The regime of Bashar al-Assad fell on December 8, 2014, after fourteen years of war that claimed the lives of more than half a million people, destroyed a third of the national capital, and triggered one of the largest waves of displacement in modern history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The joy of the regime’s fall was an expression of deep hope for rebuilding the relationship between the state and society on new foundations of transparency, justice, and equal citizenship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Eighteen months after the transitional government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, took office, a crucial question arises: Is Syria truly moving towards building a state of institutions, or is it reproducing the “patronage” patterns that characterized the Assad regime, albeit with new faces?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This question is not academic, but existential, as it is directly linked to the state’s ability to restore confidence, attract reconstruction investments estimated at $216 billion according to the World Bank, and avoid sliding into new crises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Economic Power Concentrated in the Hands of the New Elite<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Field data reveals clear patterns of “elite appropriation” that are recurring in the new economic structure. President al-Sharaa\u2019s brother, Hazem al-Sharaa, was appointed Vice President of the Supreme Council for Economic Development, overseeing confiscated assets estimated at $1.6 billion, in addition to his control over the sovereign wealth fund and the telecommunications company Syriatel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Another brother, Maher al-Sharaa, served as Secretary-General of the Presidency before being dismissed in May of this year. The governor of Damascus is reportedly the president\u2019s son-in-law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A study by the U4 Center for Combating Corruption indicates that \u201cthe new economic institutions concentrate power in the hands of the presidency and limit independent oversight, with ministerial responsibilities being transferred to the presidency, thus consolidating decision-making power in the hands of the president and his inner circle.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Syria made modest progress on Transparency International\u2019s 2026 Corruption Perceptions Index, rising three points from 2024. Syria was among the most corrupt countries in the world, ranking fourth worst with a score of only 12 points.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, Syria still ranks 172nd out of 182 countries on the index, and lags behind in governance, rule of law, and regulatory quality indicators. This meager improvement does not reflect a qualitative shift, but rather may indicate a marginal improvement in the oversight environment, while the patronage system remains unchanged.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The 2026 budget revealed projected revenues of approximately $8.716 billion and expenditures of $10.516 billion, resulting in a deficit estimated at $1.799 billion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Although the government launched a “citizen’s version” of the budget as a step toward transparency, the absence of quarterly reports from the sovereign wealth fund, the lack of disclosure regarding oil sector contracts, and the opaque settlement agreements with businessmen affiliated with the Assad regime all point to the continuation of a culture of secrecy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The year 2016 witnessed an unprecedented wave of labor protests involving teachers, port and factory workers, and truck drivers in Damascus and the coastal regions. These protests revealed a “crisis of confidence and a lack of participatory decision-making, making the street a direct pressure tool instead of unions.” This reproduces one of the fundamental motivations behind the 2011 uprising. Theoretical Framework \u2013 Why Do Patronage Systems Reproduce Themselves?:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A. Neo-Pastoralism Theory:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Political literature defines “neo-pastoralism” as a hybrid between traditional authority (where power is treated as personal property) and modern bureaucratic authority (where institutions exist in name only but are controlled by networks of personal loyalty).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this model, state institutions (ministries, sovereign wealth funds, state-owned enterprises) are used as instruments for distributing privileges to a network of loyalists, rather than as instruments for serving the public interest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n B. Why do transitions fail to break this cycle?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Research on political transitions indicates that patronage systems possess an exceptional capacity for survival, even in moments of major collapse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Specialized literature offers two main explanations:<\/p>\n\n\n\n First<\/strong>, institutional logic. When a state collapses, networks of personal loyalty become the only tool available to the new ruler to ensure control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the absence of qualified and impartial personnel, appointments based on loyalty become a \u201crational option\u201d in the short term, but they quickly turn into an institutional trap that reproduces patronage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second<\/strong>, societal normalization. Five decades of authoritarian rule have produced \u201cpatronage citizens\u201d who have learned that \u201cconnections\u201d are the rational survival strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This normalization makes demands for transparency seem like a luxury, while nepotism becomes the norm. Consequences \u2013 Why does neo-patronage threaten Syria\u2019s future?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Undermining Trust in Transitional Justice:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The discrepancy between prosecuting some crimes of the former regime (especially political crimes) and making special settlements for economic crimes (as happened with businessmen like Mohammad Hamsho) creates a sense of injustice and weakens the legitimacy of the entire transitional justice process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Deterring Investment and Impeding Reconstruction:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Syria ranks poorly in governance and rule of law indices, which raises the “risk premium” demanded by investors and makes the investment environment unattractive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Investors are not afraid of measurable risks, but they flee from “institutional ambiguity” where rules are unclear or subject to sudden change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n With Syria needing $216 billion for reconstruction, continued opacity means a continued funding shortfall.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fueling Sectarian and Regional Grievances:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The monopolization of economic positions by new elite networks creates the exclusion of other communities (Alawites, Druze, Christians, and Kurds), which threatens the cohesion of the national fabric. Despite the signing of an agreement with the Kurds in January 2026 to integrate their self-administration into state institutions, the continuation of patterns of economic exclusion could reproduce the tensions that plagued the country for decades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Reproducing the conditions of 2011:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Labor protests, arbitrary decisions, regional marginalization, and business obstacles for those without connections\u2014all early warning signs of a return to the pre-2011 pattern. As the BTI 2026 report concluded, \u201cRapid political change has not mitigated fragmentation, as economic collapse and security threats continue to shape the course of the transition.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Based on the national vision that Syria belongs to everyone, and that the success of the transitional phase requires a fundamental course correction, the Syrian Future Movement proposes the following recommendations:<\/p>\n\n\n\n First: At the institutional level \u2013 Breaking the monopoly of power:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Second: At the societal level \u2013 Building a culture of citizenship<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Third: At the international level \u2013 Standards-based partnerships<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Syria today faces a rare historical moment, a genuine opportunity to emerge from a decade of destruction and tyranny. However, it also faces the danger of reproducing the same patterns that led it to war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The new era is not inevitable; rather, it is the result of political choices that can be changed through will, transparency, and participation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The path to a new Syria lies through strong institutions, not powerful individuals; through just laws, not influential intermediaries; and through equal citizenship, not sectarian favoritism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The success of this path also depends on the Syrian leadership realizing that its true legitimacy does not stem from military victory, but from its ability to build a state for all, where rights are protected, dignity is preserved, and national wealth is managed transparently to prevent a return to darkness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In conclusion, Syria deserves more than just a change of faces; it deserves a fundamental transformation in the relationship between ruler and ruled, in the way public funds are managed, and in the understanding of the meaning of the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This change begins today, with courageous decisions that restore trust between the people and the state and open the door to a future worthy of the great sacrifices made by the Syrian people.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" After fourteen years of war, is Syria moving towards justice and citizenship, or is it reproducing the previous patterns of governance?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":35,"featured_media":65653,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[179],"tags":[4718],"class_list":["post-65655","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-political-office-en","tag-articles"],"yoast_head":"\nRecommendations:<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Conclusion:<\/h2>\n\n\n\n