Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime at the end of 2014, Syria entered a transitional phase marked by a radical transformation in its energy sector, which had previously been a key instrument of Iranian and Russian influence.
During decades of Assad’s rule, the country relied heavily on Iranian oil and fuel supplies, which covered up to 60-70% of its needs, making it an integral part of the “axis of resistance.”
Today, however, the severe electricity crisis—with power available for only 2-4 hours a day in most areas, and occasionally up to 6 hours in Damascus—has prompted the transitional government to redirect its reliance towards regional Arab and international sources, reviving projects such as the Arab Gas Pipeline.
This shift reflects a broader geopolitical strategy aimed at reintegrating Syria into the Arab regional system, with key support from Qatar, Jordan, and Egypt, and tacit approval from the United States, in exchange for a gradual reduction of Iranian influence. However, this shift comes amid a major military escalation in 2026, as the Israeli-American war on Iran (beginning in February 2026) has led to massive disruptions in global energy markets, exposing new supplies to increased risks.
Historically, the Arab Gas Pipeline was constructed in several phases:
Starting from Egypt to Jordan in 2003, it was extended to Syria in 2008 and Lebanon in 2009, with the aim of transporting Egyptian gas northward at a capacity of approximately 10 billion cubic meters annually.
Effective operation ceased after 2011 and during the rule of the ousted Assad regime, due to declining Egyptian production, repeated terrorist attacks in Sinai, and the destruction of parts of the Syrian domestic network during the war.
But from 2012 until the end of 2024, the Syrian-Jordanian section of the pipeline remained unused for supplying gas to Syria, reinforcing its overall dependence on Iran.
With the political change expected at the end of 2024, reviving the pipeline became a crucial part of regional reconstruction efforts. In March 2025, a short pilot project (lasting approximately 50 days) was conducted with Qatari funding. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) was imported via the Jordanian port of Aqaba, regasified, and pumped to the Deir Ali power plant south of Damascus, contributing to the generation of approximately 400 megawatts.
In August 2025, the northern section (Kilis-Aleppo) of the pipeline transporting Azerbaijani gas via Turkey, with volumes reaching 1.2-1.6 billion cubic meters annually, was also reactivated with Qatari funding to support power plants in Aleppo and Homs.
Regular pumping commenced on January 1, 2026, based on a formal agreement signed on January 26, 2026, between the Syrian Petroleum Company and the Jordanian National Electric Power Company (NEPCO). The agreement stipulates the supply of approximately 4 million cubic meters per day (equivalent to about 140 million cubic feet, or 1.5 billion cubic meters annually), with initial quantities ranging between 30 and 90 million cubic feet per day, followed by a gradual increase.
This supply relies on importing LNG from global markets (including the United States and, previously, Qatar). The LNG is then regasified via a floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) in Aqaba until the end of March 2026, and subsequently transported north via the Arab Gas Pipeline to support power plants.
The Jordanian National LNG Company has begun the process of leasing a new FSRU to ensure a continuous supply beyond March.
These supplies have contributed to raising total electricity production to approximately 3 gigawatts (from 1.5-1.6 gigawatts previously), with a relative improvement in some areas, such as Damascus, where electricity supply has reached up to 6 hours per day at times.
However, rationing remains severe in most governorates due to high technical losses (reaching 30-40%) and increasing demand. Recent developments in March 2026—particularly the decrease in gas imports from Jordan—led to a further reduction in supply hours, as announced by the Syrian Ministry of Energy on March 2, 2026. Supply quantities fell below the target required to maintain network stability.
It is worth noting that there is no direct supply from Israel to Syria, but an indirect connection exists through the Jordanian network.
Jordan relies on Israeli gas from the Leviathan and Tamar fields (previously around 300 million cubic feet per day). While mixing within the network is possible, Syrian-Jordanian agreements classify the gas as “globally imported” for political reasons.
Iranian strikes temporarily halted production from these fields, negatively impacting supplies to Jordan and subsequently to Syria. Jordan was forced to prioritize its domestic needs and utilize alternative fuels such as diesel and heavy fuel oil.
The ongoing war in Iran has also led to the destruction of key Iranian export facilities, disruptions to Iranian fuel supplies, instability in the Strait of Hormuz (through which approximately 20% of the world’s liquefied natural gas passes), and attacks on Gulf refineries such as Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura.
As a result, Qatari and Egyptian supplies have been temporarily halted, and Egypt has stopped supplying approximately 100 million cubic feet per day to Syria and Lebanon via the Arab Gas Pipeline, redirecting the volumes domestically and to Jordan.
Global liquefied natural gas prices have also risen sharply, further exacerbating the vulnerability of Syrian supplies.
Strategically, this shift presents significant opportunities for Syria’s regional reintegration through diversification of energy sources (Qatar, Jordan, Egypt, and Azerbaijan via Turkey), thereby reducing Iranian-Russian influence and bolstering socio-economic stability by improving electricity supply.
However, the risks remain substantial, including:
- Security instability in the Gulf.
- Higher costs. Reliance on a fragile infrastructure could lead to a return to severe rationing or popular protests if the crisis is not managed wisely.
- In conclusion, the revival of Arabic calligraphy and the diversification of energy sources in Syria represent a model for the reshaping of regional alliances after the collapse of the “Iranian axis.”
The new reliance on imported liquefied natural gas via Jordan (previously financed and supported by Qatar) reflects a strategy of “integration for stability.”
It remains fragile in the face of ongoing military escalation.
In the long term, the Syrian Future Movement believes that stability in Syria requires:
- Genuine investments in domestic production (especially in the eastern Euphrates oil fields after their recapture, in addition to new projects such as agreements to build 5 gigawatts of new capacity with a Qatari-Turkish-American alliance).
- Internal political settlements.
- International partnerships that guarantee continuous funding and security (such as American or Qatari guarantees for supplies).
Without these, we believe the electricity crisis may continue to reflect the deeper geopolitical challenges in the Middle East and threaten to hinder the reconstruction and stabilization process in Syria.
