Foreign Jihadists: Between Fueling the Battle and Threatening Stability

Introduction:

One of the most complex issues that arises in the aftermath of military victory is the fate of irregular forces that took part in the battle—especially when some of these forces include foreign jihadists.

President Ahmad al-Shara‘, who led decisive battles along the Syrian coast against the remnants of the Alawite regime and its allies, managed to secure a significant military advantage with the support of various factions, including foreign jihadist groups that entered the battlefield with intense combat effectiveness.

Despite the field achievements, this participation has produced a multilayered dilemma: how can these temporary forces be utilized without becoming a strategic burden that threatens the stability of the emerging government?

Here, we examine similar international experiences and propose practical and innovative solutions to address this sensitive issue from our perspective—ensuring that the gains of victory do not turn into a source of internal instability or international isolation!

First: From Foreign Jihadists as a Combat Tool to a Legitimacy Dilemma

From the very early stages of the new regime’s formation under President Ahmad al-Shara‘, military decisiveness emerged as a necessary step to dismantle the remnants of the Alawite regime’s authority.

In this context, foreign jihadist groups from Central Asia, North Africa, Chechnya, and Europe became involved in the battle to overthrow the Assad regime, playing a significant tactical role in tipping the scales in favor of the revolutionary forces.

Here, the political and security reality imposes critical questions that demand answers:

• What is the nature of these groups?
• To what extent are they loyal to the Syrian national project?
• How can their influence be dismantled after their combat role ends?
• Can President al-Shara‘ continue to govern in the presence of groups that do not recognize political borders or citizenship, but instead adhere to a supra-national ideology?

Second: How Have Countries Around the World Dealt with the Phenomenon of Foreign Jihadists?

1 . Algeria After the Black Decade

• At the beginning of the millennium, Algeria adopted a policy of civil concord and offered conditional amnesty to armed Islamic groups, which included disarmament in exchange for limited integration. However, it dealt firmly with foreign elements, expelling some and imprisoning others, and Algeria cooperated with their home countries to deport them under security agreements. It is worth noting that Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika said in 2006: “Those who have no homeland have no future, and those who do not believe in the state have no place among us.”

2 . Iraq After 2003

In a similar context, Iraqi governments faced a comparable challenge after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, when foreign groups flooded across the borders to fight against the American presence and the new authority. Baghdad adopted a dual strategy:

• Compulsory Containment: Through killing or imprisonment.
• Ideological Deconstruction: With programs in prisons to reconsider jihadist ideology.

3 . The Libyan Experience

In Libya, Gaddafi fell due to allied forces, including Islamic groups and foreign fighters. However, the lack of a clear plan to deal with these fighters later led to their transformation into warlords. They seized control of ports and oil fields, resulting in ongoing political and security divisions.

A warning issued by the UN representative to Libya, Martin Kobler, in December 2016 stated: “Leaving foreign fighters unaddressed in a systematic manner could recreate violence under new banners.”

4 . The Chechen Russian Model

Russia faced foreign fighters in Chechnya and applied a “no-negotiation strike” policy, leading to massacres, but successfully ended the insurgency. The Russian model proved effective in terms of security but left horrific human rights repercussions.

5. Bosnia and Herzegovina (After the 1992-1995 War)

During the Bosnian War, several foreign jihadists fought alongside the Bosnian Muslims, particularly from the Arab world. However, after the signing of the Dayton Agreement (1995), their presence became an obstacle to stability and the implementation of the political agreement. The United States and Europe demanded that the Bosnian government expel them.

The passports granted to these jihadists during the war were revoked, and many were forced to return to their home countries, or were handed over to their countries of origin. Some faced trial.

As the American envoy to Bosnia in 1996 put it, “You cannot build a civil state with armed ideological pockets from outside the borders.”

6. Somalia – (Al-Shabaab Organization)

Since 2007, foreign militants (from Kenya, Yemen, Europe) have been involved in the extremist Al-Shabaab organization. However, the Somali government, supported by the African Union, later adopted a dual policy:

1. Geographic isolation of these elements from major cities.
2. Targeted assassinations and field elimination in coordination with U.S. forces.
3. In addition, there were repatriation programs for foreign fighters in cooperation with their home countries.

7. Afghanistan (Post-Taliban Era 2001–2021)

After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, there were large numbers of Arab, Chechen, and Pakistani fighters. The U.S. and coalition forces detained many of them at Bagram Prison or Guantanamo Bay. The Afghan government did not have the capacity to deport them on its own, so the operation was carried out in intelligence cooperation with major countries. Later, laws were enacted prohibiting the residence or political activity of any foreigner on Afghan territory.

8. Nigeria (Boko Haram and Foreign Branches)

Boko Haram attracted foreign elements from Niger, Chad, and Mali, posing a threat to Nigerian security. The government carried out:

1. Military campaigns on the borders to prevent the entry or escape of fighters.
2. Regional coordination through the “Multinational Joint Task Force” to deport or neutralize non-Nigerian elements.

9 . General Conclusions from International Experiences:

Countries that succeeded in addressing the issue of foreign militants often relied on a combination of:

1. Security firmness (deportation – neutralization – detention).

General Conclusions from International Experiences:

Countries that succeeded in addressing the issue of foreign militants often relied on a combination of:

1. Security firmness (deportation – neutralization – detention).
2. Legal legitimacy (trials – revocation of citizenship – penalties).
3. International cooperation (with their countries of origin or international organizations).
4. Not integrating them into any long-term national project.

Thirdly: International Messages to President Ahmed al-Shara Regarding This Issue

Several countries have sent both implicit and direct diplomatic messages to President Ahmed al-Shara in recent weeks, urging him to find an urgent solution to this phenomenon:

1. United States (March 2025): In a statement from its State Department, it called for “the containment of transnational jihadist elements to preserve the stability of the modern Syrian state.”
2. France (January 2025): The French Foreign Minister stated, “Any country that tolerates supra-national ideological factions will be under the scrutiny of the international community.”
3. Russia (February 2025): Russia expressed concern about “the concentration of non-Syrian cells near the southern Russian border,” considering that “stability can only be achieved by cleansing the Syrian environment of transnational influences.”
4. Turkey (March 2025): In a closed-door meeting, Turkey expressed support for “any effort to ensure the withdrawal of non-Syrian fighters from sensitive geographical areas near the coast,” provided that it is done without provoking sectarian sensitivities.

Fourthly: Strategic Options for President al-Shara

Based on previous experiences and the unique Syrian context, the Syrian Future Movement recommends following a multi-pronged strategy:

1. Redirecting Foreign Elements Outside Syrian Geography
2. Opening secure crossings under international mediation to ensure an organized, safe exit.
3. Providing legal guarantees in coordination with international organizations that the departing individuals will not face execution unless they have committed crimes.
4. Containment and Disengagement Programs
5. “Ideological neutralization” programs in closed centers.
6. Offering economic incentives to withdraw from militarization, especially for youth who are not fully ideologically committed.
7. Conditional Surrender of Certain Leaders
8. Some jihadist leaders, whose hands are stained with blood or who have committed violations, should be handed over to their home countries according to agreements that respect sovereignty, ensuring that this is done in a manner that prevents retaliatory reactions.
9. Establishing an Independent National Security Council
10. Composed of national, legal, and military figures to formulate a comprehensive policy for dealing with the issue, away from narrow political calculations.
11. National Media and Community Campaign
12. To explain the state’s actions and garner popular support for any actions involving foreign groups. The fight against extremism is not only military but also involves winning hearts and minds.

Conclusion: Between Battle and Construction

President Ahmad al-Shara, having successfully completed the liberation battles on the coast, now faces a more complex battle: the battle for state-building.

There can be no construction without purging the land from transient chaos, controlling power centers, and achieving full sovereignty.

The Syrian Future Movement believes that the historic opportunity available to President al-Shara requires courage in decision-making, intelligence in timing, and a vision that goes beyond the battlefield to a state-building project that embraces the people, not the passing fighters.

While foreign jihadists were a temporary tool in the liberation battle, their continued presence without regulation or dismantling could become a constraint that shackles the very project of governance.

Based on this, we in the Syrian Future Movement affirm that dealing with the issue of foreign jihadists must be approached through a comprehensive national strategy that takes into account:

1. The necessity of fully restoring sovereign decision-making and not allowing any armed presence outside the state, regardless of its justifications or affiliations.
2. Presenting a clear political project that reassures both the internal and external communities that Syria is moving toward a state of law and institutions, not a refuge for transnational ideologies or foreign ideological projects.
3. Strengthening relations with international and regional powers through transparency in managing this issue, reassuring the world that the new Syrian state is capable of securing its own safety and the security of its surroundings without the need for foreign forces.
4. Strictly distinguishing between those who fought in defense of Syria and those who seek to impose their own project on its land, as there is no equality between those who respected national sovereignty and those who work to undermine it.

In conclusion, the Syrian Future Movement calls on President Ahmad al-Shara to seize this historic moment to prove that the state, which was liberated by arms, can only be built through sovereignty, can only be solidified by law, and can only stabilize when the era of illegal arms ends and the era of the free citizen and the inclusive national project begins.

The new Syria will not be built with imported arms, but with sincere national will, and this is what will happen.

Political Office

Research Team

Research and Studies Department

Articles

Syrian Future Movement