Building the Syrian National Identity (2): Constitutional Identity

Introduction:

In the context of post-conflict countries, the constitution is not merely a legal document regulating authorities and defining the powers of institutions. Rather, it represents the highest expression of collective will and the basis through which the relationship between the citizen and the state, and between the political community and the sovereign authority, is reshaped.
As a founding contract, the constitution not only defines the form of the political system, but also embodies national identity, redefines affiliation, and establishes rights and duties within a binding and legitimate legal framework.
In the Syrian case, constitutional identity has remained hostage for decades to closed authoritarian texts, drafted under coup-like or autocratic regimes. The constitution has transformed from a founding instrument into a means of political control, enshrining centralization, reproducing power, and excluding social pluralism and popular representation.
Syrian constitutions have revolved around the person of the ruler, not the will of the community, and around the leading party, not the social contract. This has left the Syrian citizen absent from the supreme text that is supposed to define and empower him.

With the fall of the central regime in December 2024 and the adoption of a new constitutional declaration, the urgent need to rebuild Syria’s constitutional identity on pluralistic, participatory, and institutional foundations emerges. This will end the legacy of marginalization and establish a new legitimacy based on popular will, not the engineering of power.

Redefining constitutional identity is not merely a technical or legal issue; it is a foundational moment that reshapes the nation and establishes who the citizen is, what the state is, who possesses sovereignty, and how power is exercised.

This paper, part of a series on identities that the Syrian Future Movement seeks to address and raise awareness about, also seeks to analyze the evolution of Syria’s constitutional identity, from authoritarian texts to the potential of the founding contract. This paper will use a historical-institutional reading and an empirical comparison with international models, leading to a proposal for foundational criteria for a constitution that reflects diversity, guarantees popular sovereignty, and restores the citizen’s position as a founder, not a follower, and as a partner, not a controlled one.

Axis One:
Syrian Constitutions: Between Establishment and Regulation:

Constitutions are a reflection of political legitimacy. They not only regulate powers and define rights, but also express the nature of the social contract between state and society. In the Syrian context, constitutional texts have undergone profound transformations, essentially reflecting a transition from establishment to control, from pluralism to monopoly, and from representation to exclusion.
To understand this transformation, three pivotal constitutional moments must be analyzed: the 1950 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution, and the 2012 Constitution.
1- The 1950 Constitution: A founding attempt amid limited pluralism.
The 1950 Constitution came in the wake of independence and was the result of parliamentary discussions involving representatives of various political movements, most notably the National Bloc, the National Party, and some independents.
This constitution was distinguished by a serious attempt to establish a parliamentary democratic system. It stipulated the separation of powers, enshrined civil and political rights, and established the principle of the rule of law. Article 1 also stated that “Syria is an independent, sovereign, democratic, and representative republic,” a definition with clear founding implications.
However, the 1950 Constitution was not without contradictions. It remained far from recognizing ethnic and religious diversity and did not establish clear mechanisms to ensure the participation of societal components in shaping political decisions.
The fragility of party life and the military’s interference in politics quickly undermined the constitutional experiment, with parliamentary life being abolished following a series of military coups beginning in 1951.
2- The 1973 Constitution: Enshrining Authoritarian Legitimacy
The 1973 Constitution represents a crucial turning point in Syrian constitutional history. It came in the context of the restructuring of the political system led by the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party after its seizure of power in 1963.
This constitution was drafted in a manner that enshrined the dominance of a single party and recreated legitimacy through its monopoly on political representation. Perhaps the most notable feature of this constitution is Article 8, which stipulates that “the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party is the leading party in society and the state.” This article effectively abolishes political pluralism and transforms the constitution from a founding document into a tool for ideological control.
The Charter of the National Progressive Front, established in 1972, also conferred formal legitimacy on this monopoly, as it incorporated small parties within the Ba’ath Party’s orbit, lacking real independence or the ability to influence political decisions. This was reflected in the structure of constitutional institutions, as Parliament was marginalized and the president was granted near-absolute powers, including the appointment of ministers, the dissolution of the People’s Assembly, and the amendment of laws without effective oversight. The 1973 Constitution was not merely a legal text; it was the embodiment of an authoritarian doctrine that viewed the state as a tool for control, not a space for pluralism. This model contributed to the weakening of the public sphere, the marginalization of citizens, and the transformation of constitutional identity into a closed ideological narrative.
3- The 2012 Constitution: A Formal Amendment Amid a Legitimacy Crisis
In the midst of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the regime announced the preparation of a new constitution, which was approved in a public referendum in February 2012.
This text included some formal amendments, such as the abolition of Article 8, the stipulation of political pluralism, and a limit on the presidential term.
However, these amendments did not bring about a fundamental shift in the power structure or the nature of the constitutional contract.
Article 3, which states that “the religion of the President of the Republic is Islam,” and the article defining Syria as part of the Arab nation, reproduce a nationalist-religious narrative that excludes non-Arab and non-Muslim components. Furthermore, the mechanisms for drafting the constitution were not participatory; rather, they came from the top down, without national dialogue or genuine representation of the opposition’s societal and political forces.
Researcher Zakaria Al-Saqqal has pointed out that “the 2012 Constitution was not written as a founding contract, but rather as an attempt to reconstitute legitimacy at a moment of its collapse.”
The transformation from the 1950 Constitution to the 1973 Constitution and then to the 2012 Constitution clearly demonstrates how the Syrian constitutional text shifted from a founding attempt to a tool for authoritarian control. Instead of expressing the collective will, the constitution became a means of reproducing power, enshrining the monopoly of representation, and marginalizing citizens and societal components. This shift partly explains the legitimacy crisis facing the Syrian state and highlights the need to rethink constitutional identity as a pluralistic founding contract, rather than a closed text that perpetuates hegemony.

Axis Two:
The Position of the Citizen in the Syrian Constitution – From Representation to Marginalization:

In modern constitutional thought, the citizen is the cornerstone of political legitimacy, as the possessor of sovereignty and the source of authority, not merely a recipient of decisions or a subject of authority. The constitution, in essence, is not merely a legal document regulating the relationship between authorities; rather, it is an expression of the collective will that redefines the individual as a political actor, possessing rights and participating in shaping the public sphere. However, Syrian constitutional texts, throughout their various stages, have not enshrined this concept. Instead, they have treated the citizen as a subordinate administrative entity, not as a partner in decision-making or in holding the authorities accountable.
The 1950 Constitution emerged in the post-independence context and was the result of parliamentary discussions in which representatives of various national movements participated.
This constitution bore some features of democratic foundations, as it stipulated civil and political rights, such as freedom of expression, the right to demonstrate, and freedom of the press. It also established the principle of the rule of law and the separation of powers. Article 25 of the Constitution stipulates that “Freedom is a natural right of every citizen,” and Article 28 states that “Citizens are equal before the law in rights and duties.” These formulations indicate a foundational attempt to enshrine legal citizenship.
However, despite these provisions, the Syrian citizen in the 1950 Constitution remained confined to the role of recipient, not actor.
The Constitution did not establish clear mechanisms for popular participation in formulating public policies, nor did it regulate the relationship between citizens and executive institutions in a manner that would allow for accountability or oversight. Furthermore, the lack of recognition of societal diversity and the absence of guarantees for the representation of ethnic and religious components demonstrates the limitations of the democratic conception in this text.
Researcher Abdel-Ilah Belkeziz has pointed out that “founding constitutions in the Arab world often enshrine individual rights without establishing mechanisms to implement or guarantee them institutionally” (Belkeziz, 2012). With the promulgation of the 1973 Constitution, the Syrian constitutional identity entered a new phase of structural marginalization of citizens. The Ba’ath Party’s dominance was consolidated as “the leading party in society and the state,” according to Article 8.
This provision effectively abolished political pluralism and rendered citizens subordinate within a closed party system, devoid of the right to organize, object, or participate independently.
This approach was accompanied by the Charter of the National Progressive Front, which included small parties within the Ba’ath Party’s orbit, lacking real independence or the ability to influence political decisions.
Political and civil rights in this constitution, despite their formal existence, were restricted by vague concepts such as “the nation’s interest” or “national unity,” making them vulnerable to authoritarian interpretation.
Freedom of expression, for example, even if it was mentioned in the text, was subject to security surveillance, and the right to demonstrate was restricted by executive laws issued by the executive authority without independent judicial oversight. In this context, the citizen was not a partner in policy formulation; rather, he was required to show loyalty and discipline, given the absence of mechanisms for participation and accountability.
Syrian researcher Yassin al-Haj Saleh noted that “the Syrian political system, as manifested in the 1973 Constitution, reproduces the citizen as a subordinate, rather than an active, entity, and empties constitutional texts of their democratic content through a closed legal system.”

In the context of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the regime announced the preparation of a new constitution, which was approved in a public referendum in February 2012. This text included some formal amendments, such as the abolition of Article 8, the provision for political pluralism, and a limit on the presidential term. Article 34 stipulates that “every citizen has the right to participate in political life,” Article 42 recognizes freedom of expression, and Article 44 grants the right to peaceful demonstration.
However, these texts, despite their liberal formulation, did not bring about a fundamental shift in the citizen’s position. Participation mechanisms remain absent, and the legal environment restricts rights through executive laws issued by the executive authority, such as the Media Law, the Political Parties Law, and the Demonstration Law, all of which subject the exercise of rights to strict security oversight.
One of the most prominent manifestations of the marginalization of citizens in Syrian constitutional texts is the absence of mechanisms for effective participation in decision-making and democratic accountability of institutions.
Syrian constitutions do not establish a free electoral system that allows for real competition between parties, nor do they regulate mechanisms for popular oversight of the executive authority, nor do they recognize the right of citizens to appeal administrative decisions or public policies before an independent judiciary.
The weakness of local councils and the absence of political decentralization further centralize decision-making and erode the concept of “active citizenship” of its meaning.
A study issued by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies showed that “according to constitutional texts, Syrian citizens are treated as recipients of decisions, not as partners in their formulation, which weakens the legitimacy of institutions and deepens the gap between state and society.”

The citizen’s position in the Syrian constitutional text reflects a profound crisis in the state’s perception of political legitimacy. Instead of the citizen being the source of authority, he has become subject to it. Instead of constitutional texts enshrining his rights, they now restrict them in the name of the greater good or national unity.
This marginalization can only be overcome by redefining the constitutional identity as a founding contract that enshrines the citizen as a political actor, establishes mechanisms for participation and accountability, and rebuilds trust between the state and society.

Third Axis:
Representation of Communities in the Syrian Constitution – Between Structural Denial and Formal Pluralism:

In ethnically and religiously diverse societies, constitutional recognition of societal components is a prerequisite for achieving political justice and building a stable social contract. The constitution not only expresses the organization of powers, but also embodies the state’s perception of its identity, who it includes within the “people,” and who it excludes or marginalizes. In the Syrian case, societal pluralism has remained present in reality, but it is absent or distorted in constitutional texts. This has led to a profound representation crisis and a rift in the relationship between the state and non-dominant components.
The 1950 Constitution was enacted in the context of building a post-independence national state. It bore some features of democratic foundations, but it did not explicitly recognize ethnic or religious pluralism.
Article 1 defines Syria as an “independent, sovereign Arab state,” a definition that excludes non-Arab components, particularly the Kurds, who constitute a significant percentage of the population in the north and northeast of the country. The constitution also did not include any articles addressing the cultural or linguistic rights of minorities, nor any mechanisms to guarantee their political or administrative representation.
Researcher Abdel-Ilah Belqaziz has pointed out that “the founding Arab constitutions often adopted closed nationalist narratives that excluded diversity in the name of unity and reproduced the state as an expression of a single identity.”
In this context, the lack of recognition was not merely a legal deficiency; it was an expression of an ideological conception of the state, marginalizing components that did not adhere to the dominant national identity.
With the 1973 Constitution, Syria entered a new phase of identity monopolization. Article 1 stipulated that “Syria is part of the Arab homeland,” and Article 3 stipulated that “the religion of the President of the Republic is Islam,” effectively excluding non-Arab and non-Muslim components from the definition of the state.
Article 8, which enshrined the Ba’ath Party’s leadership of society and state, confined political representation within a closed partisan framework, preventing societal components from expressing themselves or defending their interests. French researcher Michel Seurat noted that “since the 1970s, the Syrian regime has reshaped national identity through a security-nationalist discourse that excludes diversity and reproduces loyalty through the centrality of the party and the state.”
This exclusion was not merely theoretical; it was translated into security and administrative policies, such as prohibiting education in the Kurdish language, restricting the construction of churches, and marginalizing Alawites in official discourse despite their presence in the power structure.
In an attempt to respond to the demands of the revolution, the 2012 constitution was approved after a popular referendum. It included some formal amendments, such as the abolition of Article 8 and the provision for political pluralism. Article 3 stipulates that “the state respects all religions,” and Article 9 refers to “respect for cultural diversity.” However, these provisions remained general and not enforced through legal or institutional mechanisms.
Syrian researcher Radwan Ziadeh noted that “the 2012 constitution attempted to demonstrate formal openness, but it did not establish any real guarantees for the representation of communities, nor did it establish any mechanisms to protect their cultural or political rights.” For example, despite the implicit recognition of the Kurds’ existence, they were not granted the right to education in their own language, nor special administrative representation, nor did the state establish any independent body concerned with the rights of religious or ethnic minorities.

In comparison with the constitutions of post-conflict countries, we find the following:

1- Iraq (2005 Constitution)
It stipulated that “Iraq is a federal state,” recognized the autonomy of the Kurdistan Region, and recognized Kurdish as a second official language. Special representative institutions were also established, such as the Regional Council of Ministers and the Federal Constitutional Court, to ensure a balance between the center and the various components.
2- Tunisia (2014 Constitution)
Although Tunisia is less ethnically diverse, its constitution established the principle of equal citizenship and rejected discrimination based on religion, language, or origin. Article 39 obligates the state to protect cultural identity, and Article 6 recognizes freedom of belief, which constitutes a constitutional guarantee for the rights of religious minorities.
3- Rwanda (2003 Constitution)
After the genocide, the constitution adopted the principle of “unity in diversity,” establishing proportional representation in parliament for all ethnic groups, and establishing a National Reconciliation Commission and a National Dialogue Council to ensure collective participation in policy formulation.
The lack of constitutional recognition of ethnic groups in Syria is an expression of a crisis in the state’s perception of its identity.
The constitution, as implemented, excludes Kurds, Christians, and Alawites from effective participation and reproduces a narrow national-religious narrative that weakens national belonging and fuels separatist or protest tendencies.
A study issued by the Syrian Center for Political Studies showed that “the absence of constitutional pluralism is one of the most prominent factors contributing to the fragility of the national contract and hinders any effort to rebuild the state on just and inclusive foundations.”

Axis Four:
The Structure of Powers in the Syrian Constitution – From Centralization of Decision-Making to the Absence of a Real Separation:

The principle of separation of powers represents a fundamental component of the modern constitutional conception. It aims to distribute powers among three independent branches—executive, legislative, and judicial—to balance power and protect individual and collective rights.
However, the Syrian experience has given this principle a formal character over the generations of constitutions. The mechanisms of checks and balances have aged, and the constitution has transformed from a requirement to control state power into a legal justification for the executive branch’s monopoly on decision-making. This axis examines the evolution of the structure of powers in Syria from the 1950 Constitution to the 2012 Constitution, and analyzes the implications of this structure for the essence of constitutional legitimacy..

1.Executive Authority: Continuous expansion of powers:

• The 1950 Constitution and the Function of Executive Control: The 1950 Constitution formulated executive provisions that were considered advanced at the time compared to the region’s constitutions. Article 73 limited the president’s term to six years, renewable once, and linked this to the government’s accountability to parliament. However, the president’s powers remained broad in practice, thanks to Decree No. 61 of 1951, which granted him the right to issue executive decrees with legal force during times of emergency. This power was exploited by the president to circumvent legislative oversight.
• The 1973 Constitution: Explosive Centralization: The 1973 Constitution marked a qualitative shift in the dominance of the executive branch. Article 90 stipulated that “the President of the Republic exercises the power to issue legislation in cases of national necessity,” which conferred upon him a legislative function alongside the power to issue decrees. Furthermore, emergency decrees were exempted from parliamentary or judicial review, providing a constitutional window for the issuance of repressive or economic legislation without an independent legal basis.
• The 2012 Constitution: Formal Restrictions: The 2012 Constitution attempted to limit the legacy of exceptional provisions by defining two terms and prohibiting the issuance of independent legislative decrees. However, the text itself retained Article 146, which allows the executive branch to take exceptional measures “to preserve national security,” without requiring prior parliamentary approval or effective judicial oversight. Thus, the executive branch remained the most prominent entity representing both the executive and legislative branches.

2.The legislative authority, from wasted effectiveness to a shady facade:

• The 1950 Parliament: The Roots of Legislative Power: The 1950 Constitution stipulated a parliament with the power to elect the president, withdraw confidence from the government, draft legislation, and oversee the general budget. This arrangement was supposed to reflect the spirit of parliamentary democracy. However, the demise of party life and the spread of military coups, beginning with the 1951 coup, weakened parliament, reducing it to a mere advisory body lacking the elements of independence.
• The 1973 Constitution: A Ratification Body with Poor Powers: The 1973 Constitution limited the powers of the People’s Assembly to approving presidential decrees and the National Front Law. The Assembly was not granted the power to initiate primary legislation or amend decrees except under restrictive conditions. The text granted the president the power to automatically dissolve parliament, instead imposing electoral mechanisms that predetermined the percentage of victories through legal manipulation, thus hindering the Assembly from fulfilling its oversight role.
• A Formal Representative Body in 2012: Despite provisions in the 2012 Constitution allowing the government to be overthrown by a two-thirds majority of the People’s Assembly, the political environment had already mapped out a majority supporting the executive authority. The electoral law was also amended to guarantee at least 70% of the seats to the regime’s allies. This undermined the principle of genuine representation, reducing the Assembly to a body lacking the capacity to exercise legislative scrutiny or effectively hold the executive accountable.

The judiciary, apparent independence and actual usurpation.3:

• Early Constitutional Guarantees: The 1950 Constitution established judicial independence in Article 111, set strict conditions for the dismissal of judges, and prohibited the establishment of exceptional courts. However, the absence of an autonomous judicial council and the reliance on the Ministry of Justice for the appointment and transfer of judges provided the state with an outlet for direct influence over the judiciary in political and public matters.
• The 1973 Constitution and Instruments of Control: After 1973, the Supreme Judicial Council was established by executive decree, administered by the President of the Republic, and its members were appointed by presidential decree. This transformed the judiciary into an extension of the party-state. The judiciary gained the authority to hear civil cases and litigate opposition cases, but with a tightening of its subordination, as judges were unable to file a constitutional lawsuit or oversight over the constitutionality of decrees.
• Drafting formal independence in 2012: The 2012 Constitution included provisions for the independence of the judiciary and the establishment of the Constitutional Court. However, the text did not specify objective criteria for selecting its members, and political appointments continued to dominate the composition. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court was not granted the power to review the constitutionality of laws prior to their implementation, but rather was limited to individual appeals after their implementation, depriving it of its role as an effective guardian of the separation of powers.

4. A critical reading and the repercussions of the lack of balance:

An analysis of the power structure in the Syrian constitutions reveals a clear determination to favor executive centralization at the expense of the effectiveness of the legislative and judicial branches. The constitutional monopoly of executive power is evident in:

• Retaining joint legislative and executive powers.
• Marginalizing parliament through electoral laws and provisions for its dissolution.
• Subjecting the judiciary to political appointment and transfer mechanisms. These features have weakened the essence of constitutional legitimacy and transformed the constitution into a legal cover for the regime’s monopoly on decision-making and the absence of accountability. Reestablishing Syria’s constitutional identity now hinges on addressing this structural imbalance through a genuine separation of powers and ensuring independent institutions capable of oversight and balance, not through superficial amendments that do not change the essence of the system.

Axis Five:
Symbols and National Identity in the Syrian Constitution – A Unitarian Narrative or a Platform for Pluralism?

In the constitutional text, national symbols, as focal points of the state’s unifying identity—from language to flag, emblem, and definition of the homeland—are social tools that reinforce a sense of belonging or fuel exclusion.
A review of the Syrian texts, including the constitutions of 1950, 1973, and 2012, reveals the dominance of narrow nationalist or religious narratives that overlook internal diversity and transform symbols into ideological extensions rather than unifying symbols.
This section relies on a detailed analysis of each major constitutional symbol, drawing on references specializing in constitutional law and national symbolology.

1. Language: A Tool of Belonging and Exception: Article 3 of the 1950 Constitution affirmed that “Arabic is the official language of the state,” excluding other local languages spoken by Syrians, such as Kurdish, Armenian, or Syriac. This linguistic restriction reflected a unilateral approach to identity, whereby the use of other languages was viewed as a challenge to the unity of the nascent state. This provided constitutional cover for repressive centralized policies against linguistic minorities during successive coups and security inspections. In the 1973 Constitution, the legislator maintained the same linguistic formulation, supplementing it with connotations of “Arab national unity” through a preamble that celebrated the Ba’athist-Arabist project. However, the 2012 Constitution, despite its reference in Chapter 1 to “respect for cultural diversity,” did not provide any constitutional mechanisms to implement this principle in the linguistic sphere. Rather, it maintained the issue of minority language education according to “the law,” allowing executive decrees to restrict Kurdish education and deprive Christian schools of special language programs.
2. The National Flag: A Symbol of Sovereignty and a Shifting Meaning: The 1950 Constitution did not include a detailed text on the flag, as the matter was referred to a later law, leaving the flag vulnerable to urgent changes without constitutional certainty. The independence flag was replaced by the flag of unity with Egypt, then redesigned after the collapse of the United Arab Republic. All this occurred through purely administrative decrees, without a real constitutional role to restrict amendments and preserve the stability of the national symbol. In the 1973 Constitution, Article 2 stipulated that “the flag of the Syrian Arab Republic shall be adopted in accordance with the law,” with two stars in the middle symbolizing the unity of Egypt and Syria. This inclusion contributed to the cloaking of the national symbol in a Ba’athist-nationalist ideological discourse, breaking the unifying character of the flag from the moment it was adopted and shifting the focus of allegiance to a one-dimensional project. With the 2012 Constitution, the same phrase was retained without amendment, maintaining the tension between the stability of the constitution and the detailed legislative requirements of the Flag Law
3. The National Slogan and Anthem: A Constitutional Shortcoming in the Project’s Narrative: The absence of any constitutional article addressing the national slogan or anthem in the constitutions of 1950, 1973, and 2012 leaves these symbols within the reach of ordinary laws or decrees, necessitating repeated changes to respond to fluctuations in power. Despite the importance of the national anthem in establishing a shared identity—as Nir notes in his study of art and symbolism—the “Protectors of the Homeland” did not receive constitutional recognition that would guarantee its non-change without a popular referendum or extensive constitutional debate. In contrast, some post-conflict constitutions—such as the Tunisian Constitution of 2014—succeeded in including the national slogan and anthem within the first chapters, protecting these symbols from alteration and imbuing them with a sacred character that links the rights of future generations to the symbol itself. In Syria, the absence of a constitutional text enables the executive authority to politicize slogans, turning them into a mere focus for electoral maneuvering and official celebrations.
4. Defining the Nation and Belonging: From the Unity of the Country to the Ambiguous Pluralist Discourse. The 1950 Constitution defined the state as the “Syrian Arab Republic,” a lofty nationalist definition, but it ignored the local specificities of the multi-ethnic and religious regions. This definition cemented citizens’ belonging to the unified Arab bloc, ignoring their ties to the countryside, the northern regions, or the mountainous areas. This gave a purely centralized legitimacy and obstructed any respect for local specificities or recognition of local diversity. In the 1973 Constitution, this formulation evolved into “Syria is part of the Arab homeland,” with the nationalist slogan repeated in the preamble, reinforcing the unilateral narrative of the state as a political and cultural project. Meanwhile, the 2012 Constitution, in its preamble, referred to “the Syrian people with all its components,” but retained articles defining the nation in narrow nationalist terms and did not include the right of regions or governorates to formulate their administrative or cultural components. Thus, the pluralistic discourse remained vague and lacking institutional influence.
5. A critical reading and recommendations for enriching constitutional identity: This analysis reveals that Syrian constitutions have practiced a single symbolic narrative, marginalizing internal diversity in the symbols of language, flag, emblem, and definition of the nation. Reconstructing a pluralistic constitutional identity requires the addition of explicit provisions:

• A constitutional text protecting local languages as official languages in the governorates, with the establishment of a Constitutional Language Council comprising representatives of all components.
• Include the flag, emblem, and anthem in the first chapters, specifying procedures for amending them through a constitutional law ratified by a general referendum.
• Defining the homeland as “the ethnically and religiously diverse Syrian Republic,” granting the right to local self-governance in cultural and educational fields.
• Adopting an article on “active citizenship,” defining collective and individual rights and obligating the state to protect them institutionally through a constitutional court with prior and undiminished oversight.

With these proposals, symbols can be transformed from tools of political dilution into unifying symbols that support a pluralistic constitutional project that respects the Syrian citizen’s identity in its various degrees, and grants the constitution a true status as a founding contract that guarantees the scope and effectiveness of diversity in the management of public affairs.

Axis Six:
Towards a Pluralistic Constitution – Conditions, Mechanisms, and Proposals:

The transition from an authoritarian constitutional text to a pluralistic constitution in Syria is a journey that requires genuine political will and an institutional climate that allows for the participation of all actors and components. A pluralistic constitution is not simply a set of articles added to an old text; rather, it is a foundational process that establishes a framework that ensures recognition of diversity and formulates ongoing mechanisms for accountability, oversight, and participation.

The following is an expanded presentation that reviews:
First, the basic principles and conditions for writing a pluralistic constitution.
Second, the institutional mechanisms for its drafting.
Third, drawing inspiration from Arab experiences.
Fourth, the most prominent challenges.
Fifth, detailed proposals for implementation in the Syrian context.

1.The basic principles and conditions for writing a pluralistic founding constitution :

• Participatory Popular Sovereignty: It is not sufficient to simply stipulate popular sovereignty as a theoretical principle; it must be embodied through constitutional institutions that empower every citizen to actively contribute to drafting and subsequently amending the constitution.
• Therefore, the founding phase requires the establishment of popular forums that organize local committees in each governorate, with elected representatives from villages, suburbs, and neighborhoods participating. These committees work in parallel with the central Constituent Assembly [Marzouki, 2020, p. 28].
• Absolute Transparency: Transparency is at the heart of building trust between citizens and the constitutional process. Constitution drafting sessions should be broadcast live through local media and the social media platforms of the elected body, with successive drafts and a record of interventions and votes published. This ensures the right to access information and prevents actors from monopolizing the final content.
• Fair and Balanced Representation: Fair proportional representation enhances the participation of ethnic, religious, and regional minorities and marginalized social groups, and prevents the expansion of one bloc at the expense of another. Therefore, the electoral law for the Constituent Assembly must stipulate quotas for Kurds, Muslims, Christians, Druze, and tribal groups, with at least 30% representation for women and 20% for youth under 35.
• Continuous Accountability and Oversight: The constitution should not be a static document. Rather, it should include provisions stipulating the role of an independent constitutional court, which will address challenges to the conformity of legislation with the constitution and have the authority to review laws before and after the law. It should also include a provision guaranteeing the right of representatives to question and form constitutional investigation committees without interference from the executive branch.

Institutional Mechanisms for Drafting the Constitutional Contract 2

• Elected Constituent Assembly: Drafted through a constitutional law issued by a representative parliamentary transitional council, paving the way for the election of assembly members through a fully proportional representation system, with small constituencies ensuring that representatives are close to their popular bases. The assembly may convene in specialized committees (rights and freedoms, separation of powers, economy, regionalism) to sign sub-drafts before merging them into a comprehensive draft.
• Committees of Experts and Academic Institutions: These include experts in constitutional law, political philosophy, and civil society. Their mission is to prepare preliminary drafts on complex topics (powers, rights, decentralization) to be presented to the Constituent Assembly. This committee is financially and administratively independent from the executive branch, under the auspices of a transitional constitutional body.
• Expanded National Dialogue: A national forum is organized, to which representatives of registered political parties, human rights organizations, trade union federations, and religious and tribal councils are invited to discuss the drafts and make recommendations. It is preferable to record and publish comments periodically, with citizen mediators serving to ensure communication between the interlocutors and civil society.
• Interim and Final Referendum: An interim referendum is held on the general principles of the constitution after the initial drafting. Support for these principles is required by a 50% plus one majority of voters. Provisions that conflict with the majority’s wishes are then reconsidered. A final referendum is then held on the full text, with support levels similar to or reduced to 40%, to enable a negative boycott to derail the entire project.

Drawing inspiration from Arab experiences: Successes and .3 challenges:

• Tunisia (2014) established a 217-member Constituent Assembly, divided among proportional representation lists, and including specialized committees. The drafts were put to a referendum, with the Constituent Assembly receiving 94.6% support.
• Morocco (2011) adopted a constitution through an ongoing national dialogue led by the monarchy, with the participation of political parties and civil society organizations. The constitution adopted a constitutional monarchy with a new formulation of rights and freedoms. The referendum was held with a 60.5% participation rate.
• Iraq (2005) witnessed the discussion of the establishment of a Kurdistan Region with constitutional autonomy, with executive and legislative powers distributed federally. Security disturbances posed challenges to implementation, but the experience established constitutional mechanisms to protect minorities. These examples demonstrate that combining proportional representation, broad dialogue, and technical committees leads to balanced texts, despite the differences in political and security backgrounds.

4.Major Challenges in the Syrian Context

• Security and Geopolitical Fragment: The control of armed factions and the interference of regional powers impose obstacles to holding free constitutional elections, and tensions may increase if groups feel deprived of the right to participate.
• Lack of a Tradition of Democratic Participation: Syrian citizens are accustomed to formal roles in political practice, which calls for comprehensive civic education programs (citizenship schools, intellectual and cultural workshops) to foster a culture of constructive dialogue.
• Faltering Intermediary Institutions: The weakness of political parties and the fragmentation of civil society prevent broad-based participation. Therefore, independent organizations must be supported and credible representative bodies established before the founding process begins.

5.Detailed implementation proposals:

• Enacting a basic electoral law: Defining constituencies based on governorates and their components, adopting mixed lists (half proportional representation and half individual representation) to ensure a balance between popular support and fair representation.
• Forming a transitional constitutional body: Pursuant to an international or Arab resolution, including representatives from the countries guaranteeing the transitional phase, tasked with overseeing the elections and providing legal protection for participants.
• Launching a digital platform for participation: Allowing citizens to submit proposals for draft clauses, which will be automatically amended in succession, with a periodic bulletin detailing how comments are being taken into account.
• Regional and local workshops will be organized in cooperation with governorate councils, specialized judges, and lawyers to enrich the drafts with local experiences, and document their results in reports to be presented to the Constituent Assembly.
• A periodic review mechanism: The constitution stipulates that a review conference will be held five years after its entry into force, during which the required amendments will be reviewed. This conference will be conducted in three stages (expert committees, national dialogue, and an interim referendum).

With this vision, Syria can move towards a pluralistic founding constitution that stems from the actual diversity of the Syrian people, stipulates permanent mechanisms for participation and accountability, protects the rights of minorities, and promotes a culture of active citizenship.

Axis Seven:
Constitutional Time and Transitional Justice in a Post-Conflict Context:

In a post-conflict context, the constitution cannot be viewed as a static text drafted once and then archived. Rather, it can be viewed as a “living contract” that interacts with the changing political, social, and security realities. This framework is linked to the concept of “constitutional time,” which reflects the constitution’s ability to undergo controlled renewal through transitional justice mechanisms that establish mutual trust between the state and society and ensure the implementation of constitutional principles.

Definition of constitutional time and its dimensions:.1
“Constitutional time” is linked to the idea that a constitution has a “life” that extends after its promulgation, during which mechanisms for review, amendment, implementation, and interpretation are formed.
Constitutional time includes:

• Foundational period: The period of drafting and approving the constitution.
• Amendmental period: The stages of constitutional review, governed by a specific majority and objective conditions.
• Implementation period: The period of the constitution’s entry into force and the implementation of its provisions through institutions.
• Living period: The possibility of creating new review mechanisms and rules that ensure the dynamism of the text as reality changes.In Syria, the constitutional period closed at the moment of the referendum on the 2012 constitution, depriving society of the prospect of controlled amendment and ongoing dialogue, deepening the gap between text and reality.
  

Components and Tools of Transitional Justice:. 2
Transitional justice constitutes a balance between two dimensions: uncovering the truth and punishing rights violators, and reforming institutions to ensure that violations are not repeated.
Its tools are divided into:

• Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: To reveal and document the circumstances of violations to victims and the public.
• Litigation and Legal Prosecutions: To establish special courts or international criminal mechanisms for war crimes and corruption.
• Reparations and Reintegration: To compensate victims and reintegrate them professionally and socially.
• Vetting: To remove those suspected of involvement in state crimes from public and executive positions.
• Institutional Reform: To review and constitutionalize emergency laws and exceptional decrees. By incorporating these tools into the constitution, transitional justice becomes an integral part of the living constitutional era.

Mechanisms for Incorporating Transitional Justice into the Constitution:.3
To ensure constitutional dynamism, the constitution should include a special chapter on transitional justice that specifies:

• The establishment of an “Independent National Commission for Transitional Justice” to oversee truth and reconciliation commissions and trials and set their deadlines.
• An explicit text specifying the powers of this commission to issue constitutional and legislative recommendations and submit mandatory reports to the Constituent Assembly or Parliament.
• Mechanisms for constitutional appeals against emergency decrees or exceptional decisions that violate human rights principles.
• Stage dates for referendums to evaluate the implementation of transitional justice (e.g., two and five years after the constitution comes into effect).
• A constitutional review clause every five years that allows for amendments to the chapter on transitional justice through a simplified mechanism (a two-thirds parliamentary majority). These provisions transform the constitution from a single-use document into a living contract that responds to societal transformations and supports reform mechanisms.

Tunisia’s Experience (2014–2016):. 4
Following the 2011 revolution, Tunisia adopted the 2014 Constitution through an elected Constituent Assembly. This coincided with the launch of the Truth and Dignity Commission (2014), which:

Documented more than 60,000 violations. Organized public hearings attended by victims of the former regime. Issued recommendations for judicial and security reform, including its principles in the constitution.
The 2014 Constitution included a special chapter on victims’ rights and transitional justice (Articles 148–151), and granted the Constitutional Council the power to monitor their implementation, which positively impacted citizens’ confidence in the seriousness of the reform.

The South African Experience (1993–1996):. 5
South Africa set a unique model when drafting its Interim Constitution (1993) before its final adoption (1996).

• The Reconciliation Commission, chaired by Dr. De Clercq, established public sessions for victims and detainees.
• The Interim Constitution provided for a separate chapter on reconciliation (Chapter 7) and set the Commission’s term at five years.
• The 1996 Constitution allowed for the proposal to amend the same chapter through a two-thirds referendum, which clarified the text and made it more responsive to post-conflict challenges (Yunus, 2000, pp. 112–118). This early flexibility enabled South Africa to update the Constitution and include anti-discrimination laws in the 2003 amendment.

The South African Experience (1993–1996): 6
South Africa presented a unique model when drafting its transitional constitution (1993) before its final adoption (1996), as follows:

• Fragmentation of armed actors: Dispersed sovereignty requires preliminary security agreements to ensure the safety of voters and participants in the transitional justice body.
• Regional and international interference: This may hinder national consensus if external factions are required to agree to the formation of an independent body.
• Weak national accountability record: The absence of domestic trials and fear of domestic prosecutions may push for the use of international courts, raising sovereign sensitivities.
• Resources and funding: The establishment of transitional justice commissions requires independent funding that frees them from the influence of local and regional centers of influence.

Recommendations for Enhancing Constitutional Timeframe and Transitional Justice:.7

• Include a separate chapter on transitional justice and victims’ rights in the constitution, with clear provisions for the formation of the National Commission and specifying its term and powers.
• Establish periodic review mechanisms (every five years) that allow for amending the chapter on transitional justice by a simple majority, ensuring flexibility and responsiveness to developments.
• Ensure the Commission’s financial and legal independence through provisions specifying its sources of funding (a special budget) and exempting it from emergency provisions.
• Establish a specialized constitutional court to handle appeals related to transitional justice, which will exercise prior oversight over complementary legislative texts.
• Launching civic education programs aimed at raising citizens’ awareness of the concept of constitutional timeframe and their role in reconciliation and accountability processes, through schools, universities, and the media. By including these provisions, the Syrian Constitution will become a living contract capable of absorbing the post-conflict era and establishing a transitional phase based on justice, active citizenship, and mutual trust between state institutions and society.

Conclusion:
Towards Rebuilding National Legitimacy and Envisioning a Pluralistic Constitutional Future:

In this paper, we reviewed the trajectory of Syrian constitutional identity from the 1950 Constitution to the formal 2012 Constitution, passing through the transformation of texts from tools of authoritarian control to attempts to establish limited pluralism. We saw how citizens and diverse communities were sidelined from decision-making centers, how the executive authority monopolized powers, and how monolithic narratives were established in language, symbols, and the definition of the nation. Most importantly, we identified the features of a new founding contract that transforms the constitution into a living text, seamlessly responding to the pulse of society, and providing mechanisms for timely review and implementation of transitional justice.

This is a summary of the paper’s main points:

• Constitutional identity is not a static text, but rather a social contract pulsating with mechanisms of participation and accountability.
• Syrian experiences have proven that the absence of fair representation and cultural and religious diversity leads to a legitimacy crisis and political deadlock.
• A true separation of powers remains the foundation of any constitution that guarantees balance and oversight, free from unilateral quotas.
• National symbols—language, flag, emblem, and the definition of the nation—must be reformulated to serve as a unifying platform for all Syrians.
• A pluralistic founding contract requires an elected constituent assembly, a comprehensive national dialogue, and interim and final referendums.
• A living constitutional timeline does not close with a referendum; rather, it interacts with transitional justice through independent bodies and periodic review mechanisms.

In conclusion, we at the Syrian Future Movement discussed innovative ideas for envisioning a constitutional future. These proposals included:

• An interactive digital constitution, meaning the launch of a trilingual digital platform (Arabic, Kurdish, and English) that integrates blockchain technology to track amendments and popular voting, transforming each proposal into a permanent and transparent record that can only be changed through a specific constitutional consensus.
• Establishing “youth councils” in each governorate, granting the new generation the right to initiate proposals for constitutional amendments or laws: an official advisory body that addresses their aspirations and provides binding recommendations to the Constituent Assembly.
• Constitutional simulation programs in schools and universities, and the design of educational curricula, parliamentary simulations, and interactive video games that explain to citizens—young and old—the mechanisms of drafting a constitution and allow them to experience voting on its provisions in virtual scenarios, to deepen constitutional awareness.
• Forming a team of legal and civil society experts to travel between cities and villages, holding roundtable workshops with local residents, gathering opinions, and transforming them into official documents to be presented to the Constituent Assembly, ensuring the participation of geographically distant citizens.
• Integrating a permanent oversight body within the Constitutional Court, including representatives of youth, women, and minorities, to monitor the implementation of laws and decrees in accordance with the Constitution and investigate complaints against authorities without bureaucratic mediation.
• Establishing regional recognition and adopting a “multi-layered identity” model that recognizes Syrian citizenship as a common denominator, then giving a regional and cultural dimension to articles pertaining to local governance, granting governorates the right to display their own banners and determine the tune of their regional anthem under the banner of the state and national flag. At the end of this endeavor, the pluralistic constitution is built on a fundamental conviction: that Syrian diversity is not a burden, but rather a source of strength and creativity. The process of building a living, inclusive constitution is not established by a single document, but rather by continuous practice underpinned by transparency, sincere political will, and a genuine partnership between state and citizen. With this new contract, constitutional identity becomes a bridge connecting a painful past with a free and integrated future, one that secures the Syrian citizen’s place as an active partner in shaping his or her nation.

the reviewer

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