Building the Syrian National Identity (1):Between Roots and Renewal, Towards a Comprehensive National Awareness

introduction:

In contemporary sociological literature, political identity is defined as the form by which a political group expresses itself within the general system, including its perception of authority, the legitimacy of representation, and the limits of possible political action. It is not a ready-made construct, but rather a socio-historical process influenced by structural, institutional, and discursive transformations.

In the Syrian case, political identity is a complex domain intertwined with official representation, civic affiliation, and popular withdrawal, within a system described as “post-political,” given the stagnation of representation and the shrinking public sphere for decades. Since the early 1970s, the former Syrian regime has worked to engineer a coercive political identity for citizens.It is based on adherence to a central party front, submission to a unified authoritarian discourse, and formal participation in sham parliamentary representation. This identity is characterized by being “super-politically imposed,” arising not from a social contract, but rather from a horizontal relationship of domination that negates the citizen’s political self and replaces it with functional affiliation to a party, the army, or the bureaucratic apparatus.With the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011 and the subsequent disintegration of the central state, new attempts began to emerge to redefine political identity outside the authoritarian framework, through local councils, opposition networks, and civil society. However, these attempts remained limited in their demarcation due to competition for legitimacy, weak institutional structures, and the geographic fragmentation into conflicting spheres of influence..

Today, with the gradual liberation of large parts of Syrian territory (the remaining areas of the SDF and Sweida), a rare foundational moment emerges to address the question of political identity on contractual and representative foundations, rather than coercive and loyalist ones. This moment requires a restructuring of the relationship between citizen and state, and between individuals and institutions, within a framework that establishes popular sovereignty as the true incubator of any unifying national identity.
In this context, this paper aims to analyze the transformations of Syrian political identity between forced affiliation and free representation, and to explore the possibilities of re-establishing it in light of the changes on the ground, the expected constitutional paths, and the local societal interactions that are reproducing the Syrian self as an independent political actor, not an appendage of authority.

On the concept of political identity – from authoritarian representation to contractual citizenship:

Political identity is one of the manifestations of symbolic power in society. It is not only a citizen’s way of self-identifying within the political structure, but also a form of the moral distribution of power, recognition, and belonging.
Historical and intellectual transformations have contributed to the re-formulation of this concept, from collective representation linked to the clan or sect to the concept of citizenship based on the political contract.

In classical literature, the republican school viewed political identity as a product of active participation in public life, as in Rousseau and Arendt, where the political self becomes synonymous with freedom and collective practice within the common sphere.
The liberal school, on the other hand, linked political identity to individual rights and institutional participation, emphasizing the citizen’s relationship with the state as a legal agent rather than a direct participant.

In post-colonial contexts, such as in the Arab world, models of “forced politicization” have emerged, as described by Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, where citizens are reduced to their relationship with power through ideological, ethnic, or party affiliation, rather than through doctrinal engagement or pluralistic representation.
Within this framework, Syria has been characterized, since the Ba’ath Party came to power, by a pattern of “nationalized political identity.”The citizen is no longer an independent political entity, but rather part of a hierarchical structure centered on the party and dominated by a centralized nationalist discourse.

This has emptied the public sphere of its natural political dynamics, replacing them with functional identities measured by loyalty to the center rather than the ability to express oneself.

The danger of this model is evident in the absence of three basic pillars of political identity:

1. The absence of representative pluralism, as the political sphere was confined to a progressive national front, without the possibility of competition or actual party diversity.
2. The denial of individual political will, as citizenship was not considered a representative right, but rather a functional position within a system of loyalty.
3. The merging of national identity with authoritarian identity, as the expression of national belonging became conditional on defending the authority, not the state as a unifying institution.

With the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, particularly in the context of civil society movements and local councils, a new political identity began to emerge, based on representation rather than compliance, and on community affiliation rather than ideological loyalty. However, this identity remained fragile, fragmented among factions, and more closely tied to security and geographic contexts, lacking a real capacity to formulate a comprehensive political project..
With the liberation of large parts of the country following the fall of Assad, the current political moment raises the possibility of a return to the concept of “contractual citizenship,” whereby the Syrian political identity is formed through constitutional recognition of diversity and through the building of institutions that allow individuals to express themselves, represent themselves, and participate within a shared political space, rather than through authoritarian compliance..

Redefining political identity in Syria does not simply mean dismantling old frameworks, but rather establishing a new narrative for the relationship between the individual and the state, between the constituents and the center, and between sovereignty and legitimacy. This process is inseparable from constitutional construction, institutional restructuring, and the construction of the public sphere as an incubator for civil political action.

Deconstructing the political identity of the Syrian state before the revolution (from engineering loyalty to denying pluralism):

A state’s political identity reflects the nature of the contract sought to be built between citizens and institutions. It determines how the state views itself and what it demands of individuals in terms of legitimacy and belonging.
In the Syrian case, since the Ba’ath Party seized power in 1963, followed by the consolidation of Hafez al-Assad’s rule beginning in 1970, a political identity for the state was formed based on symbolic and political subjugation, through five central tools: party monopoly, militarism, nationalization of nationalism, the closure of the public sphere, and the persecution of competing identities.

First: Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution – Legalization of party monopoly:

Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution represented the cornerstone in building a unified political identity, stating that “the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party is the leading party in society and the state, and leads a progressive national front working to unify the energies of the masses of the people.”
With this text, which remained in force for four decades, any possibility of political competition was eliminated, and representation was transformed into mere compliance within a hierarchical party structure, reproduced within institutions, parliament, and unions.
Human Rights Watch described this system as “a totalitarian party rule that does not allow for pluralism or rotation, where the citizen’s political identity is reduced to his loyalty to the Baath.”.

Second: The National Progressive Front – False Pluralism and Ideological Fusion:

The National Progressive Front was established in 1972 to include licensed parties. However, it was a formal front subject to Ba’ath authority, as stated in its charter: “The party constitutes the majority in the Front’s institutions and directs its general policy.” No party within the Front was permitted to engage in activity within the army, universities, or outside its disciplined framework.
Even the communist movements were forced to split into two wings (Bakdash and Faisal) under the umbrella of the Front, in exchange for freezing their independent activities.

Third: The 1982 Hama Massacre – Redrawing the Boundaries of Political Identity by Force:

In February 1982, Hafez al-Assad’s regime committed an unprecedented massacre in the city of Hama, following a rebellion led by the Muslim Brotherhood. According to estimates by Robert Fisk and Thomas Friedman, at least 20,000 civilians were killed, and large parts of the city were destroyed.
This massacre was a declaration that political affiliation outside of the regime was not only impermissible, but met with annihilation.
Hama became a symbol of the forced nationalization of identity and the lengths to which the regime would go in denying diversity.

Fourth: The symbolic militarization of citizenship – redefining belonging through the military:

As the army’s role in political life increased and it became an administrative-security arm, the state began redefining citizenship as a symbolic military affiliation. The model citizen, in official discourse, is one who serves in the army, adheres to the slogan “Assad is our leader,” and believes that security takes precedence over politics.
This phenomenon has come under the title of “symbolic militarism,” as a component of the engineering of national identity according to the authoritarian model.

Fifth: Emergency Law and Security Forces – Closing Down Public Space:

Since the declaration of a state of emergency in 1963, political identity has become a relationship between citizens and the intelligence apparatus, rather than between them and the state as a civil institution. Opposition activists were persecuted, independent unions were frozen, and the public sphere was replaced by surveillance systems..
It is noteworthy that the beginning of the emergence of this relationship began with the establishment of the “Second Division” (Military Intelligence) under the leadership of Abdul Hamid al-Sarraj, to be the center of societal control, and a tool for building a political identity devoid of diversity, saturated with fear and withdrawal..

Sixth: Reducing nationalism to power – the citizen as an extension of the regime:

In school textbooks, official speeches, and state media, the nation and the political system were conflated:
Anyone who opposes the government is a traitor, even if they serve society.
Patriotism became measured by loyalty to the “leader,” not by public service or the national interest.

This model becomes a “false authoritarian identity,” where belonging is emptied of its ideological content and reloaded with the defense of imposed legitimacy.

Political Identities during the Syrian Revolution and Conflict (2011–2012): From the Explosion of the Public Sphere to the Crisis of Representation:

When the Syrian revolution began in March 2011, the country witnessed a pivotal moment that reopened the public sphere after five decades of restrictions. It revealed a sweeping societal desire to redefine citizens’ political identities beyond party loyalty or authoritarian affiliations.
The movement began in the city of Daraa, following the arrest and torture of children who wrote anti-regime slogans. This sparked protests that spread to most governorates.
In those first weeks, slogans were raised such as “The Syrian people will not be humiliated” and “God, Syria, and freedom only.” During the Friday of Dignity (March 18), the first martyrs of the revolution were killed by security forces in Daraa, including Hussam Ayyash and Mahmoud Jawabreh.
The popular uprising spread on the Friday of Pride (March 25) to Damascus, Homs, Hama, Baniyas, and Latakia, where demonstrators toppled a statue of Hafez al-Assad in Daraa, a symbolic moment that marked the beginning of a symbolic break from the authoritarian identity of the state. During the first months, hundreds of local coordination committees and councils emerged, particularly in the Damascus countryside, Daraa, Homs, and Idlib. They presented a non-ideological model of representation, based on community service and legitimacy.
A Carnegie report described these councils as “the nucleus of a civil political identity, based on local action, not ideological affiliation or factional loyalty.”
However, these identities faced significant difficulties, most notably the absence of a legal framework, geographical fragmentation, and a lack of institutional support.
With the onset of militarization and the emergence of armed identities, we see that, in light of the systematic repression, members of the Syrian army began to defect. The most prominent of these was Lieutenant Colonel Hussein Harmoush, who founded the “Free Officers” movement, followed by Colonel Riad al-Asaad, who announced the establishment of the Free Syrian Army on July 29, 2011, to protect demonstrators.
By the end of 2011, the Free Syrian Army was engaged in clashes in Rastan, Talbiseh, Homs, and the Idlib countryside. The militarization of the revolution began to take on a new symbolic character, as political identity in some areas became linked to the dominant faction, rather than the national project.
On October 2, 2011, the Syrian National Council was announced in Istanbul, a political umbrella group comprising the forces of the Damascus Declaration, the Muslim Brotherhood, representatives of the councils, and the movement’s coordination committees.
Despite initial popular acclaim, the council faced criticism related to the dominance of certain factions and the lack of connection to the Syrian ground.
On November 11, 2012, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces was established in an attempt to expand representation and include new factions. However, it later encountered the problem of the gap between internal and external actors, as the coalition lacked effective authority on the ground, while local councils and civil societies remained without clear international recognition.

As the revolution entered its advanced stage, Syria was divided into areas of influence:

• In Idlib and rural Aleppo, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emerged as a unique form of legitimate representation.
• In areas east of the Euphrates, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) proposed a federal model that embraces a multi-ethnic political identity.
• In southern Syria and Ghouta, civilian and military bodies are fragmented without a unified political authority.

Frederic Hof, the former US envoy to Syria, described this situation as a “representative schizophrenia,” whereby states recognize ineffective entities, while local actors are excluded from any serious political process.

Despite its significant symbolic momentum, the revolution failed to produce a unifying political identity. Rather, the pluralism that emerged devolved into fragmentation, not convergence. The Syrian citizen returned to a central question: Who am I politically after the revolution?
Am I a member of a faction? A member of a council? Or simply a civilian in an area outside of control?
Thus, the revolutionary political identity remained without a founding contract, a constitution, or a unified national project that could reshape belonging on new foundations.

Political Identity in Post-Liberation Areas (From Local Representation to the New Sovereignty Contract):

Post-liberation areas, particularly in northern Syria, represent an experimental political laboratory for reshaping political identity, free from traditional authoritarian systems and the chaos of factional divisions that characterized the years of conflict.
Since 2017, these areas have witnessed the rise of local administrative-political structures attempting to fill the representational void and establish a preliminary form of the relationship between citizens and institutions, establishing a model of representative pluralism and interactive citizenship.

First: Local councils and the crystallization of the grassroots political identity:

Hundreds of local councils were established in liberated areas, particularly in Idlib, Afrin, al-Bab, Jarabulus, and elsewhere. They provided a civil administrative model that supervised basic services (water, electricity, education, traffic) and coordinated with humanitarian organizations and regional bodies.
According to a study prepared by the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, “local councils formed the nucleus of decentralized Syrian representation based on local elections, civil legitimacy, and community partnership,” despite differences in levels of professionalism and representation.
Some of these councils organized internal elections with the support of sub-councils and local unions. The concept of the “civil political actor” began to emerge, expressing itself in the public sphere not through sectarian affiliation or ideological loyalty, but rather through service and civic engagement.

Second: The experience of the Syrian Interim Government – a crisis of supranational legitimacy:

The Syrian Interim Government was established in November 2013 by the National Coalition as an attempt to unify institutions in areas outside regime control.
Despite relative support from some international bodies, the government suffered from a clear representation gap. Its ministers were appointed outside Syrian territory, without elections, and it failed to administer local councils or establish independent governing institutions.
This experience can be described as “top-down representation,” whereby the official political identity remained disconnected from local action.

Third: The Salvation Government and the dominance of ideologically based legitimate representation:

In Idlib, the Syrian Salvation Government was established in 2017 with support from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), to administer public affairs through affiliated ministries and councils.
Despite the presence of official institutions (a Ministry of Justice, a Ministry of Education, and a Sharia Court), political legitimacy remained controversial due to factional and religious affiliations, the absence of independent elections, or genuine community engagement.
Human Rights Watch (2021) documented several reports of security interference in the work of councils and the restructuring of institutions based on non-civilian considerations.

Fourth: Geographical specificity and heterogeneous political identity pattern:

East of the Euphrates, a different model based on federalism has emerged. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria has adopted a political model based on multi-ethnic representation (Kurds, Arabs, Syriacs), with the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) as a major component.
Several local elections have been held since 2017, and “legislative” councils have been formed to manage municipalities and services.
However, this model has faced popular and political rejection in other regions of Syria due to its lack of unifying national legitimacy and its association with a specific partisan-ethnic geography.

Fifth: Features of the new political contract:

Despite the significant differences, the experience of the liberation zones indicates the presence of five initial features of an emerging political identity:

• Local representation is a gateway to legitimacy, as legitimacy is no longer tied to the center, but to the local community: who provides services, who is elected, and who is held accountable.
• Separating the security sphere from the civilian sphere, as strong demands have emerged to isolate military authority from civilian institutions, despite these demands not being fully achieved.
• The emergence of political and administrative pluralism. In some areas, there is more than one representative body, which raises the need for a founding contract that unifies authority without exclusion.
• The entrenchment of civil identity versus factional identity, as citizens begin to define themselves as participants in local affairs, not as supporters of a faction.
• The weakness of the overall national formula: Despite the emergence of local identities, the national political identity remains absent or fragmented, hindering the reconstruction of the state on the basis of a comprehensive contract.

The Problem of a Unified National Identity: From Fragments of Representation to a New Sovereignty Narrative
One of the most complex questions in the Syrian transitional phase is:

After years of conflict, division, and sub-identities, is it possible to recreate a comprehensive national political narrative? Can this narrative encompass ethnic, religious, and regional diversity without denial or exclusion? Or will the reconstruction of national identity fall into the trap of the old centralization or the recycling of power in new forms?

First: The disintegration of the national narrative after the revolution:

Since 2011, with the disintegration of the former regime’s control over large parts of the country, the central national narrative promoted by the state began to erode. Citizens began to define themselves based on their geographic, class, or revolutionary location:

• “I am from liberated Idlib.”
• “I am affiliated with the local council in Ghouta.”
• “I am a member of the Autonomous Administration of Northern Syria.”
• “I am a soldier in the Free Syrian Army.”

This fragmented representation resulted from the interaction of three factors:

1. The collapse of the symbolic authority of the state.

2. The absence of a unifying constitutional authority.

3. The rise of resistance identities instead of foundational identities

Second: Comparative Experiences – Is it possible to build a national identity after conflict?
International experiences indicate that building a national identity after conflict can only be achieved through a foundational narrative that transcends divisions, as in:

• South Africa after apartheid, where the “one table” discourse was adopted and identities were integrated through the constitution and unifying symbols.
• Bosnia after the civil war (1995), despite the presence of complex representative structures, the absence of a national narrative led to continued political division.
• Rwanda after the genocide (1994), where the authorities adopted a comprehensive national discourse based on civic identity and historical accountability.
• This demonstrates that national identity is constructed not through denial or forced assimilation, but through recognition, representation, and justice.

Fourth: The conditions for building a new national identity
Rebuilding the national political identity requires:

.Writing a comprehensive foundational narrative that includes recognition of diversity, apologies for violations, and agreement on general principles.

Drafting a constitution that reflects diversity, not obscures it, by including representation formulas for all components and.adopting the principles of equal citizenship.

Reclaiming the public sphere as a space for political affiliation by establishing national dialogue institutions, representativ councils, and inclusive intellectual platforms.

Redefining the nation as a contractual project, not an authoritarian entity. The nation is not a regime, but rather a contract. that unites the people under just sovereignty.

The position of Syrian groups and components in the new political identity (between recognition and actual partnership):

Syrian groups and components, including ethnicities, sects, local communities, and tribes, constitute fundamental pillars of the country’s social and political structure. However, for decades, they have been marginalized or used as symbolic tools within the authoritarian state structures. With the outbreak of the revolution and the subsequent restructuring of liberated areas, an opportunity emerged to reshape the relationship between these groups and the emerging political identity, away from subordination or denial.

In the defunct Syrian political model, sectarian or ethnic representation was often symbolic:

• Groups are given “secondary positions,” without real power.
• Individuals are employed as a symbol of “pluralism,” without an institutional structure for partnership.For example, despite the participation of some Christians, Druze, and Kurds in state institutions, their identities have not been politically or culturally recognized within the national contract. The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies has documented that “Syrian national identity has been built on the erasure of diversity, not its integration.”

Since 2011, all components have participated in the movement:

• The Kurds established civil councils and participated in the peaceful movement, before some of them turned to self-administration.
• Alawite opposition voices, such as the “I am a Free Alawite” group, emerged, demanding the sect’s separation from the regime.
• Christians participated in coordination committees and formed civil society organizations.
• Arab tribes in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa contributed to the civil and military resistance and established local councils.
• However, the absence of a comprehensive national framework caused this participation to lose its foundational impact, and it became fragmented and disorganized.

In the conditions for true political partnership and the integration of components into a new political identity, symbolic representation is not sufficient. Rather, three conditions are required:

• Political and constitutional recognition of collective identities. The constitution must recognize the right of communities to express themselves, organize, and learn in their own languages ​​and heritage, without this becoming a threat to national unity.
• Building participatory representative institutions, such as decentralized legislative councils or mixed constituent bodies, where legislation is drafted with the participation of all, without the dominance of any single entity.
• Creating a multi-voiced national narrative. The Syrian narrative must be written in a collective tone, encompassing the stories of oppression, struggle, and identity of each group without denial or exaggeration.

Syria can benefit from the following models:

• Lebanon, where permanent sectarian representation kept divisions alive and failed to produce a unified political identity.
• In post-revolutionary Tunisia, the Constituent Assembly included diverse geographical and political representation, resulting in a flexible constitution that accommodates diversity.
• In Iraq, despite the adoption of quotas, ethnic and sectarian representation was not accompanied by genuine recognition of identities, leaving national identity fragile.
• This demonstrates that inclusion does not mean the distribution of positions, but rather establishing the relationship between the community and the state within a legitimate participatory framework.

Towards a New Concept of Syrian Political Citizenship (From Authoritarian Dependency to Representative Effectiveness):

Before the revolution, the concept of citizenship in Syria was merely a functional position within a loyalty system, whereby a citizen was defined by his or her affiliation with the ruling party or military establishment, not by his or her political participation or constitutional rights.
With the outbreak of the revolution in 2011, and then the collapse of the regime in December 2024, new features of citizenship began to take shape, transcending dependency and establishing true civil and political effectiveness.
Between 2023 and 2025, Syria witnessed pivotal events that redefined the relationship between the citizen and the state:

• The February 2023 earthquake that struck northwestern Syria, killing more than 6,000 people, exposed the fragility of the central state and highlighted the role of local councils and civil society in responding to disasters, reinforcing the concept of “active citizenship” in the face of disasters.

• Syria’s return to the Arab League in May 2023, despite continued repression, sparked controversy over the legitimacy of representation and prompted broad segments of Syrians to demand political citizenship not tied to the regime but rather to actual participation.

• The legislative elections in July 2024, boycotted by more than 60% of Syrians and held amid widespread popular rejection in the south and north, demonstrated that formal citizenship was no longer acceptable and that citizens were demanding real, not symbolic, representation.

• The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 and the assumption of leadership by Ahmed al-Sharaa of the transitional phase opened the door to reformulating citizenship on new foundations. He announced a comprehensive national dialogue conference aimed at drafting an interim constitutional declaration.

It is worth noting that in northern Syria, the features of political citizenship began to take shape through:

• The local council elections in Idlib, Afrin, and al-Bab (2023–2024), which witnessed broad popular participation despite security challenges, and demonstrated citizens’ desire to choose their representatives, free from factional dominance.

• The Salvation Government’s experience in Idlib, despite its affiliation with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, began implementing an “e-government” model and expanding the powers of councils, providing citizens with new tools for accountability and participation.

• The announcement of the new social contract in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (December 2023) recognized the rights of women and youth and established a court to protect the contract and a High Elections Commission, marking a qualitative shift in the concept of participatory citizenship.

In light of these transformations, the new Syrian political citizenship can be framed within the following elements:

• Local and electoral representation, where citizens choose their representatives in councils and participate in formulating local policies.
• Accountability and accountability, through local media and popular oversight, have begun to emerge as tools for holding officials accountable, as in the Idlib protests against the Salvation Government (2024.)
• Constitutional citizenship: With the preparation for an interim constitutional declaration at the National Dialogue Conference (February 2025), the citizen has been redefined as a partner in formulating the political contract.
• Belonging to society, not to authority. The new Syrian citizen defines himself through his role in society, not through his proximity to the authorities or the political party.

However, despite these transformations, political citizenship still faces challenges, most notably:

• The absence of a comprehensive constitution, which makes citizenship vulnerable to political interpretations.

• The multiplicity of local authorities, between the new government and the autonomous administration, confuses citizens in determining their political affiliation.

• The weakness of political culture, a result of decades of repression, means that political participation remains limited in some areas and requires awareness-raising and rehabilitation programs.

Conclusion (Towards a Syrian Political Identity Based on Contract, Sovereignty, and Citizenship):

After an analytical process in this paper, the features of the Syrian political identity crisis became clear as a reflection of a historical separation between the citizen and the state, between the public sphere and representative institutions, and between the political community and the unifying national discourse.

The paper revealed that political identity in Syria was not built on a contractual or institutional basis, but rather on symbolic hegemony, partisan monopoly, sectarian marginalization, and ideological centralization that obstructed the formation of a representative national identity.
Throughout the paper’s axes, it became clear that the crisis is not one of description, but rather one of foundation. The partial identities that emerged during the revolution, and then the local structures that emerged after the liberation, despite their historical importance, have yet to produce a comprehensive national narrative or a legitimate political contract.

These are experiences with a local and temporary impact, but the absence of a constitutional platform and the persistence of uncoordinated pluralism keep the Syrian political identity in a state of transitional fragmentation that makes institutional construction unsustainable.
As the country enters the post-centralized phase (December 2024) and the new constitutional declaration is adopted, an unprecedented opportunity may arise to establish a new Syrian political identity that transcends the legacy of factional tyranny and embraces societal diversity within a contractual framework.

This identity will not be imported from the experiences of other countries, nor will it be imposed from above. Rather, it must be formulated based on:

• Representation of the popular base in constituent institutions, not the formulation of elites outside the local sphere.

• Explicit constitutional recognition of all components, not their use as symbolic figures.

• Redefining citizenship on the basis of participation and sovereignty, not functional inclusion within the bureaucratic structure.

• Integrating the religious-civil sphere in shaping the new political discourse, without excluding the jurisprudential vision or obstructing its objectives in public construction.

Coordination of local institutions and the transitional government within a framework of cooperation, not authoritarian competition. In a jurisprudential-political context, redefining political identity requires a return to the concepts of contract, allegiance, consultation, and general guardianship as components of historical legitimacy that are subject to renewal, not perpetuity.
The constitutional contract in the modern state, even if codified in the language of law, remains, at its core, a “social delegation of authority,” not its possession. It remains contingent upon the consent of the community, fair representation, freedom of association, and multiple paths to legitimacy.
The Syrian political project does not begin with elections, but rather with the question: Who defines the citizen? Who recognizes their rights? Who represents them? And what is the state’s reference point for integrating everyone? If the future constitution does not answer these questions in a clear, pluralistic contractual form, all structures will remain superficial, all institutions a formal representation, and every national narrative a mere slogan. Building a Syrian political identity after liberation is not achieved by changing the names of authorities, but rather by re-establishing the relationship between the individual and the public sphere through a legal and institutional system that enables the citizen to be a partner rather than a follower, an actor rather than a controlled one, and for the state to be a reflection of the will of the nation rather than a continuation of its monopoly on legitimacy.

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