The Syrian situation is a compound model for the transition from the revolution to the state, where the collapse of the authoritarian regime did not lead to the construction of modern institutions, but rather a structural vacuum in the political perception, the disintegration of the social contract, and the rise of patterns of sectarianism and popularity that hindered the capabilities of the national establishment.
This article is trying to analyze these phenomena from the perspective of political sociology, based on theoretical and field literature, to understand how and why the state stumbled, and how sectarianism and popularity contributed to the reproduction of the division rather than by overcoming it.
The concept of “stalled state” refers to a state of separation between power and society, as the state fails to monopolize the tools of legal violence, and in the production of symbols of cultural legitimacy, in the Syrian case, the fall of the defunct regime or the decline of its authority was not sufficient to give birth to a new state, but rather revealed the fragility of the institutional structure, and the inability of the opposition forces to provide an institutional alternative capable of managing diversity and controlling the conflict.
A study of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (2021) showed that more than 68% of Syrians in opposition areas do not trust local institutions, which reflects a deep legal crisis.
From the perspective of sociology, the state is not just an administrative apparatus, but rather an expression of social consensus on power and legitimacy.
Charles Tele indicated that the modern state is established through a long process of building institutions, controlling conflict and establishing legitimacy based on performance, not affiliation, in Syria, this process was not done, but rather was replaced by the logic of quotas, and the distribution of positions on the basis of loyalty, which led to the weakness of institutions, the erosion of trust and the disintegration of the national symbolic field.
In this context, sectarianism was not just a tactical discourse, but rather turned into the structure of distributing authority and wealth, which re -produces itself through the institutions of education, media, security, and even relief.
Bernard Lewis has noted that sectarianism in the Middle East is not an emergency phenomenon, but rather the product of a long history of religious politicization, as sectarian affiliation is used as a tool for political and social sorting. In Syria, this logic was devoted since the era of Hafez al -Assad, who built a system based on enabling the Alawite sect in sensitive locations, with other minorities attracting to form an anti -Sunni anti -majority alliance.
This arrangement was a system of domination, reproducing itself through loyalty, not efficiency, and not citizenship.
A field study conducted by the Carnegie International Peace Institute showed that sectarianism in Syria is used as a tool for discrimination in job opportunities, access to services, and even in the distribution of humanitarian aid.
This distinction reproduces social division, and weakens the potential to build a university state.
Sectarianism also feeds the logic of revenge and revenge, and hinders national reconciliation, where the other is seen as an existential threat, not a partner in the homeland.
As for populism, it appeared as a tactical discourse that fills the political void, but it lacks the institutional vision.
Ernesto Lucklo indicated that populism is based on building the “enemy” as a contradiction to the people, and produces a simple narrative that holds the other responsible for the crisis, without providing structural solutions.
In Syria, populism escalated in the speech of some political and media forces, as the revolution was depicted as a conflict between the “people” and “regime” only, despite the validity of this lawsuit, without recognizing the complications of society, the multiplicity of its tributaries, and the diversity of its demands.
This discourse, despite its instant attractiveness, contributed to excluding wide groups, and in dedicating the division, rather than bypassing it.
A study conducted by the Syrian Center for Social Studies (2023) showed that populism in the Syrian context was not only a political phenomenon, but also extended to the cultural and religious field, where a tactical discourse was adopted in mosques, schools, and the media, enhancing emotions, excluding the mind, and weakening institutions. D
This discourse tempts the masses, but it hinders the construction of the state, because it produces temporary loyalties, not permanent institutions.
From the perspective of political sociology, building the state requires an institutional mentality, not ideological slogans. Francis Fukuyama has indicated that the construction of the state is not only through the elections, but by building strong institutions, capable of providing services, controlling conflict, and establishing sustainable legitimacy (Fukuyama, 2004).
In the Syrian case, these conditions were not met, but civil society was marginalized, union dismantling, and the weakening of universities, which led to the absence of the public space, which can produce a comprehensive national project.
The absence of transitional justice contributed to the deepening of the crisis, as the violations were not recognized, the officials were held accountable, nor the reparation.
David Bloomfield indicated that transitional justice is a societal process aimed at rebuilding confidence, establishing a comprehensive national memory, and fortifying institutions against repetition.
In Syria, this process did not take place, but was ignored, which led to the continued logic of impunity, and the perpetuation of a culture of fear.
The exit from this impasse is not by recycling elites, or beautifying institutions, but rather by redefining the state itself as a state for all its citizens, not a state of sect, category or party.
A state based on justice, citizenship, and participation, not to quotas, loyalty, and exclusion.
This requires a radical review of political discourse, rebuilding institutions, and establishing a new social contract, in which diversity is recognized, conflict is managed, and rights are guaranteed.
In conclusion, the Syrian situation shows that the fall of the regime does not necessarily mean the birth of the state despite the sincerity of the intentions, and that the absence of the national project leads to the rise of sectarianism and popularity, and that building the state requires more than just a change in people, but rather a change in structure, logic, and vision.
Hence, political sociology provides tools to understand these transformations, but it also obliges us to think of thinking about alternatives, and seeking to establish a state that expresses everyone, managed by reason, and is built with hope.
the reviewer:
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- Tilly, Charles. (1985). War Makeing and State Making As Organized CRIME. In: Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol (Eds.), Bringing the State Back in. Cambridge University Press.
- Lewis, Bernard. (1997). The Multiple Identities of the Middle East. Schocken Books.
- Laclau, Ernesto. (2005). On Populist Reason. Verso.
- Fukuyama, Francis. (2004). State-Building: Goovernance and World Order in the 21st Century. Cornell University Press.
- Bloomfield, David et al. (2006). Reconciliation after violent conflict: a handbook. International Idea.
- The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. (2021). The field survey on confidence in institutions in Syria. Doha.
- Carnegie Middle East Center. (2022). SectAranism and Goovernance in Syria. Beirut.
- The Syrian Center for Social Studies. (2023). Populist in the Syrian religious and political discourse. Idlib.
