Introduction:
The issue of political legitimacy has been a central problem in political thought from ancient times to the modern era.
The sources of legitimacy are diverse and numerous, but the dichotomy between “revolutionary legitimacy” and “popular legitimacy” remains one of the most controversial dichotomies in contemporary political literature, especially in the context of the major political transformations witnessed by Arab societies after the Arab Spring revolutions.
This article aims to analyze this dichotomy from a theoretical perspective and then apply it to the Syrian situation after the fall of the Assad regime, focusing on the problem of a transitional government that obtained revolutionary legitimacy without enjoying genuine and widespread popular support.
The article will argue that revolutionary legitimacy, in the specific Syrian context, possesses more power and authority than traditional popular legitimacy, given the sharp societal divisions and the defeat of the counter-revolutionary forces. This makes its inclusion in the transitional phase a risky move that could reproduce authoritarianism.
Chapter One: The Theoretical Framework of Political Legitimacy:
1.1 The Concept of Legitimacy and the Evolution of the Idea:
Legitimacy, in its basic sense, means the voluntary recognition of authority and the right to govern.
This concept has evolved from the legitimacy of divine or hereditary power to a legitimacy derived from the collective will. Max Weber had already presented the classical classification of legitimacy into three types: traditional legitimacy, charismatic legitimacy, and rational-legal legitimacy [1].
However, this classification, despite its importance, does not cover all revolutionary and transitional contexts, where a legitimacy emerges that derives from the power’s ability to represent a break with and eradication of the old order.
1.2 Popular Legitimacy:
Popular legitimacy, or representative democracy, is based on the principle of popular sovereignty as formulated by social contract philosophers such as John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
Free and fair elections are considered the fundamental mechanism for translating the popular will into legitimate authority. This legitimacy depends on the presumption of the existence of a unified “people” with a general will that can be shaped through a democratic process [2]. However, the criticism leveled at this concept lies in its abstract nature and practical complexities, especially in societies divided along ethnic, sectarian, or ideological lines, where the electoral mechanism may end up legitimizing majority dominance or even irreconcilable divisions.
1.3 Revolutionary Legitimacy:
Revolutionary legitimacy stems from the act of rupture itself.
It is not derived from formal procedures but from the liberating and foundational content of the revolution.
It rests on the idea that a historical force has overthrown a despotic regime and therefore possesses the temporary right to rebuild the political system from the ground up. This legitimacy is based on philosophical concepts such as the “right of resistance” against tyranny (as in John Locke) and the idea of ”foundational violence” in Frantz Fanon’s work, who sees revolutionary violence as necessary to liberate the collective self from the inferiority complex instilled by the colonizer or despot [3].
It can also be linked to the concept of a temporary “revolutionary dictatorship,” discussed by some philosophers to protect the gains of the revolution from its enemies, or to the jurisprudence of conquest, as in Islamic jurisprudence. 1.4 Duality in the Balance: Conflict or Integration?
The contradiction between the two forms becomes apparent when a revolutionary force, after overthrowing the regime, attempts to establish a new system without obtaining a comprehensive electoral mandate.
Herein lies the central question: Does foundational (revolutionary) legitimacy precede procedural (popular) legitimacy?
Proponents of revolutionary primacy argue that the transitional phase requires protecting the revolution from counter-revolutionary forces, and therefore cannot be jeopardized by referendums that might be dominated by those fearful of or loyal to the old regime.
Meanwhile, proponents of absolute popular legitimacy maintain that any unelected authority is illegitimate, regardless of its source.
Chapter Two, The Syrian Case: An Exceptional Context:
2.1 Post-Assad Syria:
After the fall of the Assad regime, the reality in Syria is not a blank slate, but rather a landscape torn apart by unprecedented violence: a society fragmented along sectarian and ethnic lines, devastated infrastructure, a collapsed economy, the presence of competing regional and international powers, and millions of internally displaced persons and refugees. Most importantly, there is a sharp division between those who participated in the revolution and suffered its repression, and those who supported the regime or maintained passive neutrality.
This division cannot be accepted as a mere difference of opinion; it is a deep chasm resulting from years of violence that have bred feelings of fear, hatred, and profound mistrust.
2.2 The Problem of the Syrian “People” as a Unified Entity:
One of the fundamental conditions for popular legitimacy is the existence of a “demos” (people) capable of expressing a general will.
In Syria, this concept is fundamentally questionable.
The “people” that Assad ruled through security and sectarian power-sharing, and who erupted in 2011, emerged from the war even more fragmented.
There are deep identity divisions (Sunni, Alawite, Kurd, Christian, etc.), political divisions (revolutionaries, loyalists, neutrals), and geographical divisions (formerly liberated areas, regime-held areas “which were under Assad’s control at the time of liberation,” and Kurdish-controlled areas).
In this context, the idea of elections as the sole criterion for legitimacy becomes fraught with risk, as it may freeze these divisions or grant legitimacy to parties working to undermine the new state.
2.3 Non-Revolutionary Forces:
Non-revolutionary forces can be categorized as follows:
A. Former loyalists of the old regime who lost their power but may not have relinquished their ideological allegiance or their fear of accountability.
B. Neutral parties, exhausted by the conflict and seeking peace at any cost, may be willing to support any power that provides security, even if it represents a continuation of the authoritarian system.
C. Finally, groups that collaborated with external powers for their own gain.
From a revolutionary perspective, these groups fall under the category of the politically and morally defeated. They are defeated because their project (either the continuation of the old regime or the pursuit of compromises during the war) failed to achieve stability or freedom.
Chapter Three: The Superiority of Revolutionary Legitimacy in the Syrian Context:
3.1 The Authority of Revolutionary Legitimacy: Theoretical Arguments:
In light of the described Syrian context, strong arguments emerge for the superiority of revolutionary legitimacy:
- Historical and Foundational Legitimacy: The forces that led the revolution possess the legitimacy of the originator, for they paid the price and carried out the act of liberation.
This legitimacy is closer to “foundational legitimacy,” which relates to the moment of the new regime’s birth—an exceptional moment that transcends ordinary procedures [4].
- Moral Legitimacy: This stems from their representation of the victims of the former regime and the initial desire for freedom and dignity that ignited the revolution.
In the face of a regime in which the state perpetrated immense violence against its people, the moral voice of the revolutionaries supersedes any procedural consideration.
- Legitimacy of Protection: The transitional phase is fragile and susceptible to setbacks.
History shows that many revolutions have turned against themselves or seen authoritarianism return in new forms because revolutionary forces relinquished the initiative too early. Carl Schmitt reminds us that sovereignty emerges in a state of exception, and the transitional phase is a state of exception par excellence, requiring an authority capable of making decisive decisions to protect foundational gains [5].
3.2 Weakening of Popular Legitimacy in a Fractured Society:
- Impossibility of Genuine Representation: In the context of demographic fragmentation (refugees and internally displaced persons) and sharp divisions, “elections” lose their ability to produce genuine representation. They may become a referendum on identity or fear, rather than on political programs for the future.
- Risk of Exploitation: Non-revolutionary forces, especially those associated with the old regime, possess organizational experience and remaining resources that could enable them to win early elections or obstruct the process from within, exploiting the people’s desire for stability to present themselves as a guarantor of “security.”
- Priority of Reconstruction over Representation: In a collapsed state, the highest priority is rebuilding state institutions, the economy, and security. This task requires a decisive authority capable of making difficult decisions that may be unpopular in the short term (such as trials, compromises, agreements, asset seizures, or restructuring). Here, an elected authority, under these circumstances, may be unable to act for fear of losing popularity.
3.3 The Role of the New Administration (The Temporary Revolutionary Guardianship):
The new administration that assumed power after the fall of Assad, deriving its legitimacy from the revolution, faces a significant dilemma:
It possesses revolutionary legitimacy, but lacks comprehensive popular legitimacy, especially after the failure of the National Dialogue Conference, which intimidated remnants of the old regime among the Alawites, failed to convince the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and broke down communication with Suwayda. The solution, it seems, lies not in ignoring popular legitimacy, but in framing it within a progressive vision.
This administration can play the role of a “temporary revolutionary guardian” of the transition process.
Its tasks include:
Ensuring a minimum level of stability and security, a prerequisite for any meaningful political process.
Building foundational institutions (a constitution, an independent judiciary, a national security apparatus, and national unity) in a way that dismantles the old mechanisms of tyranny.
Managing reconciliation and transitional justice in a manner that achieves justice for victims without turning into revenge that fuels the cycle of violence.
Creating the conditions for genuine popular legitimacy requires building a pluralistic and rights-based political system, followed by elections when the objective conditions are ripe: a permanent constitution, strong institutions, and a free public sphere that allows for genuine political competition, free from the logic of fear and identity politics.
This role resembles the “temporary dictatorship” of the ancient Romans to protect the republic, or the idea of ”educational guardianship” among some Enlightenment thinkers. However, in this case, it is a guardianship for the benefit of democracy itself, not against it.
Chapter Four: Responding to Criticisms and Concerns:
4.1 Doesn’t revolutionary priority lead to a new tyranny?
Objectively speaking, this concern is the greatest and most likely danger, based on our human experience, particularly in Syria.
The response to this is that revolutionary legitimacy is neither absolute nor permanent. Rather, it must be limited by three things:
First, by its declared and accountable commitment to the goals of the revolution (freedom, dignity, and justice).
Second, the revolutionary forces themselves must have internal mechanisms for oversight and consultation (revolutionary councils, emerging civil society organizations).
Third, and most importantly, their project must include a mechanism for self-dissolution through a gradual and time-bound transition to an institutionalized democratic system. Revolutionary legitimacy is a bridge, not an end in itself.
4.2 What about the will of the silent or non-revolutionary majority?
The claim that the opinions of non-revolutionaries cannot be considered because they are “defeated” appears authoritarian.
A more plausible explanation is that during a critical transitional period, the “opinion” formed under the weight of war, fear, and collapse cannot be the arbiter of the country’s future. A distinction must also be made between the “transient popular will” expressed in a moment of hardship and the “foundational public interest” that seeks to build a system that protects freedoms in the future.
Therefore, the revolutionary leadership is required to represent this future public interest, even if it conflicts with some of the immediate aspirations of segments of the population seeking only security.
4.3 How do we prevent the revolutionaries from becoming a new ruling class?
Ensuring that the revolutionary elite does not transform into a “class” requires adhering to the temporary nature of its legitimacy, integrating mechanisms for rotation and accountability from the outset, and expediting the establishment of independent constitutional institutions that limit the power of everyone, including the revolutionaries.
Most importantly, it requires developing a comprehensive discourse and policies that begin with acknowledging the suffering of all Syrians (including those who supported the regime out of fear or for sustenance) and adopting a national project that transcends the dichotomy of revolutionary/loyalist.
Conclusion:
It appears that the relationship between revolutionary legitimacy and popular legitimacy is not one of absolute contradiction, but rather one of chronological order and priorities in exceptional contexts such as those Syria is experiencing.
In a deeply fractured society, where the idea of a “unified people” has lost its practical meaning, and where the forces of the old regime and sectarian divisions are still capable of manipulating any formal democratic process…
the reviewer:
- [1] Weber, Max. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, University of California Press, 1978.
- [2] Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract. Translated by Maurice Cranston, Penguin Books, 1968.
- [3] Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. Translated by Constance Farrington, Grove Press, 1963.
- [4] Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. Penguin Books, 1963.
- [5] Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Translated by George Schwab, The University of Chicago Press, 2005.
