Money laundering is one of the most serious economic and financial crimes, characterized by its complex and transnational nature. This is not only because it gives the proceeds of crime a legitimate appearance, but also because it allows organized crime, corruption, smuggling, and illicit trafficking to transform from marginal activities into a powerful economic force capable of influencing markets, institutions, and public policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Therefore, money laundering should not be viewed as merely an independent financial crime, but rather as a system that enables the underlying crime. The more successful perpetrators are in channeling their proceeds into the legitimate economic cycle, the greater their ability to reproduce their activities, buy influence, corrupt institutions, weaken legitimate competition, and control sectors of the economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This phenomenon is particularly dangerous in Syria due to the exceptional characteristics that have accumulated during the years of war and economic crisis: the expansion of the informal economy, the prevalence of cash transactions, weak trust in financial institutions, widespread capital flight, multiple money transfer channels, the proliferation of smuggling networks, a lack of transparency in some commercial and real estate activities, and the blurring of lines between legitimate and illicit funds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In such an environment, the traditional approach of criminalizing the act and then prosecuting the perpetrator after it has occurred is insufficient.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
What is needed today is a shift from the philosophy of pursuing money after it has been laundered to a philosophy of preventing illicit funds from acquiring legitimacy in the first place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Syrian Future Movement believes that combating money laundering must become an essential part of the project to rebuild the Syrian state, because the integrity of the financial system is not merely a banking issue, but is connected to the rule of law, combating corruption, protecting property, attracting investment, reconstruction, and international confidence in the Syrian economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
First: Money Laundering as a Threat to the State, Not Just a Financial Violation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The dangerous nature of money laundering lies in the fact that it represents the link between crime and the legitimate economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Money obtained through bribery, embezzlement, smuggling, illicit trade, corruption, or organized crime does not empower its owner as long as they are unable to use it normally. Therefore, perpetrators of crimes seek to go through various stages and methods to conceal the true source of the funds, complicate their flow, and then reintegrate them into the economy in a way that appears legitimate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Here, money laundering becomes a multi-layered threat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Economically, it distorts competition because the owner of illicit funds is not subject to the profit and loss logic of a legitimate investor. They may be willing to purchase property, a company, or a commodity at a price exceeding its true value simply to transfer money or conceal its source.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Monetarily, it exacerbates instability in the foreign exchange market, especially when money laundering operations are linked to speculation, informal transfers, or smuggling cash across borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Socially, it allows for the formation of wealthy classes unrelated to production, work, or investment, thus undermining the concept of economic justice and reinforcing the citizen’s perception that wealth is linked to influence and corruption, not competence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Politically and from a security perspective, the greatest danger lies in the ability of illicit funds to buy influence and exert control over institutions and public administration, allowing crime to shift from attempting to evade the state to attempting to infiltrate the state itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second: The Syrian Legislative Framework and the Gap Between Text and Reality<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Over the past decades, the Syrian legal system has witnessed attempts to establish a framework specifically for combating money laundering and terrorist financing, beginning with Legislative Decree No. (33) of 2005, followed by Law No. (20) of 2010 and its amendments, and subsequent related legislation and procedures, including Law No. (46) of 2013.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These texts represented a significant shift from the absence of specialized regulation to the recognition of the seriousness of money laundering and the necessity of establishing a system for oversight, reporting, investigation, and cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Syrian legislator also attempted to align with international standards, particularly the principles established by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) regarding the criminalization of money laundering, due diligence, reporting of suspicious transactions, customer due diligence, identification of the beneficial owner, and international cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the Syrian problem today is no longer the existence or absence of a criminal text.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fundamental problem is the effectiveness of the text.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A law criminalizing money laundering fails to achieve its purpose if the state is unable to detect suspicious funds before they enter the market, identify the true owners of companies, track the movement of funds between sectors, or link banking, tax, real estate, and customs data.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This highlights the gap between theoretical criminalization and the capacity to implement it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Syrian Future Movement believes that future evaluations of Syrian legislation should not be limited to the number of legal articles or the severity of penalties, but should be based on more practical questions:<\/p>\n\n\n\n How many suspicious transactions have been detected?<\/p>\n\n\n\n How many parallel financial investigations have been conducted alongside the investigation into the original crime?<\/p>\n\n\n\n How many assets have been frozen or confiscated by court order?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Can the competent authorities identify the true beneficiaries of companies and real estate?<\/p>\n\n\n\n What is the amount of money returned to the public treasury as a result of combating financial crimes?<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is this shift towards these indicators that will transform the fight against money laundering from mere legal texts into a measurable and accountable state policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Third: The Shadow Economy as the Broadest Incubator of the Problem<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The past few years have witnessed a significant expansion of the Syrian informal economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Of course, not all informal economic activity should be considered criminal; millions of Syrians, due to war, poverty, and the collapse of institutions, have been forced to resort to alternative economic patterns to survive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the problem begins when informal channels transform from a necessary social response into a parallel financial structure that allows for the concealment of ownership, the source of funds, and their movement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The risks increase in environments where large cash transactions are prevalent, and<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unregulated financial institutions, uncontrolled border trade, registering funds or real estate in the names of individuals other than the true beneficiaries, shell companies, and transactions where the declared value does not reflect the actual value.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, confronting the shadow economy cannot rely on mass criminalization or shock measures, as this could be counterproductive and drive more citizens and businesses outside the formal system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What is needed is the gradual reintegration of the informal economy into the formal economy through incentives, digitalization, streamlined procedures, and reasonable taxes, in parallel with a rigorous targeting of major criminal networks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fourth: Real Estate and Reconstruction as Major Risk Points<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Syrian Future Movement believes that the real estate sector deserves special attention in any future Syrian strategy to combat money laundering.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The real estate sector, by its very nature, allows for the absorption of large sums of money in a single transaction. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the actual and registered prices, the use of intermediaries and agents, and the multiplicity of sales and purchases can all make real estate a suitable tool for concealing illicit funds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The risk increases with the start of reconstruction efforts, as the Syrian market will see a significant influx of capital from both domestic and foreign sources, should the economic environment improve.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Here, reconstruction must not become a vehicle for laundering the wealth gained through war, corruption, and smuggling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, real estate development companies, major contracting firms, and investors in high-value projects must be subject to clear standards to verify funding sources, identify the beneficial owner, and disclose ownership structures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fifth: The Beneficial Owner\u2026 The Missing Link<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n One of the most important legal tools in combating money laundering is the concept of the Beneficial Owner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Knowing the company name is not enough.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Knowing the manager is not enough.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Even knowing the registered shareholder may not be enough.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The real question is: Who is the natural person who actually owns or controls the money, company, or asset?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, a central national register of beneficial owners of companies and legal entities should be established, requiring companies to disclose the individuals who exercise ultimate control, and imposing penalties for providing false information or using shell companies to conceal ownership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This data must also be linked to commercial, tax, real estate, banking, and customs records, with clear legal safeguards to protect the data and prevent its misuse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sixth: Due Diligence and Know Your Customer (KYC)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Know Your Customer (KYC) principle constitutes the first line of defense within the financial sector.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It should not be reduced to simply obtaining a personal ID or opening a bank file.<\/p>\n\n\n\n True due diligence requires understanding the nature of the client, their business, the source of their funds, and the expected volume of their transactions, as well as monitoring any unusual changes in their financial behavior.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In high-risk cases, enhanced due diligence must be applied.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This includes, in particular, large or unusual transactions, complex business structures without a clear economic justification, accounts linked to high-risk sectors, and politically exposed persons (PEPs), according to clear legal criteria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is essential to emphasize here a fundamental principle:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n A person’s status or position does not automatically imply corruption, but rather necessitates a higher level of scrutiny due to the nature of the risks associated with public influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Seventh: Expanding Oversight Beyond the Banking Sector<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n It is a mistake to limit anti-money laundering efforts to banks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Modern money laundering networks often target the least regulated sector.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, oversight obligations must extend to high-risk non-financial sectors and professions, particularly real estate, contracting, currency exchange, money transfers, precious metals and jewelry, and certain legal and accounting services when they participate in company formation, asset management, or the execution of financial transactions on behalf of clients, within the limits and safeguards stipulated by law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These entities should be required to maintain records, verify identities, identify beneficial owners, report suspicious transactions, and train their employees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Eighth: The Anti-Money Laundering Authority and the Need for Genuine Functional Independence<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Simply designating an institution as specialized is insufficient if it lacks independence, competence, and technical capacity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Syrian Future Movement believes it is necessary to reassess the legal and institutional structure of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Authority to ensure its functional independence in receiving and analyzing financial reports and to protect it from political and administrative interference.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Its capabilities in digital financial analysis and the use of network analysis systems, big data, and artificial intelligence tools to detect unusual patterns should also be developed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the use of artificial intelligence should not turn into an automated prosecution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Algorithms are tools for detecting and assessing risks, not judges. Any freezing, confiscation, or action affecting property must be subject to the law, judicial oversight, and the right of appeal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ninth: From Pursuing the Accused to Parallel Financial Investigation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n One of the most important shifts required in Syrian criminal policy is the adoption of the principle of parallel financial investigation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When investigating crimes of corruption, smuggling, organized trafficking, embezzlement, and major economic crimes, the question should not be limited to: Who committed the crime?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Rather, it must be accompanied by another question:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Where did the money go?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Who acquired it afterward?<\/p>\n\n\n\n What assets were used to purchase it?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Were the funds transferred to family members, partners, or shell companies?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Were they transferred abroad?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tracing the money in many organized crimes may be more effective than tracking the individuals alone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tenth: Freezing, Confiscating, and Recovering Assets<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Syria needs a more effective system for recovering the proceeds of crime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Imprisonment, however severe, remains limited in its impact if the perpetrator retains the funds obtained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, the rules for freezing, seizing, and confiscating assets must be developed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This includes empowering the judiciary to take urgent precautionary measures when there are serious indications of potential money laundering or concealment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, we emphasize the need to prevent the fight against money laundering from becoming a justification for arbitrary confiscation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Protecting the economy does not contradict protecting private property; rather, the rule of law requires combining the two.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, any measure affecting property rights must be defined by law, subject to effective judicial oversight, appealable, and respectful of the rights of bona fide third parties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Eleventh: Digital Transformation and Reducing Reliance on Cash<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The widespread reliance on cash constitutes one of the biggest obstacles to financial oversight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, the shift towards electronic payments is essential to combating money laundering, corruption, and tax evasion, but it must be implemented gradually and thoughtfully.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Imposing suddenly very low cash limits in an economy with a weak banking infrastructure could lead to the expansion of the black market rather than its reduction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, we propose adopting a tiered, risk-based ceiling system, starting with major government, real estate, and commercial transactions, while simultaneously expanding bank accounts and electronic payment services, reducing their cost, and ensuring their accessibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Twelfth: Unifying the Exchange Rate and Closing Offending Speculation Channels<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The multiplicity of exchange rates and the large discrepancies between them create incentives for speculation, informal intermediaries, and concealing the true value of transactions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, reforming monetary policy and narrowing the gap between exchange rates is part of combating money laundering, not merely a separate economic issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, addressing this phenomenon requires more than just stricter penalties; it necessitates reforming the economic factors that drive the market toward parallel channels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The guiding principle for public policy should be:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The more rational, streamlined, and transparent the formal economy becomes, the more the parallel economy will automatically shrink.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thirteenth: Protecting Whistleblowers, Witnesses, and Experts<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n An effective system for combating financial crimes cannot be built if those who expose crimes fear for their safety, jobs, and livelihoods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, we call for the enactment of comprehensive legislation to protect whistleblowers, witnesses, and experts, guaranteeing anonymity when necessary, prohibiting disciplinary or administrative reprisals, establishing secure reporting channels, and providing judicial protection in high-stakes cases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Furthermore, a distinction must be made between a legitimate report and a malicious one, to prevent the anti-corruption system from becoming a tool for personal revenge or settling scores.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fourteenth: Combating Money Laundering and Transitional Justice<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In the Syrian context, the issue takes on an additional dimension related to war profiteering and corruption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Transitional justice is not merely about uncovering physical and criminal violations, but also about investigating the economic networks that profited from corruption, war, smuggling, and abuse of power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Looted public funds are not simply accounting figures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They represent schools that were never built, hospitals that were never equipped, roads that were never repaired, and job opportunities that Syrians were denied.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, recovering looted assets must be a key component of economic transitional justice in Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fifteenth: International Cooperation and Restoring Confidence in the Syrian Financial System<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Money laundering is a transnational crime, and therefore no country can combat it alone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Syria needs to build channels of cooperation with international financial intelligence units and judicial and regulatory authorities to exchange information, track funds, and recover assets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Establishing a reliable anti-money laundering system is also a crucial prerequisite for reintegrating Syria into the international financial system and attracting banks, investments, and legitimate remittances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A serious investor is not only looking for profits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They are looking for a country where they know who owns money, who oversees it, who holds them accountable, and how the law protects their funds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Based on the above, the Legal Office of the Syrian Future Movement believes it is necessary to launch a new national strategy to combat money laundering and recover assets, and we recommend the following:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Syrian Future Movement believes that the real danger facing Syria is not just the lack of legislation, but the possibility of a theoretically advanced law and an economy capable of circumventing it in practice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, the fight against money laundering is not just a battle of sanctions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is a battle for transparency, institutions, an independent judiciary, interconnected information, and a formal economy capable of attracting citizens instead of driving them into the shadows.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is also a battle to reclaim a crucial concept in the new Syria:<\/p>\n\n\n\n That legitimate wealth is protected, while wealth derived from crime, corruption, and abuse of power should find no safe haven in the new state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The future Syria needs an environment that protects investors, not money launderers; encourages capital, not legitimizes illicit funds; and safeguards private property without using it as a cover for concealing the proceeds of crime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, the Legal Office of the Syrian Future Movement calls for a shift from the ineffectiveness of legislation to the effectiveness of prevention; from pursuing crimes after they have been committed to building a system that prevents and detects them in their early stages; and from targeting individuals alone to tracking down the money, drying up the sources of crime, and recovering the assets of Syrians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Combating money laundering in Syria is not a marginal technical issue, but rather a prerequisite for building the state, restoring confidence, launching a sound economy, achieving justice, and restoring Syria to its rightful place in the international financial and economic system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Anti-money laundering measures in Syria and their impact on economic institutions.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":45,"featured_media":67039,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4843,4853],"tags":[4718],"class_list":["post-67041","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-legal-office","category-research-and-studies-department-en","tag-articles"],"yoast_head":"\nRecommendations of the Syrian Future Movement:<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Conclusion:<\/h2>\n\n\n\n