In recent months, reports regarding the seizure of Captagon shipments and the dismantling of smuggling networks have dominated the security landscape in Syria. These incidents range from the interception of 226 explosive devices bound for Lebanon and the thwarting of an attempt to smuggle 91,000 Captagon pills from Lebanon into the Damascus countryside, to the dismantling of an international drug-trafficking network operating between Lebanon and Damascus, and the seizure of 200,000 Captagon pills\u2014along with six hot-air balloons prepared for smuggling\u2014in Daraa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These operations, announced almost daily by the Ministry of Interior and customs authorities, reflect a genuine security effort that deserves recognition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the same time, however, they raise a deeper question: are tactical security operations sufficient to dismantle organized crime, or is the phenomenon more complex than merely “seizing shipments” and “making arrests”?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This article does not aim to diminish these security achievements, nor does it seek to adopt a stance in opposition to the transitional authority. Rather, it offers an objective, critical analysis that places these achievements within their strategic context, evaluating them based on institutional resilience\u2014as opposed to mere figures presented for public consumption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The central hypothesis this article explores is that Syria currently faces a dangerous paradox: a decline in criminal “supply” (the number of networks and production facilities) alongside an increase in “demand” and overall risk (manifested in higher prices, more selective criminal networks, and a potential shift toward even more dangerous synthetic drugs). This is a paradox that cannot be resolved by security operations alone; it requires a comprehensive developmental and institutional strategy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Organized crime in Syria cannot be understood in isolation from the literature on criminal sociology and shadow economies.
Organized crime is not merely a collection of “gangs” operating outside the law; rather, it functions as a parallel system of governance that fills the vacuum left when a state loses its capacity to exert control, provide services, and ensure the rule of law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The concept of “Mafia governance” suggests that criminal groups do not content themselves with illicit profit alone; instead, they impose a “system” of informal taxation, provide alternative “protection,” and resolve disputes in areas where the state is absent.
In a post-conflict context, this phenomenon is amplified because a “war economy” creates physical and human infrastructure\u2014such as production facilities, smuggling routes, mediation networks, trained personnel, and accumulated capital\u2014that remains in place and ready for continued use.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
An analysis by the Carnegie Middle East Center notes that “criminal networks and shadow economies have gained prominence across the Levant, driven by war, sanctions, financial collapse, and the rise of alternative monetary systems.” It further points out that the Syrian regime played “a central role in expanding drug production\u2014specifically Captagon”\u2014and that, even following the regime’s collapse, “smuggling networks have adapted, establishing mobile laboratories and expanding their operations to reach continental Europe.” This means that organized crime in Syria is not merely a “remnant” of a former regime that can be dismantled through security crackdowns; rather, it is an economic and social structure with its own internal logic, capacity for adaptation, and incentives for persistence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Any strategy that fails to account for this dimension will remain one of “pursuit” rather than “eradication.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Organized Crime Index \u2013 Syria among the most high-risk nations:
According to the 2025 Organized Crime Index, Syria received a score of 8.50 out of 10 in the category of “Criminal Networks.” This places it among the five most severely affected countries globally, alongside Colombia (9.50), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (9.00), and Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru (8.50). More alarmingly, Syria\u2019s “resilience” score is no higher than 2.00 out of 10\u2014one of the lowest globally\u2014indicating that the capacity of Syrian institutions to resist organized crime and absorb shocks remains extremely fragile.
These figures do not merely measure the “volume of crime”; they assess the state\u2019s capacity to confront it. Consequently, Syria exhibits a combination of high crime rates and low institutional resilience\u2014the worst possible configuration for any nation. Captagon: From an “Industrial-Scale” Operation to “Mobile Laboratories”
During the years of the former regime, Captagon served as Syria\u2019s most valuable export. The New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy estimates that the former regime generated approximately $2.4 billion annually from the Captagon trade, while the total value of the global market linked to this substance reached roughly $10 billion per year.
The World Bank estimated that the annual market value of Syrian-origin Captagon ranged between $1.9 billion and $5.6 billion from 2020 to 2023\u2014a figure that eclipsed the value of Syria\u2019s legal exports, which stood at approximately $960 million in 2023.
Following the political transition, Syrian authorities reported significant security achievements. From the time of liberation until the launch of the national campaign, “Syria Drug-Free,” on June 26, 2026, approximately 1,550 interdiction operations were carried out. These efforts resulted in the dismantling of 90 international smuggling networks, the closure of 17 Captagon production laboratories, and the seizure of 20 warehouses containing raw materials, 697 million Captagon pills, 15 tons of hashish, 10 million narcotic pharmaceutical pills, and 221 tons of raw materials. However, a paradox revealed by the 2026 UN World Drug Report is that “large-scale Captagon production in Syria has been disrupted,” following the dismantling of 15 manufacturing sites and 13 storage facilities since December 2024.
Yet, this disruption has not eliminated the phenomenon; rather, it has reshaped it.
According to the UNODC report, “as Captagon production declines in Syria and Lebanon, there is a risk that it may shift to other countries within the region and beyond.”
Reports also indicate that while cross-border smuggling attempts have decreased by approximately 40%, the success rate of such operations has risen significantly. This suggests that “the surviving networks have become fewer in number, more selective in their movements, and better adapted to the new security vacuum.”
An economic consequence of this security “squeeze” is a rise in prices: the cost of a single pill has jumped from $2\u20133 to $5\u20137 in 2026, “reflecting the scale of the…” “…a tightening of control over traditional smuggling routes.” This implies that security operations have created a “more dangerous market” rather than a “smaller” one\u2014a reality that raises a fundamental question regarding the efficacy of relying solely on a security-based approach.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Human Trafficking:
Lieutenant Colonel Manaf al-Zoubi, head of the International Counter-Trafficking Branch within the Department for Combating Human Trafficking, revealed preliminary statistics illustrating the scale of the phenomenon: 600 individuals implicated in human smuggling, 100 in prostitution rings, 300 in networks involving the sexual exploitation of children, 15 networks forcing children into begging, and 3 individuals involved in the purchase of human organs. While Al-Zoubi confirmed that “no cases of organ harvesting via kidnapping have been recorded since the liberation,” he acknowledged that “the most prevalent issue involves organized networks that force children to beg.”
Regarding the abduction of women, the “Syrian Feminist Lobby” estimates that approximately 80 women and girls from the Alawite community have gone missing since the beginning of 2025. This figure includes 26 confirmed kidnappings, alongside “dozens of additional cases” that remain difficult to verify due to “the fear among victims and their families of facing retaliation.”
Furthermore, 91 instances of arrest and abduction were documented over a 100-day period, comprising 73 arbitrary arrests and 18 kidnappings across several governorates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Money Laundering:
Organized crime is not limited to narcotics and human trafficking; it also extends to money laundering. According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Syria remains on the “list of countries…” …subject to “increased monitoring” (the “grey list”) in the February 2026 update. Furthermore, the 2025 U.S. State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Report designated Syria as a “major money laundering jurisdiction.”
On July 21, 2026, Syria launched a national strategy to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism, in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Minister of Justice Mazhar al-Wais emphasized that Syria “places special importance on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism.” However, as a former minister noted, “announcing a strategy to combat money laundering is not enough; implementation will determine the future of the Syrian economy,” given that money laundering serves as a “lifeline for financing organized crime, terrorism, and the parallel economy.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A Tactical Achievement Lacking an Institutional Strategy:
There is no doubt that the recent security operations represent a genuine tactical achievement that deserves recognition. Dismantling 90 networks, shutting down 17 laboratories, and seizing hundreds of millions of pills are all indicators of an unprecedented level of seriousness in addressing this phenomenon. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has commended these efforts, confirming that since December 2024, Syria has “dismantled approximately 15 industrial-scale laboratories and 13 smaller storage facilities, which has brought large-scale production to a halt.”
The problem, however, is that these achievements are measured in terms of “inputs” (the number of operations, the quantities… …seizures) rather than by “outcomes” (such as lower consumption rates, a decline in crime, or strengthened institutional resilience). The Global Organized Crime Index reveals that Syria\u2019s resilience score (2.00 out of 10) has not improved\u2014and may have even regressed\u2014because resilience is not built through seizures, but rather through the rule of law, transparency, economic development, and social justice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Paradox of a “Security Tightening” Amidst an “Increasingly Dangerous Market”:
The most alarming insight from the data is that security operations, while successful in curbing “supply,” have failed to reduce “demand.”
In fact, the rise in prices\u2014from $2\u20133 to $5\u20137\u2014reflects the increased risks borne by smugglers, not a drop in demand.
This indicates that Syrian consumers remain, and that distribution networks are still able to reach them\u2014albeit at a higher price point.
More dangerously, the UNODC has warned that “users might shift from Captagon to methamphetamine”\u2014a far more hazardous drug that is even harder to monitor. This suggests that “success” in combating Captagon could lead to “failure” in the fight against even deadlier synthetic drugs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Organized Crime as an “Institution”:
The current security-focused approach treats organized crime as a set of “networks” to be dismantled, rather than as an “institution” whose very foundations must be drained.
The distinction is fundamental: a network can simply be replaced by another, whereas an institution requires a specific economic and social environment to sustain it.
In Syria, such an environment… The following issues persist: extreme poverty (with over 80% of the population living below the poverty line), high unemployment (exceeding 50%), a weak rule of law, and an enduring “shadow economy” that provides alternative employment opportunities for young people.
Without addressing these root causes, security operations will amount to nothing more than “mowing the grass”\u2014trimming the surface without “pulling out the roots.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The absence of transitional justice as a factor fueling crime:
Organized crime in Syria has yet to be addressed as part of the “legacy of the former regime.” As noted by the Carnegie Endowment, the smuggling networks established by the previous regime were never fully dismantled; instead, they adapted.
Consequently, transitional justice\u2014which entails holding the “kingpins” of the illicit economy accountable and seizing their assets\u2014is a fundamental prerequisite for any strategy to combat organized crime. Such measures dismantle the incentives that render crime “profitable” and ensure that the prospect of punishment becomes a credible deterrent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the national level:
First: Launch a national strategy to combat organized crime. This strategy should extend beyond “counter-narcotics” to encompass human trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, and cybercrime. It must be multi-sectoral, involving the ministries of interior, justice, health, education, and development. The Syrian Minister of Interior has noted that “criminal networks have become increasingly capable of crossing borders and exploiting technology, financial systems, and transport and communication chains; their activities now intersect across the realms of narcotics, human trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, and cybercrime.”
Second: Enhance “resilience.” “Institutionalization” through:
Strengthening the rule of law, holding the corrupt accountable, and purging institutions of “networks of influence.”
Ensuring financial transparency, activating oversight of banks, and preventing the transfer of illicit funds.
Building the capacity of the judiciary and the public prosecution, enabling them to prosecute “organized crime” as a continuous, structured phenomenon rather than as isolated, individual offenses.
Third: Linking… Combating crime through development\u2014by implementing youth employment programs, supporting small-scale enterprises, and providing economic alternatives for those currently operating within the “shadow economy.” Without such alternatives, crime will remain a “rational choice” for many.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the regional level:
Fourth: Strengthening regional cooperation\u2014particularly with Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq\u2014through mechanisms for information exchange, joint operations, and the extradition of suspects. Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon have already held a meeting in Amman to discuss “strategies for combating the production, trafficking, and distribution of synthetic drugs.”
This cooperation should be expanded to also address the illicit trade in arms and human beings, as well as money laundering.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the international level:
Fifth: Leveraging international support\u2014through the UNODC, the FATF, and the World Bank\u2014to build institutional capacity, rather than focusing solely on “seizures.” A report by the Wilson Center noted that “lifting sanctions is necessary, but not sufficient,” as Syria “requires assistance to address the terrorism, crime, and corruption that have turned it into a hub for illicit activity.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Regarding transparency:
Sixth: Engaging civil society and the media in overseeing the performance of security agencies, publishing periodic reports on the outcomes of operations, and evaluating their impact over the medium and long term\u2014rather than focusing exclusively on the short term. Conclusion:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Recent security operations in Syria represent a necessary, yet insufficient, step. Organized crime is not merely a collection of “networks” that can be dismantled; rather, it functions as a parallel institution\u2014one that thrives on poverty, weak rule of law, and the persistence of a “shadow economy.” True success will not be measured by the number of pills seized, but by a reduction in the country\u2019s extreme fragility score (currently 2.00 out of 10), a decline in the organized crime index (currently 8.50 out of 10), and Syria\u2019s transition from an “exporter of Captagon” to a “partner in combating it.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Achieving this requires a comprehensive developmental and institutional strategy\u2014not merely seasonal security crackdowns\u2014along with transitional justice measures that dismantle the incentives for crime, rather than high-profile, media-oriented seizures that target only the symptoms. The real battle is not fought in “laboratories” or “warehouses,” but rather through the strengthening of institutions, the creation of opportunities, and the restoration of human dignity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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Exploring the space between achievement and shortcomings, this article discusses the role of security forces in combating organized crime and drug trafficking in Syria.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":35,"featured_media":67965,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[179,4853],"tags":[4718],"class_list":["post-67967","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-political-office-en","category-research-and-studies-department-en","tag-articles"],"yoast_head":"\n