Administrative legitimacy in Syria, from dismantling party loyalty to establishing institutional efficiency

Introduction:

In December 2024, Syria witnessed a radical shift in its political and administrative structure, with the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and his flight from Damascus, followed by the restructuring of power by armed opposition factions.
This historic event represented a foundational moment for redefining the concept of administrative legitimacy in the Syrian state, following decades of the Ba’ath Party’s monopoly over administrative and educational decisions, and the prioritization of political loyalty over professional competence.
In this context, the Quneitra Governorate Education Directorate’s opening of nominations for school administrators outside the Ba’ath Party on Sunday, August 3, 2025, stands out as a symbolic gesture and institutional shift toward a new model of legitimacy based on competence and transparency, rather than party affiliation.

This paper seeks to analyze this transformation from a political and administrative perspective, linking it to the rebuilding of state institutions in the post-conflict phase, drawing on similar international experiences such as Rwanda and Kosovo.

The Collapse of the Party Loyalty System in Syria:

Since the 1970s, the Ba’ath Party has constituted the backbone of administrative legitimacy in Syria, where appointments to educational and administrative institutions were governed by political loyalty, not professional competence.
This model marginalized independent talent and produced a fragile bureaucracy lacking in effectiveness and accountability.
With the fall of the regime in December 2024, this system collapsed, and the need to rebuild administrative legitimacy on new foundations emerged. Party loyalty was no longer an acceptable criterion; rather, it became a burden on the institutional reconstruction process, especially in vital sectors such as education, health, and justice.

Quneitra’s Step as an Indicator of Institutional Transformation:
The Quneitra Governorate Education Directorate announced the opening of nominations for school administrators based on clear professional criteria, including years of service, academic performance, and administrative records. Despite its geographical limitations, this step carries profound implications:

Dismantling the Baath Party’s monopoly: For the first time, independent educational cadres are allowed to apply for administrative positions without the need for party recommendations.

Reinstating competence: The announced criteria focus on performance and experience, not political affiliation.

Indications of a new administrative model: This step may be the nucleus for the generalization of a participatory administrative model in the remaining governorates, especially in light of the absence of the old central authority.

Administrative Legitimacy in the Post-Assad Era:
In political literature, a distinction is made between two types of legitimacy: revolutionary legitimacy, which is based on the overthrow of the old regime, and constitutional legitimacy, which is built on stable legal and institutional foundations. In the Syrian case, we are facing a transitional moment that requires merging the two models:

• Revolutionary legitimacy: Represented by the forces that overthrew the regime, which demand the rebuilding of the state on new foundations.
• Institutional legitimacy: Requires the building of institutions capable of providing services and achieving justice, free from factional loyalties.
• The step taken by the Quneitra Education Directorate can be viewed as part of this transformation, reshaping the relationship between the state and local communities and opening the way for more transparent and participatory models.

Challenges of Rebuilding Administrative Legitimacy:
Despite the importance of this step, rebuilding administrative legitimacy in Syria faces multiple challenges:

• Lack of a unified legal framework: Syria still lacks a new constitution—despite the existence of a constitutional declaration—that regulates the relationship between the authorities.
• Multiple dominant forces: The presence of multiple factions creates a disparity in local governance models and makes it difficult to unify administrative standards.

Lack of qualified personnel: Years of war have led to a massive exodus of skilled personnel, weakening institutions’ ability to absorb the new model.

Lack of community trust: After decades of corruption and favoritism, the new administrative system needs to gradually build trust.

The Rwandan experience as a comparative model:
Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the country faced similar challenges in rebuilding its institutions.
It succeeded by:

• Adopting strict competency standards for administrative appointments.
• Launching extensive training programs to rehabilitate personnel.
• Utilizing international support for institution-building.

Integrating transitional justice with national reconciliation, which has restored confidence in the state.
Syria can benefit from this experience, particularly in the education sector, by building a competency-based administrative model, managed locally, with independent institutional oversight.

Towards an Analytical Framework for Redefining Administrative Legitimacy:
Based on the above, an analytical framework can be proposed for redefining administrative legitimacy in post-Assad Syria, based on three axes:

1. Procedural legitimacy: Based on clear appointment criteria, such as qualifications, experience, and professional record.
2. Societal legitimacy: Built on the local community’s acceptance of administrative leaders through participatory mechanisms.
3. Institutional legitimacy: Requires the presence of an independent oversight body to oversee appointments and ensure transparency and accountability.

This framework can be gradually implemented in vital sectors, starting with education, then health, justice, and finally local administration.

Conclusion:
In light of the previous analysis, the Scientific Bureau of the Syrian Future Movement offers the following recommendations to decision-makers and local councils:

1. Extend the Quneitra model to the remaining governorates, adjusting the criteria to suit the local context.
2. Issuing a transitional administrative declaration regulating appointments in public institutions and setting competency standards.
3. Launching training programs to rehabilitate administrative cadres, particularly in liberated areas.
4. Establish an independent administrative oversight body to oversee appointments and investigate complaints.
5. Benefit from international experiences in building post-conflict institutions, while taking into account Syrian specificities.

Opening the door to nominations for school administration outside the Baath Party is not merely an administrative decision; it is a foundational moment for redefining administrative legitimacy in Syria. In the absence of the old regime and the multiplicity of controlling forces, the need for a new administrative model, based on competence and managed transparently, It is managed transparently and monitored by independent institutions. This model not only rebuilds the state, but also rebuilds trust between the state and society, trust that has been lost for decades and can only be restored through fair, effective, and legitimate institutions.

References:

1. Nour Al-Khatib, “On Legitimacy in the Syrian Transition Phase,” Al-Jumhuriya, 2025.
2. Ruba Khaddam Al-Jami’, “Post-Assad Syria: Between the Restructuring of Power and the Struggle for Regional Influence,” Syria TV, 2025.
3. “Sharia Issues a Decree Regulating the Appointment of Administrative Leaders and Enhancing Efficiency and Transparency,” Syria TV, 2025.
4. Syrian Dialogue Center, “Rebuilding State Institutions After Conflicts: A Case Study of Rwanda,” February 2025.
5. “The Problem of State Building After the Revolutions: A Case Study of the State of Syria,” Arab Democratic Center, 2024.