A critical reading of the paper “Repositioning the Syrian Democratic Forces within the New Syrian State: A Consensus Vision for Institutional Integration and Control of National Pluralism”

The paper presented by the Syrian Future Movement’s Research and Studies Department, titled “Repositioning the Syrian Democratic Forces within the New Syrian State: A Consensus Vision for Institutional Integration and Control of National Pluralism,” is carefully written and follows a thematic framework for the problem, its causes, analysis, and proposed solutions. It is a commendable effort, even if I disagree with some of the arguments. I present this disagreement as briefly as possible.

introduction:

Within an understanding of the Syrian reality, and within the reality of the internal, regional, and international geopolitical balance of power, and also with full awareness of the difficulty of the task after the fall of the defunct Assad regime at the institutional, economic, social, and demographic levels; and due to the depth and enormity of the tragedy Syria has experienced, solutions must consider reality and political pragmatism, but they must also consider the national, moral, and emotional foundations of Syria. This means moving beyond the box of reliance on the justification of “political realism and the balance of power,” which can justify every policy, decision, or proposal.
Is the problem really only with the SDF?
The first and second paragraphs of the Syrian Future Movement’s paper suggest that the problem boils down to a kind of “stubbornness” on the part of the SDF, compared to the complete flexibility offered by the Syrian government in Damascus. With this perspective, I believe we are making a fundamental mistake in our neutral, objective reading. The fault lies with both parties: the SDF leadership and the Syrian government. The Syrian government also has made significant mistakes in rebuilding the Syrian state and homeland, which impact not only the problem with the SDF, but also the entire reconstruction process. These mistakes will become clear in the discussion that follows, as the Syrian government bears responsibility for these mistakes based on a fundamental principle of evaluation in any state. The government bears primary responsibility for the mistakes that occur during its tenure, because the government is typically the most powerful party within the state. In Syria, the Syrian government is the most powerful party and the political representative of the state, and it owns the relatively widest media outlets in Syria.

The missing foundations in reconstruction and thus in dialogue with the SDF:

Before discussing any means of negotiation or dialogue between the Syrian government and the SDF leadership, or any political force, or any Syrian component, there are fundamental steps the Syrian government has not taken, and steps it has taken, but in the wrong direction.

Syria, after the fall of the former Assad regime—which represented the greatest joy for Syrians after their revolution that began in 2011—needed swift action to lay the foundations of a new Syrian state that clearly envisions the future according to short-, medium-, and long-term plans and strategies, and views the past with an objective, neutral, and analytical eye. Unfortunately, the government has not provided any indication of the existence of these visions.

The crisis of lost confidence in the Syrian structure:

The Syrian government has not launched a comprehensive project, a carefully considered roadmap, for rebuilding Syria, which would include, among other things, rebuilding trust within Syria at the grassroots level (Syrian popular reconciliation) and at the political level. Here, it is necessary to define what is meant by political trust at least:
Political trust is the degree of mutual confidence between political actors—whether individuals, parties, or states—that the other party will adhere to understandings, rules, or agreements, even in the absence of direct oversight or strong guarantees. This trust is based on the expectation that the other party’s political behavior will be predictable and not aimed at treachery or illegal exploitation of this trust. Trust at this level is usually built on a previous record of commitment or shared interests clearly and transparently agreed upon, rather than on a direct personal relationship.
In general, political trust is built, not assumed. It can collapse due to sudden betrayal, or simply due to a chronic lack of transparency, imbalance, or a failed shared experience. One of the most difficult and greatest difficulties facing Syria in the reconstruction process and in establishing consensus between the Syrian government and the SDF is the loss of necessary trust between the government and the SDF leadership, and between many Syrian political forces and the Syrian popular components, which, incidentally, include a significant percentage of Sunni Arabs. This trust, in the political and national sense, is primarily the responsibility of the Syrian government, and secondarily, the leadership of the active Syrian political forces, which also represent some components. The initiative should have been taken by the presidency and the government, along with others. However, what actually happened was a reliance on the fact that the Syrian people had reached the worst state of despair and exhaustion and were ready to accept any alternative to the Assad regime. This reliance then relied on chaotic electronic media campaigns that quickly transformed into groups that brought the term “shabiha” back into the Syrian reality.

In short, the process of building trust is based on the following conditions and steps:

1. The Syrian government bears the responsibility of taking the initiative and demonstrating that it is the true guarantor of all Syrians. This does not simply involve making promises; rather, it is more important to be transparent and clear in its policy.
2. Develop a roadmap that includes political, media, and educational efforts to address the deepening and dividing vertical rifts within Syrian society over the past fourteen years.
3. Launch a well-thought-out media campaign to address the problems of sectarian and nationalist vertical rifts, particularly the prevailing myth that “the Alawites ruled, and now the Sunni Arabs rule.” What has happened in practice is that the media portfolio has been handed over to those who failed to fulfill the required mission, for example, through the Syrian News Agency. What is even more frustrating is that the first official Syrian satellite channel after the fall of Assad has not departed from the traditional approach of Arab governments, including the media of the former regime, in terms of harnessing it to serve as a mouthpiece, defender, and even promoter of the existing authority. The more serious problem is the inflammatory sectarian and nationalist rhetoric. In short, the new media apparatus is far less than what the Syrian revolution deserves. The same applies to the leaders of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), as they possess the necessary media capabilities to deliver a consistent media message within the Syrian national consciousness.
4. . Enact punitive laws and comprehensively confront the ongoing sectarian, nationalist, and political hate speech in the Syrian media, including Syrian News and Syrian social media, by all parties.
5. Open dialogue through a necessary periodic address initiated by the President of the Republic, Mr. Sharaa, and senior officials, with the Syrian public. End the policy of silence, starting with Mr. Sharaa and other senior officials. It has been the tradition of all rulers, present and historical, and even the Prophet Muhammad, for the leader to address the people during major events.
6. Adopt the principle of complete transparency before the Syrian people in all decisions and policies pursued by the government.
7. Launch the process of rebuilding state institutions within a fully transparent policy, and consequently, how these will be transferred to the Syrian governorates.
8. Review the Constitutional Declaration and what it is based on. This requires a separate paragraph.Here, it must be emphasized that the SDF leadership also bears responsibility for similar mistakes, as the leadership of the Syrian Jazira region, in a manner befitting its size as a Syrian political and military force.

Reconsidering the Constitutional Declaration within a Real Syrian Debate:

This proposal may seem shocking and impractical, but the reality is that this constitutional declaration was one of the most important reasons for the failure to build political trust between the political forces and the government, and among the various components of the Syrian people.
1- The Syrian national identity was defined in a biased, ideological manner, by imposing Syria as an Arab republic, defining the religion of the head of state as Islam, and restricting the constitution and law to Islamic jurisprudence. This statement was part of a misinterpretation, even by the majority of Syrian Sunni Arabs, and part of an emotional outburst in reaction to a misinterpretation of the rule and corruption of the Assad regime, as being specifically hostile to Sunni Islam and the Arabs.
We must acknowledge that the fear of any Syrian group, including a significant percentage of Arab Sunni Muslims, is justified, and that these provisions represent a putting the cart before the horse and a process of imposing a selective Syrian identity. In these cases, claiming that this is what the majority wants does not provide sufficient legitimacy and gives those who reject it the right to be skeptical and fearful of the authorities. Identity unites everyone, but does not force everyone to see the majority as such. Syrian identity must include Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, Syriacs, Turkmen, Armenians, and all ethnicities, as well as followers of all religions and sects.
The current constitutional formulation falls within the framework of emotional populism and prevents the resolution of the most significant problem facing Syria: national identity.
2- The constitution does not provide sufficient guarantees for a democratic transition, which goes far beyond the election of a president and parliament. Therefore, Syrian political forces and components have every right to fear that their legal rights, recognized and documented by the democratic principles recognized by the United Nations, will be violated.
3- It relies on the intentions of the person assuming the presidency. The president has been given excessive powers, without any oversight or accountability mechanisms. States are not built on good intentions or the hope that the ruler will be righteous, but rather on a clear legal foundation and legal accountability and oversight mechanisms.

Technical and administrative steps to reach an understanding with the SDF:

What the paper outlines is a reasonable and effective technical administrative path, but it cannot succeed unless political and popular trust are established, the constitutional declaration is amended, and the legislative council is formed. Negotiations between the government and the SDF leadership, despite all these structural flaws, will either remain hopeless, or, if an agreement is reached between the two parties, it will be unsustainable. These steps will remain weak, governed by the balance of power inside and outside Syria, and will lack the necessary sustainability.

The Syrian National Army and Syrian Identity:

Based on the above, and due to the Syrian government’s ambiguity regarding both the form of the state and Syrian identity, it is illogical to say that the integration of the SDF’s military forces is possible, as long as the new Syrian army imposes a doctrine with a Sunni Islamic vision, followed by a Syrian one. Furthermore, the SDF forces, despite their Arab participation, also adhere to a Kurdish nationalist doctrine, followed by a Syrian one.
The issue of military doctrine in any state is a fundamental question, not a byproduct, and in the Syrian case, it poses a real difficulty in integrating military forces.
The Syrian army, based on the historical experiences of Syria and Arab countries, must be built on a purely Syrian national foundation, independent of any nationalist, religious, or sectarian vision.

conclusion:

Establishing trust and a Syrian social contract on a national, humane basis, in accordance with the International Charter of Human Rights, without reservations, and developing a plan for social, cultural, educational, and media reconstruction outside of ideologies narrower than the Syrian sphere, is the most important and necessary step upon which any political and economic action can be built. This establishment requires dedicated efforts by the Syrian government, led first by Mr. Sharaa, and secondly, the cooperation of other political, popular, elite, and cultural forces.