From the moment the revolution began until two months after liberation, the dialectic of religion and politics imposed itself on Syria in a way that requires a frank confrontation.
This is a reality that must be acknowledged, regardless of slogans, illusions, and wishes. Insisting on denying it in this reality is a denial of reality itself. Denying reality only leads to chaos. However, acknowledging the existence of this reality may lead to understanding it and dealing with it in a way that serves the interests of Syria, both present and future.
The rapid developments in Syria increasingly highlight the presence of the dialectic of religion and politics, to the point that it begs the question: Why is this dialectic imposing itself on Syria with such intensity? Is it true that this is nothing more than a “curse” that has afflicted the country’s culture, present, and future, as some believe? Or are the implications of the phenomenon too great to be reduced to this light, escapist explanation?
In other words: Is history trying to tell Syrians something? Is human experience trying to convey a specific message to them, even through noise?
In brief and clear terms: Could this dialectic have the potential to compel Syrians to confront the challenge of searching for a “new model”?
The making of history and the creation of models of life are not the exclusive domain of anyone in this world. So why do we shy away from confronting this question?
One understands the fear some have of the “missionary” spirit when it takes hold of certain members of society or its organized groups, because the results of such a possession have often been tragic.
In the presence of certain objective intellectual and cultural conditions, the missionary spirit helps shape history and life. However, in the absence of these conditions, as has been the case in the Syrian and Arab context, the missionary spirit has become a curse on its people at times, and a curse on the entire world at other times.
In the name of the national “mission,” political authoritarianism has resulted, along with economic and social backwardness at every level. In the name of the religious “message,” isolation has resulted from the other toward the “ego,” from the world toward the “afterlife,” and from the present and future toward the “past.” In the name of the “message” of modernity, modernization, and civilization, identity has been lost at times, and the compass has been lost at other times.
This is what the missionary spirit does when it takes over a mind that doesn’t know middle ground and addresses reactions with reactions.
However, this does not mean that the alternative option is a complete “civilizational resignation.” That is the mentality of opposing dualities that besieges and stifles our reality, when we constantly jump to any third option.
Therefore, it has become imperative to investigate the dialectic of religion and politics in Syria, as it may lead to the presentation of a new model of “comprehension” and “response,” the goal of which is to enable Syrians to deal with their issues with a minimum of rationality, realism, and methodology—no more, no less.
This can only be achieved through a calm rethinking of the elements of this increasingly assertive dialectic. This rethinking, in turn, will only be possible if Syrian intellectuals, from various intellectual and ideological schools, are able to transcend their well-known, rigid, and specific positions on this dialectic.
It no longer seems possible, in the current Syrian reality, to view political practice and deal with politics through the logic of puritanical concepts and judgments, as some seek.
Nor is it possible to view “religion” through the logic of “principled rejection,” based on a mixture of a sense of cultural superiority, fear, and caution toward it, and by emphasizing the rejection of any relationship between politics and religion or religion and politics, as others do.
There is no longer any point in approaching the dialectic of religion and politics from such a perspective.
It is clear, then, that we need a great deal of flexibility, a great deal of objectivity, a great deal of detachment, and a great deal of dialogue.
These conditions may be difficult, but they are not impossible.
We all know that it is difficult for segments of Syrian intellectuals, of various affiliations, to shift from their intellectual positions for one reason or another.
However, this is no longer a choice or an intellectual luxury; it is rather a matter of Syria’s fate, its present and its future.
We are not talking here about utopian ideals. While it is necessary to believe in the possibility that Syria will, over time, make a distinguished cultural contribution and possess a unique historical role, realism imposes a logic whose urgent and pressing requirements cannot be ignored.
The discussion here is not about what we “should be.” Rather, it is about what we must do first, as a minimum, to “be.”
The dialogue required among Syrian intellectuals does not require the kind of complete consensus that some people think of. The issue is one of quality, not quantity. It is, first and foremost, a cultural “position” whose judgment is left to history.
Perhaps it will be sufficient for some segments of society to be willing to stir the stagnant streams of thought to set the train on its way.
Then, others face the familiar choice of jumping in at the last minute or living in the waiting rooms after his departure.
Political Bureau
Professor Wael Mirza
Research and Studies Department
Independent Researchers
Syrian Future Movement
