A recent Washington Post report on Israeli activity in Syria, titled “How Israeli covert activities in Syria seek to thwart its new government,” presents alleged information that Israel and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are working to support Druze actors in southern Syria, potentially undermining the stability of the new Syrian government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa.
The report, on the surface, relies on multiple sources and is presented in an engaging investigative style. However, the problem lies not in the specific information it provides, but in the overall narrative, its generalization, and its consistency with the known political, social, and strategic realities in Syria and the region.
The SDF Narrative: A Contradiction in Political Logic
Since 2015, the SDF has been one of the most prominent instruments of US policy in Syria. It is not an independent actor, but rather a military force whose very existence depends on US air cover, funding, training, and the international legitimacy provided by Washington. Any strategic move by the SDF, especially outside its direct areas of control, cannot be separated from or imagined in isolation from US policy.
This highlights the central contradiction in the report: If the Trump administration, as it repeatedly declared after the fall of the Assad regime, was committed to supporting the new Syrian government as a gateway to the country’s stability, why would it permit, or turn a blind eye to, actions by a force organically linked to it that could undermine this stability?
The implicit assumption that Washington is pursuing a double standard—publicly supporting the SDF while secretly undermining it through the SDF—lacks political logic. Trump personally staked his reputation on defending the option of dealing with the SDF, despite its past jihadist history, and paid a domestic political price for it. It is inconceivable that he would risk tarnishing this option through a high-risk intelligence operation using an already transparent tool like the SDF, which would deprive any potential operation of the element of plausible deniability upon which covert operations are based.
In any case, neither America nor Trump is the type to engage in such naive political maneuvering. If Trump had wanted to undermine the work of the interim government, he would have stated so and acted openly.
The Druze: Between Facts and Generalizations
The second, and more socially serious, problem lies in the report’s portrayal of the relationship with the Druze.
The report’s wording suggests, directly or indirectly, that Suwaida as a whole, or at least its Druze majority, entered into early cooperation with Israel from the very first days after the fall of Assad. This generalization does not reflect the complex reality of the Druze position in Syria; rather, it oversimplifies it inaccurately and carries serious political and sectarian consequences.
It is a fact that Israel has historically sought to engage with various local forces on its borders and in its regional environment, including through channels with Druze figures or groups. However, this is one thing, and portraying an entire local community as a homogeneous and cooperative political actor from “day one” is quite another.
In reality, Suwaida, until recently, was characterized by caution, waiting, and hesitation, not by early involvement in regional alignments. It is true that the July massacre constituted a sharp turning point, prompting a segment of the Druze community to reconsider its relationship with the new regime. However, projecting this belated shift onto the period of December of last year, before the features of the new government or its policies became clear—a time when the Syrian majority, including the Druze, welcomed the newcomer—is a chronological rewriting of events that serves the narrative more than the truth.
The Responsibility of the Formation in a Fragile Sectarian Context
The danger of this type of generalization lies not only in its inaccuracy but also in its direct impact on a society already experiencing acute sectarian tension. When an entire religious group is presented as a “collaborating” party or a “separatist project,” the report not only describes a reality but also contributes, albeit unintentionally, to fueling a discourse of mutual suspicion and hatred within Syrian society.
This problem becomes even more apparent when we observe that the report, despite its analytical nature, failed to place these alleged contacts within their broader historical context. The report ignores the documented prior relationships between Israel and Syrian Sunni Arab factions during the war years, which included medical, financial, and logistical support for Sunni Arab factions near the Golan Heights, some of which also included a presence of the al-Nusra Front itself. This omission creates a selective impression, as if Israeli engagement with Syrian actors is a phenomenon linked to a specific sect, rather than a consistent, pragmatic regional approach that engages with all parties for its own interests.
Did Israel make an early strategic decision?
The report implicitly assumes that Israel decided early on its position regarding the new Syrian government and made a strategic decision to undermine it from the very first days after Assad’s fall. This assumption warrants examination, as it contradicts Israel’s well-known behavior on the Syrian issue.
For over a decade, Israel failed to reach a definitive position even regarding Bashar al-Assad’s regime itself. A deep division persisted within the Israeli political and security establishment regarding whether the survival of Assad, as a weak, exhausted, and predictable regime, was preferable to an unknown alternative that could unleash chaos on the northern border. This division has not been resolved, and has never led Israel to adopt a policy of overthrowing or saving the regime, but rather to manage the conflict from a distance, by preventing Iranian entrenchment and avoiding being drawn into a comprehensive confrontation.
In this context, it becomes difficult to imagine that Israel, from day one, adopted a hostile strategic stance toward a new government seeking international recognition and which has not yet shown any escalatory tendencies toward it. More importantly, any scenario that leads to an internal Syrian conflict based on accusations of “collaboration with Israel” poses a direct security threat to Tel Aviv, one in which it has no interest. Historically, Israel prefers a clear and deterred adversary on its borders to a civil chaos that produces undisciplined armed actors and transforms “collaboration” into the fuel of open conflict.
It might be argued that Israel wants to secure some leverage to use in Syria when needed, a well-known tactic in geopolitical conflicts. But does this justify what the report presented, or implied, regarding Israel’s continued risk of striking the Damascus government through Suwayda, especially given its clear contradiction with Trump’s Syria policy?
The final point raised in the report concerns the role of former Druze Brigadier General Hassoun Hassoun in pressuring Israel to adopt this policy. But can such major decisions truly be made in Israel based on the vision or opinion of an army officer? The reality is that this decision is more than just the opinion of a former brigadier general, whose decision is clearly driven by emotion.
Interpretive Journalism and Its Limits
This report falls within the school of “interpretive journalism,” which doesn’t merely present facts but seeks to extract their political meaning. This approach is legitimate and important, but it becomes problematic when it produces a journalistically coherent narrative that lacks strategic and social coherence.
In the Syrian case, it seems that traditional Western fears of state collapse, minority conflicts, and scenarios of chaos have been projected onto a reality still in formation. A possibility has been presented as an established course, and isolated cases have been generalized to entire societies.
Conclusion
This critique does not imply that everything in the Washington Post report is false or fabricated. However, it indicates that the narrative, in its current form, suffers from a weakness in political logic, a haste in social generalization, and an unjustified leap to major strategic conclusions. The SDF cannot, has no interest in, and is inconceivable for, to jeopardize its strategic alliance with the United States through actions that contradict declared American policy. Similarly, the Druze in Suwaida cannot be reduced to a single stance or a single timeframe, nor can they be burdened with a pre-packaged political narrative at this highly sensitive national juncture.
Between legitimate warnings and exaggerated framing, the challenge for mainstream media remains to distinguish between what is actually happening and what is feared to happen, and to avoid conflating the two, especially when such conflation only serves to further fuel divisions that have yet to heal.
