In the midst of one of the most violent confrontations the region has witnessed, and with the escalation of strikes targeting multiple levels of the Iranian leadership, the familiar question seemed to resurface: Is the Iranian regime nearing collapse? But the reality was quite the opposite. Despite targeting figures from the first, second, and even third tiers of leadership, the regime did not disintegrate, nor did it exhibit the disarray expected by those who view it as a traditional pyramid that can be toppled with a single, focused blow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This paradox necessitates a re-examination of the very nature of this regime. The Islamic Republic of Iran is not merely a religious system based on the rule of the jurist (Velayat-e Faqih), nor is it a nation-state in the classical sense, nor even a traditional political republic. It is a hybrid structure, formed since 1979 at the intersection of religion, politics, security, and economics, and which has developed within a highly turbulent regional and international environment, making it impossible to understand its behavior or explain its resilience through a single, simple model.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Within this structure, religion functions not only as a spiritual authority but also as a tool for producing legitimacy. Political institutions operate less as mechanisms for free representation and more as instruments of internal organization and power distribution. At the same time, despite the transnational Islamic discourse that accompanied the revolution, the Iranian state rests on a deeper and more complex identity: a comprehensive Iranian identity that encompasses historical and cultural layers with clear Persian roots, without transforming into an overt nationalism. This interplay between Islam as an ideology, Iran as a unifying framework, and Persia as a cultural depth is what grants the regime a unique ability to reproduce itself in the face of crises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Therefore, the real question is not simply the regime’s ability to survive blows, but how it was constructed from the outset as a system capable of absorbing shocks. How did the concept of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Velayat-e Faqih) evolve from a revolutionary idea into a central element within a complex network of power centers? How do elections function within this system, and what are their limitations? How was its legitimacy constructed between religion, revolution, and external hostility? And why do its regional relations appear to be based as much on conflict as on pragmatism? Finally, how can a regime whose leaders are repeatedly targeted survive without collapsing?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These questions lead not only to a historical reading but also to an attempt to understand the logic of a system that may appear contradictory from the outside, but which, internally, operates according to a delicate balance between multiple elements, making its survival a result of its structure, not merely a political accident.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The 1979 Iranian Revolution was not simply an event that overthrew a monarchy and replaced it with a theocratic one; it was a moment of complete redefinition of the very idea of \u200b\u200bthe state in Iran. In this context, Ruhollah Khomeini presented religion as a governing framework capable of filling the political vacuum and reproducing power in a different way. This is where the theory of \u201cGuardianship of the Islamic Jurist\u201d (Velayat-e Faqih), as formulated in his book \u201cIslamic Government,\u201d emerged, not as a traditional continuation of Shiite jurisprudence, but as a radical transformation of it from a guiding role to direct sovereign power in the hands of the jurist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, this intellectual shift was not the sole factor in shaping the regime; it was intertwined with two crucial paths: internal conflict and external war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Domestically, the Iranian Revolution was not a purely Islamic event; rather, it involved multiple forces: nationalists, leftists, liberals, and Islamists. With the collapse of the Shah’s regime, this diversity transformed into a struggle over the form of the new state. Amidst this struggle, Khomeini’s faction gradually marginalized the other forces, not only to consolidate its power but also to solidify a deeper conviction: that the regime’s survival depended on the religious establishment’s monopoly of authority, while maintaining an institutional political facade that gave the regime a republican appearance without threatening its core.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this context, the development of Khomeini’s political thought cannot be separated from the broader climate of the rise of political Islam in the Muslim world during that period. However, Khomeini’s project was not a direct repetition of the experiences of Sunni movements, but rather a different reformulation of them within a Shiite context, by transferring political power to the jurist himself, rather than merely influencing the state from the outside.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The second decisive factor was the Iran-Iraq War (1980\u20131988), which played a central role in reshaping the structure of the regime. The war was not merely a military confrontation, but a foundational moment for the new state. It solidified the Iranian leadership’s conviction that survival was not achieved solely through religious legitimacy, but also through possessing independent and loyal instruments of power. In this context, the role of security and military institutions, most notably the Revolutionary Guard, was strengthened. The Guard was positioned as a force less connected to the political state than directly dedicated to protecting the regime itself and more loyal to the revolution and its ideology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Thus, the Islamic Republic was formed not as a purely religious system, nor as a traditional nation-state, but as a complex construct combining revolution and state, ideology and institution, religious legitimacy and the demands of pragmatic governance. The Iranian system was not built on a single idea, but rather as the product of a complex interplay between religious theory, internal political struggle, a complex social structure, and the bitter experience of war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Islamic Republic was not built as a simple, centralized system that could be overthrown by removing its head, but as a distributed, multi-centered system where authorities overlap and power is constantly redistributed. At the apex of this structure stands the office of the Supreme Leader, who combines religious legitimacy with political authority and has the final say on major issues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the political level, there are institutions that, at first glance, appear closer to the model of a modern state: an elected president, a parliament, and a government. However, these institutions operate within predetermined boundaries, as their decisions are subject to oversight by higher bodies, most notably the Guardian Council, which has the power to determine who is eligible to run for office and thus control the outcomes of the political process before it even begins.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In addition, there are other institutions, such as the Expediency Discernment Council, which plays a role in resolving conflicts\u2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The system itself is flawed, reflecting that it does not seek to eliminate pluralism within its institutions, but rather to regulate and manage it. This limited pluralism creates an internal balance that prevents the complete concentration of power in the hands of a single entity, while simultaneously preventing the emergence of a genuine alternative outside the system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, the most important dimension of this network is evident in the security and military structure, most notably the Revolutionary Guard, which combines multiple functions: military, security, intelligence, economic, and even social. Unlike the traditional army, it is organically linked to the regime’s ideology and acts as a guarantor of its continuity, not merely a tool for defending the state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This overlap between political, religious, and security institutions produces what can be described as a “multi-layered state,” where no single authority controls everything, but rather a multi-centered structure of authorities that monitor each other, their interests converging on a single point: the survival of the regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Furthermore, a significant portion of Iran’s economic activity is not governed by free market principles or traditional state control, but rather by semi-official networks such as charitable foundations (Bonyad) and companies affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard. This economic structure creates a class of vested interests directly linked to the regime’s survival, making stability not merely a political issue, but a material interest for extensive networks within the state and society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Iranian regime relies on managing pluralism through a restricted form of pluralism as a tool for survival and continuity. The power structure does not prevent internal conflict, but rather contains it within its institutions and corridors. This prevents the emergence of a complete “political paralysis,” as elites and crises are circulated within the network without escaping its control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Given this structure, targeting leaders, even at multiple levels, is insufficient to bring about a decisive collapse. Each power center within the regime possesses a degree of autonomy and resilience, while simultaneously being interconnected with the others in a network that makes the collapse of one a threat to all, rather than an opportunity for internal conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Here, the Iranian regime is no longer a pyramid that can be toppled with a single blow, but rather a network in which power is distributed in a way that makes it more resilient to shocks. The problem lies not only in the strength of the head, but also in the nature of the body that supports it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Elections in Iran are not used as a means of regime change, but rather as a tool for regulating it. From the outset, the electoral process is subject to the oversight of the Guardian Council, which possesses decisive authority in determining who is eligible to run for office, and thus in predetermining the boundaries of political competition. Therefore, elections are not an open arena, but a limited field of competition between factions that all belong, to varying degrees, within the system itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This does not mean that elections are entirely formal or without effect. On the contrary, they serve multiple functions within the structure of the regime. First, they grant the regime periodic legitimacy, which is used both domestically and internationally to demonstrate popular support and political continuity. Second, they allow for a degree of competition within the ruling elite, which helps to redistribute power and alleviate tensions between different power centers. Third, it acts as a mechanism for absorbing social tension, as a segment of society finds in the electoral process a limited space for expression, even if this space is predetermined. Thus, this electoral system allows elites (reformists, conservatives, and radicals) to compete over “governance” rather than “sovereignty.” This controlled conflict prevents “institutional stagnation” because it regularly rejuvenates the state’s bureaucratic apparatus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this sense, politics in Iran is not abolished, but rather redefined. The political struggle is not about the form of the regime or its legitimacy, but rather about how it is governed and the limits of its policies. Here, elections become a means of controlling this conflict, not opening it up to unforeseen possibilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ironically, this limited electoral structure contributes more to the stability of the regime than it weakens it. It prevents the absolute concentration of power in the hands of a single entity by creating internal balances, but at the same time, it prevents the emergence of a genuine political alternative that could pose an existential threat to the regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this context, what is sometimes called “reformism” within the Iranian regime can be understood not as a movement seeking to radically change it, but as a current operating within its boundaries, renegotiating some of its policies without altering its fundamental principles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In political literature, Iran is not classified as a liberal democracy, but rather as a hybrid system, or “electoral authoritarianism,” where elections are used as a tool to regulate competition within the system, not to change it. The Iranian citizen does not choose between open political projects, but rather between options predetermined within a framework that preserves the existing power structure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Thus, controlled electoral democracy in Iran is used as a tool of control and continuity, serving the regime’s survival and dynamism, not threatening it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
If the structure of the Iranian regime explains how it operates, then understanding its legitimacy explains why it persists. The Islamic Republic has not built its legitimacy on stable economic achievement, nor on broad political consensus, but rather on a complex mix of multiple sources. Four main sources of legitimacy can be identified within the Iranian regime, which overlap and are reformulated at each stage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The first of these sources is revolutionary legitimacy, which rests on the overthrow of the Shah’s regime as a foundational moment that remains present in official discourse. The regime presents itself not merely as a ruling authority, but as an extension of an ongoing revolution, thus granting it the ability to transcend traditional performance evaluations and link its existence to a larger historical idea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The second source is religious legitimacy, linked to the theory of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Velayat-e Faqih), which grants the regime a dimension that transcends politics, resembling a religious mandate. Opposition to the regime thus becomes more akin to challenging the religious framework itself, rather than simply a political objection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The third source is sovereign or nationalist legitimacy, which is built upon a discourse of resistance to foreign hegemony, particularly from the United States and Israel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Here, the regime is presented not only as the ruler but also as the guardian of the state against threats, allowing it to transform external pressures into a catalyst for internal mobilization. In this context, Islamic identity intersects with a broader Iranian identity, which is particularly activated during times of crisis to bolster internal cohesion despite ethnic diversity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The fourth, and perhaps most important, source of legitimacy is the legitimacy of resilience. From the war with Iraq, through sanctions, to direct military strikes, the regime has successfully reframed its survival as an achievement in itself. Instead of crises undermining its legitimacy, they are presented as proof of its ability to endure and even of the correctness of its course.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this sense, the Iranian regime does not survive despite crises, but rather thrives through them. Every crisis is reframed within a discourse that links external threats to the necessity of internal cohesion, creating a vicious cycle in which pressures become a factor of stability, not collapse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This does not mean that this legitimacy is impervious to erosion, or that it is accepted by all segments of society. Rather, the tension between these various sources and the economic and social realities constitutes one of the most significant challenges facing the regime. However, the regime’s ability to navigate these sources and rearrange their priorities according to circumstances grants it considerable flexibility in crisis management.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Iranian regime, like many dictatorial states, has managed to make “survival” the ultimate goal of the regime. In neoliberal systems, the achievement is “growth,” but in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is a state model based on survival as an end in itself, the achievement is “not collapsing.” This explains why sanctions do not lead to collapse; they simply reinforce the third and fourth sources of legitimacy (sovereignty and resilience). A regime whose legitimacy is built on stability may collapse with the first crisis, while a regime whose legitimacy is built on conflict finds in crisis a natural environment for its continuation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Iran’s regional behavior and the nature of its strained relations with its neighbors cannot be understood in isolation from its internal structure. In the Iranian case, hostility is not merely a changeable political choice, but a structural element inherent in the very formation of the regime. It arose with the revolution and became entrenched over time, eventually becoming an integral part of the state’s operational mechanisms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
From the early days after 1979, the Islamic Republic did not define itself as a new state within the existing international order, but rather as a revolutionary force seeking to redefine that order. The storming of the US embassy in Tehran and the hostage crisis marked a pivotal moment in this trajectory. It was not simply a diplomatic crisis, but a declaration of Iran’s shift from the position of ally to that of adversary, from a state operating within the international balance of power to one defining itself in opposition to that balance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this context, the characterization of the United States as the “Great Satan” was not merely a propaganda slogan, but an intellectual framework that redefines foreign policy as an extension of ideological conflict. The same applies to the relationship with Israel, which has become a constant element in the regime’s discourse, not only for geopolitical reasons, but also as part of constructing a political identity based on resistance and confrontation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, this antagonism doesn’t operate solely on the external level; it also serves a crucial internal function. It provides the regime with an explanatory framework for crises, allowing economic or political pressures to be attributed to external factors, thus alleviating internal pressure and redirecting anger toward the “other.” It also strengthens the cohesion of the ruling elite, as internal disagreements become less significant in the face of a constant external threat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Nevertheless, this doesn’t mean that Iranian foreign policy is entirely governed by ideology. Despite its revolutionary rhetoric, the regime has demonstrated a high degree of pragmatism, both in its relations with major powers like Russia and China and in managing its regional balances. This interplay between ideology and self-interest doesn’t weaken the regime; rather, it grants it additional flexibility, enabling it to operate within a complex environment without abandoning its core principles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the same time, this framework allows the regime to expand its regional presence, not only through traditional politics but also by building networks of influence that extend to several countries in the region. Here, expansion is not merely a geopolitical ambition but part of a defensive strategy based on shifting conflict beyond its borders, thereby integrating Iranian security into a broader regional context. The Iranian regime has transformed “influence” into “security instruments.” Iran is not merely expanding to spread its revolution, but also to build a “confrontation infrastructure” far from the state’s center, granting it “strategic depth” that protects its core from any direct attack.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, this dimension is incomplete without understanding another equally important aspect: the pragmatism of Iranian behavior, which often coexists with, and sometimes even contradicts, its ideological rhetoric. From the early years after the revolution, this contradiction was clearly manifested in what became known as the Iran-Contra affair, when Iran entered into channels of communication and arms deals with the United States, officially labeled the “Great Satan,” in the context of its war with Iraq. This event was not a mere exception, but rather an early indication that the regime’s survival might take precedence over the steadfastness of its rhetoric.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This pragmatism, however, did not remain confined to the context of war. It developed more clearly under Ali Khamenei, who inherited a more stable regime and redirected its foreign policy within a broader margin of flexibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this context, Iran has not hesitated to play roles that extend beyond its revolutionary rhetoric. In some instances, it has supported regional arrangements aimed at stability, and its interests have converged with Russia’s in managing the crises following the collapse of the Soviet Union, both in Central Asia and in its wider periphery, including the Caucasus. This shift does not signify the regime’s abandonment of its ideology, but rather reflects an ability to employ it within more complex calculations, where the rhetoric is not discarded but reinterpreted to serve its continued existence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Here, the regime is presented not only as the ruler but also as the guardian of the state against threats, allowing it to transform external pressures into a catalyst for internal mobilization. In this context, Islamic identity intersects with a broader Iranian identity, which is particularly activated during times of crisis to bolster internal cohesion despite ethnic diversity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The fourth, and perhaps most important, source of legitimacy is the legitimacy of resilience. From the war with Iraq, through sanctions, to direct military strikes, the regime has successfully reframed its survival as an achievement in itself. Instead of crises undermining its legitimacy, they are presented as proof of its ability to endure and even of the correctness of its course.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this sense, the Iranian regime does not survive despite crises, but rather thrives through them. Every crisis is reframed within a discourse that links external threats to the necessity of internal cohesion, creating a vicious cycle in which pressures become a factor of stability, not collapse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This does not mean that this legitimacy is impervious to erosion, or that it is accepted by all segments of society. Rather, the tension between these various sources and the economic and social realities constitutes one of the most significant challenges facing the regime. However, the regime’s ability to navigate these sources and rearrange their priorities according to circumstances grants it considerable flexibility in crisis management.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Iranian regime, like many dictatorial states, has managed to make “survival” the ultimate goal of the regime. In neoliberal systems, the achievement is “growth,” but in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is a state model based on survival as an end in itself, the achievement is “not collapsing.” This explains why sanctions do not lead to collapse; they simply reinforce the third and fourth sources of legitimacy (sovereignty and resilience). A regime whose legitimacy is built on stability may collapse with the first crisis, while a regime whose legitimacy is built on conflict finds in crisis a natural environment for its continuation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Iran’s regional behavior and the nature of its strained relations with its neighbors cannot be understood in isolation from its internal structure. In the Iranian case, hostility is not merely a changeable political choice, but a structural element inherent in the very formation of the regime. It arose with the revolution and became entrenched over time, eventually becoming an integral part of the state’s operational mechanisms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
From the early days after 1979, the Islamic Republic did not define itself as a new state within the existing international order, but rather as a revolutionary force seeking to redefine that order. The storming of the US embassy in Tehran and the hostage crisis marked a pivotal moment in this trajectory. It was not simply a diplomatic crisis, but a declaration of Iran’s shift from the position of ally to that of adversary, from a state operating within the international balance of power to one defining itself in opposition to that balance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this context, the characterization of the United States as the “Great Satan” was not merely a propaganda slogan, but an intellectual framework that redefines foreign policy as an extension of ideological conflict. The same applies to the relationship with Israel, which has become a constant element in the regime’s discourse, not only for geopolitical reasons, but also as part of constructing a political identity based on resistance and confrontation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, this antagonism doesn’t operate solely on the external level; it also serves a crucial internal function. It provides the regime with an explanatory framework for crises, allowing economic or political pressures to be attributed to external factors, thus alleviating internal pressure and redirecting anger toward the “other.” It also strengthens the cohesion of the ruling elite, as internal disagreements become less significant in the face of a constant external threat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Nevertheless, this doesn’t mean that Iranian foreign policy is entirely governed by ideology. Despite its revolutionary rhetoric, the regime has demonstrated a high degree of pragmatism, both in its relations with major powers like Russia and China and in managing its regional balances. This interplay between ideology and self-interest doesn’t weaken the regime; rather, it grants it additional flexibility, enabling it to operate within a complex environment without abandoning its core principles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the same time, this framework allows the regime to expand its regional presence, not only through traditional politics but also by building networks of influence that extend to several countries in the region. Here, expansion is not merely a geopolitical ambition but part of a defensive strategy based on shifting conflict beyond its borders, thereby integrating Iranian security into a broader regional context. The Iranian regime has transformed “influence” into “security instruments.” Iran is not merely expanding to spread its revolution, but also to build a “confrontation infrastructure” far from the state’s center, granting it “strategic depth” that protects its core from any direct attack.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, this dimension is incomplete without understanding another equally important aspect: the pragmatism of Iranian behavior, which often coexists with, and sometimes even contradicts, its ideological rhetoric. From the early years after the revolution, this contradiction was clearly manifested in what became known as the Iran-Contra affair, when Iran entered into channels of communication and arms deals with the United States, officially labeled the “Great Satan,” in the context of its war with Iraq. This event was not a mere exception, but rather an early indication that the regime’s survival might take precedence over the steadfastness of its rhetoric.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This pragmatism, however, did not remain confined to the context of war. It developed more clearly under Ali Khamenei, who inherited a more stable regime and redirected its foreign policy within a broader margin of flexibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this context, Iran has not hesitated to play roles that extend beyond its revolutionary rhetoric. In some instances, it has supported regional arrangements aimed at stability, and its interests have converged with Russia’s in managing the crises following the collapse of the Soviet Union, both in Central Asia and in its wider periphery, including the Caucasus. This shift does not signify the regime’s abandonment of its ideology, but rather reflects an ability to employ it within more complex calculations, where the rhetoric is not discarded but reinterpreted to serve its continued existence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Also, a system built to operate under tension does not easily collapse under pressure; rather, it may reorganize itself through it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Ultimately, the question is not: Why didn’t the Iranian systemfall?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Because regimes built on stability need peace to survive\u2026while regimes built on conflict are adept at surviving in the midst of the storm.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Instead, the question becomes: Was it ever truly vulnerable to collapse, given the tools used against it?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
An in-depth analysis of the ‘de facto’ republic in Iran and its impact on regional and international stability in the midst of crises.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":35,"featured_media":64059,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[179],"tags":[4839],"class_list":["post-64061","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-political-office-en","tag-independent-researchers"],"yoast_head":"\n