Introduction – The Problem of Trust in the Founding Moment:
A profound philosophical and political question arises amidst the major transformations experienced by countries emerging from protracted conflicts, such as Syria today: Is the appointment of relatives and trusted associates by officials a legitimate “right,” a temporary “necessity” imposed by the exceptional circumstances, or a form of hidden “corruption” that must be eradicated from the outset?
Perhaps the answer, in political philosophy, cannot be simplified ideologically. Rather, it lies in a gray area that requires a precise deconstruction of the concept of “trust” itself and its relationship to “power,” particularly in the aftermath of institutional collapse and the absence of the state.
First, the Realistic Perspective:
Since the 16th century, the Italian thinker Niccolò Machiavelli, in his seminal work “The Prince,” presented a realistic view of power. This view posits that a new ruler, especially one who comes to power after instability or a power vacuum, is compelled during the founding phase to surround himself with those whose loyalty he trusts unconditionally, because the survival of the political project itself takes precedence over all other considerations. This does not mean that Machiavelli advocates nepotism as a value. Rather, he argues that political necessity in the absence of stability leads to “security” and “loyalty” taking precedence over “pure competence.” Trust, in this context, becomes the “fuel of the transitional phase,” enabling swift and sensitive decisions without fear of betrayal or infiltration.
In his study of political systems, researcher Hamdi Abdel Rahman explains this phenomenon within the context of post-conflict states, noting that the collapse of public trust compels new elites to rely on “primary trust networks” (family, close friends, and ideological loyalists) as a natural defense mechanism to ensure the cohesion of the emerging power structure.
Second, Patrimonialism:
The most important philosophical warning here comes from the German thinker Max Weber in his monumental work, Economy and Society. Weber warns against what he calls “patrimonialism,” whereby the ruler begins to treat the state and its institutions as his “private property,” and public office becomes merely a “privilege” distributed to those close to him based on personal loyalty rather than competence.
Weber argues that the transition from “patrimonialism” to “rational legal authority” is the essence of building the modern state.
The true state is based on “abstract rules” and “neutral competence,” not on “personal relationships” and “family loyalties.” The greatest danger during transitional phases remains that the “necessity of temporary trust” will transform into a “permanent culture of patrimonialism,” reproducing despotism under new slogans.
Third, The Historical Model:
Islamic history offers a unique early model for dealing with this dilemma.
The second Islamic caliph, Umar ibn al-Khattab, as historians recount, was extremely sensitive to any suspicion of favoritism.
He not only refrained from appointing his relatives, but also prevented them from holding sensitive positions so that it wouldn’t be said that “the treasury had become an extension of the caliph’s household.”
In this context, Umar ibn al-Khattab relates this saying: “Whoever is entrusted with any matter concerning the Muslims and appoints someone due to affection or kinship between them has betrayed God, His Messenger, and the believers.”
Umar’s philosophy here transcends the issue of “competence” to the issue of “image” and “public trust.” Justice must be seen, not merely practiced superficially!
People must feel that the state is not the private domain of any one individual, and this is the essence of political “legitimacy,” which precedes all other considerations.
Fourth, the Syrian Case:
In the contemporary Syrian context, it is essential to analyze the inherent danger of mixing kinship with power during the transitional phase, taking into account the historical context and dynamics. If we lived in a truly functioning state with established institutions, the appointment of a close relative by someone in power would be subject to parliamentary oversight, media scrutiny, and the like.
However, in our country, which emerged exhausted from a revolution and a war, and where oversight mechanisms are still incomplete, and institutions are not yet fully established, let alone functioning effectively—as is the case with the fragmented parliament—nepotism will transform from a mere detail into the very foundation of a new system that will take root in the nascent state.
Herein lies the problem: the state becomes an extension of the family, and public office becomes a closed space accessible only to those trusted within the circles of kinship and those who seek refuge with and orbit around them.
Here begins the quiet slide toward a spiderweb-like, network-based rule built on absolute loyalty, where competence becomes a secondary consideration.
It is worth reiterating a crucial point: the problem does not lie in the legal text (which may not prohibit the appointment of relatives), but rather in the “context,” the “political culture,” and the “absence of oversight mechanisms.” In Europe, a minister might resign over the appointment of a relative to a minor position, because the criterion is not “Is that legally permissible?” but rather “Does it serve the public interest?”
Fifth, the equation of balance:
From all of this, a balanced political vision can be derived for dealing with the issue of appointments during transitional phases:
- Recognizing the unique nature of the transitional phase, as it may necessitate some appointments based on trust in limited sovereign positions (private offices, direct security), as a temporary necessity to ensure the cohesion of power.
- However, this is a “temporary exception,” not a “permanent acquired right.”
- Distinguishing between “positions of trust” and “positions of competence.” There is a fundamental difference between appointing the president’s chief of staff (a position of trust) and appointing a health minister or central bank governor (a position of competence).
- The former may be subject to the logic of trust within certain parameters, while the latter must be subject to the criteria of competence alone from the outset.
- A strict timeframe is necessary, and it must be explicitly declared that the appointments of trusted individuals are a temporary “administrative emergency,” linked to a clear timetable, after which the state will transition to open, competitive mechanisms.
Building institutions that generate trust is crucial. Instead of trust remaining confined to individuals (family, friends), institutions (oversight bodies, civil service laws, public competitions) must be established to cultivate public trust.
Personal trust undermines the state, while institutional trust builds and strengthens it.
In conclusion:
The transitional phase is a bridge between a collapsed past and a hoped-for future.
This bridge cannot be crossed without some temporary “pillars of trust.”
But the greatest danger lies in deciding to build our permanent homes on this bridge.
Appointing relatives and trusted associates might be understandable in the early months as a mechanism for maintaining cohesion in the face of chaos.
However, it becomes a “betrayal of the revolution” and the “nucleus of a new tyranny” if it persists after a minimum level of stability is achieved, and transforms into a tool for expelling competent individuals and inheriting the state.
Furthermore, a true democratic transition is measured by the new elite’s ability to transcend “family logic” and embrace “citizenship logic,” and to shift from “group loyalty” to “individual competence.” The state is not spoils of war, nor an extension of the family, nor a reward for cronies.
The state, as Ibn al-Khattab taught us, is a trust placed upon everyone, and justice means that people feel that institutions are open to all, not that they are “closed spaces accessible only to the closest relatives.”
We in the Syrian Future Movement believe that, after all those sacrifices, our people and our homeland cannot tolerate a new experiment built on the rule of a kinship clique in the joints of the state and the system of institutions, no matter how the names change, the reasons multiply, and the rhetoric is embellished.
