-Harrah until they died.” (As-Silsilah As-Saheehah) [15] See: Rashid al-Ghannushi, Citizenship Rights, International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993, 83.
• [16] Judge Taqi al-Din al-Subki says: “Scholars have accepted this statement of Ibn Abbas and have considered it—along with the statement of Umar and the silence of the rest of the Companions—a consensus.” See: Fatawa al-Subki (2/391), and see al-Saqqaf’s study in al-Durar al-Sunniyyah: “The Ruling on Building Churches and Temples in the Arabian Peninsula” – al-Durar al-Sunniyyah (dorar.net).
• [17] Judge Iyadh cites the consensus of scholars that the imamate cannot be established for a non-Muslim infidel, adding, “However, if the ruler becomes infidel, he is removed.” See: Sharh al-Nawawi ‘ala Sahih Muslim, 12, 229.
• [18] In the margin of Shihab al-Din Ahmad al-Shalabi, p. 280, he says in al-Fatawa al-Sughra: “If they want to innovate…” Sales and churches in the cities are forbidden by consensus. As for the Sawad, it was mentioned in the section on tithe and land tax that they are forbidden, and in the section on rents that they are not forbidden. The sheikhs differed on this. The sheikhs of Balkh said: It is forbidden. Al-Fadhli and the sheikhs of Bukhara said: It is not forbidden. Al-Sarakhsi mentioned in the chapter on renting fences and houses in the commentary on rents: The most correct opinion in my view is that they are forbidden in the Sawad. He mentioned in Al-Siyar Al-Kabir, saying: “If a village is predominantly populated by dhimmis, they are not prohibited. As for a village inhabited by Muslims, the sheikhs differed on this, as we have mentioned.” The Egyptian Dar al-Ifta, under the leadership of Dr. Nasr Farid Wasil, the former Grand Mufti, previously issued a fatwa in 1999 permitting the construction of churches in Islamic countries. The fatwa stated: “Islam gives the followers of the heavenly books, whether Christian, Jewish, or otherwise, complete freedom to practice their religious rituals, establish their temples, leave their places of worship, and practice what they believe, as long as they do not oppose Islam or support anyone in its conflict.”
• [19] The Rights of Non-Muslims in Society: A Reading of Al-Qaradawi’s Thought | Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s Website (al-qaradawi.net)
• [20] Hosni Nasr, Islamic History in Light of the Islamization of Knowledge, an article in the book: “Problematic Issues in Contemporary Islamic Thought: Abstracts of Ideas from Seminars and Lectures of the International Institute of Islamic Thought, Cairo, 1986-1996,” Collection Researchers, International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1997, 229.
• [xxi] See the impact of this situation on Abu al-Hasan al-Nadwi’s book “Apostasy and Abu Bakr for It.”
• [xxii] See the full story in: Al-Bidayah wa al-Nihayah, Ibn Kathir, vol. 9, 462.
• [xxiii] Ibn Taymiyyah has a useful interpretation in discussing the severity of Umar and the leniency of Abu Bakr, saying: “If the great ruler’s character tends toward leniency, then the character of his deputy should also tend toward severity; and if his character tends toward severity, then the character of his deputy should also tend toward leniency, so that the situation may be balanced. For this reason, Abu Bakr al-Siddiq (may Allah be pleased with him) preferred to appoint Khalid as his deputy, and Umar ibn al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with him) preferred to dismiss Khalid and appoint Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah (may Allah be pleased with him) as his deputy. Khalid was as severe as Umar ibn al-Khattab, and Abu Ubaidah was as gentle as Abu Bakr, and it was more appropriate for each of them. To appoint someone to appoint him; So that his affair may be moderate. See: Majmoo’ al-Fatawa, vol. 28, 256.
• [xxiv] See, for example, the words of Ibn ‘Uthaymeen, which were used as evidence by those we discussed among al-Qaeda supporters: Sheikh Muhammad ibn Salih al-‘Uthaymeen, Fath Rabb al-Bariyah bi Talkhis al-Hamawiyah, 08b-10 (alathar.net).
• [xxv] See Dr. Habash’s reasoning on this matter: Risalat al-Jihad min al-Ghazw wa al-Fath ila al-Jaysh al-Watani, Muhammad Habash, unprinted electronic version, 65.
• [xxvi] See: Shafiq Juha, al-Musawwar fi al-Tarikh, vol. 6, 80.
• [xxvii] Sayyid Qutb (1386 AH – 1966 CE), Milestones on the Road, Dar al-Shorouk, Beirut, 6th ed., 1399 AH / 1979 CE, 33.
• [xxviii] Ibid., 17.
• [xxix] He was sentenced to death twice, the last of which was executed. In January 1985, at the end of President Gaafar Nimeiry’s rule, he was known among his followers and admirers as “the Professor.” The Republican Party continues to disseminate his ideology.
• [xxx] To read his provocative ideas, see his book: Mahmoud Muhammad Taha, The Second Message of Islam.
• [xxxi] This can also be said of the Quranists, such as Muhammad Shahrour and others.
• [xxxii] Al-Raysuni goes further and considers that “Sharia is public interest, and public interest is Sharia,” and establishes this in a striking manner. See: Ahmed Al-Raysuni and Muhammad Barut, Ijtihad: Text, Reality, and Public Interest, Dar Al-Fikr, Damascus, 2000, p. 29.
• [xxxiii] This is evident in the book “The Clash of Civilizations,” by the American author Samuel Huntington, who was a security planner for US President Jimmy Carter. Huntington decided that after the Cold War, the war would shift from nationalism to culture, and favored Islamic culture, which he considered to have bloody borders.
• [xxxiv] and Islamist Islamist Also, extremist Shiite groups reinforce the Sunni extremist groups and vice versa.
• [xxxv] See, for example, how the imprisonment of scholars has affected the statement of the Association of Muslim Scholars: “Muslim Scholars” Demand the Immediate Release of All Oppressed Persons in the Prisons of “Arab Tyrants” – Alamatonline.com
• [xxxvi] See, for example, the transcripts of Sheikh Al-Qattan’s sermons: Textual Transcription – Faithful Supremacy – by Sheikh Ahmed Al-Qattan (islamweb.net)
• [xxxvii] The Syrian Network for Human Rights estimated the number of non-Syrian Shiite militias fighting in Syria at no less than 35,000 fighters, before the withdrawals as a result of the recent events in Iraq since June 10, 2014. Most of them belong to Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, and Afghanistan, respectively. See: Syrian Network for Human Rights, Shiite Militias in Syria, July 5, 2014, retrieved on July 20, 2014. July 7, 2022, https://snhr.org/.
• [xxxviii] Following the example of French schools, the private higher education institution HEM prohibits its students from wearing the Moroccan djellaba – Al-Sahifa (assahifa.com)
• [xxxix] Koro unpacks these differences in his doctoral dissertation, which has been published. See: Ahmed T. Koro, Secularism and State Policy Toward Religion: The United States, France, Turkey, Arab Network for Research and Publishing, 2009, 73 ff.
• [xl] Dr. Adnan Ibrahim delivered two sermons on this issue, titled “The Problem of the Concealment of God in His Essence and Actions.” See: The Problem of the Concealment of God in His Essence and Actions – Part 1 | Dr. Adnan Ibrahim – Bing video
• [xli] Hanafi believes that the right and the left are not political positions, but rather two positions regarding all knowledge and practical life situations. See: Hassan Hanafi, The Right and the Left in Religious Thought, Dar Aladdin, Damascus, 1996, 6.
• [xlii] Text attributed to Henry Kissinger.