Introduction:
On November 10, 2026, the Minister of Local Administration and Environment in the Syrian Interim Government, Muhammad Anjarani, issued a direct appeal to Syrians to refrain from poaching during the bird migration season. He emphasized that birds cross the region along natural routes that require protection, and that preserving these routes is a shared responsibility that necessitates awareness and adherence to the law.
On the same day, the Ministry circulated a memo to governors, in their capacity as heads of the sub-hunting councils, mandating the control of poaching operations and the application of legal measures against violators, based on the Wildlife Hunting Law No. 14 of 2023 and the Environment Law No. 12 of 2012.
This appeal, as it appears, reflects growing concern about a phenomenon that has worsened during the years of the crisis, transforming from a marginal seasonal activity into an organized industry that is depleting Syria’s wildlife.
However, an appeal alone, however well-intentioned, is insufficient to address a complex phenomenon involving intertwined economic, social, legal, and environmental factors.
This article begins with a central, testable hypothesis: that the persistence of poaching in Syria is not due to a lack of legislation, but rather to weak institutional enforcement mechanisms and the absence of economic alternatives for hunters.
The article employs an empirical-analytical approach, utilizing two tools:
A review of peer-reviewed scientific literature that has measured the extent of the phenomenon, and an analysis of secondary data from international and national reports.
It aims to provide a causal explanation of the phenomenon, assess the effectiveness of institutional responses, and propose evidence-based, rather than admonitory, recommendations.
First, the theoretical and empirical framework:
Poaching falls under what ecology literature calls the theory of sustainable harvesting, which posits a maximum limit on the amount of resources that can be extracted from any population without harming its capacity for regeneration.
When hunting exceeds this limit, it pushes the population toward local extinction or creates what is known as the hydra effect, where increased mortality rates lead to unexpected compensatory responses in species populations, making wildlife management more complex.
Experimental studies have shown that indiscriminate hunting, which makes no distinction between species, age, or sex, is the most destructive to biodiversity because it targets non-target species as well, driving them toward local extinction.
This applies perfectly to the hunting methods used in Syria, where field investigations indicate the use of long nets, loudspeakers that mimic bird calls, and sticky traps—methods that do not differentiate between targeted quail and rare or protected birds.
Secondly, the scale of the phenomenon:
Available data reveals the enormous scale of illegal hunting in Syria. According to a rigorous scientific study conducted by BirdLife International and published in a scientific journal, approximately 3.9 million birds are killed or taken illegally annually in Syria, making it the second most affected Arab country after Egypt, which records 5.4 million birds, and ahead of Lebanon, which records 2.6 million birds.
The study estimated that between 11 and 36 million birds are killed or taken illegally annually throughout the Mediterranean region, the vast majority during migration. The phenomenon is not limited to migratory birds; it extends to wildlife in the Syrian desert.
Environmental estimates, not official statistics, indicate that approximately 90% of the wild species in the Syrian desert have been harmed or have disappeared due to overhunting. This includes the Arabian gazelle, which is classified as an endangered species, and the houbara bustard, which is one of the most targeted species during migration seasons.
Furthermore, targeting birds of prey leads to an increase in rodent populations, prompting farmers to use poisons extensively, thus widening the circle of environmental and agricultural damage.
Third, the causes:
Overhunting in Syria cannot be understood in isolation from the economic and social context that produced it.
For example, quail hunting has transformed from a seasonal hobby practiced by some young people into a primary occupation and source of livelihood for many families, especially in northern Syria, where displacement and unemployment rates have risen sharply.
Field investigations indicate that poaching has transformed into an organized industry targeting what remains of wildlife, linked to supply chains that extend from hunters to distributors to shops and markets.
However, the most influential factor in the continuation of this phenomenon is the absence of effective law enforcement in key hunting areas.
Studies indicate that the number of birds killed or illegally taken in Syria has not witnessed a significant decline since previous assessments, due to the continued absence of effective law enforcement in key hunting areas.
This means that laws exist, but their enforcement is absent or weak, and penalties are not deterrent, making poaching a low-risk, high-reward activity.
Fourth, the legal framework and institutional response:
Law No. 14 of 2023, the Wildlife Hunting Law, was issued during the era of the ousted and criminal President Bashar al-Assad, with the aim of protecting and sustaining species of birds and wild animals, preserving endangered species, and regulating wild hunting according to environmental standards, regulations, and legal controls.
The law set the hunting season from September 1st to February 15th of each year.
It also stipulated a ban on illegal hunting methods, including nets that trap more than one animal at a time, while Decision No. 109/T, issued on September 18, 2024, permitted the hunting of 25 quail on a single hunting trip.
Penalties include imprisonment from one to three months or a fine ranging from 250,000 to 500,000 Syrian pounds for anyone who hunts without a license, out of season, in prohibited areas, uses prohibited methods, or exceeds the permitted species and numbers. These penalties, although stricter than the previous Law No. 152 of 1991, The 970 [units of currency] remains limited compared to the scale of profits generated by illegal fishing.
Recent months have witnessed significant institutional action. In October 2026, Internal Security patrols in the Nabk area of rural Damascus removed and burned more than 2,500 meters of illegal fishing nets as part of an anti-poaching campaign that followed an investigative report published by the Syrian Investigative Journalism Unit (SIRAJ) in May 2026.
The Nasiriyah Municipal Council also announced a 48-hour grace period for fishermen to remove their nets, based on Law No. 14 of 2023.
In November 2026, the Ministry issued a circular to governors to control illegal fishing operations during the autumn migration season.
However, this response, while important, remains partial and circumstantial. It focuses on security campaigns and net removal, but fails to address the root causes of the phenomenon, primarily poverty and unemployment that drive hunters to this profession, the lack of sustainable economic alternatives, weak institutional capacity to monitor vast areas of land, and the proliferation of informal markets that receive captured birds without oversight.
Fifth, Regional Comparison:
The Syrian response cannot be understood in isolation from the experiences of neighboring countries facing the same challenge.
In Lebanon, the Internal Security Forces removed more than 20,640 square meters of illegal nets in the Bekaa Valley during September 2026. The total then rose to 38,280 square meters in October, before reaching 63,030 square meters in the northern Bekaa and northern Lebanon.
In Egypt, authorities removed 6,600 linear meters of illegal nets during the same period. These figures, while not necessarily reflecting a decrease in the phenomenon, indicate that a sustained and coordinated institutional response can make a tangible difference in the scale of the resources used, even if it doesn’t eliminate the economic incentive for poaching.
Sixth, Towards an Evidence-Based National Strategy:
Based on this empirical analysis, the Syrian Future Movement recommends adopting a national strategy to combat poaching, based on the following pillars:
First, strengthening institutional capacities for monitoring and enforcement: Seasonal campaigns alone are insufficient. A specialized unit must be established within the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment, equipped with trained personnel and the necessary resources, to continuously monitor key hunting areas, identify violations, and refer them to the judiciary.
Second, increasing penalties to deterrent levels: Current fines, which do not exceed 500,000 Syrian pounds, are insufficient to deter those who reap substantial profits from selling birds. The Wildlife Hunting Law must be amended to increase financial penalties to levels commensurate with the scale of profits, and to include imprisonment for repeated or organized poaching, or targeting endangered species.
Third, address the economic and social causes: Hunting cannot be prevented without providing economic alternatives. The strategy must include programs to empower hunters and their families economically through vocational training, microloans, and job opportunities in alternative sectors, such as sustainable agriculture or ecotourism.
Fourth, launch community awareness campaigns: These campaigns should target hunters themselves, restaurant and shop owners who sell birds, and consumers, highlighting the environmental and health damages of poaching and the benefits everyone derives from protecting birds, including their role in controlling agricultural pests, dispersing seeds, and maintaining food chains.
Fifth, strengthen scientific research and monitoring: Effective policies cannot be developed without accurate and up-to-date data. Field studies that measure migratory bird populations, map their routes, assess the impact of hunting on them, and provide measurable indicators for the effectiveness of interventions should be supported. A national database on poaching should also be established, updated regularly, and made available to researchers and policymakers.
Conclusion:
Illegal hunting in Syria represents a true test of the new state’s ability to protect its natural heritage and build evidence-based policies. The figures are shocking: 3.9 million birds are killed annually, and 90% of the desert’s wild species have been damaged or have disappeared, according to environmental estimates. There is also a near-total absence of effective legal authority in hunting areas. The institutional response, while promising, remains partial and ad hoc, failing to address the root causes. What is needed is not more appeals, but a comprehensive national strategy that combines enforcement, prevention, economic alternatives, awareness campaigns, and scientific research.
Protecting birds is protecting ecological balance, food security, and biodiversity—a trust for future generations that must not be squandered.
