On November 13th, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani emerged from Chatham House in London to announce that the next phase in Syria would witness the establishment of political parties operating within a broad national pluralism framework, paving the way for presidential and parliamentary elections in the coming years.
This statement, in its content and context, cannot be treated as a mere passing news item on a daily diplomatic agenda. Rather, it is an announcement that touches upon one of the most sensitive issues in the history of the Syrian state: the issue of prohibited politics.
For decades, political life has been emptied of its true meaning and re-engineered within closed frameworks that have transformed the party into an instrument of power rather than a representative of society.
Therefore, any talk of opening the door to the establishment of parties cannot be understood outside of this weighty history.
The political bureau of the Syrian Future Movement issued a statement welcoming the Minister’s announcement, while also offering a clear critical perspective that places this announcement within its broader national context.
However, the statement, in its essence, is more than just a license or an administrative procedure; This is the declaration of the beginning of a complex transitional phase in which Syrian politics is being redefined, and trust between the state and society is being retested.
At the same time, it is a pivotal moment that could open the door to building a new state, or reproduce old models of control with new faces.
Syrian Political Memory: A Forbidden and Long-Closed Domain
Syrians today find it difficult to recall a time when the establishment of political parties was a free and natural political act.
Since the 1950s, pluralism has declined under the weight of coups, and public life has been shaped towards a single party leading the state and society, accompanied by a massive amount of marginalization and subjugation.
Because national memory is not easily erased, a grim image of the party has taken root among Syrians as an apparatus above society, not an instrument of political participation.
This heavy memory will accompany Syrians for a long time and will influence how they receive any talk of pluralism, no matter how good the intentions or how ambitious the programs.
What does Minister Shibani’s statement mean? And what questions does it raise? When the Foreign Minister announces the opening of the door to political party activity, this represents a symbolic lifting of a decades-old constraint.
At the same time, it raises fundamental questions that cannot be ignored:
- The Power Struggle:
Are we witnessing a genuine departure from the previous regime’s methods of creating subservient and controlled parties? Or are we simply witnessing a reorganization of the political sphere while maintaining control?
- The Societal Struggle:
Do Syrians possess the organizational structure and political culture necessary for the emergence of serious, programmatic parties? Or will this experiment merely reproduce chaos, a power vacuum, or traditional loyalties?
- The Legal Struggle:
Will a modern parties law be drafted that guarantees independence and protection? Or will the law be used as a tool for filtering and selecting parties?
- The Transitional Phase Struggle:
Will parties be granted a genuine role in shaping Syria’s future? Or will they be relegated to mere political window dressing for the world?
These questions, and others, are not intended to sow doubt, but rather to emphasize that pluralism is not an administrative decision; it is the very process of state-building.
What does the new regime itself fear regarding political parties and pluralism?
It is important to add an analytical perspective often overlooked in discussions: the fears the state itself may harbor regarding nascent pluralism.
These fears, whether expressed by the authorities or not, constitute a part of the political landscape:
- Fear of political fragmentation: The new era has emerged from a brutal war and a devastated state. There are concerns that rapid political liberalization could lead to partisan conflict, threatening national unity or igniting unchecked competition.
- Fear of foreign interference: The authorities may fear that regional powers will establish affiliated parties through funding or soft power, thus reproducing the years of foreign influence.
- Fear of the return of the old regime’s networks: Pluralism could pave the way for the return of old networks possessing organizational experience, financial resources, and the ability to maneuver. The authorities fear these networks might resurface under the guise of new political parties.
- Fear of state weakness in the face of powerful parties: During transitional phases, the state is often weak, while parties may emerge with a following, funding, or media presence that precedes the establishment of formal institutions.
- The Fear of Unregulated Party Chaos
A state without a party law or electoral experience could face hundreds of small entities that would confuse the landscape and consume the energy of the transitional phase.
Here, we say: These fears are not a reason to restrict pluralism, but rather a reason to organize and manage it through a modern law, an independent judiciary, and a responsible political life.
Party Life in the New Syria: A Space Without Maps
Syria today lacks established party institutions upon which to build.
However, this void could be a historic opportunity for the emergence of new parties that are more representative of the people and less entangled in traditional networks of vested interests.
To turn this opportunity into reality, three essential conditions are necessary:
- Genuine and protected freedom of association
- An independent judiciary
- A civil society capable of oversight
Without these conditions, pluralism could devolve into a lifeless political cacophony, resulting in dozens of parties whose aims and representation are unknown to the average citizen.
The Syrian Public Mood: Between Fear and Hope
The reaction to Foreign Minister al-Shaibani’s messages on social media reflected a clear division:
Some saw the statement as a courageous step, while others viewed it as merely a rehashing of the previous regime’s tactics.
This division is understandable and justified; Syrians have yet to experience a state that is politically neutral.
Therefore, rebuilding trust between society and the state will be a long process, requiring transparency, institutionalization, and continuity.
What can political parties accomplish during a transitional phase?
In countries emerging from conflict, political parties have not only played an electoral role but have also served as instruments for state-building:
– Formulating economic visions
– Developing reconstruction programs
– Establishing local governance and administrative systems
– Fostering social reconciliation
– Safeguarding transitional justice
– Regulating the relationship between the central government and the regions
– Establishing a new constitution
This leads to the crucial question:
What kind of political parties do we want?
And what model of government do we want to serve?
The Role of the Syrian Future Movement: An Alternative Model for Political Life
Since its founding in 2012, the Syrian Future Movement has embraced the principles of a civil state, justice, and citizenship, and has refused to be a confrontational entity or subservient to any other power.
In the reconstruction phase, the goal is not merely for the movement to become a party within the political spectrum, but rather to present a new model for party life:
– Parties based on programs, not individuals
– Transparent funding without ambiguity
– A national role within the transition process, not on its margins
– Realistic initiatives to draft an independent parties law
– Spreading a new political culture based on dialogue, not polarization
– Building bridges with both domestic and international actors, free from subservience and hostility
The existence of a movement or movements with this approach is not a mere detail, but a guarantee for guiding political life towards a civil future, not towards recycling the past.
Conclusion: From Pluralism to Building the Future
Minister Al-Shaibani’s statement is not the end of the road, but its beginning.
It may be a right start or a wrong one, but judgment will not be based solely on laws, nor on the number of parties, but rather on the transformation that the Syrian state will witness in the coming years.
Syria today stands at a rare foundational moment, similar to the great moments experienced by nations emerging from brutal wars.
It is a moment fraught with fear and brimming with hope, in which the features of the new state will be defined.
Perhaps the Syrian political landscape today resembles a vast expanse of land where war has erased all traces of the past, and what is now required is to draw a new map. This map will not be drawn solely by the strongest, but rather by those with the vision and the idea.
The difference between the two is the difference between reproducing the old state and building the just, civil republic that all Syrians dream of.
In short: The important thing is not that Syrians be allowed to form parties, but that they be allowed, for the first time in decades, to shape their political future with their own hands, without guardianship or fear.
