A Question Yet to Be Asked:
Whenever a critical voice is raised in Syria—addressing issues like corruption, cronyism, or incompetence—some immediately sound an alarm, claiming there is a conspiracy to bring down Syria, just as Mohamed Morsi was brought down in Egypt.
It is true that this automatic link between any form of criticism and foreign-led conspiracies serves as a defensive mechanism, intended to silence dissent by branding the critic a traitor.
Yet, the issue runs deeper than mere accusation.
The real question is not, “Does criticism lead to a coup?”—for the obvious answer is no; criticism is a matter of words, whereas a coup is a matter of arms.
Rather, the true question is: Can criticism ever be part of a coup plot? And can the discourse surrounding “conspiracies” ever be justified in certain contexts?
What Is a Military Coup?
A military coup is neither a popular protest nor a critical article; it is an organized military action aimed at seizing executive power by taking control of command centers and communication networks.
In his book Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), Samuel Huntington provided a pioneering analysis of coups, distinguishing between “foundational coups”—which occur in societies with weak institutions—and “conspiratorial coups”—which take place in more complex societies.
In his book The Man on Horseback (1962), Samuel Finer offered a classification of military interventions, drawing a distinction between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” interventions. More relevant to our topic is the work of Naunihal Singh in his book Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups (2014). He explains that a coup is a “coordination game,” where success hinges on the plotters’ ability to “demonstrate that they have already succeeded”—leading every official to perceive the coup as inevitable, prompting them to either join it or refrain from resisting.
In their notable study, Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010 (2011), Jonathan Powell and Chad Thyne add that successful coups tend to occur when the military is unified and the civilian leadership lacks legitimacy or the capacity to resist.
Conversely, failed coups are associated with internal divisions within the armed forces and the presence of civilian institutions capable of holding their ground.
These objective conditions reveal that a coup is not merely a “reaction” to an article or a tweet; rather, it is a complex military operation requiring unity within the military ranks, support from elites, and the ability to establish a fait accompli.
None of these elements are present in peaceful, civilian-led criticism.
Can criticism serve a coup-oriented agenda?
This raises an obvious question: if the conditions for a coup are objective, can criticism function as one of these conditions?
The answer is: yes, it can.
History provides instances where systematic, well-funded criticism has been used as a “cover” or a “preparatory phase” for coup attempts or foreign interventions. Examples include:
Foreign intervention in Libya (2011): The rhetoric of “protecting civilians” was used as a cover for regime change, even though the intervention exceeded the UN Security Council’s mandate.
The Egyptian coup (2013): The “Tamarod” (Rebellion) campaign, which gathered 22 million signatures, served as a popular facade for military intervention—an intervention that was, in essence, a military coup.
However, this does not mean that all criticism is a conspiracy, nor that an accusation of conspiracy is always valid. Rather, it suggests that a “gray area” exists, and that both sides may employ various tools to mislead one another.
So, how can we distinguish between the two?
Criteria for distinguishing between legitimate criticism and a conspiracy:
Drawing upon the study of coups, religious texts, and historical precedents, five practical criteria can be proposed:
First criterion: Transparency versus secrecy. Legitimate criticism is conducted openly, relies on verifiable facts, and offers alternatives. A conspiracy, by contrast, is carried out in secret, relies on unverifiable information, and focuses solely on creating confusion without providing solutions.
Second criterion: The target. Legitimate criticism targets specific policies and actions—not individuals or groups. A conspiracy, however, aims to undermine trust in the entire system, regardless of its specific policies.
Third criterion: Funding and sponsorship. Legitimate criticism relies on local resources or transparent support from known entities. A conspiracy, conversely, relies on covert foreign funding or support from unidentified sources. The fourth criterion: The stated objective. Legitimate criticism aims at reform and is open to dialogue and correction; a conspiracy, by contrast, aims at overthrowing the existing order and rejects any dialogue except on its own terms.
The fifth criterion: Violence. Legitimate criticism is peaceful and rejects violence as a means for change; a conspiracy, however, accepts violence—or the threat thereof—or seeks to incite the military to intervene.
These criteria are not absolute, but they serve as practical tools for making such distinctions.
Criticism in Islam: Between Sincere Counsel (Naṣīḥah) and Armed Insurrection (Khurūj):
Muslim jurists have drawn a precise distinction between peaceful criticism—which is both a right and a duty—and armed insurrection, which is subject to strict conditions.
Legitimate criticism is rooted in the Quranic verse: “And let there be [arising] from you a nation inviting to [all that is] good, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong” (Quran, Āl ‘Imrān: 104), as well as the Prophetic tradition: “Whoever among you sees an evil, let him change it with his hand; if he cannot, then with his tongue; and if he cannot, then with his heart—and that is the weakest level of faith” (narrated by Muslim).
Jurists have emphasized that “criticizing corrupt conditions and enjoining what is right does not constitute an insurrection (khurūj) against the ruler, provided that one adheres to religiously sanctioned methods.”
As for armed insurrection, the Prophet (peace be upon him) warned against it, as it leads to “great evil.”
In his Kitāb al-Fitan (Book of Tribulations), al-Bukhārī records, on the authority of Ibn ‘Abbās, that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: “Whoever sees something from his ruler that he dislikes, let him remain patient; for whoever separates himself from the community (jamā‘ah) by even a handspan and then dies, dies the death of the Jāhiliyyah [pre-Islamic era of ignorance].” In his Majmu’ al-Fatawa, Ibn Taymiyyah asserted that “rebellion against Muslim rulers with arms is among the gravest of fitnas (civil strife/turmoil) and evils.”
However, the jurists themselves distinguished between armed rebellion and the act of denouncing wrongdoing through speech.
Imam al-Nawawi, in his commentary on Sahih Muslim, stated that “enjoining good and forbidding evil is a collective obligation (fard kifayah); if some people undertake it, the obligation is lifted from the rest.”
Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, in Fath al-Bari, noted that “denouncing [wrongdoing] verbally does not lead to fitna; it is, therefore, legitimate under all circumstances.”
The Syrian Case—What We Know and What We Do Not Know:
The discourse surrounding a “conspiracy” appears more complex here; following the fall of the regime of… Critical voices have emerged, calling for the accountability of corrupt individuals, the appointment of qualified personnel, and an end to cronyism—with recent appointments having sparked widespread controversy.
But the question remains: is there a “military coup-plotting force” in Syria today?
The available indicators do not allow for a definitive conclusion; there are various factions, diverse leaderships, and overlapping loyalties. However, this does not necessarily mean that the army is “disunited” in a way that would preclude a coup.
History shows that disunited armies can indeed carry out successful coups—as has been the case in many countries—while conversely, even a unified army might fail in a coup attempt if the civilian leadership is capable of resisting.
What can be stated with confidence is that the transitional government still retains a degree of relative legitimacy; the civilian opposition has yet to demonstrate an ability to organize its ranks; and external actors have shown no serious intent to topple the new regime—particularly following the lifting of sanctions and the removal of official designations. Furthermore, there exists a military force within the country that rivals the power of the transitional authority.
In conclusion:
Every Syrian must realize that while criticism is not the same as a coup, it is not always benign.
Criticism can be a legitimate right, or it can be part of a broader agenda.
Distinguishing between the two is not easy, yet it is essential for protecting the state from chaos and safeguarding the act of criticism from accusations of treason.
The “conspiracy” narrative—invoked in response to any form of criticism—is not benign; its purpose is to silence calls for accountability.
Conversely, criticism that rejects dialogue and aims solely at toppling the regime is also not benign, as its objective is to sow chaos. In the Syrian Future Movement, we believe that responsible criticism is both a national right and a religious duty, and that dialogue is the only way to avoid sliding into violence.
We call upon the transitional government to open genuine channels of dialogue with political forces and civil society, and to address legitimate demands for reform; for responding to criticism is the only guarantee that it will not escalate into a revolution or a coup.
References:
- Powell, J. M., & Thyne, C. L. (2011). Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset. Journal of Peace Research, 48(2), 249-259.
- Singh, N. (2014). Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale University Press.
- Finer, S. E. (1962). The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. Pall Mall Press.
- Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Johns Hopkins University Press.
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