Executive Summary:
This study addresses the central problem in contemporary Islamic political thought: the tension between two models of governance. The first is a model of ascetic simplicity, based on the life of Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab. The second is a model of representative prestige, based on the experiences of governors of Syria such as Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan and Abu Ubaydah ibn al-Jarrah.
The study analyzes how Syrian public opinion employs these historical models to critique manifestations of official pomp and circumstance within the context of war, displacement, and the erosion of public services.
The study adopts a comparative discourse analysis methodology, drawing on theoretical tools from political anthropology (the concepts of “symbolic space” and “imagined power” in Eckelman and Piscatori) and from comparative sociology of religion (the concepts of “civil fluidity” and “circular sovereignty” in Salvatore).
The study reveals a third approach to this problem, one that transcends the simplicity/prestige dichotomy and embraces a vision of “decentralized civic virtue.” It proposes the development of a “symbolic gap index” as a tool for assessing representative justice in governance systems.
The Problem and Research Questions:
How can the demand for “simplicity of rulers,” based on foundational Islamic models, be reconciled with the necessity of “state prestige” as a condition for achieving legitimacy and symbolic power in international and domestic relations?
What are the political and social implications of employing these two models in contemporary Syrian critical discourse?
How can a theoretical and methodological framework be constructed that transcends the “Bedouin/urban” dichotomy towards measurable and evaluable criteria?
Central Hypothesis: Syrian criticism of official processions does not represent a rejection of prestige as a value, but rather a protest against the monopolization of symbolic space in the absence of distributive justice. This reflects a crisis of confidence in state institutions more than an anthropological rejection of manifestations of power.
First, the theoretical framework – mechanisms for producing prestige and legitimacy:
1.1 Symbolic space and the construction of imagined authority:
In their seminal work, Muslim Politics (1996/2004), Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori introduce the concept of “symbolic space” as a domain in which actors compete to produce meaning and redefine the boundaries between the religious, the political, and the civil.
Eickelman and Piscatori reject a monolithic view of political Islam, instead examining how “actors—scholars, mothers, government leaders, musicians—invoke shared Islamic symbols to reshape the boundaries of civic discourse and public life.”
This perspective is crucial for analyzing our situation: the official procession is no longer merely a protocolary procedure; it is a symbolic ritual that produces and reproduces the prestige of the state. When Syrians criticize the minister’s motorcade, they are not objecting to the existence of political symbolism itself, but rather engaging in an interpretive struggle over who has the right to monopolize this symbolism, at what cost, and in what context.
2.1 A Critique of the Liberal Model: Towards Circular Sovereignty
In his project on the “Sociology of Islam,” Armando Salvatore offers a radical critique of the Weberian and Habermasian models that have dominated the study of political Islam.
Salvatore argues that these models impose a centralized “Westphalian” framework on Islamic contexts that have historically been more mobile, flexible, and circulatory.
Salvatore proposes an epistemological alternative: the concept of “circular sovereignty,” which does not require a rigid, prestige-based center but rather relies on civil structures that are not centralized.
This concept opens the door to a third approach to our problem: neither the simplicity of Umar (individual asceticism) nor the prestige of Damascus (powerful representation), but rather a civic virtue that transcends borders and produces order without the need for costly rituals of centralized prestige.
This approach finds contemporary manifestations in models of local and decentralized governance, and in the critiques of reformist Islamists of the bureaucratic deep state.
3.1 The Problem of “The Invention of Tradition”:
Eickelman and Piscatori offer an additional, crucial analytical tool: “The Invention of Tradition.”
Historical figures (Umar, Muawiyah) do not return to us in their pure form; rather, they are rhetorically reinvented to justify contemporary positions.
When a Syrian critic invokes Umar ibn al-Khattab, he is not invoking a seventh-century figure, but a contemporary image of equal justice, just as Muawiyah invoked the “Byzantine” justification to legitimize his prestige.
The problem lies not in the invocation itself, but in prioritizing one dimension over another without considering the complex contexts.
Second, the historical foundations of the two models in Islamic political thought:
2.1 The Umarian Model: The Economy of Asceticism and the Establishment of Legitimacy through Visible Equality:
Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab (may God be pleased with him) represents the most frequently cited model in the discourse of “the simplicity of rulers.”
Sources point to foundational scenes: sleeping under trees, refusing personal guards, wearing patched clothing, and entering Syria on foot.
However, a purposive reading reveals that Umar’s asceticism was not an end in itself, but rather a means of legitimizing his rule within a society newly established as a state, which viewed luxury as a sign of arrogance and separation from the community of believers.
Here, Umarian legitimacy rests on the economy of visible equality. The ruler must be seen as equal to the people in order to be just in his governance.
2.2 The Syrian Model: The Prestige of Representation in the Face of Empires:
When Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan and Abu Ubaydah ibn al-Jarrah were criticized for their displays of grandeur, they did not justify it as personal extravagance, but rather with purely political logic: “This is the nature of Syria and its proximity to the Romans.” Sources state that Umar ibn al-Khattab reviewed the delegation from Syria during the Hajj season. When he saw them dressed in slave-like clothing, he asked, “Are they children?” The reply was, “No, they are princes.”
Herein lies the crucial difference: appearance was not a personal requirement, but rather a symbolic function of the position within a competitive geopolitical context.
The ruler’s prestige here served as a message to the neighboring empire that the Islamic state was not a transient nomadic entity, but a powerful force worthy of respect and treaties.
2.3 The Umar-Muawiya Debate: Foundational Criticism as a Regulatory Mechanism:
Historical sources are replete with instances of the Companions criticizing one another, most notably Umar’s criticism of Muawiya and Abu Ubaidah.
This criticism was not… This is not an abolition of the Levantine model, but rather a reminder of the price of prestige. Prestige is conditional upon not becoming a luxury, not separating the ruler from the ruled, and not draining public funds.
Here, Islamic heritage offers a mechanism for critical balance between the two models, the same mechanism that is absent today when the motorcade becomes an unaccountable reality.
Third, Case Study – Syrian Critical Discourse in its Context:
3.1 The Specificity of the Syrian Context (War, Displacement, and the Economy of Symbols in a Time of Austerity):
Syrian criticism of official motorcades cannot be understood in isolation from the catastrophic context of the war that has been ongoing since 2011 (albeit with different faces after the fall of Assad). In a country where more than half the population has been displaced, its infrastructure destroyed, and electricity, water, and transportation services have become a daily luxury, the official motorcade acquires a doubly painful significance. It serves as a reminder of a class that moves smoothly through paved spaces, while the average citizen suffers from poor roads and service disruptions.
The explanatory hypothesis here states that the criticism is directed at the elite’s monopoly on prestige, not at prestige itself as a value, especially given the current collapse of public services.
In other words, it is a critique of the symbolic monopoly, not of the symbol itself.
3.2 Analysis of Critical Discourse, from the Invocation of Omar to the Motorcycle Icon:
The circulation of three key scenes in Syrian discourse reveals a profound critical structure:
A. The Invocation of the Omar Model: This expresses a yearning for a “just ruler” who is equal to the people, contrasted with a feeling that pomp and circumstance masks a lack of moral and political legitimacy.
B. The Afghan Minister Icon: The transformation of the image of the Afghan minister on the motorcycle into a critical “icon” reveals the reduction of reform to mere form.
The paradox here is that the motorcycle may be a means of transportation in Kabul and an expression of institutional poverty, not moral austerity.
This reduction obscures the responsibility of institutions and perpetuates a culture of evaluating the ruler by his image, not his policies.
C. A Critique of the Timing of Prestige: Here, the criticism is not focused on the existence of the motorcade itself, but rather on its timing at a moment when the state is unable to provide even the most basic services. The timing here creates the significance.
Fourth, Towards a Composite Model – Dignified Simplicity and the Symbolic Gap Index:
4.1 Dignified Simplicity: Foundational Principles:
The study proposes moving beyond the “simplicity/prestige” dichotomy through the concept of “dignified simplicity,” based on three principles:
The prestige of the institution, not the person of the ruler: A symbolic and legal separation between the dignity of the office and the appearance of the official. Prestige belongs to the flag, the building, and the system, not to the minister’s vehicle or the size of the entourage.
This principle frees the official from the burden of “personal representation” and liberates the citizen from reducing performance evaluation to the official’s image.
Rational Symbolic Economy: Establishing transparent standards for spending on displays of power, linking them to political and diplomatic functions, not personal preferences.
This allows for the prestige of international representation (a meeting between a foreign minister and their counterpart), while regulating the prestige of domestic representation (internal travel). 3. Bridging the Representational Gap: Officials are not expected to live like nomads in the urban age, but they are also not permitted to live like kings in a republic where the majority suffers from poverty.
The gap between the standard of living of officials and that of ordinary citizens must be rationally explainable, not merely a reflection of a separate political class.
4.2 Constructing the Symbolic Gap Index (SGI): This study presents a preliminary framework for a constructible and applicable index that measures representational justice in governance systems across three dimensions:
Consumer Inequality Dimension: The ratio of the cost of official entourages (vehicles, security, protocol) to the average per capita income or to the budget of the Ministry of Services.
Visible Inequality Dimension: The frequency of official appearances in contexts of prestige versus contexts of service.
A quantitative measure of “the number of times official appears in formal attire at palaces” versus “the number of times official appears at work sites and during crises.”
Accessibility Dimension: The average time an ordinary citizen needs to reach an official (calculations of appointment booking, waiting, and intermediaries) versus the speed of the official’s own movement.
This indicator, once systematically and statistically developed, can serve as a tool for evaluating symbolic governance, shifting the discussion from moral impressions (such as “this official is austere/arrogant”) to measurable and comparable criteria.
4.3 The Scandinavian Model: A Comparative Approach
The Scandinavian model (Sweden, Norway, Denmark) offers a contemporary example of “dignified simplicity.” The prime minister sometimes drives himself and uses public transportation, yet the state itself maintains a high level of institutional prestige.
The crucial difference is that prestige here stems from performance and transparency, not from spending on appearances.
There, Scandinavian citizens don’t need to see their leader in a motorcade to know the state is strong; comprehensive services and honest institutions constitute the true prestige of the state.
This model demonstrates the possibility of separating institutional strength from the simplicity of its symbols.
Fifth, Results and Recommendations:
5.1 Results:
- The two models (the Omari and the Shami) are contextually different but not fundamentally contradictory, and they can be reconciled through a purposive approach that considers the conditions of time and place.
- There is a third perspective on the issue, neglected by previous studies, which can be theoretically grounded in Salvatore’s concept of “circular sovereignty” and models of decentralized governance and civic virtue.
- The Syrian critique of official processions does not express a rejection of prestige as much as it expresses a rejection of the monopolization of symbolic space in the absence of distributive justice. It is a contextual critique par excellence.
- Reducing reform to “simplicity of appearance” (the bicycle icon) obscures the responsibility of institutions and perpetuates a culture of judging the ruler by his image rather than his policies.
- Quantitative tools can be developed to measure the symbolic gap, transforming ethical discourse into policies that are evaluable and developable.
5-2 Research Recommendations:
- Field Studies: Conduct a social survey in the Syrian context to measure the significance of symbolic prestige among citizens and its relationship to trust in institutions and willingness to defend them.
- Comparative Studies: Conduct an in-depth analysis of governance models in Islamic contexts (Türkiye, Iran, Malaysia, Indonesia, etc.).
- Afghanistan) in terms of its formal symbol economy, and its classification according to the Symbol Gap Index.
- Historical Studies: A broader examination of the “Umar and Mu’awiya” debate in historical sources, and an analysis of how this debate is employed in modern Arab political discourse.
- Methodological Development: Construction and standardization of the Symbol Gap Index (SGI) as a quantitatively applicable tool in public administration and governance studies.
Jurisprudential Study of Islamic Objectives: Analysis of the concept of “state prestige” in Islamic political jurisprudence, and differentiation between what is a legitimate objective (state power, deterrence of the enemy) and what is a social custom subject to change.
In conclusion, it can be said optimistically that the Syrian people, despite the ongoing transition and the presence of pockets of fighting (Hasakah, Suwayda) that require elimination to facilitate a healthy state, are creating an inherent capacity to naturally shape their state and country. Action and reaction emerge in a dialectical process beneficial for reform and building from the ground up. This is more conducive to sustainability and future stability if the Syrians understand its importance.
List of Sources and References:
First, Historical Sources:
- Al-Tabari, Muhammad ibn Jarir. History of the Prophets and Kings. Edited by Muhammad Abu al-Fadl Ibrahim. Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif, 1967.
- Ibn Asakir, Ali ibn al-Hasan. History of Damascus. Edited by Omar ibn Gharama al-Amrawi. Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1995.
- Ibn Sa’d, Muhammad. The Great Classes. Edited by Ihsan Abbas. Beirut: Dar Sader. (Publication year not given in the available edition).
Second, Modern Theoretical References:
- Eickelman, Dale F., and James Piscatori. Muslim Politics. 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
- Salvatore, Armando. Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity. Reading: Ithaca Press, 1997.
- Salvatore, Armando. “The Dissonant Politics of Religion, Circulation and Civility in the Sociology of Islam.” In Islam after Liberalism, edited by Faisal Devji and Zaheer Kazmi, 125–148. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Salvatore, Armando. Islam and Statehood: Instituting the Ecumenical System. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2024.
Third, Studies of the Arab and Islamic Context:
- Al-Jabiri, Muhammad Abed. The Arab Political Mind. Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1990.
- Al-Azm, Sadiq Jalal. Self-Criticism After the Defeat. Beirut: Dar al-Tali’ah, 1968.
Note: This study was prepared within the framework of the project “Anthropology of the State and Symbolic Authority in Contemporary Islamic Contexts and its Application to the Syrian Reality.” The Digital Libraries Administration is thanked for providing access to the referenced academic sources.
