Syria is currently experiencing one of its most critical periods since the establishment of the modern state. After more than fourteen years of war and conflict, the country entered a new transitional phase with the issuance of the Constitutional Declaration on March 13, 2025, which stipulated a five-year transition period. This was followed by Presidential Decree No. (66) on June 13, 2025, establishing the Higher Committee for the People\u2019s Assembly Elections, culminating in the formation of the new People\u2019s Assembly, composed of (210) members.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This Assembly differs from all previous assemblies, not only in its formation mechanism, which combines election and appointment, but also in the nature of its responsibilities as the legislative body tasked with leading the legal and institutional development of the state during the transitional phase.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This raises fundamental questions: Does the Assembly, with its current composition and powers, possess the capacity to lead this complex phase? What are the chances of success for the transitional experiment? And what are the most significant challenges it faces?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This article, based on the vision of the Syrian Future Movement as a national, civil political movement born from the Syrian revolution, attempts to offer an objective analysis grounded in reality and drawing on comparative experiences, ultimately aiming to anticipate potential scenarios for the future of the transitional phase.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This analysis does not stem from an opposition or pro-government stance, nor does it seek to pass judgment on the Council or the government. Rather, it is based on a national reformist vision that considers the success of the transitional phase a supreme national interest for all Syrians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the same time, it emphasizes that supporting state institutions does not contradict the right to objective criticism and constructive evaluation. Indeed, the success of any transitional phase requires institutions capable of listening to feedback and utilizing it to improve performance and solidify trust between the state and society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
First: The Current Situation: Between a Heavy Legacy and High Hopes<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n An Unprecedented Social and Demographic Reality<\/strong>: The protracted war continues to cast a heavy shadow over Syrian society, having displaced millions and created profound demographic and social changes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to a UNHCR report issued in June 2026, approximately 1.3 million Syrians returned to their homes in 2025, nearly three times the number who returned the previous year, following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024. This contributed to a decrease in the number of Syrian refugees worldwide from approximately six million to 4.9 million.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite the importance of this return, the same report confirms that many returnees face significant challenges, including insecurity, widespread destruction of infrastructure, difficulty accessing basic services, high unemployment rates, and weak economic activity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, reintegrating millions of returnees and providing them with housing, education, healthcare, and employment opportunities represents one of the greatest challenges facing the Syrian state during the transitional phase.<\/p>\n\n\n\n An Economic Reality Between Fragile Recovery and Structural Challenges<\/strong>: Initial signs of economic recovery have begun to emerge, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimating a slowdown in inflation rates and a modest budget surplus for 2025. Growth is expected to rise in 2026 and beyond, driven by the gradual lifting of sanctions, Syria’s reintegration into the international financial system, and an improved investment climate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, these indicators do not paint the whole picture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to the World Bank, the Syrian economy continues to suffer the effects of fourteen years of war, which has devastated large parts of the economic infrastructure, depleted resources, expanded the informal economy, and perpetuated financial pressures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This discrepancy between the IMF and World Bank estimates is not so much a contradiction as it is a reflection of differing perspectives. The IMF focuses on macroeconomic indicators and monetary stability, while the World Bank takes a broader view of the war’s impact on development and the standard of living.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Syria remains among the low-income countries, facing ongoing challenges such as unemployment, poverty, and weak public services. This makes the success of economic reform contingent on the state’s ability to translate overall recovery indicators into tangible improvements in the lives of its citizens. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Comparative experiences indicate that the success of transitional phases is not achieved merely by changing the ruling power, but rather requires building strong institutions, achieving broad national consensus, and managing the issues of justice, reconciliation, and development in a balanced manner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n South Africa<\/strong> The country chose to establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, chaired by Desmond Tutu and sponsored by President Nelson Mandela, adopting the principle of truth-seeking in exchange for conditional amnesty. This helped avoid widespread waves of revenge and contributed to building the new state, despite many social wounds remaining open.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The most important lesson for Syria lies in the necessity of achieving a delicate balance between the victims’ right to justice and society’s need for national reconciliation, in a way that preserves the country’s unity and prevents the emergence of new conflicts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cambodia<\/strong> Despite the success of these courts in convicting a number of those responsible for major crimes, they have been criticized for their slow procedures, high costs, and limited societal impact.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This experience suggests that Syria could benefit from a model that combines international standards with national sovereignty, focusing on holding those responsible for serious crimes accountable, without turning transitional justice into a protracted process that burdens the state and delays reconstruction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Bosnia and Herzegovina<\/strong> The Dayton Agreement succeeded in ending the war, but it established a complex political system based on power-sharing. This system maintained security but weakened the effectiveness of state institutions for decades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The importance of this experience for Syria lies in the necessity of avoiding the transformation of ethnic, religious, or social diversity into a permanent system of power-sharing, and instead working to build a state based on citizenship, institutions, and the rule of law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Libya and Iraq<\/strong> Therefore, the success of the Syrian experience requires broad national consensus, strong institutions, independent national decision-making, and prioritizing the public interest over sectarian or regional interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In light of current data and drawing on international experiences, three main scenarios can be envisioned for the future of the Syrian People\u2019s Assembly and the transitional phase. It is important to emphasize that these scenarios are not definitive predictions, but rather analytical tools to help anticipate possible paths.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Scenario One: National Consensus (The Most Likely Scenario)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n This scenario assumes the Assembly\u2019s success in fulfilling its core tasks, foremost among them completing the legislative framework of the state, enacting laws regulating the transitional phase, and preparing the constitutional and political environment for holding general elections at the end of the transitional period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this process, the Assembly will be able to build national consensus on major issues, primarily transitional justice, administrative reform, reconstruction, and improving the investment climate. This will gradually lead to political and economic stability and strengthen the confidence of citizens and international partners in the trajectory of the new Syrian state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The success of this scenario requires:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Second Scenario: Institutional Stagnation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n This scenario assumes the continuation of state institutions, albeit with their inability to achieve the required accomplishments due to the slow pace of reforms, weak political consensus, or persistent economic pressures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this case, citizens’ trust in institutions may gradually decline, reconstruction efforts may be delayed, and constitutional and legislative reforms may stall, without leading to state collapse or a return to all-out war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This scenario is reinforced if:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Third Scenario: Relapse (The Least Likely Scenario)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n This scenario involves significant setbacks in the transitional phase due to the convergence of political, economic, and security crises, leading to escalating protests, the resurgence of tensions, a decline in citizens’ trust, a contraction in investment opportunities, and the return of refugees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Although this scenario remains the least likely given the current circumstances, avoiding it requires proactive crisis management rather than merely addressing the aftermath.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This scenario becomes more probable in the following cases:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Fourth: Practical Recommendations from the Perspective of the Syrian Future Movement<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Based on the Syrian Future Movement’s vision of supporting the building of a modern state, we believe that the success of the transitional phase requires a comprehensive package of political, legislative, and administrative measures, most notably:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Expanding the base of national participation: Despite the unique nature of the transitional phase, strengthening national participation remains a fundamental factor in establishing the legitimacy of institutions.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, we propose expanding national consultations during the constitution-drafting process, involving legal and academic experts, civil society organizations, professional associations, and representatives of national groups, to ensure the production of a constitution that enjoys the broadest possible consensus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Launching a Comprehensive National Reconciliation Project: Transitional justice is incomplete without responsible national reconciliation that safeguards the rights of victims and prevents the recurrence of divisions.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, we propose the establishment of an independent national reconciliation commission, operating in parallel with justice institutions, and adopting programs for community dialogue, truth-seeking, reparations, and the promotion of social peace.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Prioritizing the Economy and Services: We believe that no political transition will succeed if citizens remain unable to meet their basic needs.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Hence, priority should be given to rehabilitating infrastructure, improving electricity, water, education, and health services, creating an attractive investment environment, enhancing transparency and combating corruption, and expanding social protection programs for the most vulnerable groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Building Modern State Institutions: The success of the transitional phase requires the completion of building professional, independent institutions based on competence and the rule of law.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n This includes reforming the judiciary, developing public administration, restructuring security and military institutions on national foundations, and strengthening administrative decentralization to ensure efficient services and preserve national unity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Engaging Syrian Civil Society and the Diaspora: Syrians abroad, along with civil society organizations, represent a significant national asset in the reconstruction process.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, institutional mechanisms should be developed to leverage national expertise and skills, encourage the return of investments and capital, and broaden participation in public policy-making.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Consolidating Political Life and Pluralism: The success of the transitional phase is not limited to rebuilding state institutions; it also requires building a vibrant political society. A healthy and stable political system.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Therefore, the Syrian Future Movement sees the importance of expediting the issuance of a modern law for political parties and a modern election law, ensuring political pluralism, equal opportunities, the peaceful transfer of power, and strengthening citizens’ trust in democratic practice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It also calls for the preparation and enactment of a law on political ethics and public life (the draft of which we are currently announcing as a priority), as a legislative framework that regulates political conduct, establishes a culture of dialogue, limits hate speech and incitement, and affirms respect for legitimate political competition, far removed from exclusion, defamation, or the exploitation of religious, national, or sectarian affiliations for political gain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Movement believes that establishing ethics in public service is one of the fundamental guarantees for the stability of the state and strengthening trust between citizens and its institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Appendix: People’s Assembly Priorities During its First Year:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Syrian Future Movement believes that the priorities of the Assembly during its first year include:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Syria today faces a historic test that is not only about rebuilding its institutions, but also about rebuilding trust between the state and society, and among Syrians themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Undoubtedly, the heavy legacy of war, economic devastation, societal divisions, and foreign interventions makes the path to stability fraught with challenges. However, history proves that countries that possessed genuine national will, a clear vision, and capable institutions were able to overcome the most difficult crises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Syrian Future Movement believes that the success of the transitional phase is not achieved by relying on individuals, but rather by building strong institutions, upholding the rule of law, enhancing national participation, establishing a culture of dialogue, respecting pluralism, and transforming Syrian diversity into a source of strength and unity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The movement also affirms that a modern civil state does not contradict the identity and values \u200b\u200bof society, but rather is based on respecting and preserving them within the framework of equal citizenship, justice, freedom, and responsibility, thus guaranteeing the rights and dignity of all Syrians without discrimination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Syria does not need a miracle as much as it needs a unified national will, effective institutions, equitable justice, a productive economy, and a political culture that believes in partnership, not domination. Only then will renaissance not be a deferred hope, but a national project that can be achieved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The success of the People’s Assembly in fulfilling its mission will not be a success for any one institution, but rather a step on the path to rebuilding the modern Syrian state, consolidating stability, and paving the way for a future worthy of the Syrian people. Syria deserves the effort, and it is capable of rising again.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The new Syrian People’s Assembly and its role in the transitional phase and the importance of its composition for decision-making.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":65449,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4688],"tags":[4718],"class_list":["post-65451","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-presidency-office-en","tag-articles"],"yoast_head":"\nSecond: Lessons from International Experiences in Transitional Phases<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The South African experience after the end of apartheid is considered one of the most prominent models in managing transitional justice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Cambodia adopted a hybrid model of national and international courts to try senior Khmer Rouge leaders through special tribunals supported by the United Nations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Bosnia and Herzegovina represents an important example of the difficulty of Transition after civil wars.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The experiences of Libya and Iraq reveal that the absence of national consensus, weak state institutions, the prevalence of power-sharing and divisions, along with foreign interference, can transform the transitional phase into a prolonged state of instability.<\/p>\n\n\n\nThird: Possible Scenarios for the Future of the People\u2019s Assembly and the Transitional Phase<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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Conclusion:<\/h2>\n\n\n\n