Introduction, context of the crisis and structural transformation:
On Friday, May 30, 2025, the Syrian government’s Ministry of Defense published the “Military Code of Conduct and Discipline,” stating that this charter applies to all those wearing military uniform within the new Syrian army. The announcement of the “Military Code of Conduct and Discipline” in Syria, in the context of post-authoritarianism and the effective fall of the authoritarian regime, calls for a thorough critical reading that goes beyond its legal form to the philosophical and constitutional foundations upon which such a text is supposed to be based. The contemporary Syrian context is characterized by the absence of a comprehensive social contract, widespread institutional disintegration, and a profound rift in the concept of legitimacy. This makes any attempt to organize the military institution an existential challenge, not merely a technical one.
Following the tragic events in Sweida, we turn to the charter, in its current form, to address it as a potential lever for the military institution and a means of preventing a recurrence of the dysfunction that was one of the causes of what happened and is happening in Syria. The Charter is presented as an alternative to the law or an introduction to the constitution, which calls for questioning it from the perspective of the philosophy of law, the nature of political authority, and the role of military discipline in light of the structural vacuum in the national contract.
Discipline as a philosophical concept between obedience and sovereignty:
In modern political thought, military discipline is not understood as mere adherence to orders, but rather as a manifestation of the relationship between the individual and authority within the framework of a specific social contract.
Thomas Hobbes, in “Leviathan,” believes that obedience to authority is necessary to ensure security, but it is granted to sovereignty founded on the voluntary surrender of individuals.
In contrast, John Locke stipulates that authority must be legitimate and subject to a constitution, and that obedience is not absolute but conditional upon the protection of natural rights.
The proposed Syrian Charter treats discipline as an instinct or mental state that must be instilled, but it ignores the supposed source of that instinct’s legitimacy: Is it based on an effective constitution? An elected authority? Civil representation?
Without this, discipline becomes mere irrational obedience, or, as Immanuel Kant described it, “moral alienation” when obedience is exercised without question or reason.
In transitional contexts, such as Syria, military discipline cannot be understood outside the framework of redefining the relationship between the army and the state, and between authority and society. Military doctrine is not shaped solely by moral principles, but also by the army’s position within the new legal and political structure, and by a broad societal consensus regarding its role and function.
Military discipline between authoritarian regimes and contractual models:
To distinguish the horizon of military discipline in the new Syria, one must first recognize the fundamental differences between discipline as a functional concept in authoritarian regimes and its position in constitutional contractual states.
In an authoritarian regime, such as the one that ruled Syria for decades, discipline is formulated from above, through a command structure centered around the leader or the ruling party. Here, discipline is nurtured by a discourse that transcends the law to personal loyalty, and obedience is exercised as the essence of military identity.
In contractual systems, as in modern constitutional experiments (such as post-apartheid South Africa or post-Pinochet Chile), discipline is redefined as a voluntary commitment to a comprehensive social contract and supportive civil institutions.
Discipline is derived not from a person or ideological discourse, but rather from a clear constitutional legal reference that defines the military’s function, regulates its behavior, and subjects it to oversight and accountability.
The proposed Syrian Charter does not provide any clear guidelines linking the content of obedience and discipline to a new constitutional framework. Instead, it remains suspended in a legal vacuum, making it more likely to enshrine formal obedience without real submission to the law.
Analyzing the Structure of the Charter: Replacing Institutions with Ethics?
When the structure of the text itself is dismantled, it becomes clear that the Charter is based on moral terms such as “instinctual obedience,” “preserving civilian dignity,” and “loyalty and discipline.” However, it ignores the application of legal or civil authority, and lacks a clear link to the legislative institution, the transitional constitution, or even oversight or accountability procedures that would ensure that discipline does not become a new tool of tyranny.
This moral orientation, despite its symbolic importance, is not sufficient to establish a military doctrine in the post-tyranny era.
Indeed, it could pose a doubly dangerous risk if it becomes a cover for unchecked military behavior, or a tool for monopolizing violence under the banner of “unity and discipline.”
From a constitutional perspective, the Charter lacks what comparative jurisprudence calls “constitutional guarantees for the armed executive,” that is, mechanisms that prevent the politicization of the military or its use outside the bounds of the public interest and the constitution.
Post-authoritarian Syria: The Legitimacy Vacuum and the Threat of Non-Contractual Discipline
The post-central regime context in Syria creates a structural legitimacy dilemma affecting every vital institution, most notably the military. The absence of an elected legislative authority, the lack of a consensus-based constitution, and the multiplicity of military decision-making centers are all factors that make any military organization vulnerable to losing legitimacy or becoming a tool of the dominant authority, rather than an embodiment of state unity.
In this context, the Military Charter emerges as a document torn between institutional ambition and organizational retreat. Rather than reflecting a constitutional national vision, it appears to be an attempt to preempt political establishment by controlling the military in the absence of a unified civilian will.
More dangerously, discipline that is not based on a constitutional civilian contract can be used to justify the practice of violence in the absence of accountability, under the pretext of “obedience and discipline.” International experience indicates that building military discipline outside a constitutional and institutional framework often leads to the reproduction of authoritarianism. In post-Ceausescu Romania, the army was not integrated into civilian institutions until the constitution was amended and its functions were linked to effective parliamentary oversight. In Libya, the post-Gaddafi army-building project failed in part due to the absence of a political contract regulating the relationship between the military and civilians. In South Africa, the integration of the new national army was based on an explicit constitutional document obligating the army to protect the constitution, not political authority.
Philosophical foundation: obedience, will, and the absent social contract:
From a philosophical perspective, a fundamental question arises: Can discipline be moral and patriotic in the absence of a contractual collective will? Here, the contributions of thinkers such as Habermas emerge, who emphasizes that legitimacy is not derived from obedience, but rather from participation, deliberation, and mutual recognition between individuals and institutions. In Habermas’s philosophy, discipline is not technical obedience, but rather an expression of voluntary submission to a legal system that the individual sees as a product of their collective will.
In the Kantian model, however, the relationship between law and obedience is formulated through moral reason: “There is no obedience without will, and no law without morality.” Accordingly, military discipline becomes legitimate only if it is based on a constitution resulting from general consensus, not on imposed authority or a formal text isolated from the popular will.
In the absence of a social contract in Syria, discipline becomes an uninstitutionalized form of obedience, which may be used to reshape power rather than to serve the people. Hence the need to question the Charter not on the basis of its organization, but on the basis of its legitimacy as a component of the contractual state project.
Towards a Contractual Military Charter: Foundational Proposals and Initial Provisions:
To build a national army in Syria that is a tool for protecting the constitution and society, rather than a tool of superior authority, the military charter must be transformed from an abstract moral document into a contractual text governed by a temporary constitution and subjecting the military institution to strict civilian oversight.
A. General founding principles:
- Absolute Subordination to the Constitution:
- It must be explicitly stipulated that the military establishment, in its structure, organization, and behavior, is not subject to any partisan or political authority, whatever its nature. Rather, it is absolutely committed to the interim constitution during the transitional period, and subsequently to the permanent constitution once it is approved. This subordination does not merely mean recognizing the constitution, but rather working under its umbrella, adhering to its provisions, and complying with the civilian judicial and legislative authorities. The constitution is the universal contract between the people and their institutions, and any institution that violates or deviates from it threatens the unity and legitimacy of the state.
- Civilian and Institutional Oversight:Establishing the principle of civilian oversight of the military establishment requires transferring oversight authority from the security or executive agencies to representative, legislative, and independent bodies. Defense policies and major military decisions must also be subject to the oversight of the transitional parliament or a competent civilian constitutional body, which has the power to summon, interrogate, and hold military leaders accountable without interference from the executive branch. It is also proposed to establish a joint civil-legislative defense committee, comprising civilian experts, with advanced oversight and technical powers.
Transparency and Accountability:
It is not sufficient to simply stipulate ethical values such as integrity and discipline. Transparency mechanisms must be institutionalized, including:
- Annual announcement of defense budgets and expenditures.
- Publishing performance and discipline reports.
- Enabling the media and civil society to access non-security-classified information.
- Establishing independent accountability mechanisms that enable citizens and soldiers to file complaints regarding unlawful practices.
- Political and Institutional Neutrality:
The army is a neutral national institution. Its members are prohibited from engaging in any partisan activity or political propaganda. It is prohibited to use the military institution in internal conflicts, power struggles, or falsifying the will of the people in elections or referendums. Any violation of this principle is considered a direct threat to the democratic system and is subject to constitutional penalties.
- Civilian-Military Doctrine:
Military doctrine must be reformulated to be consistent with the concept of a constitutional civil state, so that soldiers and officers are trained to:
- Protecting the rule of law, not the sovereignty of individuals.
- Respecting human rights and the values of citizenship.
- Clearly distinguishing between national defense and internal security work.
- Understanding their role as custodians of weapons, not as bearers of a political mandate.
- Transitional Justice and Emotional Formation:
A national army cannot be built without relying on the principles of transitional justice, which require acknowledging the past, addressing the issues of victims, and dismantling the authoritarian military culture. The new doctrine includes programs to train officers and soldiers on the concepts of:
- Community reconciliation.
- Criminalization of past violations.
- Respect for the country’s ethnic, religious, and political diversity.
- Commitment to International Humanitarian Law:
The army is trained on the rules of international humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions, and the rights of civilians in armed conflict. The charter emphasizes that violating these principles is not only a professional violation, but also a crime, subjecting the perpetrator to prosecution before national and international courts.
Foundational Conclusion: The Army as a Guarantee Institution or a Hegemonic Authority?
In the current Syrian context, the military code of conduct cannot be separated from the question of constitutional legitimacy and the concept of the social contract.
The army, in a contractual state, is neither an instrument of obedience nor a mere security actor, but a sovereign institution responsible for protecting the democratic system, not controlling it.
If the Syrian army is to transform from an instrument of authority into a national institution, the code must be reformulated as a constitutional document that subordinates the military to the civilian and grants obedience its legal and moral meaning. Here, we recall Montesquieu’s maxim: “Power must stop power.” There can be no discipline without oversight, and no national army without a constitution that regulates the relationship between power and sovereignty, and between obedience and freedom.
the reviewer:
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