Abstract:
This study analyzes the Syrian landscape during the first year of the transitional phase (2025-2026) based on a report by the Middle East Institute and theoretical approaches in comparative politics.
It concludes that Syria is experiencing a phase of “fragile stability” characterized by a decline in armed violence and a relative improvement in economic indicators. However, it faces structural challenges in the areas of transitional justice, building inclusive institutions, and reshaping the relationship between the state and society.
The study argues that the success of the transition hinges on transforming the “security opportunity” into a comprehensive political process and on a balance of regional and international roles supporting this path.
Introduction:
After more than fifty years of dictatorial rule and thirteen years of revolution against Bashar al-Assad, Syria entered a new transitional phase in December 2024.
The report issued by the Middle East Institute in February 2026 paints a cautiously optimistic picture of the first year of this phase, noting a significant decrease in violence and a relative improvement in some economic indicators.
But the fundamental question remains: Do these indicators reflect a genuine shift toward sustainable stability, or are we facing a state of “fragile stability” that could collapse under the weight of accumulating challenges?
This study attempts to answer this question through a critical analysis of the current Syrian landscape.
The Security Landscape – Declining Violence and the Challenges of Building a National Monopoly on Force:
The report indicates an unprecedented decline in the pace of violence during 2025, with homicides decreasing by 73% in the last quarter of the year.
This decrease is primarily attributed to the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into state institutions, a development that resolves one of the most complex issues of the Syrian conflict related to the separate administration in the northeast of the country.
This integration also contributed to an 85% decrease in attacks by the Islamic State (ISIS) (The Middle East Institute, 2026).
However, this security stability faces three main challenges:
First: The transformation of forms of violence from large-scale military confrontations to societal and retaliatory violence.
The report itself indicates a 91% decrease in “civil reprisals,” meaning the danger persists and requires ongoing mechanisms for social control and transitional justice.
Some areas, such as the Syrian coast and Suwaida, witnessed violent events, but international reports do not attribute these to a central decision by the new political authority.
Second: The fragility of the integration process, especially in areas with diverse populations.
The success of the SDF’s integration remains contingent on the state’s ability to accommodate the Kurdish and Arab diversity in those areas and ensure fair representation for all groups.
Researcher Imad al-Ali points to the importance of “ending the alienation of the political institution from society” as a prerequisite for building a stable state (al-Ali, 2025).
The report also mentions a positive development: the recruitment of Alawites, Druze, and Christians into the security forces. However, this measure must culminate in genuine political participation, not remain merely a security tactic.
Third: Challenges to national sovereignty in the face of external threats. The report notes more than a thousand Israeli airstrikes and ground incursions since the fall of the former regime, with the government relying solely on diplomacy in its response. The state’s ability to protect its borders represents a true test of its long-term stability.
Economic Indicators – Partial Recovery and Structural Risks:
The report records positive economic indicators, including a 20% increase in the value of the Syrian pound, 5% GDP growth, the return of three million refugees, and the signing of announced investment deals worth $35 billion. These indicators reflect an improvement in confidence and a partial return to economic activity.
However, a deeper analysis reveals major challenges.
Monetary recovery is often linked to injecting liquidity and a temporary return of confidence, and does not necessarily reflect a recovery in the real productive sectors.
The greatest risk is the reproduction of the “rentier economy” that was one of the causes of the Syrian revolution, through reliance on foreign aid and politically conditional investments, instead of building a productive economy capable of creating sustainable employment opportunities.
However, reconstruction costs are estimated at approximately $216 billion, according to previous World Bank studies (Arab Center for Research, 2025). This means that even if fully realized, the announced investments cover only a limited portion of the needs.
Furthermore, the return of three million refugees places immense pressure on a devastated infrastructure and nearly collapsed public services. This humanitarian dimension is often overlooked in macroeconomic analyses.
Transitional Justice: A Difficult Equation Between Accountability and Reconciliation:
The issue of transitional justice is one of the most complex in the current Syrian crisis.
Researcher Hamid Balghit identifies four key variables for understanding the relationship between transitional justice and democratic transition: the relationship with the former regime, the political agreements that underpin the transition, the constitutional question, and the prioritization of the transitional phase (Balghit, 2025).
The situation in Syria is complicated because the former regime was not merely a dictatorship; it built a comprehensive security state that permeated every aspect of society. The South African experience offers a controversial model, where the Truth and Reconciliation Commission prioritized forgiveness over accountability, a trade-off some considered “the democracy of reason over the democracy of emotion” (Arab Center for Research, 2025).
This model approached justice with the logic of prioritizing a political transition.
However, applying this model in Syria faces particular challenges.
President Ahmed al-Sharaa was part of a former faction (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) with a history in Idlib, raising questions about how the new government will deal with any abuses committed by its factions.
Some observers see positive signs in al-Sharaa’s discourse, as he did not use the concepts of “Sharia” or “Islamic State” in his interviews, but rather spoke in the language of “pragmatic reason” and the diverse Syrian social context (Bishara, 2026).
But This does not negate the need for clear institutional mechanisms for truth-seeking and redress.
Political and Social Challenges – From Discourse to Practice:
Researcher Azmi Bishara raises an important question in understanding the discourse of the new Syrian leadership: Can Islamist movements that arise in repressive contexts transform upon reaching power?
Numerous experiences indicate that political Islam “changes its colors according to the context.” When the context is liberal, it becomes liberal, and when militarism and repression prevail, it transforms into jihadism (Bishara, 2026).
This contextual analysis helps us understand President al-Sharaa’s discourse, in which he speaks of a “new Syria” and a “state of law” in clear, civil terms.
However, the gap between discourse and practice remains a source of concern.
Positive indicators exist, such as the imams of mosques in Damascus who called on citizens to return the furniture looted from public institutions, and a popular response to these calls was observed.
But the major questions remain: How will the state deal with individual freedoms?
And how will it ensure the participation of all segments of society in decision-making? Is civil society a missing dimension in many analyses? In recent months, signs of limited social mobilization have begun to emerge, but the space available to NGOs and independent unions remains undefined.
Experiences of transition in other countries demonstrate that building democracy, while achieved through formal institutions, also requires a robust civil society capable of accountability and participation.
The previous division of the Syrian map into multiple spheres of influence (the former regime, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the Turkish-backed opposition, the SDF, and Suwayda) created a legacy of diverse administrative and political experiences (Ismail, 2026).
Integrating this diversity into a unified state necessitates a genuine national dialogue that acknowledges this plurality and does not seek to erase it.
The International and Regional Dimension – A Prerequisite for Successful Transition:
The Middle East Institute report focuses primarily on American recommendations, calling for the establishment of a permanent diplomatic, military, and intelligence presence in Damascus.
However, the success of the Syrian transition cannot be reduced to the relationship with Washington alone.
Turkey’s role remains crucial given its long border with Syria, the refugee crisis (with approximately 3 million Syrians in Turkey), and Ankara’s relationship with Syrian opposition factions. The Gulf states, which could be major sources of investment, often impose conditions related to reforms and combating corruption.
Russia and Iran, despite losing their main ally (Assad), still have interests in Syria that they may seek to preserve.
Dancourt Rostow’s theory suggests that preserving “national unity” is the first and most essential stage in any democratic transition (Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2013).
However, in the case of Syria, national unity cannot be separated from the regional and international environment.
Therefore, the success of the transition requires a balanced diplomatic approach that engages with all these parties and is not beholden to the will of any single international power.
The new Syrian government has repeatedly expressed its desire for balanced relations, as articulated by Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani in his statements.
Conclusion: Syria Between Fragile Stability and the Opportunity for State-Building:
Syria today presents a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, there are positive security and economic indicators after years of chaos and destruction.
On the other hand, there are deep structural challenges related to identity, participation, and justice.
The current phase can be described as one of “fragile stability,” where significant progress has been made in the security sector, but without parallel progress in the political, economic, and social spheres. This stability remains vulnerable to instability.
We in the Syrian Future Movement believe that the success of the Syrian transitional experience depends on several interconnected factors:
First, the new leadership’s ability to transform “revolutionary legitimacy” into “constitutional legitimacy” through an inclusive political process in which all components participate.
Second, establishing genuine transitional justice mechanisms that balance the requirements of accountability with the demands of national reconciliation.
Third, adopting a development model that shifts the Syrian economy from rentierism to productivity and creates job opportunities for returning refugees and youth.
Fourth, developing balanced international relations that support the building of Syrian state institutions without external interference and invest in sustainable peace instead of reverting to policies of polarization and exclusion.
Furthermore, comparative experiences show that democratic transition is neither linear nor guaranteed to produce results.
However, it remains the only option for Syria to escape the cycle of violence and tyranny and enter a space of citizenship and dignity.
The first year of the transitional phase has shown positive signs, but the road to building a new and stable Syrian state is still long and arduous.
References:
- Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. (2025). Transitional Justice and Democratic Transition in Arab Countries (Volume 1). Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies.
- Bishara, Azmi. (2026). “The Political Transition Process in Post-Assad Syria: An Analysis of Discourses.” Doha: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies.
- Al-Ali, Imad. (2025). “Political Transition in Syria: State Building and Political Institution Reform.” Arab Policies, No. 72.
- Balghit, Hamid. (2025). “Explanatory Variables of the Relationship Between Democratic Transition and Transitional Justice in the Experiences of the Maghreb Countries.” Takamul Journal.
- Ismail, Ali. (2026). “Beyond December 2025: Possible Maps of Syrian Transition.” Al-Thawra Newspaper.
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies. (2013). Democratic Transition: A Theoretical Framework. Doha: Al Jazeera Center for Studies.
- The Middle East Institute. (2026). Syria’s Transition: Declining Violence and the Path Forward. Washington DC.
