Repercussions of the developments in the coastal regions on the “state-building” project

Introduction:

Away from justification and wishful stances, the events in the Syrian coast since 06/03/2025 can be considered serious war crimes committed by two parties:

The first party, the “Coastal Shield” group, exploited sectarianism to mobilize Alawites, attacked police checkpoints, stations, and hospitals, and killed civilians from Sunni-majority provinces. They also targeted Alawites who refused to pledge allegiance to them and intensified sectarian tensions by committing crimes in the uniform of the General Security against the families of Alawite fighters who withdrew from combat.

The second party consists of popular groups from various Syrian provinces that moved to the coast to take revenge on the “Coastal Shield” group. These included independent groups, families, clans, and small factions that had not joined the official forces. These groups committed violations against Alawites, perceiving every Alawite man as necessarily complicit in killing Sunnis.

The only military force that did not pose a threat to civilians and engaged solely in disciplined military combat was the Syrian state forces, also known as the “General Security.”

This analytical article examines the impact of these coastal events on the Syrian state, assuming that it bears no direct responsibility for any violations of human rights or the laws of war.

Defining the Subject:

“War crimes” are defined as grave violations of international laws and customs governing armed conflicts. These crimes typically involve acts of violence against non-combatants, such as civilians, or against civilian property.

Examples of War Crimes:

1. Deliberate Killing: Executing individuals not participating in combat without military justification.
2. Torture and Inhumane Treatment: Subjecting prisoners or detainees to torture or mistreatment (beatings and extortion may be considered violations).
3. Attacks on Civilians: Not just deliberate killing, but also direct or indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas or individuals.
4. Targeting Civilian Property: Destroying or attacking civilian property without military necessity.
5. Forced Displacement: Forcibly relocating civilian populations from their homes.
6. Use of Prohibited Weapons: Deploying weapons that cause unjustified harm or excessive suffering, such as chemical or biological weapons.
7. Unlawful Detention: Holding individuals without a fair trial or legal justification.

War crimes are among the most serious international offenses, and perpetrators can be prosecuted before international courts such as the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Question of Responsibility:

This article assumes that official forces are not responsible for violations against civilians, as documented by human rights organizations, notably the Syrian Network for Human Rights. It goes without saying that official forces bear no responsibility for the crimes committed by what they termed as the “remnants of the regime.”

However, the key question remains: Do the state or official forces bear responsibility for the violations committed by the irregular forces that were mobilized and deployed from other provinces to the coastal region?

Under international law, a state can be prosecuted during wartime for war crimes committed by affiliated elements, even if it publicly condemns these crimes and claims to seek accountability. A state is considered responsible for the actions of its personnel and affiliated groups, including its armed forces and allied militias. This responsibility can be examined through three main avenues:

1. International Responsibility: A state can be held legally accountable if it is proven that these elements committed war crimes under its directives or approval. Additionally, if the state knew or should have known about these crimes and failed to take the necessary measures to prevent them or hold perpetrators accountable, it bears responsibility.
2. International Criminal Court (ICC): Individuals and officials from the state can be prosecuted before the ICC for war crimes or crimes against humanity. Moreover, the state itself can be held accountable if these crimes were part of state policy or carried out under its directives.
3. Legal Standards: Prosecuting states and individuals for war crimes is a complex process that requires strict legal procedures and substantial evidence. This can be pursued through national or international courts, as well as independent investigations and international human rights organizations.

Therefore, states must reaffirm their commitment to international law and take all necessary steps to prevent crimes and hold perpetrators accountable. This is because even when using auxiliary forces that are not officially part of the state’s armed forces, the state can still be held responsible for war crimes committed by these forces.

This can be clarified through the following points:

First, the state’s legal responsibility: If the state exercises actual supervision or control over auxiliary forces and directs them in military operations, it may be held accountable for any violations committed by these forces.

Second, responsibility for failure to ensure accountability: States are obligated to prevent war crimes by taking the necessary measures to ensure that all affiliated elements act in accordance with international humanitarian law. If a state fails to take such measures, it may be held responsible.

Additionally, even if a state declares its rejection of crimes and seeks accountability, it may still be held responsible if it fails to take effective measures to investigate crimes seriously and hold perpetrators accountable.

Third, responsibility under international law: As demonstrated by the example of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the ICC can prosecute individuals and state officials for war crimes, even if they are members of auxiliary forces. This can include prosecuting military and political leaders if it is proven that they knew or should have known about the crimes being committed and failed to take the necessary measures to prevent them.

Fourth, practical application: In real-world cases, it may be challenging to hold a state fully responsible if it is genuinely attempting to hold those involved in crimes accountable.

Nevertheless, the international community and human rights organizations remain vigilant in monitoring state actions and ensuring compliance with international laws. However, such violations can be exploited to impose pressure on the authorities.

How so?

War crimes can be exploited to impose pressure on a state, even if it is seeking to hold violators accountable during wartime. Under international law, responsibility is not limited to individuals who commit crimes; the state itself can also be held accountable if it fails to take sufficient measures to prevent these crimes or effectively prosecute the perpetrators.

On the other hand, even if a state declares its rejection of crimes and seeks accountability, it may still face international pressure from other states, particularly adversaries, and human rights organizations that may question the seriousness of these efforts or deem them insufficient. Such pressures could lead to economic or political sanctions or even result in officials being prosecuted before international courts.

Conclusion:

Based on the above, it will be crucial for the state to be transparent in its efforts to hold violators accountable and to cooperate with the international community to ensure justice is served and prevent the exploitation of these crimes to impose pressure on it.

From our commitment to the success of the state’s project in Syria, and our belief that the failure of the state will cost us all, we are convinced that the national responsibility lies with the leaders of the Coastal Shield and the remnants that are trying to prevent the rebuilding of the Syrian fabric and to open a (non-revengeful) page that the new state has carried since its early days.

For all these reasons and more, the political office of the Syrian Future Movement presents the following recommendations, which the state can follow on legal, political, diplomatic, and other levels to ensure that the war crimes committed by the auxiliary forces do not affect it:

First, Legal Recommendations:

1. Hold all those involved in committing war crimes accountable through transparent and independent investigations, and bring them to fair trials.
2. Enact and update national laws to align with international humanitarian law and ensure accountability for all individuals committing violations, even in exceptional cases.
3. Fully cooperate with international courts, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), in investigations and prosecutions related to war crimes.

Second, Political Recommendations:

1. Emphasize the importance of the rule of law and the intolerance for any human rights violations, regardless of the perpetrator.
2. Strengthen communication with civil society organizations and human rights groups to reaffirm the state’s commitment to protecting human rights.
3. Ensure transparency in all processes related to holding those responsible for war crimes accountable, and periodically publish the results of investigations.
4. Involve Alawites in power by providing opportunities for Assad’s opponents among them and reputable figures from previous factions to hold political positions, thereby removing the justification used by remnants of the regime to marginalize Alawites.

Third, Diplomatic Recommendations:

1. Communicate with other countries and international organizations to clarify the state’s official position and the measures it is taking to hold those responsible for war crimes accountable.
2. Request the support of the international community in strengthening national efforts to hold war crime perpetrators accountable and provide the necessary technical and legal assistance.
3. Reaffirm the state’s commitment to all international agreements related to human rights and international humanitarian law.

Fourth, General Recommendations:

1. Organize awareness campaigns and training for military forces and auxiliary forces on international humanitarian law and human rights to ensure no violations occur in the future.
2. Raise awareness among citizens about the importance of human rights and accountability, emphasizing their role in monitoring and filing complaints against violations.
3. Work to strengthen national unity and emphasize that protecting human rights is everyone’s responsibility through joint efforts between the government, civil society, and international organizations.

We believe that by following these recommendations, the state can reduce the impact of war crimes committed by the auxiliary forces in particular, enhance its image in both the international and domestic communities, and protect the gains of victory and liberation.

Political Office
Research Team
Research and Studies Department
Articles
Syrian Future Movement