Since May 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has threatened a military incursion into northeastern Syria, targeting the cities of Tal Rifaat and Manbij in Aleppo Governorate. Both cities, west of the Euphrates River, are under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This signals a shift in the map of military control, which is considered the longest period of calm since the beginning of the military conflict in Syria in 2012. The map of military control in Syria remains unchanged in terms of the boundaries of control and the lines of contact between local forces on the ground. The parties to the conflict have maintained completely stable control ratios, as recorded at the end of February 2020. This is all due to the signing of ceasefire agreements between Turkey and Russia on October 23, 2019, and on March 5, 2020. The areas of control remained stable between opposition factions and the SDF, as well as between opposition factions and Syrian regime forces.
The General Context of Northeastern Syria:
Through this operation, Turkey aims to integrate the areas where it previously launched operations inside Syria. There are also diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving tensions in northeastern Syria. Since 2019, the United States has held several rounds of talks to ease tensions between stakeholders in the region. These talks focus on Kurdish-Arab discussions and internal Kurdish discussions with the ultimate goal of facilitating engagement between Turkey and the SDF.
Although some aspects of Syrian policy remain contentious between Washington and Ankara, the two NATO allies are united in their rejection of Bashar al-Assad’s destabilizing status quo and their desire to maintain the current ceasefire in Idlib province. Regarding the relationship with the SDF, future negotiations will need to be conducted in more comprehensive coordination with Turkey, both secretly and publicly, in order to address a series of thorny issues, including the separation of the Syrian Democratic Forces from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the establishment of a more ethnically and religiously inclusive governance structure in northeastern Syria.
Hostile Relationship:
The relationship between the Syrian Democratic Forces (also known as the SDF) and Turkey is complex and contradictory, and can be revealed in several important aspects:
Tensions and military escalation. The SDF is a multinational force formed with US support and includes Kurdish and Arab fighters, but with a clear dominance of ethnic Kurds loyal to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). They consider Abdullah Öcalan, accused of terrorism and imprisoned in Turkey, a theoretical and leadership reference. Therefore, this composition could play a role that harms Turkish-American relations.
- Turkey considers the SDF an extension of the PKK, not just supporters, and it also views them as a threat to its national security. The SDF also represents the main force fighting ISIS in northeastern Syria, which means competition with Turkey’s role.
Potential cooperation with the Syrian regime and the SDF, despite the failure of the Autonomous Administration’s representative during her recent visit to Damascus to advance the relationship further. She was even arrested, only for the Russian envoy to intervene and release her. Despite the tensions, the SDF commander expressed his willingness to cooperate with Syrian government forces to confront Turkey. SDF commander General Mazloum Abdi believes that the primary goal of the Syrian army is to defend Syrian territory from Turkish attacks.
Future challenges: Turkey continues to threaten a new military incursion into Syria, which increases tensions in the region. Overall, the relationship between the Syrian Democratic Forces and Turkey is influenced by the political and security challenges in the region, but it is an adversarial relationship and must be handled with caution and wisdom.
Regarding the Possibility of Resolving the Tension:
First, there must be a conviction on the Turkish side that the tension with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) can be resolved diplomatically and politically. This conviction has so far proved difficult, and even attempts to mediate it with Ankara are not feasible. Consequently, any talk of a general solution will remain futile and unrealistic, given Turkey’s intransigence toward accepting the SDF. This was evident in its refusal to accept the SDF’s invitation to local elections in the eastern Euphrates region, in addition to its rejection of the social contract previously approved by the SDF.
On the SDF side, there is a need to question its call for dialogue with Ankara, made by Mahmoud al-Muslat, the co-chair of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), and its seriousness in doing so. It also needs to examine the strength of its position and the leverage it possesses to persuade Türkiye to change its position on the SDF. Second, negotiations between the concerned parties must address several important points in an attempt to resolve the tension in northeastern Syria:
- Borders and security, including discussions on sensitive areas, how to secure the border between Turkey and Syria, and alleviating Turkish concerns about the impact of SDF control in Syria on the strength of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
- Local governance, by examining how to organize it in the disputed areas, ensuring that the administrative system is inclusive and respects the rights of all minorities. This was not achieved in the recent postponed municipal elections, which were even rejected by the Autonomous Administration’s ally, the United States.
- Economic interests, particularly the local economy, trade, and natural resources.
- Security, counterterrorism, and securing the region from all security threats, whether those affecting Turkey, Syria, the region, or the world.
- Human rights, civil society, and promoting civil and community participation in shaping the future.
These points form the basis for negotiations leading to a resolution of the tension between Turkey and the SDF.
The SDF and the National Army:
Regarding the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian National Army, which are both components of the Syrian armed opposition to the Bashar al-Assad regime, they follow different orientations.
The SDF is a multi-ethnic force, albeit seemingly formed with and still under US support. It includes Kurdish and Arab fighters, adopts a secular and democratic ideology, and seeks to establish a federal system or administrative decentralization in northern Syria. It also works to combat ISIS and stabilize the region.
The Syrian National Army (SNA) is the structure of the Syrian armed opposition, composed primarily of Syrian Arab and Turkmen rebels operating in northern Syria. The SNA aims to assist Turkey in establishing a “safe zone” in Syria and to establish a national army to operate in the areas gained as a result of Operations Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, and Peace Spring. The SNA also works to combat the SDF and ISIS to the same extent. Despite their differing ideologies, the National Army and the SDF share a common goal of combating terrorism, maintaining stability in Syria, and opposing the Bashar al-Assad regime, albeit through different means, despite the exchange of accusations against the SDF on this point.
Although they may clash occasionally, they also work together in some instances to confront common threats. Furthermore, the two sides’ interests overlap between their areas of influence, with trade occurring through crossings connecting these two areas. They also share a common position of rejecting Bashar al-Assad’s current authority, to a minimum.
In general, the relationship between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian National Army is complex and influenced by the field and political conditions in Syria and the region as well.
Finally…
Turkish rhetoric against the areas under SDF control is escalating, most recently by changing its military policy from limited to continuous, with talk of a hot summer for the SDF. It appears that the SDF’s relationship with the Americans has not previously protected it from attacks on its vital centers and the assassination of its key leaders, and will not prevent it in the future. Therefore, the SDF has three options:
- Maintain the current situation and wait for the broader Syrian landscape to change, especially with the emergence of the new Saudi role.
- Surrender to the Syrian regime forces and hand over the SDF-controlled territory to them, while accepting integration into Syrian regime institutions as individuals. This would transform the SDF’s current status into a political party, for example.
- Turn the tables and integrate with the Syrian National Army, transforming its hostility to Turkey into a strong friendship, severing all secret and overt ties with the PKK, and working to bring their views closer together and bridge the gap between them.
Undoubtedly, each scenario has its advantages and disadvantages. Perhaps we, in the Syrian Future Movement, given our moderate national role accepted by all parties, can play a mediating role and play a positive role if the SDF chooses an option in which the Syrian Future Movement can be effective and beneficial.
the reviewer:
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Jumaa Muhammad Lahib
Research and Studies Department
Political Bureau
Syrian Future Movement
