Today, as Syria navigates a transitional phase, it faces a critical foundational challenge: how can a modern, inclusive state be built within a society exhausted by years of conflict\u2014a society where primordial loyalties (sectarian, regional, and tribal) have become intertwined with a long legacy of authoritarianism and the suppression of public freedoms?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Religious discourse, which serves as a primary frame of reference for many Syrians, offers a vital entry point for addressing this issue. While such discourse has historically been used to entrench division or justify exclusion, the question arises: can it be re-grounded to serve as a bridge toward inclusive “citizenship,” rather than remaining captive to the logic of narrow, exclusive “communal” identities?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
One cannot discuss citizenship within an Islamic context without addressing the concept of “Ummah.” In the Quran, the term carries various meanings\u2014ranging from a group bound by social ties to a community united by a shared faith. Notably, the Quran does not restrict the term “Ummah” to a single religious group; it also employs it to denote a community defined by a social contract\u2014as seen, for instance, in the description of the Jews as an “Ummah” alongside the believers in the Constitution of Medina (Sahifat al-Madinah).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Quranic foundation for inclusive citizenship is manifested in three pivotal verses:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n First: The verse concerning “mutual acquaintance” (ta\u2019aruf<\/em>). The Almighty says: “O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted” (Al-Hujurat: 13). The Egyptian Dar al-Ifta has clarified that God\u2014glory be to Him\u2014intended for this plurality to be “a catalyst for mutual acquaintance and communication, rather than for conflict and estrangement.” The verse does not negate sub-identities (peoples and tribes); instead, it redirects them toward mutual acquaintance, which serves as the foundation for any pluralistic civil society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second: The verse on holding fast [to the rope of God]. The Almighty says: “And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided” (Al-Imran: 103). The Quranic context indicates that this act of holding fast is what transforms enemies into brothers: “and you became, by His favor, brothers.” Unity, in this sense, is a voluntary act rooted in “holding fast” to a unifying frame of reference\u2014one that safeguards the rights of all and prevents fragmentation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Third: The verse on justice. The Almighty says: “And when you judge between people, judge with justice” (An-Nisa: 58). Justice here is not directed solely toward Muslims, but toward “people” in the broadest sense\u2014all of humanity. This is the Quranic foundation for citizenship: equality before the law, regardless of religion, ethnicity, or region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While Quranic verses established the principle of citizenship, the Constitution of Medina (Sahifat al-Madinah) serves as the first practical application of this principle in Islamic history. Following the migration (Hijra), the Prophet (peace be upon him) drafted a document regulating relations among the inhabitants of Medina\u2014including the Emigrants (Muhajirun), the Helpers (Ansar), the Jews, and the polytheists. Scholars have described it as “the first constitutional document in Islamic history,” one that embodied the principles of citizenship and peaceful coexistence, while laying the foundations for justice and unity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Notably, this document did not merely regulate the relationships among Muslims; it also defined the relationship between all constituent groups and the new state. The twenty-fifth clause states: “The Jews of Banu \u2018Awf are a community (ummah<\/em>) alongside the believers; the Jews have their religion, and the Muslims have theirs.” The thirty-seventh clause stipulates: “The Jews shall bear their own expenses, and the Muslims shall bear theirs; furthermore, they shall support one another against anyone who wages war against the parties to this document.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n This signifies that the document established a form of “contractual citizenship,” defining the rights and obligations of every citizen, irrespective of their creed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Numerous scholars have affirmed that the Constitution of Medina “establishes the values \u200b\u200bof citizenship and defines the rights and duties of every individual living in Medina\u2014regardless of their creed, ethnicity, or skin color”\u2014while guaranteeing those of different faiths “freedom of belief, as well as the protection of their persons, property, and honor.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is the model upon which a “new Syria” can be built: a state that enters into a social contract with all its citizens, rather than one that aligns itself with a single sect or group to the exclusion of others. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Constitution of Medina was not merely an organizational document; rather, it was an expression of a deeper vision, which found its ultimate articulation in the Farewell Sermon delivered by the Prophet (peace be upon him) during his final pilgrimage. Scholars have described this sermon as a “charter for life” and “one of the most significant documents to ever delineate human rights and responsibilities.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this sermon, the Prophet (peace be upon him) proclaimed the principle of fundamental equality among all human beings: “O mankind, your Lord is One, and your father is one. An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab, nor a non-Arab over an Arab; neither does a white person have superiority over a black person, nor a black person over a white person\u2014except through piety (taqwa<\/em>).”<\/p>\n\n\n\n This text affirmed and established the foundations for coexistence and peace among humanity, devoid of any hierarchy, and granted rights to a humanity that had long been searching for them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The implication here is that citizenship in Islam is not predicated on blood, race, or language, but rather on shared human dignity and piety\u2014criteria that are individual, not collective. This serves as a foundation upon which a moderate religious discourse in Syria can be built: a form of citizenship that does not negate sub-group identities, but rather transcends them, bringing everyone together under the umbrella of law and human dignity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The application of citizenship did not end with the era of the Prophet; it continued during the time of his Companions. Umar ibn al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with him) stands as a unique exemplar in this regard. In the covenant of security (\u2018ahd al-aman<\/em>) granted to the people of Aelia (Jerusalem), he wrote: “This is the security that the servant of Allah, Umar, the Commander of the Faithful, grants to the people of Aelia: he grants them security for their lives, their property, their churches, and their crosses.” This covenant was not merely an act of “tolerance” granted as a favor by the stronger party; rather, it was a binding contract that obligated the state to protect the rights of its non-Muslim citizens.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Furthermore, upon his death, Umar left a specific injunction regarding the dhimmis<\/em> (non-Muslim subjects), writing to his successor: “I charge him to uphold the covenant of God and the covenant of His Messenger (peace be upon him).” This signifies that the protection of the rights of non-Muslim citizens was both a political and a religious mandate, not merely an administrative measure. Scholars have noted that the rights Umar granted to the dhimmis<\/em> were “far more extensive” than those provided by other empires of that era.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The lesson for a new Syria is that citizenship is realized through a binding constitutional contract\u2014one that protects the rights of all citizens and is subject to …accountability before the judiciary. This is what Syria needs today: a new “social covenant”\u2014a \u2018ahd \u2018umri<\/em>\u2014authored by all Syrians, which guarantees every citizen their right to security, dignity, and participation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fifth: An Analysis of Classical Political Jurisprudence<\/p>\n\n\n\n In classical Islamic political jurisprudence, the concept of the jama\u2018ah<\/em> (the community\/group) is linked to political legitimacy. Jurists considered the jama\u2018ah<\/em> to be the foundation for the bay\u2018ah<\/em> (pledge of allegiance) and obedience, positing that departing from it leads to fitnah<\/em> (strife or civil discord). However, while this concept is significant for maintaining order, it can\u2014if interpreted as a “sectarian or confessional group” rather than a “national community”\u2014become a tool for the exclusion of others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Here, a fundamental distinction emerges within the Islamic tradition between the ummah<\/em> (the nation\/community at large) and the jama\u2018ah<\/em>. The ummah<\/em> represents the collective as an all-encompassing entity, bound together by social ties, shared belief, or a social contract. In contrast, the term jama\u2018ah<\/em> in political jurisprudence has sometimes been associated with ahl al-hall wa al-\u2018aqd<\/em>\u2014the elite who represent the ummah<\/em>. Scholars have noted that, in the Quran, the term ummah<\/em> is not synonymous with jama\u2018ah<\/em> in a general sense; rather, it refers to “a group of people bound by social ties that render them a single, unified entity.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n The problem in Syria is that the term jama\u2018ah<\/em> has frequently been interpreted in a sectarian or regional sense, rather than as an inclusive national community. At certain stages, religious discourse has contributed to reinforcing this narrow interpretation by restricting the jama\u2018ah<\/em> to specific groups\u2014such as “Sunnis,” the “people of a particular city,” or “adherents of a specific school of thought.” This is precisely what must be transcended today: moving from the “community” (al-jama\u2018ah<\/em>)\u2014an exclusionary entity\u2014toward the “nation” (al-ummah<\/em>)\u2014an inclusive entity that embraces everyone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The challenge of transitioning from the “community” to “citizenship” was not limited to classical jurisprudence; rather, later Muslim thinkers addressed it in innovative ways that could serve as a theoretical framework for a moderate religious discourse in Syria:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Malek Bennabi: The “Islamic Commonwealth” as a Civilizational Alternative<\/p>\n\n\n\n Malek Bennabi proposed an intellectual project for building an “Islamic Commonwealth,” which represents a “civilizational model for unity and coexistence,” based on the equation: “human being + land + time = civilization.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n Bennabi argued that this commonwealth should be “an inclusive Islamic entity\u2014participatory in its structure and function, consultative in its vision and implementation, and decentralized in its construction and administration.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n The implication here is that national unity, from a civilizational perspective, is not about “dissolving” into a single center; rather, it is about “participating” in the construction of civilization\u2014a process rooted in “land” (shared territory), “time” (shared history), and the “human being” (the citizen). This is the framework that a moderate religious discourse can offer Syria: a form of unity that does not negate diversity, but instead leverages it to build civilization. Taha Abdurrahman: “Fraternization” as Ethical Citizenship Mohammed Abed al-Jabri: A Critique of the “Arab Political Mind” and Transcending Its Determinants In light of this textual and intellectual heritage, it can be argued that a moderate religious discourse in a new Syria faces three major challenges and could potentially play three pivotal roles:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The first challenge: The legacy of the sectarian “group.” In recent decades, religious discourse has been used to entrench sectarian and regional divisions, transforming the “group” into an “exclusionary identity.” A moderate discourse is called upon to deconstruct this legacy by emphasizing that the ummah<\/em> (the community of believers) in Islam is broader than any specific “group,” and that “citizenship”\u2014as the most inclusive framework currently available\u2014does not negate religious affiliation, but rather transcends it within the public sphere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The second challenge: The absence of an inclusive “social contract.” Syria still lacks a new “social contract” that defines the rights and duties of all citizens, regardless of their affiliations. A moderate religious discourse could help ground such a contract by drawing upon the Constitution of Medina, the Farewell Sermon, and the Covenant of Umar\u2014all of which serve as authentic Islamic precedents for “contractual citizenship.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n The third challenge is the danger of sectarian “alternative discourses.” In the absence of an inclusive national narrative, sectarian and regionalist discourses fill the void, appealing to disillusioned youth. A moderate religious discourse is called upon to offer an attractive alternative\u2014one rooted in “citizenship” rather than “sectarianism,” “dignity” rather than “exclusion,” and “hope” rather than “fear.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n As for the pivotal roles that a moderate religious discourse can play, they include:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Based on this analysis, the Religious Bureau of the Syrian Future Movement offers the following recommendations:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n First: The establishment of a “National Charter for Citizenship,” inspired by the Constitution of Medina (Sahifat al-Madinah<\/em>). This charter should be drafted with the participation of all Syrian components and must define the rights and duties of every citizen\u2014irrespective of their religion, ethnicity, or region\u2014modeled after the Constitution of Medina, which united the diverse elements of the Medinan society under a single social contract.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second: A re-evaluation of the concept of the “community” (jama’ah<\/em>) in light of the broader “nation” (ummah<\/em>). Moderate religious discourse must redefine the “community”\u2014moving away from a “sectarian community” toward a “national community” rooted in reality and the common good\u2014one that is inclusive of all. This requires a critical review of the tradition of political jurisprudence, distinguishing between what is “contextual” (linked to specific historical circumstances) and what is “teleological” (linked to the overarching objectives\/purposes of Sharia<\/em>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Third: The adoption of “brotherhood” as an ethical foundation for citizenship. Religious discourse should shift from a focus on “legal citizenship” (rights and duties) toward “ethical citizenship” (brotherhood and benevolence), following the framework proposed by Taha Abdurrahman. This implies that citizenship is an “ethical commitment” to justice and benevolence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fourth: Addressing the “determinants of the Arab political mind”\u2014namely, the tribe, the spoils (of power\/resources), and dogma. This means that a moderate religious discourse must function as a “critical discourse,” exposing how the tribe, the spoils, and dogma are exploited to entrench corruption and exclusion, while advocating for transcending these elements in favor of a “state of citizenship.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fifth: Constructing a “national religious discourse” rather than a “sectarian or factional religious discourse.” It must be a national discourse that addresses all Syrians; this does not entail the erasure of religious particularities, but rather the elevation of public discourse above sub-group affiliations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The transition from a focus on “the group” (communal identity) to “citizenship” in a new Syria represents a civilizational shift in how the relationship between religion, state, and society is understood. This shift finds its foundations in the texts of the Quran and the Sunnah, in historical precedents\u2014such as the Constitution of Medina, the Farewell Sermon, and the Covenant of Umar\u2014and in the intellectual contributions of thinkers like Malek Bennabi, Taha Abdurrahman, and Mohammed Abed al-Jabri.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A moderate religious discourse\u2014such as that represented by the Religious Office within the Syrian Future Movement\u2014serves as the “natural gateway” for this transformation. It possesses the “religious legitimacy,” “cultural capital,” and “social acceptance” required to deconstruct the discourse of communal identity and build a discourse of citizenship. Achieving this requires political will from the state, intellectual effort from scholars and thinkers, and an openness from society at large. If these conditions are met, Syria could offer a new “civilizational model”\u2014not only for “citizenship,” but also for a “civilizational Islam” that views “diversity” as a mercy, “unity” as a source of strength, and “citizenship” as an act of worship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The challenges facing Syria in building a modern, inclusive state by addressing the issues of community and citizenship.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":35,"featured_media":68028,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4667,4853],"tags":[4718],"class_list":["post-68031","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-religious-office-en","category-research-and-studies-department-en","tag-articles"],"yoast_head":"\nSecond, the first constitution for “contractual citizenship”:<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Third: The First Universal Declaration of Human Rights<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Fourth: Umar ibn al-Khattab and the Model of “Protected Citizenship”<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Sixth: Toward a Civilizational Foundation for Citizenship<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Taha Abdurrahman introduces an innovative concept of citizenship: “fraternization” (mu\u2019akhah<\/em>). He views this as the only true form of citizenship, precisely because it is “founded upon ethical values.”
He argues that, within Western modernity, citizenship has become detached from morality, reduced to mere “legal rights.” In contrast, citizenship within an Islamic framework is rooted in “fraternization”\u2014an “ethical brotherhood” that transcends abstract legal entitlements.
Abdurrahman asserts that “true and sound citizenship must be connected and open\u2014in other words, it must be a form of fraternization.” In this view, fraternization is not merely “passive coexistence,” but rather a “mutual ethical commitment.” In this model, every citizen prioritizes the “public interest over private interest” and acts to “avert harm from others,” in accordance with the Quranic injunction: “Indeed, Allah commands justice and benevolence.”
This perspective offers a robust ethical foundation for citizenship within the context of moderate religious discourse in Syria. Citizenship, therefore, is not merely a “legal contract,” but an “ethical covenant” in which citizens commit themselves to justice and benevolence\u2014going beyond the simple demand for rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Mohammed Abed al-Jabri provided a profound critique of what he termed the “Arab political mind,” which he argues is governed by three primary determinants: “the tribe,” “spoils” (al-ghanima<\/em>), and “doctrine” (al-\u2018aqidah<\/em>). Al-Jabri argues that these three determinants are what prevent the emergence of true “citizenship” in Arab societies; they prioritize loyalty to a specific group (such as a tribe or a sect) over loyalty to the nation, and they transform authority into a tool for securing spoils rather than a means of public service.
The solution Al-Jabri proposes is to “overcome these determinants” by “critiquing the Arab political mind” and reconstructing political consciousness based on the principles of “citizenship,” “human rights,” and “democracy.”
While this critique is directed at the Arab heritage as a whole, it is particularly relevant to Syria, where the “tribe,” the pursuit of “spoils,” and “dogma” (in a sectarian sense) continue to serve as obstacles to the construction of a state based on citizenship.<\/p>\n\n\n\nSeventh: From “the Group” to “Citizenship”<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Eighth: Recommendations<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Conclusion:<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
References:<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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