For the past two days, Syrians have been preoccupied with the leaked information about the meeting between Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and the head of the Mossad in Jordan, and the preceding and accompanying discussions about direct contacts between Syrian officials and officials in the occupying Zionist entity.
I am not here to engage in nationalistic posturing, nor to judge intentions, nor do I wish to place the new Syrian state in the dock simply because it is seeking ways to protect Syria, stop the attacks against it, and avoid a new war that Syrians neither want nor can their country endure.
However, I believe that what is happening raises a question far greater than the details of a single meeting, and with implications far exceeding the name of the official who attended or was absent: Who controls the file on Syria’s relationship with the occupying Zionist entity?
Our answer is clear: It is not controlled by a minister, nor a security agency, nor a single government, nor even a single president.
It is a file concerning a state and a people, occupation and borders, war and peace, sovereignty and land, blood and rights, and obligations whose effects may extend to future generations. Therefore, it must be one of the most institutionally and nationally accountable files in Syrian foreign policy.
This file differs from other foreign policy files:
For Syrians, the occupying Zionist entity is not a distant country with which we disagree on a fleeting commercial, economic, or diplomatic issue.
Here, we are talking about an entity that occupies the Syrian Golan Heights, and which, after the fall of the previous regime, crossed new lines and established new positions inside Syrian territory, launched repeated attacks on Syria, and targeted sites and facilities within its borders.
Furthermore, Syria and the occupying entity share a long legacy of wars, conflict, and occupation. Therefore, any contact, negotiation, or agreement with it cannot be treated as merely a technical or security matter! (It is a matter of national sovereignty par excellence.)
The Syrian position on the Golan Heights is not simply an emotional or historical stance, but is based on the principles of international law and resolutions of international legitimacy, foremost among them Security Council Resolution 497 of 1981, which deemed the imposition of the occupying entity’s laws, jurisdiction, and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan Heights null and void and without any international legal effect.
Therefore, when we speak of negotiations, we are not speaking of a normal relationship between two politically different states, but rather of a state negotiating while part of its territory remains under occupation.
Our position on negotiations:
Let me be clear: We in the Syrian Future Movement do not reject diplomacy, nor do we advocate a war for which Syria currently lacks the necessary conditions, nor do we consider mere negotiation a relinquishment of rights.
On the contrary, protecting Syria, halting the aggression against it, and restoring its rights and territory may necessitate negotiation and the use of politics, diplomacy, international law, alliances, and all the tools of the state.
Politics is not war or surrender:
Between war and concession lies a vast expanse called diplomacy.
However, we distinguish between the necessity of negotiation and the method of conducting negotiations.
We must also clearly differentiate between contact, negotiation, agreement, normalization, and recognition.
Not every contact constitutes normalization, not every negotiation constitutes recognition, and not every security agreement constitutes a full political relationship.
But the danger begins when a state transitions from one phase to another without a clear political and legal definition of its actions, and without Syrians knowing where this path is leading.
Therefore, defining the nature of the phase the Syrian state is currently in is essential.
Are we witnessing limited security contacts?
Or negotiations to reactivate the 1974 Disengagement Agreement?
Or negotiations regarding new security arrangements?
Or are we witnessing the beginning of a different political path that could evolve into a different form of relationship in the future?
These are not questions of journalistic curiosity! They are questions of sovereignty.
Direct contact should not become the norm:
We in the Syrian Future Movement see no need for direct meetings with representatives of the occupying Zionist entity as long as the negotiating objective can be achieved through a third party, whether American, Arab, or international.
Mediation is not a sign of weakness, but rather a well-known diplomatic tool, especially when the relationship between the two parties is governed by occupation and conflict.
If national interest dictates direct contact at some point, this must remain an exception imposed by a specific national necessity, not gradually become the norm.
Most importantly, a decision of this magnitude should not become a fait accompli that Syrians discover through a foreign news agency or an Israeli or American leak, only to then wait for their state institutions to explain what happened.
Who authorized this? And what are the limits of this authorization?
There is an institutional question we should not hesitate to ask: Who determines the Syrian negotiating mandate? What are the limits of this mandate? What can the Syrian negotiator discuss, and what is he not entitled to concede or commit to?
These questions are not aimed at the Foreign Minister, nor do they question his patriotism or the patriotism of any current Syrian official. On the contrary, a clear national and institutional mandate protects and strengthens the Syrian negotiator.
A negotiator backed by state institutions, parliament, and public opinion can tell the other side: I do not have the authority to make this concession, and no one can obligate Syria to anything beyond the mandate I hold. Thus, institutional oversight transforms from a constraint on the negotiator into a source of strength.
We understand the confidentiality of negotiations, but we do not accept the confidentiality of decisions! Diplomacy is not always conducted in front of cameras, and we recognize that sensitive negotiations sometimes require secrecy. Revealing all details, proposals, and documents could harm the national interest and weaken the Syrian position.
We are not demanding that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs publish meeting minutes or disclose its negotiating tactics.
However, there is a fundamental difference between the confidentiality of negotiations and the confidentiality of decisions.
Some details can remain within the room, but the strategic direction of the state should not.
The Syrian people have the right to know the general objectives of the negotiations, their nature, the red lines, and the constants that no one can transgress.
Secrecy may extend to how we negotiate, but it should not extend to what we negotiate or what we aim to achieve.
Here, it is not It is natural for Syrian citizens to receive news about one of their country’s most sensitive issues from Israeli and American leaks, foreign media outlets, and social media.
The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is required to be the primary source of Syrian information on this matter, not a secondary source that merely interprets others’ narratives.
This is not just a media issue; it is also part of managing the negotiations.
An information vacuum doesn’t remain a vacuum; others fill it.
When the state remains silent, the opposing side can use the leak itself as a bargaining chip: publishing what it wants, concealing what it wants, and presenting only half the information or its own interpretation. Then the Syrian state finds itself having to respond to a narrative fabricated by others.
Therefore, well-planned official communication with Syrians is not a burden on the negotiations; rather, it can be one of their strengths.
If there is information that national interests do not permit disclosing now, then state clearly that there are details that cannot be published at this stage.
This is far better than leaving Syrians to search for their country’s policy in the foreign press.
What are Syria’s red lines? It is essential for Syrians to understand the fundamental principles governing any negotiation, foremost among them that the Golan Heights are occupied Syrian territory, that Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty are non-negotiable, and that any security arrangements must not be used to diminish Syrian sovereignty.
Particular caution must be exercised to prevent negotiations from shifting from border security arrangements to strategic constraints imposed on Syria itself.
The cessation of hostilities must not become the price for granting the occupying Zionist entity a direct or indirect right to dictate the structure of the Syrian army, its weaponry, its deployment within Syrian territory, or to determine which countries Syria can establish relations or alliances with.
Yes, states can agree on reciprocal security arrangements, but there is a significant difference between security arrangements and relinquishing any part of a state’s sovereign decision-making.
Where is the principle of reciprocity?
A crucial question must be addressed in any negotiation: What does Syria receive in return for what is demanded of it?
If Syria is asked to remove forces or weapons from a specific area, what is the corresponding obligation? If a demilitarized zone is proposed, will the obligations be reciprocal?
If there are guarantees for the security of the other party, where are the guarantees for the security of the Syrians?
Who will guarantee a cessation of attacks?
Who will guarantee withdrawal from the territories that have been invaded?
Sustainable security arrangements cannot be built on the security of only one party.
True security must be mutual, or it will become a power equation imposed on the weaker party.
Syria does not need an agreement that grants it temporary calm in exchange for permanent strategic constraints.
The most dangerous aspect is the monopolization of the issue:
What is more dangerous than the details of any meeting is the gradual transformation of this issue into the domain of a narrow circle within the executive or security apparatus.
The new Syria, for which the Syrian people have paid a tremendous price, must not reproduce the idea that crucial issues are decided behind closed doors, and then the people are asked to endorse the results.
The Syrian revolution, in its essence, was against the monopolization of power and decision-making. After all those sacrifices, the fateful decision regarding Syria should not simply be passed from one closed room to another.
We do not say this to equate the former regime with the new state; that is not our intention.
However, we maintain that one of the most important gains of the revolution, which must be protected, is that the Syrian people are no longer subjects informed of decisions only after they have been made. Instead, they are citizens with the right to know the major directions of their state and to hold accountable those who make decisions in their name.
The more far-reaching the impact of a decision on future generations, the greater the need to broaden the base of legitimacy upon which it rests.
The matter must reach the halls of Parliament:
Therefore, we in the Syrian Future Movement believe that any transition from temporary security arrangements or contacts to political agreements or long-term strategic commitments must be referred back to the Syrian constitutional institutions, foremost among them the People’s Assembly.
There must be genuine parliamentary oversight through the committees specializing in foreign policy and national security, drawing upon experts in international law, diplomacy, security, and strategy.
This does not mean that everyone should sit at the negotiating table. Making strategic decisions is one thing, and managing day-to-day negotiations is quite another. But the negotiating team cannot monopolize both matters.
Ministers change, governments change, and presidents change, but national commitments can remain for decades.
Therefore, no agreement should be concluded that affects Syrian territory, sovereignty, the legal status of the Golan Heights, or the future of Syrian relations with the occupying Zionist entity without the involvement of constitutional institutions and national oversight.
And what about Hikmat al-Hijri?
Here I come to a highly sensitive issue, which may be uncomfortable for some, but it is essential.
A wide segment of the Syrian population has attacked Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, with many going so far as to describe his positions as treasonous, due to his statements and stances that seek the support of the occupying Zionist entity against the Syrian state.
We categorically reject any reliance on a power occupying Syrian land against the Syrian state, and we reject any project that places any part of Syria under the protection or influence of the occupying entity.
However, if the state wants to establish a national standard that is respected by all, it cannot apply double standards. Al-Hijri, according to what has been announced, has taken positions and issued dangerous statements, but Syrians are now hearing about direct meetings between figures in the new Syrian administration and high-ranking figures in the occupying Zionist entity!
Here the question becomes legitimate:
If merely calling for communication or seeking support from the occupying entity is enough to warrant harsh national judgments, how can we expect Syrians not to question direct meetings when they are conducted by official figures?
It is true that there is a fundamental difference between someone who seeks support from a foreign power against their own state and a state that negotiates to protect its interests and rights (and this is a real difference that cannot be ignored).
But this The difference in political aims and characteristics does not negate the necessity of a clear standard governing the means of communication, its limits, legitimacy, and oversight.
If direct communication is absolutely forbidden on national grounds, then the standard must be clear to everyone.
However, if direct communication is a political tool that the state can use when necessary, then the mere act of communication itself should not be the sole criterion for treason. Rather, accountability should be based on the content, purpose, and outcome of the communication: Does it serve Syria or undermine it? Does it preserve its unity or seek to divide it? Does it restore its rights or relinquish them? Does it protect its sovereignty or grant others authority over it? A just state does not apply double standards!
What we reject on national grounds in one party, we must have the courage to establish a clear standard regarding when it concerns the other party.
We do not want to accuse the Syrian negotiator of treason:
It is essential to emphasize here that our demand for transparency and institutional oversight is not an accusation against the Syrian negotiator, nor a questioning of his patriotism.
We do not want to transfer Syria from the old culture of accusing others of treason to a new one. Not everyone who negotiates should be labeled a traitor, nor should everyone who inquires about the negotiations be suspected of lacking patriotism.
A nascent state is built on institutions, not solely on personal trust.
We may trust the minister, but we demand institutional integrity.
We may have a favorable view of the negotiator, but we demand a mandate.
We may support the objective of the negotiations, but we demand oversight of their outcomes.
Institutions are not built because officials are bad, but because they are the only way to guarantee the state’s continuity, regardless of changes in leadership.
Towards a clear Syrian doctrine for negotiation:
What Syria needs today is not merely a reaction to a meeting here or a leak there, but a clear national doctrine for managing this issue. Our doctrine states: We negotiate when Syrian interests necessitate it, we utilize intermediaries whenever possible and beneficial, and we make direct contact an exception dictated by necessity, not a routine course of action that develops silently. We adhere to the occupied Syrian Golan and all Syrian rights, and we reject any arrangements that diminish Syria’s sovereignty or grant any external party the right to control its military or political decisions or its international relations. We accept the confidentiality of negotiation tactics, but we reject the secrecy of strategic directions and decisions. We demand reciprocity in any security arrangements, we make constitutional institutions partners in crucial decisions, and we are transparent with the people about what can be revealed to them, because the people are partners in the state, not mere recipients of its decisions.
Tell the Syrians what is happening:
And I say to the new Syrian government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Do not be afraid to involve the Syrians in the truth.
The people who have endured arrest, displacement, bombardment, and death throughout the years of the revolution and the war are not minors who need their crucial affairs managed for them.
Tell him what you can, clarify your position, define your red lines, and explain what Syria wants from these negotiations.
If there is information that national interests do not permit to be disclosed, then say that there is something that cannot be published now.
Trust between the state and its citizens is not built on silence, but on honesty and transparency.
Finally, we are not faced with only two options: war or surrendering to the occupying Zionist entity! There is a vast space between them called politics.
Syria can negotiate without making concessions, use intermediaries without isolating itself, seek security without relinquishing the Golan Heights, avoid war without accepting occupation, be pragmatic without losing its national memory, and pursue its interests without abandoning its dignity and sovereignty.
But all of this requires one fundamental national principle that no one should transgress: that the relationship with the occupying Zionist entity is not the prerogative of any government, minister, agency, or individual. This is a Syrian national issue concerning land, sovereignty, war, peace, and the future of generations.
Therefore, any historic decision regarding it must be made by Syrians through their state and constitutional institutions, and the people must know its direction and limits, not learn of it after others have made it.
We want Syria to negotiate from a position of strength, to make decisions within its institutions, and for its people to be partners in the crucial choices that will determine its future.
