Introduction:
Following its liberation, the Suwayda Governorate developed a complex political and social environment due to the interplay of local, religious, political, and security factors. After the announcement of the roadmap in September 2025, and subsequent reports in some Syrian media outlets on November 16, 2025, regarding significant Arab-Jordanian coordination to resolve the crisis in the Suwayda Governorate in southern Syria, in accordance with the roadmap and in a manner that guarantees the country’s unity, the need arose to study its practical implementation and analyze the potential obstacles to its execution. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the historical context of events, assess future scenarios, and offer strategic recommendations based on evidence and up-to-date data from reliable media and analytical sources.
The Historical and Political Context of Suwayda Governorate After Liberation:
1.1 Key Events After Liberation:
Following the liberation of Syria from the defunct Assad regime, the Syrian government initiated official support to bolster security and restore basic services. However, tragic events, beginning with a familiar dispute between the Druze and Bedouin communities, escalated into a tragedy for Suwayda and its diverse population. This conflict, acknowledged by the government through its Foreign Minister, resulted in casualties and widespread suffering, and fueled calls for secession by followers of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri.
The Druze Higher Committee, headed by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, formed a powerful local force controlling resources and services. This created a delicate balance between local and central influence, despite calls for secession and the reliance on Israeli air power, which had bombed the General Staff building and the Presidential Palace in Damascus.
The governorate faced significant challenges in restoring its basic infrastructure (electricity, water, roads) due to previous war damage and delays in international and regional funding.
1.2 The Nature of the Druze Community:
The Druze community in Suwayda is dominated by a centralized tribal and spiritual organization, with the Hijri Committee wielding significant influence.
A strong sense of local autonomy prevails in the governorate, complicating any settlement or reconciliation process, particularly concerning administrative influence or financial resources.
1.3 Regional and International Interventions:
Both Jordan and the United States welcomed the roadmap, affirming their support for a peaceful solution and regional stability.
International and regional funding is limited to monitoring procedures and providing limited assistance, without direct intervention in the overall reform process.
Roadmap Assessment, Current Implementation, and Challenges:
2.1 Actual Implementation:
Implementation of some security provisions: Deployment of local forces to secure main roads, particularly the Damascus-Suwayda road.
Provision of limited assistance to those affected, but insufficient to fully meet the needs of the population.
Limited infrastructure repair, without comprehensive coverage of all villages and areas.
2.2 Challenges:
Local resistance: The Druze Committee exerts strong control over key institutions, slowing the implementation of administrative and economic provisions.
Inadequate international and regional funding: Funding is limited and directed towards short-term steps, restricting the ability to implement comprehensive reconstruction projects.
Loss of community trust: The slow implementation of compensation and services fuels public discontent and increases the risk of social unrest.
Potential Future Scenarios:
Future scenarios have been categorized into three main paths, with the probability of each estimated based on local, regional, and international factors:
3.1 Scenario A: Slow Partial Implementation (45% probability)
Limited implementation of the roadmap provisions on paper, with slow delivery of compensation and services. Limited participation from the Druze committee, while its influence continues to control local resources.
Recommendations of the Syrian Future Movement:
- Follow up on implementation transparently and with documentation.
- Support reconstruction projects through civil society.
- Strengthen the network of relationships with local activists to ensure genuine participation in reconciliation.
3.2 Scenario B: Complete Failure of the Roadmap (25% probability)
The Druze Committee rejects any actual implementation, with international and regional funding ceasing.
A resurgence of tribal and Druze tensions, and a loss of trust in the central government.
Recommendations of the Syrian Future Movement:
- Develop alternative initiatives for local reconciliation.
- Strengthen independent international monitoring of the implementation of any future steps.
- Build regional alliances to support a compromise that preserves the rights of the population while maintaining the unity of the state.
3.3 Scenario C: Partial, Conditional Success (30% probability)
Partial, balanced implementation with limited approval from the Druze Committee.
Establish a mixed governance model involving the local community and the state.
Recommendations of the Syrian Future Movement:
- Support and closely monitor the mixed model.
- Establish the “Suwaida Forum for Stability and Reconciliation” with local and regional participation. Directing
- international funding towards sustainable development projects that foster trust.
- Using media discourse that emphasizes national unity while respecting local identities.
- Proposed Timeline for Implementation (November 2025 – June 2026):
Preparation and Assessment Phase (November – December 2025): Damage assessment, engagement with the Druze Committee, and launch of emergency aid.
Reconciliation and Services Phase (January – February 2026): Implementation of compensation, restoration of essential infrastructure, and deployment of local forces.
Mixed Management and Mid-Term Assessment Phase (March – April 2026): Establishment of a local coordination forum, review of compensation distribution, and enhancement of community participation.
Sustainability and Monitoring Phase (May – June 2026): Ensuring the sustainability of projects and services, evaluating final results, and strengthening state sovereignty with local community participation.
Sustainability and Monitoring Phase (May – June 2026): Ensuring the sustainability of projects and services, evaluating final results, and strengthening state sovereignty with local community participation.
Conclusion:
The analysis indicates that the roadmap in Suwaida faces significant challenges due to local resistance, insufficient funding, and slow implementation. However, the third scenario (conditional partial success) remains the most viable for achieving relative stability, provided that local oversight and international and regional support are effectively integrated.
Furthermore, the Syrian Future Movement can play a pivotal role in supporting the hybrid model, promoting civic participation, and ensuring that any reconciliation is practical and inclusive, while preserving the unity of the Syrian state.
References:
- Al Jazeera, “A 7-Step Syrian Path to Overcoming the Suwayda Events with Jordanian and American Support,” September 16, 2025. (aljazeera.net)
- Anadolu Agency, “Announcement of a 7-Step Roadmap for a Solution in Suwayda,” September 16, 2025. (aa.com.tr)
- Jordan Times, “Jordan, Syria, US Ink Roadmap to End Crisis in Suwayda, Stabilize Southern Syria,” September 16, 2025. (jordantimes.com)
- Rudaw, “Druze Leadership Rejects Syria-Jordan-US Roadmap,” September 17, 2025. (rudaw.net)
- FDD’s Long War Journal, Ahmad Sharawi, “Suwayda Military Council: A New Druze Coalition Emerges in Syria,” February 24, 2025. (fdd.org)
- Alma Research and Education Center, Tal Beeri, As Suwayda Governorate Clashes – July 2025, August 2025. (israel-alma.org)
- Small Wars Journal, Jeremy Hodge & Hussein Nasser, Syria’s Crime Den: Trafficking, Extremism and Instability in Suwayda, August 11, 2025. (smallwarsjournal.com)
