The door opened for one of the largest waves of voluntary returns in modern history on December 8, 2014, with the fall of the Assad regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
According to the UNHCR, more than 1.6 million refugees and 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned to their areas of origin since that date.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Syrian Network for Human Rights estimates that more than three million Syrians, including refugees and IDPs, had returned to their areas by the end of the first quarter of 2016.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, this significant return momentum does not tell the whole story. According to the latest UNHCR data, approximately 5.5 million people remain displaced within Syria, and some 1,126 camps still exist in northern Syria, sheltering nearly 700,000 IDPs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These figures raise a fundamental question: Why do so many remain trapped in camps, despite the end of military operations and the existence of the political will for return?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This article attempts to move beyond the superficial narrative of the “desire to return” to analyze the structural dimensions that hinder a sustainable return. It employs a methodology that focuses on the interaction between economic, service-related, and institutional factors, seeking a forward-looking vision that transcends emergency relief and embraces sustainable development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The data reveals a paradoxical reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the one hand, since December 2024, Syria has witnessed the return of more than 3.5 million people, representing approximately 14% of the total population.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the other hand, around 700,000 internally displaced persons remain in camps, while 15.6 million people suffer from humanitarian needs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This contradiction reflects a fundamental truth: return is a decision, but stability is a consequence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Returning to a devastated area without securing the minimum necessities of life is not a true return; it is merely a relocation to another location of poverty and deprivation. Field studies have shown that Syria currently lacks the institutional, economic, and infrastructural capacities necessary to accommodate large waves of returnees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Housing Crisis:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Ministry of Public Works and Housing estimates that Syria needs approximately 1.5 million housing units to meet population needs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Other data reveals that the current housing need exceeds 1.3 million destroyed homes, in addition to a deficit resulting from population growth estimated at more than 400,000 housing units.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this context, the government announced a plan to rehabilitate 60,000 homes designated for camp residents, with funding of $1.8 billion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, this figure, despite its importance, does not exceed 4% of the total housing needs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While some indicate a need that may reach two million housing units, the gap between the plan and the actual need remains vast, explaining why the poorest families remain trapped in camps, unable to afford the costs of reconstruction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Infrastructure:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n According to World Bank data, the total value of physical damage reached approximately $108 billion, with infrastructure accounting for about 48% of that. More recent World Bank estimates put the cost of reconstruction at approximately $216 billion, roughly ten times the projected GDP, distributed as follows: infrastructure ($82 billion), housing ($75 billion), and non-residential buildings ($59 billion).<\/p>\n\n\n\n This massive scale of destruction means that returning home is not simply about opening a door; it means returning to a life without water, electricity, roads, schools, or hospitals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Preliminary studies by the “Syria Without Camps” committee indicate that between 60% and 70% of the obstacles preventing return can be addressed through infrastructure rehabilitation. However, addressing this percentage requires massive investments far exceeding currently available funding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Extreme Poverty:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The United Nations estimates that approximately 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line, while unemployment rates exceed 50%, and youth unemployment surpasses 60%.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This tragic economic reality means that the vast majority of families cannot afford to rebuild their homes or resume their lives in their original areas. For a family living below the poverty line, returning home is not simply a matter of moving from a tent to a house; it means facing additional financial burdens in the absence of income sources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Lack of Job Opportunities:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The decision to return is closely linked to the availability of job opportunities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As field reports document, a displaced person working in one of Idlib’s factories finds themselves facing a difficult choice: remain in the camp where their livelihood is available, or return to their village where job opportunities are virtually nonexistent. This dilemma is not limited to workers in the private sector; it extends to farmers who have lost their agricultural lands or had their trees cut down, and to workers in the service sectors, which have yet to recover.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A Syria Without Camps:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In March 2026, President Ahmed al-Sharaa issued Decree No. 59, establishing a committee to oversee the rehabilitation of infrastructure in devastated areas, with the aim of gradually eliminating the camps.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The government aims to begin implementing the project by the end of this year, relying on government funding of $1.8 billion and Saudi support of $1.5 billion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But this ambitious project faces several challenges, including:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n First: The funding gap. While the estimated cost of reconstruction is around $216 billion, currently available funding is only a few billion. Even with the government relying on support from the European Union and donor countries, the gap remains enormous.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second: Conflicting priorities. Initial studies indicate that between 60 and 70% of the obstacles can be addressed through infrastructure, but tackling the remaining percentage, related to home repairs, requires additional investments, at a time when the 2026 budget is suffering from a deficit estimated at around $1.8 billion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Third: Sustainability. Human rights organizations point out that ending the displacement crisis is not measured solely by the number of returnees, but also by their ability to settle and avoid being displaced again. This requires\u2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sustainable investments in housing, infrastructure, electricity, education, health, and basic services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Transforming return from an individual decision to collective stability requires a strategic approach that goes beyond emergency relief to sustainable development, based on three pillars:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n First: Accelerating the pace of reconstruction, prioritizing the most vulnerable groups: families whose members have doubled during the years of displacement, widows, the elderly, and people with disabilities. While the plan to rehabilitate 60,000 homes is an important initial step, it only addresses a small fraction of the actual need of 1.5 million units. It is essential to streamline the procedures for accessing rehabilitation programs and ensure that aid reaches those who need it most.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second: Linking reconstruction to economic development. Sustainable return is impossible without providing income sources for returnees. This requires revitalizing small agricultural and industrial projects, providing accessible loans, attracting investments to rural areas, and creating alternative job opportunities for young people to reduce displacement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Third: Sustaining international support. The international community must recognize that reconstruction is not charity, but an investment in the stability of the entire region. While the UNHCR has supported the return of more than three million Syrians, its operations in Syria are funded at less than 30% of their 2026 needs, which amount to approximately $324 million.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This necessitates translating pledges into actual funding and linking support to clear standards of transparency and merit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Between the return of millions of Syrians since December 2024 and the continued presence of approximately 700,000 in Idlib camps, a deep chasm separates the decision to return from the ability to settle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Return is not simply a decision; it is a complex equation that combines housing, services, and employment, within an economy where 90% of Syrians live below the poverty line.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The “Syria Without Camps” plan represents a step in the right direction, but its success depends on the ability of the government and the international community to bridge the gap between aspirations and available resources. When the equation of housing, services and work is achieved, and when Syrian villages are transformed from transit points into environments of life and production, only then can it be said that the long-standing issue of internal displacement has entered the path of a final solution.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" A comprehensive analysis of the structural dimensions of the internal displacement crisis in Syria and the impact of return on the humanitarian situation.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":35,"featured_media":65874,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4783,4685],"tags":[4718],"class_list":["post-65876","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-capacity-building-and-self-development-department","category-family-office-en","tag-articles"],"yoast_head":"\nTowards a strategic vision for sustainable return:<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Conclusion:<\/h2>\n\n\n\n