Following major historical turning points, and specifically after the fall of totalitarian regimes, societies go through a highly sensitive phase known in political literature as the “fluidity of the transitional phase.” At this juncture, the greatest challenge is not dismantling the old structure, but rather establishing “legal legitimacy” in place of “revolutionary legitimacy.”
The recent announcement by the Syrian Ministry of Interior regarding the arrest of more than 5,000 members of the remnants of the old regime and the Shabiha militia, including high-ranking security and military officials, and the commencement of trials for figures of crime such as Amjad Youssef, represents a clear declaration of the birth of a genuine “state-building process.”
However, the haphazard actions witnessed in recent days, and the attempts to implement “street justice” by pursuing, eliminating, or expelling those associated with the remnants of the old regime outside the framework of institutions, raise a pressing question: Who truly benefits from dragging the sons of the revolution into a state of lawlessness and undermining the nascent state-building process?
The first axis, “Political Realism” versus “Revolutionary Emotion”:
The intellectual perspective compels us to distinguish between two logics: the logic of revolution, based on anger and immediate accountability, and the logic of the state, based on balances, stability, and continuity.
Historically, transitional authorities are forced to practice what is known as “political realism.” This logic sometimes dictates making temporary compromises or understandings with financial or technocratic networks from the previous regime to ensure that supply chains and the economy do not collapse, and to avoid a service vacuum that could lead to a humanitarian catastrophe.
The public’s awareness of these compromises is often fraught with emotional frustration, which is understandable given the magnitude of historical injustices. However, the danger lies in this frustration transforming into destructive behaviors that reject the state’s judicial process and replace it with “private justice.” This slide will not only harm the institutional framework but also—consciously or unconsciously—serve those who seek to undermine the Syrian state. Yet, historical fairness and a profound sociological approach compel us not to reduce this popular uprising to mere “political ignorance” or “succumbing to conspiracies.” It is, above all, born of collective trauma and an existential wound. Today’s revolutionary sees every judicial delay, and every familiar face of the former regime freely walking the streets, as a direct affront to his dignity and a renewed violation of the sanctity of his comrades’ blood.
This raises the legitimate and bitter question that cries out from within many: “How can we wait while we see our tormentors walking freely in the markets while our children lie in graves?” This question cannot be dismissed as a mere passing whim, for it is in reality an expression of a profound crisis of confidence between the individual and the nascent state, which has thus far been unable, for objective reasons, to offer the public a swift resolution or a tangible justice that would restore their sense of humanity.
The wise solution lies not in suppressing this question or criminalizing those who raise it, but rather in embracing it politically and legally, and channeling its immense energy from the path of individual revenge—which undermines the movement’s credibility and makes it vulnerable to infiltration—into an organized popular momentum that exerts civil pressure on the judiciary to expedite its proceedings and on the authorities to fulfill their promises.
The angry public is not, and never has been, an enemy of the state; rather, it is its vigilant, living conscience. However, transforming this conscience from a moral watchdog into an extrajudicial executioner is precisely the hidden objective sought by those lying in wait. It is the trap into which, if the victorious sons of the revolution fall, will destroy the revolutionary project before their new state can fully take shape.
Historical experiences, from the post-Ceaușescu era in Romania to the post-Saddam Hussein era in Iraq, have demonstrated that resorting to mob justice only deepens divisions, destroys the national fabric, and prolongs suffering.
Successful experiences, such as post-apartheid South Africa, were based on institutional reconciliation and structured transitional justice, despite the magnitude of the grievances and the multitude of affected parties.
The second axis: The engineering of chaos… Who benefits?
If we analyze the situation using strategic tools, we find three main actors whose interests converge in transforming the revolutionaries into “outlaws”:
First, the networks of the former regime and its remnants:
Building independent judicial institutions and professional security apparatuses means the inevitable and irreversible end of the symbols of the former regime, legally speaking.
Therefore, these networks will seek to incite panic and push the public toward indiscriminate violence, aiming to portray the transitional authority as incapable of maintaining civil peace, thereby derailing the institutionalization process and allowing these networks to escape accountability.
When angry civilians attack or expel a pro-regime militiaman, these cells exploit the incident to sow fear and claim that “the transitional authority is incapable of protecting civil peace,” thus obstructing their legal dismantling.
Here we are faced with the “victim-protester” model, which aims to undermine the new state’s resolve and create a state of “creative chaos” that allows these networks to regroup, sacrificing their smaller members to protect the major criminals.
Secondly, radical agendas and warlords:
Extremist organizations and rogue groups thrive in an environment of chaos and lawlessness. The establishment of a state with functioning institutions means pulling the rug out from under these forces and curtailing their factional influence.
Therefore, these parties deliberately manipulate the emotions of protesters under the guise of “treason” or “betraying the blood of martyrs,” to obstruct any governmental effort to organize and extend its authority.
The absence of the rule of law also provides a fertile ground for its continued existence. Therefore, it emotionally incites the masses under the slogan “The state is compromising on the blood of the martyrs” to push them toward violence and obstruct the path of governance.
These parties realize that any success for the transitional state inevitably means their end, so they exert every effort to distort its image and portray it as a “hesitant” or “complicit” state with the remnants of the old regime.
Third, regional and international powers hostile to stability:
Many external powers view the emerging Syrian model with suspicion and fear its success. Yes, and the best way to undermine this model would be to deprive the transitional state of the oxygen of stability, investment, and capital.
When images of lynchings and extrajudicial killings are exported to the world, expatriate investors and businesspeople will hesitate to inject their funds, and international actors will find a pretext to shirk their commitments under the guise that the current alternative is “politically immature” and governed by the law of the jungle.
Exporting an image of chaos from Syria serves those who want to keep the region in a state of instability, whether for geopolitical or economic reasons, and who fear that the new Syrian model will become an example for other peoples in the region seeking change.
These actors understand that stability in Syria means a shift in the regional balance of power, so they invest in its failure.
Third axis: The philosophical and political consequences of unchecked violence:
The philosopher and sociologist Max Weber defines the state as “the institution that is the human entity that holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical violence.”
Based on this concept, dismantling this monopoly and making it common property in the hands of groups or individuals—no matter how noble or revolutionary their motives—simply means dismantling the concept of the state and returning society to the “state of nature” that Thomas Hobbes described as a “war of all against all.”
When the sons of the revolution appear as forces opposed to the state’s trajectory, they are doing the greatest service to the narrative that the former regime has long promoted, both globally and domestically: “It’s either me or chaos.”
This slide will also strip the movement of its moral and legal superiority, transforming it from a “civilized alternative” project into a mere “tool of sectarian revenge,” thus threatening to undermine the international legitimacy that the transitional authority is currently trying to secure and establish.
The disastrous consequences of falling into this trap are evident on several levels:
First, the flight of investment capital:
The transitional authority has made significant strides in attracting billions of dollars in investments and the return of hundreds of thousands of expatriates and wealthy individuals.
The scenes of lynchings and extrajudicial killings set back the clock and frighten investors, who ultimately seek the rule of law.
Any investment environment requires security and judicial stability to guarantee returns. Any deficiency in this area will cause investors to hesitate or withdraw, depriving the transitional state of the vital resources it needs for reconstruction and job creation.
Secondly, the international legitimacy of the transitional authority is undermined:
The international community is monitoring the new authority’s ability to protect citizens and establish security. The erratic actions of those affiliated with the revolutionaries weaken the state’s negotiating position in international forums and portray the movement as a “militia” rather than a legitimate state project, despite the fact that the state is supposedly controlled by them and their supporters.
Any loss of international legitimacy will complicate the process of diplomatic recognition, delay the lifting of sanctions, and hinder Syria’s reintegration into the Arab and international community, thus prolonging the economic and social suffering.
Third, the destruction of the social fabric and the incitement of strife:
Individual justice often takes on a sectarian, tribal, or regional character within a diverse society. Any personal revenge outside the law threatens to ignite a disastrous conflict, especially in a country already suffering the repercussions of a protracted and complex war.
Furthermore, the fragile civil peace requires objective legal solutions, not indiscriminate acts of revenge that deepen wounds and create new cycles of vengeance and resentment.
In conclusion, building the state is the ultimate revenge:
Strategic awareness compels the sons of the Syrian revolution to realize that the greatest revenge against the defunct totalitarian regime is not killing a thug in the street, but rather building the just and stable state that the regime failed to establish over decades.
Establishing the path to statehood and building institutions does not, under any circumstances, mean overlooking criminals or reconciling with murderers. Rather, it means prosecuting them according to organized “transitional justice” mechanisms that preserve the dignity of victims and safeguard civil peace.
Protecting and defending this path is the highest revolutionary duty at this stage. To thwart all those who seek to harm Syria, and to prevent the sacrifices of millions of Syrians from being transformed from a project for a nation and a state into cantons of chaos and instability.
The sons of the revolution are called upon today to be “agents of law enforcement” by providing evidence and documentation to the transitional and internal justice bodies, instead of being drawn into “street justice” that destroys what they built with their blood.
The state they are building today is their salvation from decades of oppression, and it is the only guarantee that tyranny will never return.
And in a time when projects of chaos and stability clash, the option of the state and its institutions will remain the only path to a better tomorrow.
The awareness of Syrians of the pitfalls of the transitional phase and their unity around the project of a modern state is the strongest weapon against all those who seek to harm this ancient and wounded country.
