In the first quarter of 2026, Syria witnessed a crucial transitional phase characterized by an accelerated pace of political and security agreements between the central government in Damascus, headed by Ahmed al-Sharaa, and various local actors in peripheral regions.
This development reflects a combination of field pressures, pragmatic negotiations, and active international mediation (particularly American), within a general effort to restore central control over Syrian territory while maintaining relative stability.
The Suwaida File – A Model of Local Settlement through Humanitarian and International Mediation:
On February 26, 2026, the Suwaida Governorate witnessed the first large-scale prisoner exchange between the Syrian government and the National Guard factions affiliated with Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. Sixty-one residents of Suwaida were released in exchange for 25 members of the security and defense forces who had been held by local factions.
The International Committee of the Red Cross oversaw the operation, while American mediation played a pivotal role in reaching the agreement.
From an analytical perspective, this exchange falls within the framework of functional limited settlements, where the humanitarian file is separated from deeper political and military issues, thus generating a gradual trust dynamic and reducing the risk of direct escalation.
However, the factions’ continued de facto control over parts of the province indicates that full integration remains a distant goal in the near term, and that any future progress depends on providing tangible political and service-related guarantees to the Druze community.
Northeast Syria – Implementation Phase of the Integration Agreement and the Challenges of Gradual Implementation:
The January 29-30, 2016 agreement between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) established a comprehensive framework that includes a permanent ceasefire, the administrative and military handover of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor governorates, the integration of SDF members individually into the Ministries of Defense and Interior after security vetting, the reactivation of state institutions in Hasakah, and guarantees of specific Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights (including a presidential decree on this matter).
The agreement also included the handover of border crossings and oil and gas fields, and the management of prisons and camps related to ISIS.
In February 2026, a quiet military implementation process began, involving the withdrawal of heavy and medium weapons from certain urban areas (such as Hasakah), according to undisclosed information, and the handover of some sites and maps related to tunnels and weapons depots, along with joint field visits by military delegations.
President al-Sharaa appointed Brigadier General Ziad al-Ayesh as a presidential envoy to oversee the implementation. However, reports indicate continued disagreements regarding the details of the complete handover of heavy weapons, border crossings like Semalka, and the mechanisms for forming the “Hasakah Division,” making the process gradual and fraught with the risk of escalation if not managed with high political sensitivity.
The American Role and the Paris Process:
The United States played a pivotal role as a mediator in both the Suwaida and northeastern Syria files, in addition to sponsoring the Paris negotiations (January 2026) between Syria and Israel. These negotiations led to the establishment of a “joint communication cell” for intelligence sharing, de-escalation of military tensions, and exploration of economic opportunities, with a focus on reactivating the 1974 Disengagement Agreement in a manner that respects Syrian sovereignty and Israeli security.
From a realistic international perspective, this role represents an American attempt to realign regional priorities: establishing a unified Syria as a stabilizing force to counter the remnants of ISIS, reducing former Iranian influence, and easing border tensions.
This approach also provides a temporary external guarantee for the internal integration process, but it remains contingent on developments in US domestic and regional politics.
Conclusions and Future Prospects – Between Opportunities and Risks:
The general trend toward re-establishing central sovereignty appears to be the most likely scenario in the foreseeable future, supported by interim understandings and international backing.
However, we in the Syrian Future Movement believe that the success of this approach depends on fundamental factors:
- Providing economic and service-related benefits and genuine political representation to the relevant groups (primarily the Kurdish and Druze communities) to avoid a sense of marginalization.
- Careful management of detailed disagreements during the implementation phase, particularly in northeastern Syria.
- Continued international (primarily American) support as a stabilizing factor, with the awareness that shifts in external priorities could affect the dynamics.
Ultimately, the Syrian transition requires a delicate balance between power and strategic intelligence from all parties.
The success of this phase depends on transforming temporary settlements into a comprehensive political framework that respects Syria’s diversity without compromising the country’s territorial and institutional unity, while remaining vigilant against the risk of renewed tensions should tangible gains be delayed or trust be undermined.
