In politics, official statements don’t tell the whole story, and protocol photos don’t always reveal what happens behind closed doors. Sometimes, the timing of a visit, the destination, and the events leading up to it are more significant than dozens of statements that follow.
It is from this perspective that I interpret Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani’s visit to Pakistan.
This visit is the first by a Syrian foreign minister to Islamabad in nearly nineteen years, and this alone makes it a significant event in the process of rebuilding Syrian foreign policy.
However, I believe its true importance lies not only in restoring the severed ties between Damascus and Islamabad, but also in the regional context in which it occurred.
As we know, just days ago, the Mecca Agreement for joint defense was signed between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan. The Abu al-Duhur military airport was targeted by Israeli strikes due to Israeli concerns about a potential Turkish military presence. Damascus announced a new and important position regarding the nuclear materials discovered in Syria. Then, the Syrian Foreign Minister traveled to Islamabad to welcome the new defense agreement.
These issues may be officially separate, but are they strategically separate?
I don’t believe Syria will knock on the door of the Mecca Agreement tomorrow demanding to become its fourth member, nor do I see Damascus’s interests at this stage as requiring a rush to join closed military alliances.
However, I see something else. Perhaps Syria has an opportunity to become the fourth, albeit unofficial, partner in a system of interests forming among three countries, each representing something the new Syria needs.
On one hand, Turkey represents geographical depth, military and technological expertise, and already has a role in training the new Syrian army and rebuilding some of its capabilities.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia represents Arab depth, political and economic weight, and the ability to open regional and international doors for Syria.
As for Pakistan, it possesses a large army, a defense industry, long strategic experience, advanced scientific and technological capabilities, in addition to being a nuclear power.
When the Syrian Foreign Minister publicly welcomes the Mecca Agreement while in Islamabad, it is politically legitimate to ask: Does Damascus view the agreement as a matter concerning only three countries, or as the nucleus of a new regional security system in which Syria wants to find a place for itself?
Abu al-Duhur: A Message to Damascus or Ankara?
The timing of the Israeli strike on Abu al-Duhur airport becomes even more intriguing.
I don’t interpret this strike as a message to Damascus alone.
In my estimation, a significant part of it was directed at Ankara, and this is becoming increasingly clear through the statements made.
Therefore, the dispute is no longer solely about what Syria possesses today, but rather about what Syria could become if its military capabilities were rebuilt with the assistance of a major regional power like Turkey.
Thus, the Israeli message can be interpreted as follows: You can rebuild the Syrian state, and you can develop your relations, but transforming Syria into a new strategic military arena has Israeli boundaries.
Herein lies the problem, because for Syria to accept this equation practically means accepting to remain a state with diminished sovereignty, where others have the right to dictate the type of army it possesses, the facilities it uses, and the partners with whom it cooperates.
However, rejecting this equation does not necessarily mean going to war, and this is a crucial point for me.
Deterrence is not synonymous with war; in fact, the best deterrence is that which prevents war from occurring.
Was the Abu al-Duhur strike a preemptive message?
One can take this a step further, but as a political hypothesis rather than confirmed information.
The timeline is intriguing: a defense agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, and talk of Syrian-Turkish military cooperation.
Then an Israeli strike on Abu al-Duhur, followed by a high-level Syrian visit to Pakistan.
This raises the question of whether Israel intends to establish boundaries from the outset for any future security architecture extending toward Syria, and whether, regardless of the alliances forming around Damascus, Israel will retain the ability to operate within it whenever it perceives its security interests to be threatened.
The paradox, however, is that this policy could backfire. The more Damascus discovers that its military institutions are vulnerable to attack without sufficient deterrence capabilities, the greater its need to cultivate a network of relationships that would make any aggression against it more costly.
This is where Ankara, Riyadh, and Islamabad become increasingly important in Syria’s official calculations.
Then the nuclear factor emerges!
And here I arrive at one of the most intriguing political coincidences. As we know, just before al-Shaibani’s visit to Pakistan, Syria announced that it would retain the nuclear materials it had discovered under the safeguards and supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Foreign Minister affirmed Syria’s right to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Then, almost immediately after this announcement, the Syrian Foreign Minister traveled to a nuclear-armed country called Pakistan.
I have information that Syrian-Pakistani nuclear cooperation was an item on the agenda of the unannounced discussions.
Syria genuinely wants to establish a national program for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and it found no better partner than Pakistan.
When I say nuclear Pakistan, I am not referring to the transfer of nuclear weapons to Syria, nor to a secret military program, nor to drawing Syria into a nuclear arms race.
I am talking here about peaceful nuclear knowledge. Pakistan did not become a powerful nation simply because it possessed nuclear weapons, but because it built universities, laboratories, scientific personnel, engineering and technical institutions, and a comprehensive knowledge base.
Syria needs this type of power, and it needs Syrian nuclear physicists and engineers, nuclear medicine and oncology treatment, radioactive isotope production, radiation applications in agriculture and industry, and technologies to help manage and desalinate water.
In the long term, we need to study all possible options for energy production, including civilian nuclear power, when economic and technical conditions permit.
And that’s the hope.
Why don’t the two countries establish a Syrian-Pakistani program for peaceful nuclear cooperation under the full supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency?
Why don’t hundreds of Syrian students, researchers, and engineers go to Pakistani institutions, universities, and research centers?
And why doesn’t Islamabad become a partner in rebuilding Syria’s scientific infrastructure, which has been depleted by decades of tyranny and then years of war and displacement?
What really worries Israel?
Here, the Israeli perspective can be re-examined.
Perhaps the real Israeli question isn’t what Syria will possess in the summer of 2026, but rather what Syria could become in ten years? What if the country stabilizes? What if Arab money and investment, especially Saudi investment, contribute to its reconstruction?
What if Turkey contributes to rebuilding the army, defense institutions, industry, and technology?
What if Pakistan becomes a partner in training, defense industries, science, technology, and peaceful nuclear applications?
What if Syrian universities regain their scientists and expertise?
Here, the equation changes.
Therefore, I believe we shouldn’t focus solely on Abu al-Duhur! The airport is part of the picture.
The bigger picture is the shape of the Syrian state that is being built.
Even Iran is present in Islamabad. This is another dimension that should not be overlooked.
Pakistan shares a long border with Iran and has a history of cooperation, competition, shared interests, and crises. The new Syria has come a long way in extricating itself from the Iranian axis, but it cannot base its foreign policy for decades on the concept of severing ties alone.
A moment will come when Damascus will need to manage its relationship with Tehran (there will be no return to Iranian dependence).
In the future, Islamabad could be one of the channels of controlled communication between the two countries. Therefore, it was noteworthy that Al-Shaibani, specifically from Pakistan, raised the issue of mediation with Iran and its Syrian conditions.
This gives us further reason to believe that Islamabad may become an important hub in Syrian policy toward the East. Syria is not obligated to choose between axes.
And here I arrive at what I see as the crux of the matter:
The biggest mistake the new Syria could make is to shift from one axis to another. Syrians paid a heavy price when their country became part of the Iranian project.
I don’t want us to replace subservience to Tehran with subservience to Ankara, or any other capital!
From Protection to Deterrence:
Firstly, a state that seeks a protector becomes dependent on that protector.
But a state that ties its stability to the interests of ten countries finds that aggression against it becomes costly for ten capitals.
This is the philosophy of deterrence that I see as suitable for Syria, and which makes violating Syrian sovereignty more difficult than before.
This is where the Mecca Agreement becomes important.
This is where the Turkish relationship becomes important.
This is where the visit to Pakistan becomes important.
Even the peaceful nuclear program becomes part of a broader concept of national power.
Will Syria become the fourth partner?
I don’t know if the Syrian decision-maker today has such a vision in mind.
But I believe the question that must be addressed is: Can Syria become a fourth strategic partner in the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani axis without becoming a subordinate member of a new alliance?
I believe this is possible, and perhaps even preferable to formal membership at this stage. This would involve defense cooperation with Turkey, strategic investment in the Arab world with Saudi Arabia, and scientific and technological collaboration with Pakistan, all underpinned by an independent Syrian decision-making process.
Post-Islamabad: I don’t view Al-Shaibani’s visit as merely a protocol visit, but rather as a test of a potential new direction in Syrian foreign policy. Major alliances begin with a visit, followed by an officer training program, intelligence cooperation, industrial partnerships, scientific missions, investments, cooperation in energy and nuclear medicine, and finally, political and security coordination.
Years later, everyone discovers that a complete strategic network has emerged before their very eyes while they were preoccupied with reading official statements.
I believe the Islamabad visit deserves to be viewed in this light.
And I believe the Mecca Agreement deserves careful consideration by Damascus. I believe that Syrian-Pakistani cooperation deserves to extend beyond traditional diplomacy to encompass defense, education, industry, technology, medicine, energy, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
However, I place one condition above all else: that Syria not become a subordinate part of a new axis! We do not want to replace one axis with another; rather, we want Syria itself to become an axis where interests converge, and where national will is not usurped.
This, in my view, is the difference between a state that seeks protection and a state that builds the strength, knowledge, and relationships that compel everyone to take it into account.
