Legal background of the memorandum:
On July 9, 2025, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa issued Presidential Decree No. 114, establishing an independent national institution known as the “Development Fund.” This decree was issued in conjunction with substantial amendments to Investment Law No. 18 of 2021.
This decision sparked legal and constitutional debate regarding its legitimacy in light of the provisions of the Constitutional Declaration issued on March 13, 2025, which constitutes the governing framework for the transitional phase in the new Syrian Republic.
This memorandum aims to provide a legal assessment, based on in-depth legal consultations conducted by the Research and Studies Department of the Scientific Office of the Syrian Future Movement, of the extent to which this decree is compatible with applicable constitutional texts. It also reviews the challenges and concerns related to the interpretation of the president’s executive powers and the mechanisms for regulating the new institutions within the constitutional oversight and accountability system.
First: Definition of the decree and its constitutional position:
According to Article 31 of the Constitutional Declaration, the President of the Republic and the ministers exercise executive authority within the limits of the Declaration, while legislative authority resides with the People’s Assembly (Article 30). Therefore, issuing regulatory and institutional decrees falls within the President’s purview, provided they do not amend existing laws or create new legislative provisions outside his authority.
The decree establishing the “Development Fund” constitutes an independent financial-economic institution and is considered regulatory if established pursuant to existing legal provisions.
As for the amendments to Investment Law No. 18 of 2021, particularly those related to tax exemptions and the legislative characterization of projects, they are considered legal amendments rather than administrative regulations. This raises a question about the President’s authority to implement them without referral to the Legislative Council or a competent constitutional body.
Second: Evaluating the relationship with the provisions of the Constitutional Declaration:
Article 11 – The Principle of Economic Development states:
“The national economy aims to achieve social justice and comprehensive economic development… The state encourages investment and protects investors in an attractive legal environment.”
Thus, the decree appears to align with the objectives of this article in terms of stimulating investment and development. However, this does not give it the status of legislation, requiring implementation through institutional legislative instruments such as the People’s Assembly or a relevant ministry.
Article 12 – Separation of Powers states: “The state guarantees the independence of the authorities, and their institutions are subject to mutual oversight to ensure integrity and transparency.”
Thus, linking the fund directly to the presidency, without subordination to a body subject to parliamentary or judicial oversight, constitutes a loophole in the separation of powers structure and reduces the ability of oversight institutions to hold the fund’s management accountable or review its decisions.
Article 8 – Reconstruction states:
“The state seeks to coordinate with relevant countries and entities to support the reconstruction process.”
Here, the establishment of the fund can be considered an organizational response to this article, but it must be done within an accountable institutional structure, not through the creation of a functionally immune institution directly linked to the presidency.
Third: Analysis of the Fund’s Structure and Concerns about Institutional Immunity:
The decree stipulates the following:
- The fund is directly linked to the presidency.
- It enjoys administrative and financial independence.
- It is not subject to any executive or oversight body other than the presidency.
- This means that:
- Legislative institutions do not have the authority to monitor or periodically evaluate the fund.
- There is no independent institutional body capable of investigating its management or auditing its decisions.
- The fund can exercise major financial functions without being subject to parliamentary or judicial accountability, which contradicts the principles of constitutional transparency.
- This raises the question of whether to replicate presidential immunity for an independent economic institution represents a violation of the principles of “oversight of public funds” and “executive accountability to legislative institutions” and should be reconsidered.
- Compared with international constitutional models, we see the following:
- In Tunisia, economic decrees affecting investment may not be issued without being submitted to the legislative council.
- In Morocco, institutions linked to the king are considered symbolic or ceremonial, while economic institutions are subject to parliament and the Supreme Court of Accounts.
- In transitional justice countries such as Argentina and South Africa, economic funds are linked to relevant ministries and independent oversight boards to ensure transparency.
Legal recommendations:
- Redefining the status of the Development Fund and linking it to the Ministry of Planning or the Investment Authority to ensure institutional oversight.
- Referring legislative amendments to the Investment Law to the Legislative Council when it convenes for review and approval through official channels.
- Subjecting the Fund to an official, independent external audit department, such as the Supreme Authority for Financial and Administrative Control, with annual public reports.
- Including the Fund in a unified financial law, to be later approved by the People’s Assembly, defining its mandate, spending ceiling, and employment and investment mechanisms.
- Referring to the Supreme Constitutional Court to interpret presidential powers to amend investment laws during the transitional period.
Conclusion:
Presidential Decree No. 114 of 2025 represents an important institutional step toward rebuilding the national economy. However, it entails potential conflicts with the text and spirit of the Constitutional Declaration, particularly in its administrative structure and its relationship with oversight authorities.
We, in the Syrian Future Movement, believe that developmental ambitions should not be a gateway to bypassing constitutional rules, but rather a means to enshrine them. Achieving development begins with institutional legitimacy, not just decision-making flexibility.
For all of the above, the Syrian Future Movement recommends an urgent constitutional review of this decree. This will achieve the economic goal without compromising the principles of oversight and accountability, and establish a national economic contract governed by institutions, not individuals, and by the constitution, not circumstantial necessities.
