Since the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2014, the Syrian-Israeli file has witnessed a profound strategic shift. Israel has not only continued its occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights, but has also effectively crossed the disengagement lines that had governed the situation since 1974, entering additional Syrian territories, in parallel with repeated military operations within Syrian territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In response to this Israeli alteration of the reality on the ground, the new Syrian government has moved to a direct and indirect negotiating track with Israel under American auspices. This culminated in January 2016 with the establishment of a “Joint Fusion Mechanism” to coordinate information exchange, de-escalation, and diplomatic and commercial engagement. The statement issued after the Paris talks confirmed the existence of this mechanism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Syrian Future Movement believes that this development necessitates a re-examination of the question that governs the entire Syrian debate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The issue is no longer simply: How do we bring Israel back to the 1974 agreement?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But first, we must ask:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Should the 1974 agreement remain the ceiling for the Syrian position after Israel has effectively violated it?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Then, more importantly:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
How can Syria move from defending the disengagement lines to a national strategy that regains the initiative and places the issue of the Golan Heights and all occupied Syrian territories at the heart of any negotiations?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Syrian Future Movement does not consider war a rational option for Syria in its current circumstances. However, it also does not believe that avoiding war means lowering the bar for national rights, nor that political pragmatism necessitates moving from a state of occupation to normalization before addressing the root of the conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Therefore, this paper proposes considering a new Syrian doctrine for the Golan Heights and the southern border, based on a clear equation: no futile war, no normalization without concessions, no Israeli security at the expense of Syrian sovereignty, and no security agreement that transforms the occupation into a permanent reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
First<\/strong>: The 1974 Agreement: From a Means of Managing the Conflict to a Constraint on the Syrian Side?<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Disengagement Agreement between Syria and Israel was signed on May 31, 1974, establishing arrangements for the separation of forces and a zone monitored by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).<\/p>\n\n\n\n For decades, the agreement succeeded in limiting direct military confrontation, but it was not a peace treaty, it did not resolve the Golan Heights issue, and it did not grant Israel sovereignty over the occupied territories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is a crucial point that should not be overlooked! The 1974 agreement was a tool for managing the conflict, not resolving it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n After December 8, 2024, the reality upon which the agreement was based changed fundamentally, as Israeli forces advanced into the buffer zone and additional areas within Syrian territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The United Nations continues to treat the Disengagement Agreement as the framework governing the situation and demands its respect, and UNDOF remains established based on it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Herein lies a paradox worthy of discussion: If Israel has effectively violated the agreement’s terms, is it in Syria’s interest to continue treating it as a sacred framework beyond which no consideration can be given?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Or could Syria\u2019s unconditional adherence to the agreement inadvertently lead to a situation where Syria becomes the party bound by the agreement while Israel gains the freedom to alter the reality on the ground?<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Syrian Future Movement believes that the 1974 agreement is not an inherent Syrian right, such that preserving it should become a national objective. Rather, it is a legal and political instrument that should be evaluated insofar as it serves to restore Syrian rights and sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second<\/strong>: Should Syria withdraw from the 1974 agreement?<\/p>\n\n\n\n This question should not be taboo in Syrian political thought.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the answer requires extreme precision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A unilateral and direct Syrian withdrawal could give Israel an opportunity to claim that Syria is the one that dismantled the framework upon which the United Nations has relied for decades, and it could lead to complications regarding the work of UNDOF and the international stance on Israeli incursions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, the most compelling option is not necessarily for Syria to declare its withdrawal from the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, but rather to construct a more nuanced legal and political position based on the principle that Israel has fundamentally violated the arrangements upon which the Disengagement Agreement was founded. Consequently, Syria reserves the right to reassess its commitment to the agreement, including suspending, reconsidering, or terminating some of its provisions in accordance with international law, unless Israel returns to full compliance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is not an idea without legal basis. Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties recognizes, in principle, that a fundamental breach of a bilateral treaty can constitute grounds for the other party to terminate or suspend its application, in whole or in part.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, pursuing this course requires specialized international legal analysis, particularly given the unique nature of the Disengagement Agreement, its connection to Security Council resolutions, and the presence of a UN peacekeeping force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, we propose a different strategy based on \u201cconditional suspension instead of unconditional withdrawal,\u201d whereby Syria declares that it considers the continuation of the Israeli occupation and expansion a fundamental breach of the existing arrangements, and offers a time-bound diplomatic track for Israel to return to its previous positions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If Israel refuses, Syria reserves the right to redefine its relationship with the agreement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this way, Syria will not be the one granting Israel a free end to the 1974 agreement, but rather will be holding Israel\u2019s actions themselves legally and politically accountable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Third<\/strong>: December 8, 2024, should not become the ceiling of Syrian rights!<\/p>\n\n\n\n Current negotiations largely revolve around demanding that Israel return to the positions it held before December 8, 2024. This demand is legitimate and necessary; indeed, the Paris talks themselves addressed a return to those lines and the revival of the 1974 arrangements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the danger lies in its gradual transformation from a phased demand into a Syrian political ceiling! The Syrian-Israeli conflict did not begin on December 8, 2024. And the occupied Syrian territory does not begin at the points where Israeli forces entered.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Israel after the fall of the Assad regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Syrian Golan Heights are occupied, and this represents the core of the issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n First level<\/strong>: Immediate withdrawal from all territories occupied by Israel after December 8, 2014.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is not a matter for compromise, nor is it part of a normalization deal, but rather a correction of a new and illegitimate situation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second level<\/strong>: The return of the occupied Syrian Golan Heights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is the fundamental sovereignty issue that must not be dropped or relegated to the margins in exchange for resolving the issue of new incursions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If the ultimate Syrian achievement is merely the return of Israel to the positions of December 7, 2014, we will have succeeded in addressing the new occupation while leaving the original occupation out of the equation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fourth: From Israeli security to \u201cmutual security\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Syrian Future Movement observes that a large part of the discourse surrounding the negotiations begins with the question: How can Israel be reassured?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, the corresponding Syrian question is almost entirely absent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Who will guarantee Syria\u2019s security from Israel? Security is not a privilege of one state over another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If Israel has the right to demand the absence of military threats near its borders, then Syria, by the same logic, has the right to demand the absence of Israeli forces or offensive formations near its borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, we propose the principle of mutual and reciprocal security. If Syria is asked not to deploy certain weapons within a specified distance of the border, then Israel must reciprocate with a similar commitment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If a demilitarized zone is established, it should not be an Israeli security zone within Syrian territory, but rather a reciprocal system on both sides of the border, with international guarantees and monitoring.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Syrian principle can be simply formulated as follows: every permanent security restriction imposed on Syria must be met with a proportionate restriction on Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Israel’s security ends at Israel’s borders, just as Syria’s security ends at Syria’s borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n No state’s security concerns, however legitimate, should be transformed into a permanent right to occupy another state’s territory or to dictate the deployment of its army within its borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fifth<\/strong>: No to a unilateral demilitarized zone in Syria! Various ideas are being proposed regarding the establishment of a demilitarized or limited-weapons zone in southern Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the concept of demilitarizing southern Syria raises a sovereignty issue if it implies that a foreign power can determine the size, armament, and deployment of Syrian forces within Syrian territory, while Israeli forces are not subject to any corresponding restrictions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Here, Syria could discuss exceptional security arrangements if necessary to prevent war, but only under four conditions:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n There should be no Syrian withdrawal from a position in exchange for an Israeli advance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n No Syrian disarmament in exchange for the continued presence of Israeli forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n No open-ended security arrangements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n No direct Israeli control over Syrian territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If a monitoring mechanism is needed, it should be an internationally agreed-upon UN or UN body, not one that allows Israel to become the observer and guardian of southern Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sixth<\/strong>: Rejecting the Transformation of Israel into a \u201cSecurity Guarantor\u201d within Syria<\/p>\n\n\n\n This issue transcends the Golan Heights. Any implicit recognition of Israel\u2019s right to intervene within Syria under the pretext of preventing a future threat sets a highly dangerous precedent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The pretext might be the presence of a specific weapon today, the formation of a local government tomorrow, the protection of a minority thereafter, and then any internal Syrian development could become a matter of Israeli national security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Syrian Future Movement believes that the security and protection of all Syrian communities is primarily a Syrian national matter, and that any additional guarantees must come through Syrian state and civil institutions and legitimate international frameworks, not by granting a state occupying Syrian territory the right to military intervention within Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Seventh<\/strong>: The Paris Talks\u2026 Between Preventing War and Lowering the Syrian Stance!<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Syrian Future Movement does not adopt a hostile stance towards the principle of negotiation itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Diplomacy is a tool of states, and in the current Syrian circumstances, it may be more effective than military confrontation in protecting national interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the objection lies in the content, scope, sequence, and form of the negotiations. The Paris talks in January 2026 resulted in the establishment of the Joint Fusion Mechanism, a liaison cell dedicated to coordinating information sharing, de-escalation of military conflict, diplomatic engagement, and even trade opportunities, all under US supervision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This level of engagement goes beyond mere emergency military contact to prevent clashes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Syrians, and Syrian political forces in particular, have the right to ask: What sovereignty has Syria gained in return?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Has it secured a binding timetable for withdrawal?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Has the incursion ceased?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Has the Golan Heights issue become a core part of the negotiations?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Has Israel explicitly acknowledged that its new military presence is temporary and will end by a specific date?<\/p>\n\n\n\n These questions are more important than the number of meetings or the characterization of their atmosphere as positive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Syrian Future Movement affirms that the meetings and agreements held by the current Syrian regime with Israel do not represent the Movement’s position and are not politically binding. The Movement reserves its full right to evaluate, criticize, and reject the methods and outcomes of these meetings and agreements when it deems them to be in violation of Syrian national principles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Our objection is not to diplomacy itself, as its alternative is war, but rather to a diplomacy that might begin by relinquishing Syrian bargaining chips before obtaining genuine sovereign concessions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Eighth<\/strong>: No Normalization Before a Legal Settlement We are not in favor of normalization with Israel while it occupies Syrian land, nor do we see economic or trade projects as a substitute for restoring national rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n True peace cannot be built on a shared tourist resort while the land remains occupied.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nor can it be built on energy or agricultural projects while sovereignty remains suspended.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The American-proposed sequence should not be that Israeli security begins with economic cooperation, then normalization, and only then will the issue of land be discussed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The equation must be completely reversed: land and sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Withdrawal, then mutual security, then a just political settlement, and then (the Syrians will decide, according to their national interests and will, the nature of the future relationship).<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is not a policy of rejecting peace, but rather a demand that peace be a result of justice, not a substitute for it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ninth: A Syrian Document of Non-Negotiable Rights It is based on the following principles:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Golan is occupied Syrian territory, and any recognition of Israeli sovereignty over it is illegitimate, especially since the broader international position remains opposed to this sovereignty; the European Union reaffirmed its rejection of it in August 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Rejection of any change in sovereignty resulting from Israeli military operations after December 8, 2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Considering withdrawal from the newly occupied territories an immediate entitlement, not a prerequisite for normalization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Keeping the return of the Syrian Golan at the heart of any final settlement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Rejection of the establishment of an Israeli security zone inside Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Rejection of granting Israel a permanent right to determine the deployment of the Syrian army within its territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Rejection of any unilateral disarmament arrangements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Requirement of reciprocity in any border security arrangements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Rejection of allowing the protection of any Syrian component to become a pretext for Israeli military intervention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n No political or economic normalization before addressing the issue of the occupation and Syrian sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tenth<\/strong>: The Strategy of “Raising the Political Cost of the Occupation” There is a difference between military costs and political, legal, and diplomatic costs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Syria can build a long-term strategy that makes the continuation of the occupation an increasing burden by internationalizing every violation, documenting expansion and incursions, activating legal and diplomatic files, building an Arab and international alliance around the unity of Syrian territory, and linking any future security arrangements to the principle of withdrawal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The goal is not to seek a quick media victory, but rather to prevent the new occupation from becoming normalized over the years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n An occupation that goes unchallenged politically and legally gradually transforms from an international crisis into a mere geographical detail.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Eleventh:<\/strong> Israel, too, needs a settlement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Syria should not enter any negotiations with the mindset that Israel holds all the cards.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yes, it is true that the military balance of power is overwhelmingly in Israel’s favor, but military power is not the only element in the equation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Israel, in turn, needs stable borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It needs to prevent the emergence of a new hostile Syrian front.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It needs to prevent the return of Iran and its affiliated militias.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It needs a Syrian government capable of controlling its territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It needs regional and international acceptance of its security arrangements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Most importantly, the ongoing occupation itself may create the very environment that Israel fears. The more the occupation expands and the deeper the violations become, the higher the likelihood of local resistance movements, the lower the Syrian state’s ability to control the streets, and the greater the appeal of the most extremist forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In August 2026, Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz announced that Israeli forces would not withdraw from the areas Israel designates as security zones in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza\u2014a statement that reinforces fears that the concept of temporary security is becoming a long-term presence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Here, the Syrian message must be clear: occupation does not create secure borders! It may create temporary calm, but it accumulates the causes of future conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Twelfth<\/strong>: New Scenarios Meetings and coordination mechanisms would continue, and military operations would decrease somewhat, but the Israeli presence would remain inside Syrian territory, and the temporary situation would become permanent over the years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The danger here is that Israel would gain security, coordination, and calm, while Syria would not gain its land or sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Scenario Two<\/strong>: A full return to the 1974 agreement. It addresses the new incursions but does not resolve the Golan issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, it should be treated as a phase of restoring the previous status quo, not a historic settlement of the conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Third scenario: A mutual security agreement leading to a gradual withdrawal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is the most rational scenario if genuine international will exists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Israel would gradually withdraw from the newly occupied territories in exchange for mutual security arrangements, international monitoring, and guarantees preventing the use of southern Syria as a platform to threaten Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the agreement must include an explicit clause preventing its interpretation as a Syrian concession of the Golan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fourth scenario<\/strong>: Syria suspends the 1974 agreement. But this option should not be pursued impulsively. This must be preceded by extensive legal and diplomatic preparations, and by informing the Security Council, the United Nations, and the guarantor states, so that Syria appears as the state demanding the restoration of the rule of law, not the state dismantling the existing legal order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fifth Scenario<\/strong>: Collapse of the Process and a Return to Confrontation Opening a long and geographically expansive Syrian front could alter regional calculations, create new alliances, reproduce armed forces outside state institutions, and give Iran and others opportunities to return under the guise of resisting occupation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, ending the occupation is not only in Syria’s interest, but can also be part of a regional security system that prevents the region from returning to proxy wars.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To the Syrian Government:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n First: The return to the pre-December 8, 2024 lines should not be considered the ultimate limit of Syrian demands.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second: Israel must be required to provide a written and binding timetable for withdrawal from the newly occupied territories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Third: A specialized international legal study should be conducted on the possibility of suspending the 1974 agreement, either wholly or partially, as a result of Israeli violations, without taking any step that would grant Israel a free legal advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fourth: Deconfliction arrangements should be separated from political and economic normalization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fifth: The principle of reciprocity in security measures should be adopted in any future agreement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sixth: Any Israeli right to military intervention inside Syria under the pretext of protecting a Syrian component or preventing a hypothetical threat should be rejected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Seventh: The Golan Heights issue should be returned to the forefront of Syrian diplomatic discourse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To the United States of America:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Washington must move from managing the conflict to addressing its root cause, and link the success of its mediation to an actual and tangible withdrawal, not merely a de-escalation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Security guarantees offered to Israel should not be transformed into guarantees for retaining Syrian territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For Arab states:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n What is needed is a shift from statements rejecting the annexation of the Golan Heights to building an Arab diplomatic position that helps Syria integrate its sovereignty and territorial integrity into any new regional security framework.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For Israel, the occupying entity:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n It must be understood that a stable, unified, and sovereign Syria is far more secure for Israel than a weak, fragmented, and partially occupied Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Turning southern Syria into a permanent security zone will sow the seeds of future resistance, even if it achieves a temporary lull.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Conclusion:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Syrians today do not need to choose between two false options:<\/p>\n\n\n\n war or normalization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is a vast space between them called politics, diplomacy, international law, political pressure, regional alliances, firm negotiations, and strategic patience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Syrian Future Movement believes that the new Syria should not enter negotiations merely as a state seeking to halt Israeli airstrikes, but rather as a state with occupied territory, sovereign rights, and historical and legal claims.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While we reject pushing Syria into a war it cannot withstand, we equally reject transforming its current weakness into permanent concessions that future generations will inherit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Furthermore, the Syrian Future Movement, as an independent political force, does not consider the meetings and negotiations conducted by the current Syrian regime with Israel to represent its political position, nor does it consider itself bound by their parameters or outcomes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We view with concern the rapid shift from contacts supposedly aimed at preventing escalation to mechanisms that include intelligence, diplomatic, and commercial cooperation before any tangible progress on sovereignty is achieved on the ground.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Our national demands must remain higher.<\/p>\n\n\n\n An Israeli withdrawal to positions prior to December 8, 2024, is not the end of the matter, but rather the beginning of rectifying the new imbalance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 1974 agreement is not the end of history, nor should it be transformed from a tool for protecting Syria into a constraint preventing it from claiming its rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Golan Heights is not a secondary bargaining chip that can be postponed indefinitely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Golan Heights is occupied Syrian territory, and all Syrian land that Israel entered after the fall of the regime is also occupied Syrian territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, we propose a shift from the doctrine of restoring the 1974 agreement to the doctrine of restoring the Syrian initiative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A doctrine that does not seek war, but does not fear it to the point of relinquishing rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A doctrine that does not reject negotiation, but does not offer anything in return for free.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A doctrine that does not reject Israeli security, but places Syrian security on an equal footing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A doctrine that does not make the disengagement agreement the ceiling of rights, but rather a tool for their restoration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As for lasting peace, it is a peace that comes after justice, not a peace in which the occupier is asked to coexist with its occupation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n No senseless war. No security for one party at the expense of the sovereignty of the other. There will be no concessions on the Golan Heights or any part of the occupied Syrian territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This, in our view, is the equation that can give Syria a stronger negotiating position today, while simultaneously preserving the rights of Syrians for the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" A deep analysis of the post-1974 agreement era, a new Syrian doctrine, and the developments of military and political tensions in the region.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":66935,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4688,4853],"tags":[4718],"class_list":["post-66939","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-presidency-office-en","category-research-and-studies-department-en","tag-articles"],"yoast_head":"\nTherefore, the Syrian Future Movement proposes a clear distinction between two levels:<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
\n
The Syrian Future Movement rejects the transition from occupation to normalization by bypassing the core issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Syrian Future Movement proposes drafting a \u201cNational Document for the Golan and the Southern Borders\u201d that defines the minimum that the Movement believes no Syrian authority should concede in its negotiations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Syria is not required to fight Israel to make the occupation costly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Scenario One<\/strong>: Continued negotiations with the consolidation of the status quo. This is the most dangerous scenario, despite appearing the most peaceful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this scenario, Israel would withdraw to its positions prior to December 8, 2024, and UNDOF would resume its full functions. This is better than the current situation, but it should not represent the end of Syrian policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If the occupation continues and Israel refuses to withdraw, Syria could consider declaring that Israel’s fundamental breaches have rendered the continuation of some Syrian obligations untenable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is the scenario that must be avoided at present. Open war does not serve the interests of a weakened Syria, but it is also not necessarily a comfortable scenario for Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThirteenth: Recommendations of the Future Movement Syrian<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
No normalization without concessions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n