Introduction:
An Entry into Damascus’s Central Role in Political Governance:
Damascus has long represented the core of governance and administration in Syria throughout the ages. Its political stability has consistently been linked to the involvement of its notables, elders, and prominent figures in the structure of power. Historically, the interaction between rulers and the city’s notables has emerged as a decisive factor in shaping the political landscape, with experience proving that excluding these elites from decision-making leads to political instability and administrative failure.
Today, as many Damascenes feel that the new rulers are disregarding the city’s notables, the fundamental question resurfaces: Can governance in Damascus succeed without the approval of its traditional elites?
Historical Context:
During the Ottoman era, Damascus served as one of the empire’s main administrative centers, with its notables playing a crucial role in maintaining governance stability. History records periods of political tension when the Ottoman authorities attempted to reduce the influence of these elites or appointed foreign governors with no ties to Damascus’s local fabric. Among the most notable events were:
- The dismissal of Damascus Governor Darwish Pasha in 1585, following protests led by the city’s notables over excessive taxation and poor administration.
- The 19th-century Ottoman reforms that marginalized prominent Damascene families such as the Al-Azm and Al-Omari clans, leading to political unrest in the city.
When Ibrahim Pasha entered Damascus, he attempted to win the loyalty of the Damascene elites by granting them administrative and economic privileges. However, he clashed with their rejection of compulsory conscription, which led to the 1834 uprising that forced him to use military force to suppress it.
As for the French, they made a critical mistake upon entering Syria by ignoring the traditional Damascene elites, preferring instead to deal with marginal figures or individuals brought from outside the Syrian national context. They believed this would weaken the popular support base for the resistance. However, this marginalization widened the gap between them and the local community, creating a state of political and social discontent that led to successive uprisings—most notably the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925, which was led or supported by several national figures connected to the traditional Damascene class, such as Fakhri al-Baroudi and Saadallah al-Jabiri.
As popular rejection escalated, the French realized the error of their approach to Damascus’s elites and the dangers of ignoring the city’s genuine social foundations. They later attempted to co-opt the elites by integrating some traditional families into local administration and self-governance institutions, thinking this would bring stability. However, these efforts came too late and were incomplete, as most elite figures had already aligned themselves with the national movement and became the backbone of political opposition.
Among these figures were key leaders like Hashim al-Atassi, who led political efforts toward independence; Fares al-Khoury, known for his negotiation skills and defense of Syrian sovereignty; and Abdul Rahman Shahbandar, who spearheaded opposition efforts on the ground.
After Syria gained independence from French occupation in 1946, the Damascene elites played a central role in political life, drawing on their historical and social legitimacy and their ties with the national movement. This was embodied by leaders such as Shukri al-Quwatli, Jamil Mardam Bey, and Saadallah al-Jabiri, who were active within the National Party and the National Bloc. These elites sought to establish a civil state based on party pluralism and constitutional governance and played a key role in balancing various internal and regional forces.
However, the 1949 coup led by Husni al-Za’im marginalized the traditional elites in favor of military rule, resulting in recurring political instability due to escalating conflicts between military and civilian leadership.
When Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1970, he adopted a dual strategy toward the Damascene elites based on two pillars:
- Excluding traditional political elites such as the al-Quwatli, al-Azm, and Mardam Bey families, among others.
- Co-opting merchant and administrative families like the al-Mahayni, al-Shihabi, al-Qabbani, al-Bizreh, al-Munajjid, al-Sanqar families, etc., whose role was limited to ensuring a stable economic cycle and polishing the regime’s image in Damascus. In exchange, they were granted limited privileges in the chambers of commerce and industry, on the condition of complete loyalty to the regime—with no actual political role whatsoever.
Simultaneously, he sought to manufacture a new elite composed of rural or sectarian figures, elevating alternative Sunni faces to perform symbolic roles that did not reflect the true social depth of Damascus.
In doing so, Hafez al-Assad destroyed the historical role of the capital’s elites and reshaped the elite class in a manner that served a closed security regime that neither accepted partnership nor bore any connection to historical legacy.
With Bashar Hafez al-Assad assuming power in Syria, the structure of authority underwent a radical transformation in the composition of the elite dominating the political and economic scene. The center of gravity shifted away from the traditional Damascene elites—who for many years had represented the political face and social identity of the capital—toward a new class of compliant businessmen. These individuals were tied to the regime through unofficial partnerships based on loyalty and subordination, rather than competence or social roots. Their interests infiltrated the core sectors of the national economy, effectively turning the market into a monopoly controlled by a small circle that revolved around the regime, financed it, and exploited its influence to suppress competitors and exclude anyone outside this closed network.
This corrupt alliance between wealth and power led to the systematic marginalization of traditional Damascene elites, who had long embodied the historical continuity of the capital’s civil national identity. It also dismantled the social and political fabric that had formed the city’s structure for decades. Moreover, it imposed a hybrid class of newly created elites, manufactured in the basements of the security apparatus rather than in the corridors of history or through societal struggle. These figures served merely as superficial fronts, lacking depth or social legitimacy—an imposition that later created a clear imbalance in Damascus’s social structure and a deliberate confusion of its foundational order.
Can Damascus Be Governed Without the Consent of Its Notables?
This question imposes itself strongly when observing the current Damascene landscape. Since the beginnings of national rule in Syria, Damascus has represented more than just an administrative capital—it has undoubtedly served as the symbolic face of legitimacy and the balancing point between the state and society.
The Syrian experience over the past century affirms that marginalizing Damascus’s notables has never been a successful or sustainable option.
The old families, community leaders, and symbolic figures who shaped the political and cultural history of the city were never mere social ornaments. Rather, they represented a consensual depth within the national fabric and a guarantee of governance stability and credibility.
Today, with President Ahmad al-Shar‘ assuming leadership of the country, fears are growing of a renewed pattern of exclusion under different pretexts. Many Damascenes perceive a deliberate disregard for the city’s historic households and for the elites who have long contributed to decision-making and maintaining balance—evoking past policies that produced nothing but alienation and withdrawal.
And in order to prevent this dilemma from turning into a crisis, a smart approach requires redefining the relationship between the state and the capital through three tracks:
- Restoring the status of the notables in their broad civil sense, by integrating academics, civil society figures, guild elders, and moderate religious leaders into the public sphere—instead of confining representation to bureaucratic or security frameworks.
- Establishing an independent and weighty Damascene Honor Council, composed of trusted figures with symbolic representation, whose role would be to offer counsel and reflect the general mood of the city—thus contributing to rebuilding bridges between the state and society.
- Granting a real role to local elected institutions in Damascus, by strengthening the role of municipalities, initiating decentralization tools, and expanding the powers of local councils, allowing Damascenes to be partners rather than mere spectators.
- Allocating seats in the upcoming People’s Assembly for true notables appointed directly by the president, which would be a symbolic and effective step affirming official recognition of the Damascene elite, granting them a legitimate platform for expression and oversight within the legislative institution—thereby enhancing representation and restoring balance without disrupting electoral mechanisms.
Conclusion:
Damascus has never been merely a geographic capital; it has always been—and still is—the center of balance for legitimacy, history, and Syrian identity. To rule it is not merely to wield power, but to possess a legitimacy that arises from the deep fabric of its society—foremost among them, its traditional elites.
Experience has shown that bypassing or marginalizing these elites does not come without a political cost. On the contrary, it opens the door to imbalances that may lead to internal tensions with repercussions that ripple across the entire country.
At this new historical crossroads, with President Ahmad Al-Shar‘ ascending to power, the essential question reemerges: will he reproduce a model of governance that respects the particular character of Damascus and listens to its figures? Or will he take a different path that bets on engineering a new form of legitimacy without the notables?
Several past eras have shown that consensus with Damascus’s elites is not a tactical choice but a strategic necessity—and that any attempt to bypass this reality is soon met with social withdrawal or political backlash that complicates governance.
Accordingly, building lasting stability requires a careful reading of the Damascus equation and its internal dynamics.
Our recommendations in this context are based on six fundamental pillars:
- Consolidating partnership with traditional Damascene elites, through consultative councils or representative frameworks that preserve their historical status and restore their role in decision-making.
- Striking a balance between emerging competencies and influential families, through an administrative model that combines heritage with modern expertise and prevents the domination of one side over the other.
- Adopting a policy of thoughtful inclusion rather than reckless exclusion, to shield the capital from recurring tensions caused by past isolationist policies.
- Drawing on the political memory of the capital, as a reservoir of both successes and failures, to avoid repeating mistakes that entrenched the rift between governance and society.
- Respecting Damascus’s unique character when proposing reform programs, to avoid social backlash that could hinder or hollow out the reform process.
- Rebuilding trust between the state and the Damascene society, through initiatives of a social and economic nature that restore balance and give residents a sense of partnership in shaping the future.
Ignoring these realities will lead the new government into a silent yet profound confrontation—one that may result in the loss of Damascus not as territory, but as a political and social stronghold—something no national project seeking stability and openness can afford.
Dr. Zaher Baadarani
Presidency office
Article
Syrian Future Movement
