Digitalization and cybersecurity in the new Syria

Introduction:

The telecommunications and digital infrastructure sector in Syria in 2026 constitutes one of the most sensitive and vital areas in the national reconstruction process.

It is no longer simply a matter of restoring cell towers and providing stable internet service, but has become closely linked to three interconnected strategic objectives:

• Achieving genuine financial and economic inclusion for broad segments of the population, especially in rural and displaced areas.
• Empowering micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), which form the backbone of the Syrian economy.
• Protecting national digital sovereignty and national security in an era where geopolitical competition intersects with technology.

Available estimates indicate that MSMEs represent more than 90% of active economic establishments, contribute between 38% and 42% of GDP (based on available estimates for 2024–2026), and provide between 65% and 72% of actual employment opportunities in the country.

Meanwhile, financial inclusion remains alarmingly low, with over 64% of adults in the Arab region unbanked, and more than 80% of daily transactions in the Syrian context still relying on cash.

The current technological reality and the geopolitical dilemma:

Since 2011, Western sanctions imposed on Syria—which have continued to varying degrees even after some partial easing in 2015—have led to a near-total reliance on Chinese equipment and solutions in the telecommunications sector.

Huawei, and to a lesser extent ZTE, control more than 50% of the network infrastructure of the two main operators (Syriatel and MTN).

Conversely, since 2018–2019, the United States has continued its global campaign against the use of Huawei and ZTE equipment in critical infrastructure, citing concerns about China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which requires companies to cooperate with state agencies, potentially opening the door to unauthorized access to data or espionage.

This campaign is not new; It began by including companies in the Entity List in 2019, followed by the Clean Network Initiative in 2020, and has continued to focus on transition and developing countries.

However, the real dilemma for Syria is a practical and financial one:

Western solutions (Ericsson, Nokia, Cisco, Qualcomm, etc.) face strict export restrictions (Export Administration Regulations), even after partial amendments in 2025.

Their cost is significantly higher than Chinese alternatives.

The delivery and installation time is considerably longer.

There is currently insufficient international funding or bank guarantees to cover the costs of a rapid transition to Western solutions. Proposed Strategy – Multi-Phase and Multi-Source Technological Diversification:

To break free from this entrenched duality, the Syrian Future Movement proposes adopting a multi-phase and multi-source technological diversification strategy that avoids total dependence on any single supplier and ensures a gradual transition towards relative independence:

First, the short-term phase (2026–2028):
Focus on completing the rapid rehabilitation of infrastructure while immediately strengthening national cybersecurity layers.

Continue relying on Chinese suppliers for the rapid expansion of 4G coverage and a limited start to 5G, while integrating Western or open-source security solutions into the upper layers of protection (firewalls, SIEM, EDR, end-to-end encryption).

Second, the medium-term phase (2028–2032):
Gradual transition to a hybrid architecture that includes pilot projects for Open RAN technology and the activation of 5G-Advanced in major cities. 40–60% of the Radio Access Network (RAN) and core network will be diversified, integrating Western suppliers (Ericsson, Nokia) in critical sectors and Open RAN solutions from companies like Mavenir or Parallel Wireless in less critical layers, while retaining some Chinese components in non-critical areas.

Third, the long-term phase (2032 onwards):
Building local capabilities and developing a domestic micro-technology industry, so that 20–30% of solutions (software, management systems, customized applications) are produced locally.

This will rely on partnerships with Syrian expatriate talent in Silicon Valley, Europe, and Canada, as well as with national universities and research centers.

Based on the above, we at the Economic Bureau of the Syrian Future Movement recommend the following:

1. An advanced national regulatory framework:
   The enactment of a comprehensive cybersecurity and digital economy law within 12–18 months, including the adoption of ISO 27001:2022 and IEC 62443 standards for critical infrastructure, the establishment of an independent National Cybersecurity Authority, and the mandatory requirement for a supply chain risk assessment for every project exceeding $5 million.
2. Digital and financial inclusion programs:
   Reaching 55–65% of the adult population with a bank account or digital wallet by 2030, through support for QR code payments, issuing subsidized cards in rural and displaced areas, and providing tax and financial incentives for merchants who accept digital payments.
3. Hybrid and Open Infrastructure:
   Launch 3–5 pilot projects for Open RAN and 5G-Advanced technology in Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs by 2029, adopting a disaggregated RAN model according to O-RAN Alliance specifications, and reducing reliance on a single vendor in the core network to less than 60% by 2030.
4. National Capacity Building:
   Establish 3–4 National Centers of Excellence in Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Latakia, aiming to train 12,000–18,000 specialists annually by 2030, while launching a talent return program offering grants and subsidies to expatriate Syrian engineers and programmers.
5. Balanced International Partnerships:
   Conclude bilateral agreements with the United States and the European Union to facilitate the export of non-military technologies, while continuing economic cooperation with China in non-sensitive sectors, and joining international initiatives such as the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence and the ITU Standards bodies.

Conclusion:

This demonstrates that digitalization in Syria transcends a purely technical matter, and it is not a unilateral geopolitical choice.

It is a matter of long-term technological, economic, and strategic sovereignty.

At its core, it is a multi-stage, multi-source diversification strategy built on strengthening national capabilities, transparency, and balanced partnerships. Furthermore, it is the only viable path to achieving relative independence without jeopardizing national security or the course of sustainable development.

Main references:

1. Reuters, “Exclusive: Washington presses Syria to shift from Chinese telecom systems”, 26 February 2026.
2. UNDP Syria, “Economic Monitor – Post-Conflict Recovery and MSMEs”, 2025.
3. World Bank, “Syria Economic Update – Recovery Pathways”, 2024–2026 editions.
4. United Nations, “Financial Inclusion in the Arab States – 2025 Report”.
5. U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), “Export Controls on Syria – 2025 Updates”.
6. O-RAN Alliance, “O-RAN Specifications Release v2.0 and beyond”, 2024–2025.
7. International Telecommunication Union (ITU), “Digital Development Dashboard – Syria Indicators”, 2025.
8. ISO/IEC 27001:2022 – Information security management systems.
9. IEC 62443 series – Industrial communication networks – IT security for networks and systems.