Regarding the responsibility of the head of the transitional phase

Amid the public debate surrounding the performance of the transitional authority in Syria, a fundamental question arises that transcends personal considerations and delves into the very structure of the regime: If the transitional political system is indeed a centralized presidential one, as stipulated in the interim constitutional declaration, then the head of the transitional phase bears primary responsibility for major decisions and for the gap experienced by the majority of Syrians between the rhetoric of liberation and the reality of their lives.

This question is crucial for understanding the equation of responsibility in a foundational phase that cannot tolerate evading accountability.

The interim constitutional declaration, signed in March 2025, establishes a five-year transitional period, granting its president broad executive and legislative powers. These include appointing one-third of the members of the legislative council, declaring a state of emergency, and commanding the army, all without a separate prime minister or an elected parliament capable of holding him accountable.

Observers have described these powers as granting the president a role akin to that of a de facto head of government, effectively creating a center of gravity that controls all strategic decisions, from ministerial appointments to economic and security policies.

Therefore, any discussion of responsibility cannot distribute it equally between the president and ministers, because in this arrangement, ministers are merely executive bodies for the president’s directives, not partners in decision-making.

This concentrated presidential structure, which might be understood as a necessity for a transitional phase requiring swift resolution, places the president before a dual test: the test of foundational legitimacy—his ability to lead the country toward elections and permanent institutions—and the test of service-oriented legitimacy—his ability to meet the minimum daily needs of the people.

While the common argument holds that the transitional authority’s primary task is unity and elections, with poverty and the economy being prerequisites to be addressed later, this separation appears indefensible in light of the literature on political transition.

Electoral legitimacy requires a minimum level of security, services, and trust. Without tangible economic returns, elections become a mere formality that fails to produce genuine legitimacy.

The numbers are unforgiving. Recent UN reports indicate that over 80% of Syrians live below the poverty line, with extreme poverty reaching 66%, and that nine out of ten people live in poverty, while one in four suffers from unemployment.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that Syria needs more than 50 years to recover its pre-war economic levels, given a 50% drop in GDP and a 40-year setback in economic and social progress. This projection assumes that economic growth rates continue at their current pace without significant acceleration and substantial investments. The report also suggests that this period could be reduced to just 10 years if the country achieves annual economic growth six times faster than current rates.

These figures, as they appear, are a quantitative reflection of daily suffering: 56% of Syrians struggle to cover living expenses at least once a month, and 29% are considering emigration primarily for economic reasons.

This gap between rhetoric and reality is reflected in opinion polls.

According to the 2026 Arab Opinion Index survey in Syria, which included 3,600 participants from various governorates, 50% of Syrians believe the country is heading in the right direction, compared to 35% who believe the opposite. However, more than 40% consider unemployment, poverty, and poor economic conditions to be the main problems.

Other surveys indicate a decline in the positive assessment of the government’s performance from 25% in April 2026 to 20% in June, while the negative assessment rose from 44% to 52%. These figures do not mean that the majority has lost faith in the transition, but rather that the government’s service-oriented legitimacy is the weakest link in the legitimacy equation.

From a political science perspective, this dilemma can be understood in light of accountability theory in presidential systems.

In parliamentary systems, accountability is easier because the government is accountable to parliament, which can withdraw confidence from it.

In presidential systems, especially in their concentrated form, accountability becomes more difficult because the president combines the roles of head of state and head of government, and there is no parliament capable of holding him accountable. The literature on political transition has indicated that concentrated presidential systems can lead to what is called delegated democracy, where the president is directly elected but governs without effective oversight mechanisms, thus weakening horizontal accountability. In the Syrian case, where there is no elected parliament and where a third of the members of the legislative council are appointed by the president, horizontal accountability becomes virtually nonexistent, leaving only vertical accountability—that is, the people holding the president accountable through public opinion and protest. This form of accountability is neither institutional nor stable.

Islamic political thought offers a rich framework for addressing this issue. The concept of consultation (shura) in Islam is a foundational principle for the legitimacy of the political system, as established by the sources of Islamic political jurisprudence. Scholars have affirmed that responsibility in Islam is general, encompassing both the ruler and the ruled. The ruler is accountable for his actions, and every member of the community can review his perceived errors and hold him accountable through the people of authority and influence.

This framework emphasizes that authority is a trust and a shared responsibility between the ruler and the ruled, not a personal privilege. Therefore, in the Islamic perspective, the head of the transitional phase is responsible not only for unity and elections, but also for justice, which is the foundation of governance, and for providing food, health, and educational security for the people, because poverty, ignorance, and disease are the triad that destroys societies.

However, it is fair to say that responsibility in transitional phases is not absolute. There are enormous structural constraints, such as sanctions that have not been fully lifted, ongoing Israeli incursions, internal divisions, a lack of financial resources, and the collapse of institutional capacities inherited from decades of despotism.

These constraints do not absolve one of responsibility, but rather define its meaning: responsibility is responsibility within the limits of one’s capacity, not absolute responsibility for every outcome.

To say that the president bears the greatest responsibility does not mean that he is solely responsible, but rather that, by virtue of the system’s structure, he is the one who possesses the authority to make decisions. The president is the one who makes the major decisions, and therefore, he bears the political and moral consequences of these decisions.

What is needed today is not to prosecute an individual, but to build a system of accountability.

This requires a transition from a centralized presidency to a balanced presidency, through effective oversight mechanisms, an elected parliament, independent media, and a civil society capable of holding the government accountable.

It also requires a new social contract that defines the rights and duties of citizens and the state, sets clear priorities for public spending, and guarantees a minimum level of social protection.

Accountability is a daily practice built through institutions, laws, and a political culture.

Recommendations:

First, separate the presidency from the premiership and amend the constitutional declaration to stipulate the existence of a prime minister accountable to the legislative council. The president would be responsible for sovereign decisions, while the prime minister would be responsible for day-to-day administration and public services. This separation would alleviate the burden on the president and create a second level of accountability.

Second, launch a national dialogue on priorities. Poverty cannot be addressed without consensus on spending priorities. This dialogue must include the government, unions, the private sector, and civil society, and should result in an economic and social charter that identifies priority sectors and sets measurable timelines.

Third, establish an independent anti-poverty body, similar to anti-corruption bodies. This body should monitor poverty indicators, propose policies to reduce it, and provide regular reports to the public. This will enhance transparency and accountability, making poverty reduction an institutional rather than a personal issue.

Fourth, strengthen social protection. Cash transfer programs, food subsidies, and health insurance should be expanded to include the most vulnerable groups, especially female-headed households, out-of-school children, and those working in the informal sector. This requires local and international funding, but it is essential to stem the social hemorrhage.

Fifth, rebuild trust through small achievements. Trust cannot be restored with grand pronouncements, but rather with tangible accomplishments: improving electricity supply, reopening schools, ensuring water security, and simplifying administrative procedures. These small achievements, if repeated, create a sense that the state is functioning and reduce the frustration that fuels emigration and protest.

The question of accountability in Syria is not about individuals, but about the system itself. The centralized presidential system, in which the head of the transitional phase has been granted broad powers, places the greatest responsibility on his shoulders, but at the same time creates a vacuum in institutional accountability.

The conclusion that everyone must understand is that legitimacy is built on services, justice, and participation.

If the head of the transitional phase succeeds in transforming the centralized presidency into a balanced one, and if he succeeds in linking national unity with social justice, he will achieve what many have failed to do: a state where citizens respect their authority because it respects their dignity.

However, if the gap between rhetoric and reality persists, stability will remain fragile, trust will remain a rare commodity, and what is needed is not to wait for miracles, but to build institutions of accountability that make justice, poverty, and dignity issues of the state, not of individuals.

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