The role of British sanctions in promoting transitional justice in Syria

This paper examines the UK sanctions imposed on December 19, 2025, against six individuals and three Syrian entities implicated in human rights abuses, as reported in official UK Foreign Office statements and media outlets such as Reuters.

The paper aims to assess these sanctions as a tool for promoting transitional justice in post-Assad Syria, following the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in December 2024. It focuses on their potential benefits in fostering accountability and stability, as well as their drawbacks in impacting the economy and international relations.

Using a descriptive analytical methodology that draws on secondary sources, including UK government documents, human rights reports, and academic studies on transitional justice in post-conflict societies, the paper reveals that while the sanctions support the dismantling of repressive militias and encourage internal reforms, they could hinder reconstruction if not carefully managed, particularly given the lifting of some UK sanctions in April 2025 to support the energy and financial sectors.

The individuals targeted include: Mohammed Hussein al-Jassem (Abu Amsha), Saif Boulad (Saif Abu Bakr), Ghiath Dalla, Miqdad Fatiha, Mudallal Khoury, and Imad Khoury. The entities targeted include the Hamza Division, the Sultan Murad Division, and the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division (al-Amshat).

The recommendations focus on realistic strategies to mitigate the impact of sanctions, particularly for those associated with the current Syrian Ministry of Defense, through internal reforms, international cooperation, and legal economic diversification, to ensure a peaceful transition that takes into account the delicate circumstances in the new Syria.

Introduction:

Syria has undergone a radical transformation since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2014, ushering in a transitional phase marked by political, economic, and social challenges.

In this context, the British government announced on December 19, 2015, new sanctions against six individuals and three entities linked to serious human rights violations, as detailed in British Foreign Office documents and media reports.

These sanctions, which include asset freezes and travel bans, target figures such as Muhammad Hussein al-Jassem (commander of the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division) and Saif Bulad (commander of the Hamza Division), as well as Russian-Syrian businessmen like Mudallal Khoury and Imad Khoury, who financially supported the former regime. The official reasons include the repression of civilians during the events on the Syrian coast in March 2025 and the violations committed during the war (2011-2024). This reflects Britain’s commitment to transitional justice, as Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper stated: “Accountability and justice for all Syrians are vital to ensuring a successful and sustainable political settlement in Syria.”

This decision follows a partial lifting of sanctions in April 2025, which allowed investments in the energy and trade sectors to support reconstruction, highlighting a balanced policy between accountability and support.

This paper aims to analyze the positive aspects of these sanctions in promoting transitional justice, such as building trust among Syrian communities, and their negative aspects, such as complicating relations with Turkey (which previously supported some factions) or Russia.

The most important question here is: How do these sanctions contribute to transitional justice? What are their risks during the transitional phase? And how can their impact be mitigated, especially for those within the current Syrian Ministry of Defense?

Academic studies indicate that international sanctions in post-conflict societies play a dual role in transitional justice, promoting accountability but potentially hindering development.

For example, in Brahm’s 2004 study on the impact of transitional justice in post-conflict settings, he highlights how mechanisms such as genuine courts and commissions contribute to restoring victims’ dignity and building trust, but international sanctions add an extra layer of pressure.

As in the study “Transitional Justice and Sanctions” (2012), these mechanisms help build trust between warring groups and promote institutional change, but they require a balance to avoid exacerbating polarization.

In similar contexts, such as post-2003 Iraq or post-2011 Libya, studies like “Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies” (2005) have shown that sanctions contribute to dismantling repressive structures, but they negatively impact the economy if they are comprehensive.

The Paris study (2010) further emphasizes the positive effects of transitional justice at the state level, such as trials and commissions, while noting that sanctions enhance deterrence but require domestic support. Similarly, in “Transitional Justice and the Quality of Democracy” (2013), a combination of measures over a long period (ten years or a generation) is recommended, as the United Nations advises.

Regarding Syria, EU and UK sanctions since 2011 have isolated the regime, but their easing in 2025, as outlined in the April amendments, reflects a shift towards supporting reconstruction.

Meanwhile, the study “Between Impunity and Justice” (2023) reveals that sanctions are seen as a tool for redress and the reintegration of some offenders, but they require stakeholder support.

The gaps include a lack of local Syrian studies on the impact of sanctions on national unity, which justifies this research.

In this paper, we adopted a descriptive-analytical approach, utilizing secondary sources such as GOV.UK documents, Reuters reports, and academic studies on transitional justice.

The SWOT framework was used to assess the strengths and weaknesses as follows:

  • Strengths: Positive internal aspects such as enhanced accountability.
  • Weaknesses: Negative internal aspects such as economic impact.
  • Opportunities: Positive external aspects such as international cooperation.
  • Threats: Negative external aspects such as diplomatic tensions.

The data includes an analysis of official documents and articles, with limitations related to the recency of the information (December 2025), requiring future updates.

Primary field data was not used due to security conditions, but reliance on credible sources ensures objectivity.

Results and Analysis:

1- Strengths:

Sanctions contribute to enhanced accountability by targeting militia leaders such as Muhammad Hussein al-Jassem and Saif Boulad, who are implicated in the repression of civilians in the Sahel. This helps dismantle these entities and unify the New Syrian Army under transitional oversight.

This reflects a success in confidence-building, as in other experiences where sanctions have led to institutional reforms. Furthermore, it encourages international investment, especially after the lifting of sanctions in April 2025, which allowed for financial inflows for reconstruction, thus promoting sustainable development and preventing a return to authoritarianism.

For example, freezing the assets of businessmen like Mudallal Khoury and Imad Khoury cuts off funding to the remnants of the old regime, supporting national reconciliation, as Cooper emphasized.

In a broader context, studies such as Paris (2010) show that such measures promote democracy in the long term.

2- Disadvantages:

On the other hand, sanctions may hinder the economy, especially if they extend to wider networks linked to the Ministry of Defense, affecting reconstruction in areas such as Latakia and Tartus.

They also raise international tensions, for example with Turkey, which previously supported the Hamza and Sultan Murad Brigades, or with Russia due to Mudallal and Imad Khoury’s nationality, which could complicate diplomacy during the transitional phase. Studies such as Brahm (2004) warn that sanctions may exacerbate polarization if perceived as foreign interference, threatening national unity. In Syria, sanctions could slow development, as has happened in other cases where they have impacted the civilian economy without fully affecting their intended beneficiaries.

Furthermore, they could be interpreted as collective punishment, hindering the integration of reformist elements within the Ministry of Defense.

3- Recommendations:

Based on the preceding analysis, the Syrian Future Movement proposes realistic recommendations to mitigate the impact of sanctions, focusing on current Syrian Ministry of Defense personnel to ensure legal compliance and reform:

  1. Internal Reforms within the Ministry of Defense: A comprehensive review should be conducted to dismiss implicated elements, such as those associated with Ghiath Dalla and Miqdad Fatiha, who joined the official forces without regard for or disregard of their affiliations. Training programs on international humanitarian law should be implemented. This could lead to requests for sanctions relief supported by evidence, as has been the case in other instances. Furthermore, internal committees should be established to monitor violations and enhance transparency.
  2. International and Diplomatic Cooperation: Coordination with the UK and the UN is crucial to establish joint committees investigating violations, which could pave the way for sanctions relief, as seen in April 2025. Syria could propose information-sharing programs on militias to demonstrate compliance, leveraging support from organizations such as Human Rights Watch.
  3. Legal and Economic Strategies for Overcoming Sanctions: Diversify partnerships with unaffected countries, such as China, to support defense without violating restrictions, focusing on permissible humanitarian aid. Developing internal financial mechanisms to avoid asset freezes, drawing on Iraq’s experience, is also recommended.
  4. Capacity Building and Awareness: Train young people in the Ministry of Defense on international compliance mechanisms and integrate transitional justice lessons into educational programs to transform sanctions into an opportunity for reform. Conduct regular field studies to assess impact, inviting civil society participation. These recommendations take into account the sensitivity of the transitional phase, emphasizing legal avenues to avoid escalation.

Conclusion:

The December 2025 sanctions present an opportunity to promote justice, but they require balanced management.

We believe these recommendations provide a framework for overcoming them, thus supporting a new Syria.

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