Abstract:
This study examines the political, security, and economic challenges facing the transitional government led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, based on an in-depth analysis of the Atlantic Council report published in March 2026.
The study focuses on two pivotal issues that reflect the complexity of the current phase: the fragile integration process with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast, and the socio-political movement in the Suwayda Governorate.
The study concludes that the success of the transitional project, based on “moderation and integration,” hinges on the government’s ability to achieve a delicate balance between external pressures (American, Turkish, and Israeli) and legitimate internal demands, while offering a forward-looking vision and realistic recommendations that take into account the current circumstances.
Introduction:
The fall of the Assad regime constitutes a pivotal event in contemporary Syrian history. However, the transition from authoritarianism to building a state based on citizenship and institutions involves immense complexities.
As the Atlantic Council analysis indicates, the new government inherited a devastated state, suffering from deep structural distortions accumulated over five decades of Ba’athist rule and ten years of devastating war.
The challenges are not limited to the security aspect, represented by remnants of the former regime or the integration of factions, but extend to rebuilding trust with diverse social groups (Kurds, Druze, Alawites) that have been subjected to systematic marginalization policies, while simultaneously facing complex regional and international pressures.
This study aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the Syrian landscape one year into the transitional phase, focusing on the dynamics of integration and balance that constitute the core of President al-Sharaa’s strategy. We will use the Atlantic Council report (March 2026) as a starting point and expand the analysis based on international reports and recent statistics issued by organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in order to answer the central question: To what extent can policies of moderation and integration succeed in managing the complex challenges of the transitional phase in Syria, particularly concerning the SDF and Suwaida?
First, the challenges of state-building in the post-conflict phase:
The Syrian landscape suffers from a heavy legacy represented by the absence of genuine state institutions operating according to standards of transparency and citizenship.
The intelligence services and the Ba’ath Party were the de facto instruments of governance under Assad, creating a political culture based on cronyism, corruption, and foreign interference.
With the collapse of this structure in December 2014, a power vacuum emerged, and factional control took hold, raising legitimate concerns among many Syrians and international observers about replacing one form of tyranny with another, or descending into renewed chaos.
The economic situation represents the greatest and most pressing challenge.
According to a World Bank report published in January 2016, the cost of reconstruction in Syria is estimated at $250-300 billion, a figure far exceeding initial estimates (which the Atlantic Council report cited at $200 billion), and reflecting the immense scale of the destruction inflicted on infrastructure and the productive sector.
Regarding unemployment and poverty, data from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for February 2026 indicates that more than 85% of Syrians live below the poverty line, and that the unemployment rate reaches 55% of the workforce, with the situation being particularly dire among youth and women.
Furthermore, lifting the Caesar Act was a necessary but insufficient step. The initial US sanctions (imposed since 1979) still constitute a psychological and legal obstacle to major investments, especially European and American ones.
While there is apparent interest from Turkish and American companies, translating this interest into actual investments requires a stable legislative environment and sovereign guarantees, which are still being established.
Secondly, the SDF and the Pending Integration:
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) file is the most accurate measure of the success of Damascus’s integration policy. The Atlantic Council report provides a detailed account of developments in this matter, from the March 2025 agreement to the clashes in Aleppo and the SDF’s near-complete withdrawal from Raqqa and Hasakah in early 2026, culminating in the new agreement signed on January 30, 2026.
Analysis of Developments:
Strengths of the New Agreement: The presidential decree granting Syrian citizenship to Kurds and recognizing Nowruz (the Kurdish New Year) represents a historic and crucial step that addresses a decades-old grievance. Furthermore, the agreement to integrate the SDF into the Ministries of Defense and Interior effectively ends the institutional duality that had prevailed.
Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities: Despite the agreement, the integration process is still in its early stages and faces significant obstacles, including:
- Internal Resistance: The refusal of some Kurdish factions to abandon the idea of federalism, as noted in the report, represents a strong opposition that could hinder implementation.
- Lost Trust: Years of fighting and separate administration have created an atmosphere of distrust that will require considerable time and effort to overcome. Government control over oil wells and self-governing institutions, while essential for national unity, will face bureaucratic and popular resistance in the region.
- External Interventions: The presence of US forces in the northeast as a historical ally of the SDF adds further complexity. Washington’s role as a mediator (through Ambassador Barrack) is delicate, but its continued military presence could weaken the central government’s grip and fuel separatist demands.
Third, Suwaida: Another Example of the Difficulty of Building National Consensus:
The situation in Suwaida is no less complex than that of the northeast, although the motivations differ.
There is the involvement of Druze fighters, operating with a sectarian agenda under the leadership of Druze cleric Hikmat al-Hijri, in clashes and acts of violence during the summer of 2015, and calls for independence from figures, most notably Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri.
This reflects a state of unease and anxiety within the Druze community, which possesses a unique social and historical identity.
The Roots of the Problem and its Repercussions:
Fear of Change: Like other minorities, the Druze suffered under the policies of the former regime, but they maintained their…
The relative stability in their region, coupled with the fear of Islamist dominance in the new government and the repetition of sectarian violence witnessed in other areas, fuels tendencies toward isolation or demands for greater autonomy.
Internal Divisions: The Druze community in Suwaida is not a monolithic entity. There are factions that support integration into the new state with guarantees, others that are more cautious and push for decentralization, and traditional forces that fear losing their influence. The exploitation of these divisions by some external powers appears to further complicate the situation.
Regional Dimensions: Israel’s apprehensive stance toward the Turkish or Islamist presence in Syria is reflected in Suwaida, where Tel Aviv seeks to exploit any tensions to its advantage. This places Damascus in direct or indirect confrontation with foreign interference in its internal affairs.
Fourth, The Regional and International Equation – Many Players on the Syrian Chessboard:
Syria is no longer merely an arena for local conflict; it has become a stage for complex regional and international power balances.
The report highlights the crucial role of President Trump’s return in creating a breakthrough, through his special relationship with Erdoğan and his hardline stance toward Israel (which, according to the report, limited its direct military ambitions inside Syria).
Analysis of Roles:
- The United States: Washington is adopting a pragmatic approach under the leadership of Ambassador Barak, based on lifting sanctions in exchange for political and security guarantees, while maintaining a limited military presence as leverage on several issues. The success of this approach seems contingent on the stability of the Syrian government and its avoidance of sectarian conflict.
- Turkey: Turkey stands to gain the most, both economically and politically, from this new phase. Its strong presence in the energy and construction sectors makes it a key partner in reconstruction. However, its military presence in the north and its relationship with former opposition factions remain unresolved issues that require addressing within a comprehensive agreement.
- Israel: Israel continues its policy of “preemptive strikes” against any potential threats, and the report also indicates that it continues to exert pressure.
Tensions with Turkey in Syria, coupled with concerns about any future Syrian-Iranian rapprochement, keep the Syrian issue at the forefront of Israeli national security priorities, raising the specter of potential escalation.
Conclusion: Based on the preceding analysis, three possible scenarios can be envisioned for the next phase in Syria:
The Optimistic Scenario (Gradual Integration): The government succeeds in implementing the SDF agreements, and if this is successful, Suwaida follows gradually, along with the establishment of professional security institutions and a unified national army.
Gulf, Turkish, and Western investments gradually flow in, improving the economic situation and alleviating social tensions. Conditional international support continues, and the intensity of foreign interventions decreases.
This scenario requires wise leadership and considerable patience.
The Pessimistic Scenario (Setback and Return to Tension): The SDF and Suwaida agreements fail due to internal intransigence or external pressures, and clashes resume. Economic reforms falter due to corruption and a lack of vision, and international support declines. Regional powers (Israel) exploit the chaos to bolster their influence, drawing Syria back into the cycle of conflict. This scenario threatens the country’s unity and dashes the hopes of the Syrian people.
The realistic scenario (a fragile, sustainable balance): This is the most likely scenario. The government continues on a path of moderation, and agreements are partially implemented, though underlying disagreements persist.
The economic situation improves slowly and unevenly, creating limited popular support.
International support remains, albeit cautiously, and some limited external interventions continue, while internal parties learn to manage their differences peacefully.
Therefore, we in the Syrian Future Movement, based on the circumstances of this transitional phase, recommend the following:
Recommendations for the Syrian government:
- Gradual implementation and confidence-building: Begin implementing agreements with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Suwayda with small, measurable steps, involving local forces in implementation and follow-up committees.
Prioritize service-related issues and joint security before delving into major political details.
- Governance and combating corruption: Establish a supreme body for combating corruption and promoting transparency, under international supervision, to send a positive signal to investors and donors.
Activate the oversight role of civil society organizations. • Strengthening Inclusive Discourse: Continue adopting a political and religious discourse that promotes citizenship and respects the particularities of all communities, and translate this into educational curricula and official media.
Recommendations for the International Community:
- Smart Conditional Support: Link the provision of financial and technical assistance to the achievement of clear and agreed-upon standards in the areas of good governance and human rights, while avoiding the imposition of prohibitive conditions that weaken the government.
- A Unified UN Role: Intensify the efforts of the UN Special Envoy for Syria to bring together internal and regional parties at a single negotiating table, with the aim of developing understandings on issues of sovereignty, unity, and combating terrorism.
- Addressing Humanitarian Issues: Work on urgent programs for the voluntary and safe return of refugees, and support early recovery projects in newly liberated areas, thereby reducing the chances of a resurgence of extremism and violence.
One year after Assad’s departure, Syria stands on the threshold of a pivotal stage.
The policies of “moderation, integration, and balance” pursued by President al-Sharaa, as described in the Atlantic Council report, are the most prominent feature of this stage. But its success is not guaranteed; rather, it hinges on the new leadership’s ability to translate these slogans into concrete actions on the ground, in the face of a heavy legacy of fragmentation, mistrust, and multiple external interventions.
The two most complex issues, the SDF and Suwaida, will remain key indicators of the health of the transitional process.
We believe that the opportunity to build a new Syria still exists, but its window is closing with time, and it requires exceptional wisdom from all parties, both internal and external, to seize it before it closes.
List of sources:
- Atlantic Council (translated by Syria TV website). (March 13, 2026). “Atlantic Council: Moderation, Integration, and Balance… Can Sharia Succeed in Managing Challenges?”
- World Bank. (January 2026). Progress Report on the Economic Impact of the Conflict in Syria and Reconstruction Needs.
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). (February 2026). Overview of Humanitarian Needs in Syria.
- Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic. (September 2025). Report on Violations in the Coastal Areas and As-Suwayda.
- American Chamber of Commerce Report. (December 2025). Investment Prospects in Post-Conflict Syria.
