Those familiar with the history of this country understand that major turning points often mark the beginning of a deeper test. The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 exposed the fragility of a state built on control rather than legitimacy.
Syrian history is replete with lessons that have long been ignored.
One-party rule transformed the state into an instrument of oppression, stripping it of its capacity to represent its own people.
The revolution that erupted in 2011 was a rejection of this transformation; however, due to regional and international interventions—compounded by the intransigence of the Assad regime—it devolved into a devastating war.
The outcome is well-known: more than a decade of infighting, massive destruction—with the World Bank estimating the cost of reconstructing physical assets alone at approximately $216 billion—the displacement of millions, and the near-total collapse of state institutions.
What distinguishes the current moment from the past is that the new authority has emerged from outside the old system. This presents a historic opportunity, yet it also imposes a twofold burden: the need to prove that this is not merely the replacement of one regime with another, but the inception of an entirely different kind of state.
Ironically, it is precisely this dual burden that makes strategic analysis essential.
An authority that is initially defined only by its rhetoric can ultimately be judged solely by its actions; an authority that promises a state can only be held accountable through the tangible indicators of state-building.
There are three strategic gaps:
The first gap: The sovereignty gap.
Regarding territory and sovereignty, more than 1,229 incursions by the occupying Zionist entity into Syrian territory have been documented between the fall of the Assad regime and late October 2026, primarily concentrated in Quneitra, Daraa, and the Damascus countryside.
The Etana Center recorded approximately 3,200 Israeli ground operations up to September 2026—1,996 of which took place in 2026 alone—with September seeing the highest monthly figure, at 361 operations.
The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) confirms an escalation in violence against civilians, alongside the construction of fortifications, the leveling of agricultural land, and arrests.
These violations are redrawing the lines of territorial control and pose a direct threat to any sovereign project. Israel is testing both the international community’s level of concern and the transitional government’s ability to transform sovereignty from a mere slogan into a reality.
The second gap: The social legitimacy gap.
Regarding the population, there remain approximately 5.54 million internally displaced persons (IDPs)—according to UNHCR data as of October 22, 2026—even though more than two million displaced people have returned since the end of 2024.
Inflation has begun to rise again, and an increase in fuel prices in September ignited a wave of widespread protests, particularly in the north and east.
Poverty continues to affect the majority of the population, unemployment remains high, and women’s participation in the labor market is low. These figures point to an evident crisis of legitimacy; a government unable to provide basic services and a minimum standard of living gradually loses its moral standing to demand patience and sacrifice from its people. In essence, the protests are an expression of the widening gap between the rhetoric of change and the reality of actual achievement.
The third gap: the institutional gap.
On the part of the authorities, there have been tangible steps: progress in integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces, the formation of transitional justice bodies, diplomatic outreach to Washington and various Arab states, and an agreement with the World Bank to establish a multi-donor fund to support recovery.
However, domestic legitimacy cannot be built through external meetings alone. Recurring protests over living conditions, coupled with tensions in specific regions, underscore the persistent gap between rhetoric and results.
The problem is that transitional institutions are, by their very nature, fragile.
They lack full legitimacy, sufficient capacity, and the necessary time.
Unless they rapidly evolve into permanent institutions, they risk becoming mere facades for managing a crisis, rather than tools for resolving it.
Ultimately, the greatest danger—beyond even the serious threat posed by Israeli incursions—is the possibility that the transitional phase might devolve into the mere management of a crisis, rather than its resolution.
History teaches us that authorities who fail to protect their own territory gradually lose their legitimacy, regardless of their stated intentions.
Furthermore, authorities that defer social justice in the name of prioritizing stability only serve to recreate the very conditions that fueled the revolution in the first place.
Strategic analysis suggests that Israel is exploiting the power vacuum and the absence of deterrence to impose a new reality in the south—a situation further complicated by the approach of its own national elections. Internally, the delay in building inclusive and transparent institutions paves the way for the resurgence of sub-national, sectarian, and regional loyalties.
An important analytical connection emerges here: the gap between sovereignty and legitimacy is not two separate gaps, but rather a single, unified one.
A state that cannot protect its territory loses the capacity to protect its citizens.
A state that cannot provide services loses the standing to demand allegiance.
Consequently, the state enters a vicious cycle: weak sovereignty leads to weak legitimacy, and weak legitimacy, in turn, undermines the capacity to establish sovereignty.
If the current trajectory continues without fundamental change, the potential scenarios for the next two years include:
First, a scenario of partial recovery: achieving some success in attracting Gulf and international investments through a multi-donor fund, alongside a relative improvement in services, while Israeli incursions persist as a limited, de facto reality.
This scenario maintains a fragile stability but fails to build a strong state.
Second, a scenario of erosion: worsening living conditions coupled with ongoing border violations, which fuels broader protests and weakens the transitional legitimacy. In this case, the risk of internal fragmentation increases.
Third, a scenario of genuine resurgence: this requires bold decisions, a clear sovereign policy toward the south—relying on diplomacy backed by both soft and hard power—a serious (non-retributive) transitional justice process, economic reform focused on production rather than consumption, and the meaningful participation of all societal components in the drafting of a constitution and the building of institutions. The third scenario is not impossible, but it is conditional. It requires political will, sustainable funding, regional support, and popular participation. Without these conditions, it will remain merely a dream.
Based on this analysis, five recommendations can be proposed:
First: Linking sovereignty to development. It is impossible to defend a territory without building economic and military capabilities; what is required is a strategy …a clear sovereign vision that integrates diplomacy with deterrence, and development with the protection of borders.
Second: The construction of permanent—not merely transitional—institutions. Transitional bodies must rapidly evolve into permanent institutions, endowed with clearly defined mandates, specific budgets, and mechanisms for accountability.
Third: Addressing the economic crisis as a top priority. Legitimacy cannot be built on rhetoric alone; bold economic reforms are required, including market liberalization, support for domestic production, and the protection of the most vulnerable segments of society.
Fourth: The inclusion of all social components. A state based on citizenship cannot be built without the genuine participation of every segment of society, regardless of their affiliations. This necessitates an inclusive national dialogue, rather than just meetings among elites.
Fifth: The formation of regional and international alliances. Syria cannot face its challenges in isolation. Strategic partnerships—with Arab nations, Turkey, Europe, and the United States—are essential to secure the necessary political and economic support.
Ultimately, the future will not be determined in foreign capitals, but rather by the capacity of the Syrian people to transform this moment of change into a state-building project.
The state that Syria requires is not one defined by a specific faction, region, or sect; it is a state of citizenship—one that safeguards its territory, rebuilds its economy, and guarantees the dignity of its people.
The choice before us is clear: either we write a new chapter worthy of the sacrifices made by the Syrian people, or we recycle the mistakes of the past under the guise of new slogans. History will not be kind to the hesitant.
