Iran and the Option of “Easing Hostility” with the Syrian Opposition

Introduction:

• The hostility between Iran and the Syrian opposition has reached a zero-sum state. Iran, which initially supported the Arab Spring movements, swiftly changed its stance when the Syrian regime was threatened, opposing and thwarting the revolution. This was done by exploiting the international community’s support for the Syrian revolution at the time, and its rejection of the Assad regime’s repressive and brutal response. Iran aimed to expand its influence and authority both in the government and across the geographical landscape of the nation.
• Therefore, it can be asserted that the hostility has become established, existing, and ongoing. From this, it becomes necessary to explore the notion of “easing the hostility,” rather than “friendship” or “reconciliation.”
• This research engages with reality to argue for the idea of “easing hostility” and presents an unprecedented, realistic plan and proposal.
• It’s crucial to distinguish between the public’s stance against any political force that uses religion and demographic change as its policy, and the political currents, parties, and groups that have temporarily assumed authority in the Syrian opposition. It’s important for populations to remain vigilant against fragmentation, but it’s equally essential for decision-makers to find realistic avenues to pursue benefits or avert harm, whether in the short, medium, or long term.

Perspective on the Relationship with Iran:
The approach to the relationship with Iran can be seen from two perspectives:

1. Public Perspective: This can be summarized as a “reaction” rather than an action itself. Iran has engaged in sectarian invasions under various political guises, including:

• Political Shi’ism, exploiting any method or behavior, considering Shi’ism as a sect organically linked to the concept of the Imamate and the Supreme Leader. The goal is to seek followers of a political authority, not a sect or religion.
• Recruiting and dominating young Syrians in their controlled areas through teaching Shi’ism, offering scholarships to various Iranian cities like Qom, Mashhad, Tabriz, Isfahan, Tehran, etc., in addition to establishing seminaries and Husayniyahs in Syria, and facilitating economic and security gains for others.
• Spreading Shiite shrines and treating them as centers of political influence, as part of an inherited Shiite policy.
• Supporting and encouraging militia activities, clearly seen in Iraq and Syria.

1. Political Perspective: This involves viewing Iran as part of the “axis of evil” as labeled by the West, and treating it as a hybrid state between old theocratic and modern national states. Iran is seen as a power that has established a far-reaching entity, centrally controlled through a religious dictatorship, exerting control through religious authority more than through contractual interest. Iran is thus treated as a rogue state, with its operatives avoided as much as possible, through international measures like the nuclear deal and regional arrangements like the Saudi-Iranian agreement in China and strategic relations with Turkey in the Islamic world.

The Option of “Easing Hostility”:
The Syrian opposition and Iran face two options. The first is the current state of zero-sum conflict, forcing the Syrian opposition to confront the Iranian project in Syria and the region. This requires the Syrians in the opposition to present themselves as a frontline Sunni defense against Iranian Shiite encroachment, rather than as revolutionary and opposition forces. The second option, deemed currently impossible, involves considering “easing hostility between the Syrian opposition and Iran.” The Scientific Office in the Department of Research and Studies of the Syrian Future Movement sees the need to explore this option now, considering its improbability as a reason to study its pros and cons and to expand the vision for stakeholders.

Study of the Option:
This option is addressed from four perspectives:

1. Challenges:

• From the Public Side: Resolving issues within the “absorption” culture includes:
  a. Ending Political Shi’ism through societal prohibition, spreading necessary religious awareness, and supporting Sunni religious institutions and centers. Shi’ism, like Sunnism or Christianity, can be either non-proselytizing or proselytizing. Islam, in its majority excluding esoteric sects, is a proselytizing religion.
  b. Strengthening the state to address the issue of militias operating at its expense. The solution lies in establishing the state first and then extending its authority, as the absence of a strong state leads to fertile grounds for militia activities.
  c. From the Political Side: Understanding the nature of Syrian politics is essential. The Syrian opposition and its support base lack a clear, defined discourse to frame its nature. The revolutionary national Syrian perspective can establish the following:
  * Avoiding dragging our people into a bloody conflict beyond their capacity.
  * Major countries involved in the conflict are earnestly trying to resolve their issues. The nuclear deal between the West, led by the USA, and Iran is progressing post-Trump’s withdrawal in July 2015, with certain wings of the Democratic Party in America supporting it. The Saudi-Iranian agreement in China, though negotiations may take a long time, does not harm Saudi interests in the short term. The strong relations between Turkey and Qatar with Iran pose a real question about why the Syrian opposition raises hostility towards Iran to the highest level!
• The existence of a reformist stream in Iran, strengthened by Iranian public demonstrations against the hardliners, could be an important gateway for communication and coordination with the Iranian side. The presence of an acceptable mediator, like Qatar and Turkey, is a key factor in resolving most political issues.

1. Obstacles: Several factors hinder the transition from a state of absolute hostility to one of reduced hostility:
   a. Current blood feuds and their connection to historical Sunni-Shiite vendettas.
   b. The ongoing humiliating occupation of Syria by Iran, even to the Syrian regime itself.
   c. The continuation of Iran’s narrative that labels the Syrian opposition as extremist Sunni terrorism.
2. Positives:

• Merely reducing conflict among the region’s peoples, and transitioning from a regressive military conflict to a civilized, rational disengagement, is a positive and noble goal. This is especially true for a nation whose book is the Quran and whose prophet is Muhammad. The most significant positives include:
  a. Reducing the pace of Sunni-Shiite hostility and decreasing extremism on both sides.
  b. The triumph of dialogue and strategic cooperation over endless cycles of revenge.

1. Negatives:
   a. Acknowledging Iran’s expansion and influence in the region.
   b. The weakness of Sunni regional powers in the face of Iran’s expansion into Sunni areas, forcing them to deal with Iranian influence as a fait accompli.
   c. The benefit to extremist religious factions in condemning those who advocate such an option.
   d. Potentially angering the West, which is hostile to Iran (if it exists at all).

Conclusion:

• The hostility continues, and its conditions and circumstances are expanding. Therefore, we acknowledge that discussing the easing of hostility might seem unrealistic. However, considering it by some wings of the Syrian opposition (at least) deserves our attention. This proposal aligns with the Arab, Islamic, and international inclination towards this strategic option.
• It is essential to consider the reasons behind the Iranian narrative that labels the Syrian opposition as terrorist. Perhaps breaking this narrative can be achieved through moderates on both sides, in addition to the role of a Sunni mediator like Qatar.
• Resisting the Iranian occupation is undoubtedly a patriotic act. What we have mentioned does not criticize this but directs it. Easing hostility does not mean the absence of hostility; it means transforming the enemy into an opponent, peer, or partner in certain issues, such as increasing moderates and reformists in Iran and Syria, and seeking Shiite religious figures who believe that Iran’s political actions will negatively reflect on Islam in general and on Shiites in particular.
• The Lebanese experience in the southern suburbs shows that betting on political Shi’ism and militia work is unproductive. Hezbollah, Amal Movement, and all Iran-aligned currents are merely one Lebanese party among others. Iran has contained them and then directed them. However, politically Shiite militias have no respect in their sectarian circles; they are militias that disintegrate at any military juncture, as seen in the recent Ain al-Rummaneh battle.

Through this narrative, the Research and Studies Department of the Scientific Office of the Syrian Future Movement recommends a practical, realistic action plan as follows:

1. The existence of intent and will on both the Iranian side and the Syrian opposition side, and the effort towards creating a new media discourse to activate this will, as a practical start for the option of “easing hostility,” which transforms enmity into rivalry, with the hope that the future will transition it towards a political gain.
2. Introducing an acceptable mediator for both parties, and we advise that the mediator be a state, to ensure the option and its outcomes.
3. Establishing a joint monitoring and auditing body between the Iranian side and the Syrian opposition to oversee the progress of the agreement and its continuity.
4. Informing regional and international allies about this plan and its strategic importance, dispelling legitimate concerns about this option, ensuring the legitimate political rights of the Syrian people, and guaranteeing the “easing of hostility” between Syrians and Iran.

• Following what has been stated, and according to the vision of the Syrian Future Movement, we recommend the necessity of contact and coordination between the Syrian opposition and the reformists in Iran, through an accepted mediator by both parties. This should involve declared and transparent steps for the general populace. The Syrian Future Movement, with its moderate positions and historical background, can contribute to establishing acceptable and solid rules towards this step, provided it has popular or Syrian elite support.

[1] The head of the political bureau of the Arab Renaissance Party of Ahwaz (London) presents a research paper on the policy of exporting the Iranian revolution and its foundations toward the Arab region. See: Sabah Al-Mousawi, Foundations of Iranian Foreign Policy toward the Arab Region, in the book: The Iranian Project in the Arab and Islamic Region, 3rd ed., 2015, Dar Al-Bashir, Egypt, p. 45.

[2] Ibrahim Al-Minshawi says: “Iran seeks to employ its soft power to achieve its foreign policy objectives, especially those based on religious grounds, by working to spread its Shiite doctrine based on the principle of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.” He studied and argued this point using the Yemeni case. See: Ibrahim Al-Minshawi, Soft Influence: The Religious Dimension in Iranian Foreign Policy and the Houthi Movement in Yemen, January 31, 2016. The article was taken on Monday, July 10, 2023, from the Arab Center for Research and Studies: Soft Power: The Religious Dimension in Iranian Foreign Policy and the Houthi Movement in Yemen (acrseg.org).

[3] Researcher Sayyid Abu Dawood states that “the mullahs’ regime aims to attract Arab and Muslim students to study at Iranian universities, especially Al-Mustafa and Khomeini universities, where these students are subjected to extensive indoctrination through mandatory courses in Shiite thought, which they are required to attend in order to receive their degrees. Furthermore, the regime provides financial assistance to the poor among them to gain their sympathy for this ideology and, subsequently, for the Iranian state. This makes them easy prey for the regime, which can manipulate them as it sees fit upon their return to their countries to serve its objectives against Arab enemies.” See: Sayyid Abu Dawood, The Rise of Iranian Influence in the Arab World, Dar Al-Obaikan Publishing, Riyadh, 2014, pp. 180-181.

[4] For further details on the importance of the idea of ​​circulating shrines in strengthening Shiite fervor, see: Salah al-Din al-Amiri, The Construction of Memory in Twelver Shiite Heritage: Visiting Shrines as a Model, Believers Without Borders, 2016.

[5] Garrett Nada and Mattisan Rowan, Profiles: Pro-Iran Militias in Iraq, November 10, 2021, (Profiles: Pro-Iran Militias in Iraq | The Iran Primer (usip.org)

[6] Omar Abu Laila, How Iranian Militias Swallowed Deir ez-Zor, February 16, 2022, in (How Iranian Militias Swallowed Deir ez-Zor? | The Washington Institute), accessed July 10, 2023.

[7] The phrase was attributed to former Bush speechwriter David Frum, originally as an axis of hatred and then evil. Fromm explained his logic for creating the “axis of evil” phrase in his book The Right Man.

[8] Mirzadeh argues for the modernity and authenticity of the Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic (Velayat-e Faqih) in a way that reveals a particular vision of the concept of the modern state. See: Maryam Mirzadeh, “The Thesis of the Islamic Revolution and the Project of the Modern State,” July 7, 2022, in The Thesis of the Islamic Revolution and the Project of the Modern State | Al-Mayadeen (almayadeen.net), accessed July 10, 2023.

[9] This is clearly evident in the first founding statement, the open letter issued by Hezbollah in 1985, which reads: “We are the sons of the nation of Hezbollah, whose vanguard God has granted victory to in Iran, and which has re-established the nucleus of the central Islamic state in the world… We pledge allegiance to the orders of one wise and just leadership, represented by the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Jurist, who fulfills all the necessary conditions, and who is currently embodied in the divinely guided Imam, Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini, may his shadow endure.” (End quote, paraphrased. The document is published as an appendix in the book: Hassan Fadlallah, The Other Option, Dar al-Hadi, Beirut, 1994.)

[10] Iran benefited from the Iraq War twice: first, because it expanded its influence in the region, and second, because it expanded at a time when Western military intervention to change regimes was no longer a viable option, nor an acceptable choice, after the costly experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan.

[11] In a field study, Professor Khaled Sandawi paints a comprehensive picture of Shi’ism in Syria. See: Khaled Sandawi, Shi’ism in Syria Is Not a Myth, translated by Hamad Al-Issa, Madarek Publishing House, Dubai, 2014.

[12] Alaa El-Din recommends several steps, including containing the militias rather than eliminating them, and empowering civil society, among others, in his translated paper on Iranian militias in Iraq. See: Ranj Alaa El-Din, Containing Shia Militias: The Battle for Stability in Iraq, Brookings Institution, Doha, December 2017, pp. 5-6.

[13] Bishara argues that all of this, and more, is not “the motives and goals of the Syrian revolution when it began as a revolution against tyranny.” See: Azmi Bishara, Syria: The Path of Suffering Towards Freedom: An Attempt at Contemporary History, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, n.d., n.p., p. 608.

[14] See: The Iranian Nuclear Agreement: What Is It and Will It Be Reactivated? – BBC News Arabic

[15] Iran Nuclear Deal: Meeting between Iran and major powers in Vienna to revive the agreement, BBC, April 2, 2021, BBC, in (Iran Nuclear Deal: Meeting between Iran and major powers in Vienna to revive the agreement – BBC News Arabic), accessed July 11, 2023.

[16] The Saudi-Iranian Agreement: Its Effects and Implications, Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, April 13, 2023, in: (The Saudi-Iranian Agreement: Its Effects and Implications – Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies (harmoon.org)), accessed July 11, 2023.

[17] Iran-Saudi Arabia: Detente Expands to Defense Amid Israel-Hamas Conflict – Bloomberg

[18] For an overview of the strategic Turkish-Iranian relationship under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which evolved into a partnership, contributing to Iran’s emergence from regional and international isolation, despite their silent competition for influence in the Middle East, see: Rana Al-Khamash and Abdel Fattah Al-Rashdan, Turkey and the Iranian Nuclear Program: Limits of Agreement and Disagreement (2002-2016), Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Beirut, 2016, p. 65.

[19] Details of the Qatari-Iranian relationship 40 years after the Khomeini revolution, Al-Arabiya website, last updated May 20, 2020.

In the article “Details of Qatari-Iranian Relations 40 Years After the Khomeini Revolution” (alarabiya.net), accessed on July 11, 2023.

[20] Unfortunately, there is no study on the Iranian reformist movement and its stance on the Syrian revolution and regime; rather, we are basing our position here on personal impressions and connections.

[21] See: War Crimes Committed in Syria: Complaint Against Iran at the International Criminal Court (alarabiya.net)

[22] It suffices to mention the Iranian sites in Syria established by battles and wars. See: Jusoor Center for Studies, “Points of Iranian Forces’ Presence in Syria,” August 1-2, 2020. This publication includes a map showing the locations of bases and points of presence of Iranian forces in Syria only, excluding affiliated militias. The map includes 125 sites distributed across 10 Syrian governorates, with Daraa Governorate having the highest number at 37 sites, followed by Damascus and its countryside with 22 sites, and then Aleppo with 15 sites. (Points of Iranian Forces’ Presence in Syria, August 1, 2020 (jusoor.co)), accessed July 11, 2013.

[23] Shamia presents an analysis of Iran’s position on the Syrian Revolution.